MOTIVE-FORCE 


AND 


MOTIVATION-TIR'ACKS 


Ex  Libris 
C.  K. 


MOTIVE-FORCE 


AND 


MOTIVATION-TRACKS 


A  RESEARCH  IN  WILL  PSYCHOLOGY 


BY 


E.    BOYD    BARRETT,    S.   J. 

DOCTOR    OF    PHILOSOPHY 

SUPERIOR    INSTITUTE,    LOUVAIN. 

HONOURS    GRADUATE 

NATIONAL    UNIVERSITY,    IRELAND. 


LONGMANS,    GREEN,    AND    CO. 

3g,  Paternoster  Row,  London 
NEW  YORK,   BOMBAY,  AND   CALCUTTA. 

191 1 


Printed 

by 
CH.    PEETERS,    LOUVAIN. 


i  -ny 

"-v  -or«r-T 
SANTA  BARBARA 


til 


TO 
MY    MOTHER 


PREFACE. 


Much  interest  has,  of  late,  been  manifested  in  the 
problem  of  Character- Formation,  and  Will-Education. 
Many  books  have  been  written  on  the  subject,  and 
psychological  researches  have  been  undertaken,  with 
the  object  of  elucidating  various  details  of  the  problem. 
All  serious  Educators  now  aim,  rather  at  training  the 
Will  and  Intellect,  than  al  burdening  the  Memory. 
The  wisdom  of  Montaigne's  saying  is  recognised  : 
« Tayme  encore  mieulx  forger  mon  dme  que  la 
meubler.  » 

The  problem  of  Character- Formation  however,  pre- 
sents peculiar  difficulties.  It  presupposes  a  Science  of 
Man,  capable  of  explaining  the  complex,  vital  dyna- 
mism of  human  activity.  Such  a  science  does  not 
exist,  and  its  possibility  even  is  doubtful.  Yet  even  if 
such  a  Science  did  exist,  with  all  its  principles  fully 
developed,  and  accurately  formulated,  its  application 
to  practical  needs  would  still  be  exceedingly  difficult. 
«  Whether  or  no  a  science  of  man  constructed  in  fluid 


—  VIII   — 

or  living  terms  is  possible,  it  is  certain  that  we  cannot 
make  the  same  use  of  it  that  we  make  of  the  other 
sciences.  We  cannot  use  it  to  predict  or  control  the 
behaviour  of  men,  as  we  use  the  others  to  predict  and 
control  the  behaviour  of  the  bodies  or  forces  to  which 
they  refer  »  ( i ) . 

Towards  such  a  science,  be  it  realisable  or  no,  the 
first  step  must  be  an  efficient  Psychology  of  the  Will. 
Every  phase  of  volitional  activity  must  be  fully  analy- 
sed, and,  as  it  seems  to  us,  such  an  analysis  is  alone 
possible  by  means  of  the  new  experimetal  method. 

It  was  with  the  object  of  analysing  some  phases  of 
the  Choice-Process  that  the  present  experimental 
researches  were  undertaken.  They  were  carried  on  in 
the  Psychological  Laboratory,  of  the  Superior  Institute 
of  Philosophy,  at  Louvain  University,  during  the  aca- 
demic years  1909-10,  and  1910-11. 

This  thesis,  submitted  in  part  for  the  Doctorate  of 
Philosophy,  at  Louvain,  and  afterwards  as  a  whole,  for 
the  degree  of  Master  of  Arts,  in  the  National  University 
of  Ireland,  has  been  written  under  pressure  of  time. 
The  author  feels  that  he  has  neither  done  justice 
to  the  subject  treated,  nor  to  the  materials  at  his  dis- 
posal. Nevertheless,  he  feels  that  first  efforts,  towards 
an  experimental  knowledge  of  the  Will  are  likely  to  be 
received  indulgently,  especially  if  they  lead  to  some 
improvement  or  development  of  the  method  of  this 
nascent  branch  of  Psychology. 

It  has,  then,  been  the  first  aim  of  the  author,  to 

(i)  L.  P.  JACKS,  The  Alchemy  of  Thought,  p.  196. 


TY 
I.A.     ~ 

segure  that  the  method  employed  in  these  researches 
should  be  able  to  stand  the  test  of  criticism.  No  detail 
has  been  consciously  neglected,  and  no  improvement 
due  to  the  development  of  the  modern  psyschical  method 
has  been  ignored.  In  preparation  for  this  research,  the 
author  has  had  the  advantage  of  visiting  many  famous 
psychological  laboratories  :  Leipzig,  Berlin,  Gottingen, 
Wiirzburg,  Frankfort,  Bonn,  Gronningen,  Utrecht, 
Ghent,  etc.,  and  of  hearing  the  views  of  many  eminent 
psychologists,  Kiilpe,  Miiller,  Marbe,  Heymans,  Rupp, 
Zwaardemacker,  Van  Biervliet,  and  others,  on  the 
method  and  technique  of  modern  Psychology. 

The  standpoint  adopted  in  this  book  is,  of  course, 
strictly  empirical  and  experimental.  The  method  is, 
in  general,  that  of  the  Wiirzburg  School,  riz.,  the 
Introspective  Method,  This  school  might  well  take  as 
its  motto  the  "Evbov  pXeire  of  Marcus  Aurelius  (i). 

It  is  hardly  necessary  to  point  out  that  this  thesis  is 
not  written  for  the  general  public,  presupposing  as  it 
does  the  discipline  of  Philosophy.  It  is  distinctly  tech- 
nical, and  the  terminology  of  modern  Psychology  is 
employed.  It  is  written  for  the  those  engaged  in  the 
study  of  the  Will,  and  of  Character.  There  are  never- 
theless, some  chapters  which  may  interest  the  general 
reader.  It  is  well  perhaps  here,  in  order  to  forestall 
possible  misunderstandings,  to  add  a  word  of  explana- 
tion with  regard  to  the  position  of  this  work,  with 
respect  to  the  problem  of  the  «  Freedom  of  the  Will.  » 


(  i  )  "  Evbov  |i\£ire.  "  Evbov  f]  irr|-f  r|  roO  dyaOoO,  Kal  del  dvafJXOetv  buva^vn,  ddv 
del  OKdn-nj?.  Thoughts,  VII,  5g. 


This  work  is,  as  I  have  said,  strictly  empirical  and 
experimental.  It  is  beyond  its  aim  to  treat  of  any 
problem  of  metaphysics.  It  deals  with  the  modest  task 
of  analysing  and  classifying  Volitional  phenomena.  It 
is  clearly,  outside  its  scope  to  enter  into  a  discussion  of 
Free  Will.  Directly  then,  it  cannot  be  said  to  establish 
any  new  proof  of  Freedom.  Indirectly  however,  it 
shows  the  worthlessness  of  the  psychological  arguments 
for  Determinism. 

It  remains  for  me,  in  concluding  this  Preface,  to 
acknowledge  certain  claims  on  my  gratitude.  First, 
and  chiefly ,  I  am  indebted  to  my  Professor, 
Dr  A.  Michotte,  for  his  able  direction  and  kindly 
counsels,  and  for  his  goodness  in  acting  as  «  Subject  ». 
Next  I  must  thank  Dr  F.  Fransen  of  Louvain  Univer- 
sity, and  Mr.  J.  Vance  B.  A.  of  Cambridge  University, 
for  their  kindness  in  acting  as  -Subjects*..  Finally, 
I  owe  much  to  the  Rev.  T.  Sheridan  S.  J.,  B.  A. 
Oxford  University,  who  read  over  my  MSS. 


E.  BOYD  BARRETT,  S.  J. 


Louvain  University, 
June  191 1. 


CONTENTS. 


INTRODUCTION. 

The  backward  state  of  Will  Psychology.  Diversity  of  Will 
Theories.  Reasons  for  the  backward  state  of  Will  Psychology  : 
A.  Inadequate  methods  ;.B.  The  Complexity  of  Volitional  Acts  ; 
C.  Psychological  causes.  The  New  Psychology  a  Romanticism. 
The  Standpoint  of  Experimental  Will  Psychology.  The  Need  of 
a  Will  Psychology i 

CHAPTER   I. 

MODERN  THEORIES  OF  THE  WILL. 

The  Object  of  this  Chapter.  The  Will  Theory  of  W.  Wundt. 
O.  Kiilpe.  W.  James.  Criticism  of  James'  Classical  Theory. 
H.  Hoffding.  H.  Ebbinghaus.  T.  Ribot.  Bain,  Brentano, 
Stout.  Will  Theories  of  Experimental  Psychologists.  Donders. 
Diirr.  Dr  Ach.  Dr  Pram.  Dr  Michotte 16 

CHAPTER  II. 
THE  OBJECT  AND  METHOD  OF  THE  PRESENT  RESEARCH. 

Object  of  the  Present  Research.  The  Importance  of  the  Psycho- 
logy of  Motive.  General  Method  of  Research.  The  Method  in 
Detail.  Technique.  The  Different  Stages  of  the  Method ;  A. 
Forming  of  Associations  ;  B.  The  Recognition  Experiments  ; 
C.  The  Choice  Experiments.  The  Course  of  the  Experiments. 
The  Four  Stages  of  the  Choice  Act  :  A.  The  Perception  of  the 
Excitant ;  B.  The  Motivation  ;  C.  The  Choice;  D.  The  Realisation 
of  the  Choice.  Measurement  of  the  time  of  Realisation.  The 


—  XII    — 

Instruction.  Determining  Tendencies.  The  First  Series  of 
Experiments  The  Second  Series.  The  Third  Series.  Reaction 
Times 4? 

CHAPTER  III. 

MOTIVES. 

.  Motives  and  Motivation.  Provisional  Definition  of  Motive. 
Division  of  Motives.  Different  Views  of  Motives.  Mr  Stout. 
W.James.  H.  Hoffding.  Mr  Mackenzie.  Summary  of  Motives. 
Subjective  Motives.  Objective  Motives  :  A.  Intrinsic;  B.  Extrinsic. 
Deontological  Motives.  Psychological  Constitution  of  Motives. 
Attitudes  of  Recognising,  and  of  Choosing  contrasted.  .  .  67 

CHAPTER  IV. 
MOTIVE-FORCF.  AND  ITS  MEASUREMENT. 

The  Meaning  of  Motive- Force.  The  Critical  Point  of  Motives. 
The  Strengthening  of  Motives.  Modes  of  Motive-Strengthening  : 
A.  Effects  of  the  Instruction  ;  B.  Effects  of  Contrast ;  C.  The  Per- 
sonal Factor  :  i.  Subjective  Impulse;  2.  Appeal  to  a  Principle; 
D.  Accidental  Causes  of  Motive-Strengthening.  Economy  of 
Motive-Force.  Critical  Point  Hypothesis  and  the  Genesis  of 
Feelings.  Evidence  for  the  Critical  Point  Hypothesis.  The 
Measurement  of  Motive- Force  :  i.  Scale  of  Values  based  on  Actual 
Results  of  Choices ;  2.  Scale  of  Values  based  on  the  Reaction- 
Times  ;  3.  Correspondence  of  the  two  Scales  of  Value ;  4.  Scale 
with  respect  to  the  Critical  Zone;  5.  Confirmation  of  the  Scale. 
Other  methods  of  Measuring  Motive- Force  :  A.  Analysis  of  Feel- 
ings ;  B.  Measurement  by  means  of  Ratios.  Introspective  Evi- 
dence about  Motive-Force.  Final  Scale  of  Motive-Force.  .  8z 

CHAPTER  V. 

MOTIVATION-TRACKS. 

The  Will  as  a  Process.  The  Starting-Point  of  the  Inquiry. 
i.  Notes  'Motivation-Tracks'  from  data  of  Preparatory  Series.. 


—  XIII   — 

Nov.  1910.  2.  Notes  on  'Motivation-Tracks'  from  data  of  the 
first  part  of  the  Second  Series.  Jan.  1911.  3.  Final  notes  on 
'Motivation-Tracks'.  April  191 1.  Additional  Evidence.  Motiva- 
tion-Tracks in  the  Third  Series.  Continuity  and  Jerkiness  of  the 
Choice- Process.  The  Explanation  of  Motivation-Tracks.  Advan- 
tages of  Investigating  Motivation-Tracks io3 

CHAPTER  VI. 
THE  EVOLUTION  OF  MOTIVATION. 

Motivation  Evolution  and  Automatism.  Methods  of  Studying, 
Motivation  Evolution.  The  Indirect  Method.  Evolution  of  the 
Motive  for  E.  Extracts  from  the  Introspections  of  S1.  General 
Description  of  the  Evolution  of  the  Motive  for  E.  Content  and 
Form  in  the  Evolution  of  Motives.  The  Direct  Method  of  Study- 
ing Motivation  Evolution.  The  Evolution  of  the  J — V  Choices 
S1.  The  Evolution  of  the  K— L  Choices  of  S3.  General  Remarks 
on  Motivation  Evolution 125 

CHAPTER  VII. 

AUTOMATISM. 

Automatism  in  Choice-Processes.  Aids  towards  Automatism. 
Tendencies  against  Automatism.  Signs  of  Automatism  :  i.  Reac- 
tion-Times ;  2.  Disappearance  of  Phenomena  ;  3.  Regularity  of  the 
Choices ;  4.  Continuity  and  Evenness  ;  5.  Other  signs  of  Auto- 
matism. Volitional  Economy  in  Choices.  Economy  in  Motiva- 
tion. Volitional  Economy  and  Hesitation.  Measurement  of  the 
Degree  of  Automatism.  Active  Tendencies,  showing  a  high 
degree  of  Automatism.  Automatism  in  Agreeable  Choices  .  142 

CHAPTER  VIII. 
HESITATION. 

Hesitation  and  Motivation.  Examples  of  Hesitation.  Different 
kinds  of  Hesitation.  Hesitation  in  our  Researches.  The  Evolu- 
tion of  Hesitation.  The  L — C  Choices  of  S*.  Reaction-Time 


—   XIV  — 

curve  of  the  L — C  Choices.  The  L — G  Hesitation  :  i.  Origin; 
2.  Development ;  3.  The  Healing  of  the  Hesitation.  Hesitation 
Curves  of  the  J  —V,  and  J— B,  Choices  of  S8.  Additional  Charac- 
teristics of  Hesitation.  Hesitation  and  Inconsistency.  The  Cause 
of  Inconsistency.  Conditions  of  Hesitation.  The  Healing  of 
hesitation.  General  Remarks  on  Hesitation iSg 

CHAPTER  IX. 

HEDONISM. 

Object  of  the  Present  Chapter.  Method  of  Investigation. 
Hedonism  in  our  Researches.  Examples  of  Hedonic  Choices  : 
A.  Hedonic  Attraction ;  B.  Hedonic  Repulsions.  Hedonism  in  the 
Realisation  of  Choices.  The  Evolution  of  Hedonism.  The 
Effects  of  Hedonism  on  Motivation 179 

CHAPTER  X. 
THE   RELATIVITY  OF  VALUES. 

Relativity  in  Choice  Processes.  The  Meaning  of  Relativity. 
Relativity  in  our  Researches.  Examples  of  Relativity.  Absolute 
and  Relative  Values.  The  Laws  of  Relativity.  The  Consequences 
of  Relativity 191 

CHAPTER  XI. 

THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  CHARACTER. 

Character,  as  manifested  in  Choice.  Experimental  Psychology, 
and  Character.  The  Character  of  S2.  The  formula  of  the  Cha- 
racter of  S*.  Character-Formation.  The  Importance  of  a  Clearly- 
known,  definite  Scale  of  Values 2o5 

Appendix 221 


INTRODUCTION 


We  know  little  of  the  Will.     We  know  not  its  activi-  The  Backward 
ties,   nor  its  laws,  nor  its  psychical  elements,  nor  its  state  of  will 

'  *    J  .       Psychology. 

physiological  manifestations.  We  know  that,  at  basis, 
it  is  a  process,  vital,  immanent,  dynamic  ;  «  not  a 
permanent  thing  »  writes  Wundt,  «  but  a  rising  pro- 
gressing, subjective  process  »  but  how  to  describe  or 
analyse  that  process,  how  to  measure  it  or  where  to 
find  its  origin  or  conditions,  we  are  unable  to  say. 
About  Memory,  Association,  Vision,  Audition,  and 
Perception  in  general,  we  know  much.  A  hundred 
minor  points  of  vantage  have  been  won  in  the  siege  of 
the  mind.  A  hundred  more  are  all  but  gained.  «  The 
spying  and  scraping  with  deadly  tenacity  and  almost 
diabolical  cunning*,  which  according  to  Prof.  James 
characterise  the  new  psychologists,  have  not  been  in 
vain.  The  forces  that  hem  in  the  mind  are  gradually 
summing  themselves  up  into  her  overthrow.  One 
citadel  however,  if  we  may  continue  the  metaphor, 
remains  impregnable — that  of  the  Will. 

We  cannot  refuse  to  adhere  to  the  formula  pronoun- 
ced over  a  hundred  years  back  by  Schopenhauer  « I  do 
not  know  my  will  in  its  totality,  nor  do  I  know  it  in 
its  unity \  nor  do  I  know  it  perfectly  in  its  essence  »  — 
nor  can  we  say  more  of  the  Will,  than  did  Scotus 
as  far  back  as  the  thirteenth  century.  «  Voluntas  est 
vis  immaterialissima  et  per  consequent  maxime  a 
came  separata  »  —  for  him  it  was  mysterious,  almost 
mystical,  for  us  it  is  no  less  so. 


Diversity  of      It  would  be  difficult  to  exaggerate  the  diversity  that 
Will  Theories.  exjsts  between  the  theories  of  Will  Psychologists  as 
ancient  as  Aristotle,  or  as  modern  as  Ach.     Of  this 
diversity  Prof.  Michotte  writes  (i)  : 

II  est  frappant  de  constater  quelles  divergences  fondamentales 
separent  les  divers  auteurs  non  seulement  dans  leurs  theories  de  la 
volonte,  mais  encore  dans  la  facon  dont  ils  decrivent  les  processus 
volontaires  observables. 

Some  psychologists  as  Mr  Stout  regard  the  Will  as 
conation  and  teach  that  «  conation  and  cognition  are 
different  aspects  of  one  and  the  same  process  »  some  as 
Kiilpe  identify  Will  with  the  apperceptive  process  ; 
some  as  Miinsterberg  and  Ebbinghaus  explain  Will  by 
the  mechanism  of  association  ;  other  psychologists,  of 
a  less  serious  tone  regard  the  Will  as  psychical  force 
and  attribute  to  it  sympathetic  vibrations,  or  identifying 
it  with  personal  magnetism  speak  in  awe  of  its  myste- 
rious powers. 

For  M.  Bergson,  let  us  add,  the  Will  creates  itself  by 
willing,  for  M.  Blondel  the  Will  is  the  bud  and  blossom 
of  Action,  while  for  M.  Paulhan  the  Will  is  above  all 
a  synthesis. 

Elle  est  essentiellement  une  synthese  psychique,  nouvelle,  active, 
mais  elle  est  toujours  melee  a  Tautomatisme  et  aussi  a  1'activite 
suggeree,  comme  1'attention  est  toujours  melee  a  la  routine  et  a 
1'invention. 

Reasons  for      Without  dwelling  further  at  present  on  this  diversity 
?.e?ac™<!of  doctrine,  which  is  only  natural  in  a  science  still  in 

State  of  Will ...  J 

Psychology,  its  beginnings,  we  propose  to  enquire  into  the  Reasons 
for  the  Backward  State  of  Will  Psychology.  It  seems  lo 
us,  that  the  reasons  are  to  be  sought  for  in  the  inade- 
quacy of  the  methods  employed,  in  the  difficulties  of 
analysing  volitional  acts,  and  finally  in  the  tempera- 

(i)  MICHOTTE  and  PRUM,  Le  choix  volontaire,  p.  121. 


ment  of  Will  Psychologists  both  ancient  and  modern. 
Every  department  of  Psychology  suffered  from  the        a 

j  r       i  i       J  r     ^i  •  J      Inadequate 

inadequacy  of  the  old  methods  or  Observation  and  methods. 
Experiment,  but  none  so  much  as  Will  Psychology. 
We  find  the  same  opinion  expressed  by  Prof.  Michotte ; 
Cest  surtout  dans  le  domaine  de  la  psychologic  de  la 
volonte  que  se  fait  sentir  I  absence  de  methode  experi- 
mental ».  Here  especially,  painstaking,  careful  obser- 
vation was  called  for.  Here  the  complexity  and 
delicacy  of  the  phenomena  to  be  observed  demanded 
the  utmost  precision  of  method.  For,  as  Wundt  writes, 
«  it  is  impossible  to  find  out  how  a  volition  proceeds  in 
any  other  way,  than  by  following  it  exactly  as  it  is  pre- 
sented to  us  in  immediate  experience  ». 

The  fundamental  fault  of  older  Will  Psychologists 
was  according  to  Wundt,  that 

«  instead  of  deriving  a  volition  from  its  antecedent  psychological 
conditions  only  the  final  result,  namely  the  volitional  act,  was 
used  to  build  up  a  general  concept  which  was  called  Will,  and  this 
class  concept  was  treated  in  accordance  with  the  faculty  theory  as 
a  first  cause  from  which  all  concrete  volitional  acts  arise  (i)  ». 

Ribot,  too,  alludes  to  the  same  fault,  in  characteristic 
fashion. 

Si  Ton  s'obstine  a  faire  de  la  volonte  une  faculte,  une  entite, 
tout  devient  obscurite,  embarras,  contradiction.  On  est  pris  au 
piege  d'une  question  mal  posee.  Si  Ton  accepte,  au  contraire,  les 
faits  comme  ils  sont,  on  se  debarrasse,  au  moins,  des  difficultes 
factices.  On  n'a  pas  a  demander  apres  Hume  et  tant  d'autres 
comment  un  «  Je  veux  »  peut  faire  mouvoir  mes  membres...  c'est 
dans  la  tendance  naturelle  des  sentiments  et  des  images  a  se  traduire 
en  mouvements  que  le  secret  des  actes  produits  doit  etre  cherche'  (2). 

(1)  Outlines  of  Psychology.  Wundt.  (Judd).  sec.  14. 

(2)  Les  maladies  de  la  volonte,  p.  180.  Although  quotations  from  Ribot,  Hoff- 
ding,  etc.  are  frequent  throughout  this  volume,  t he  author  by  no  means  commits 
himself  either  to  the  views  or  standpoints  of  these  authors. 


—  4  — 

Such  objections  are  at  basis  directed  against  the 
method  employed  by  the  older  Psychologists.  The 
latter,  it  is  affirmed,  had  not  grasped  the  full  signifi- 
cance of  induction,  and  were  satisfied  with  observations 
and  experiments  that  must  be  regarded  as  superficial. 

To  objections  of  this  kind,  directed  against  the  non- 
experimental  character  of  the  Older  Psychology,  Scho- 
lastics offer  a  two-fold  reply.  Firstly,  with  M.  De 
Wulf  (i),  they  point  to  an  immense  number  of  interes- 
ting and  important  physiological  and  psychological 
observations  to  be  found  in  the  works  of  the  schoolmen. 
Doubtless  such  observations  were  not  methodically 
classified,  but  nevertheless  they  were  neither  unknown 
nor  ignored.  Secondly,  with  Cardinal  Mercier,  Father 
Maher  and  others,  Scholastics  while  admitting  a  cer- 
tain deficiency  in  the  old  Psychology,  from  the  point 
of  view  of  observation  and  experiment,  point  out  very 
justly  that  Scholastic  Psychology  was  principally  Ratio- 
nal and  as  such  did  not  call  for  so  great  a  recourse  to 
observation  and  experiment,  as  does  Empirical  Psy- 
chology : 

The  two  branches  of  the  science  of  course  employ  both  obser- 
vation and  inference ;  but  while  frequent  appeal  to  the  facts  of 
consciousness  is  a  prominent  feature  in  the  first  (the  Empirical) 
stage,  deductive  reasoning  prevails  in  ihe  last  (2). 

Rational  Psychology,  being  chiefly  synthetic  and 
deductive,  has  then  naturally,  less  recourse  to  the 
immediate  facts  of  consciousness,  than  Empirical 
Psychology. 

It  is  not  necessary  here  to  recall  the  history  of  the  new 
method  in  Psychology  —  how  the  method  of  the  more 
advanced  science  of  Physics  came  to  be  applied  to 
problems  of  the  mind.  To  Herbart  (1776-1841)  is 

(1)  Histoire  de  la  Philosophic  »  edievale. 

(2)  M.  MAHKR,  Psychology,  p.  6. 


usually  attributed  the  honour  of  recommending  the 
innovation.  Kant  is  said  to  have  declared  the  appli- 
cation of  quantitive  methods  to  Psychology  impossible. 
About  i83o  the  suggestion  of  Herbart  was  put  into 
effect  by  the  psycho-physiologists,  Weber,  Miiller, 
Helmholtz,  Dubois-Reymond,  and  others. 

The  new  Psychology  advanced  very  rapidly,  obser- 
vation and  experiment  were  used  in  every  department 
and  Wundt's  dictum  is  to-day  universally  admitted 
that  «  there  is  no  fundamental  psychological  process  to 
which  experimental  methods  cannot  be  applied  and 
therefore  none  in  the  investigation  of  which  such  methods 
are  not  logically  required.  » 

In  spite,  however,  of  this  truth  little  attention  has 
been  paid  to  the  Will  Wundt,  Kiilpe  and  a  few  Ame- 
rican Psychologists  made  some  desultory  researches, 
which  we  shall  examine  later  on,  but  it  is  only  within 
the  last  few  years  that  methodical  work  has  really  begun 
—  chiefly  at  Louvain  and  Wiirzburg. 

The  spirit  of  the  present  method  is  to  gain  a  concrete, 
definite  knowledge  of  each  element  that  makes  up  the 
psychical  act,  and  of  the  laws  which  govern  the  welding 
or  fusing  together  and  the  development  of  those  ele- 
ments. To-day  we  seek  to  measure  and  classify  the 
sensations,  sentiments,  emotions,  representations,  and 
motive-forces  which  combine  in  volitions  (i). 

The  spirit  of  Rational  psychologists  was,  we  have 
seen,  quite  different.  They  proceeded  synthetically, 
deductively.  The  facts  they  usually  considered  were 
such  complex  abstractions  as  electio,  ddiberatio,  decisio, 
appetitio,  etc.  They  did  not  seek  to  analyse  these  acts, 

(i)  In  the  words  of  Cardinal  Mercier  (Psychologic,  Preface) :«  Cette  concep- 
tion de  la  psychologic  est  absolument  dans  1'esprit  d'Aristote  et  de  saint  Thomas 
d'Aquin.  Nous  nous  rejouissons  de  ce  retour  a  la  tradition  des  grands  maitres 
que  nous  nous  faisons  gloire  de  prendre  pour  guides.  » 


nor  to  translate  them  into  sentiments,  sensations  and 
other  psychical  elements.  Some  of  them,  it  must  be 
admitted,  never  came  down  from  the  lofty  regions  of 
metaphysics  to  the  terra  firma  of  empirical  facts,  phy- 
siological and  psychological. 

If  I  may  use  a  diagram,  since  they  are  in  fashion,  I 
should  explain  the  matter  thus  : 


Concept 


In  the  triangle  on  the  left,  we  describe  the  modern 
analytic  method  ;  beginning  from  the  immediate  data 
of  conscience  and  ascending  inductively,  through  more 
complex  will-acts  towards  the  final  will  concept  (i). 
Naturally  many  stages  and  elements  are  still  to  be  dis- 
covered, but  the  process  is  sound. 

In  the  triangle  on  the  right  we  see  the  old  synthetic 
method  beginning  from  above,  or  at  least  beginning 
simultaneously  from  the  final  will  concept  and  from 
complex  will  acts,  and  interpreting  each  in  terms,  of 
the  other.  The  immediate  data  of  conscience,  as  we 
shall  see,  are,  somewhat  neglected.  The  manner  of 
proceeding  is,  of  course,  less  sound. 

(i)  Vide  Maher's  Psychology,  p.  6.  «  Starting  from  the  knowledge  acquired  in 
Empirical  Psychology  regarding  the  character  of  the  operations  and  activities  of 
the  mind,  we  draw  further  conclusions  as  to  the  nature  and  constitution  of  the 
root  or  subject  of  those  activities.  » 


Acts. 


It  should  however,  be  admitted  that  every  method  is 
necessarily  partly  synthetic.  The  fault  of  the  old 
method  was  that  it  exaggerated  the  synthetic  and  made 
less  account  of  the  analytic  element. 

The  complexity  and  evasiveness  of  volitional  acts        b 

f  J  The  Complexity 

have  deterred  psychologists  old  and  new,  from  attemp-  of  volitional 
ting  to  analyse  them.  The  schoolmen  for  the  most 
part  contented  themselves  with  a  few  words,  reverent 
in  tone,  in  which  they  proclaimed  the  highly  spiritual 
nature  of  the  Will,  and  placed  its  abode  in  the  reason. 
They  refrained  however  from  detailed  analysis.  Thus 
Aquinas  writes  :  Voluntas  est  in  ratione ;  ratio  autem 
est  potent ia  animae  non  alligata  organo  corporate  : 
unde  relinquitur  quod  voluntas  sit  potentia  omnino 
immaterialis  et  incorporea. 

Modern  German  psychologists,  with  a  few  excep- 
tions, (Kiilpe  and  his  School),  have  been  deterred  from 
venturing  on  such  dangerous  ground.  They  have  but 
little  confidence  in  the  reliability  of  introspection ;  it  is, 
say  they,  subjective  and  unscientific,  and  is  held  in 
odium  by  psycho-physicians,  of  the  Leipzig  school. 
Yet,  introspection  is,  in  Will  Psychology,  our  only 
instrument,  on  which  in  the  words  of  James,  «  we 
must  rely,  first,  and  foremost,  and  always.  » 

Some  Psychologists,  French  and  American  mostly, 
have  rushed  ahead  boldly.  They  have  become  ena- 
moured of  the  pathological  and  the  sensational.  They 
have  formulated  many  strange  theories  about  Magne- 
tism, Telepathy,  and  Psychical  Force,  and  speak  a 
strange  jargon  hardly  in  keeping  with  serious  science. 
Beyond  some  neat  descriptions,  they  have  done  little 
for  Will  Psychology —  and,  as,  Mr  J.  Sully  says  — 
«  a  smart  descriptive  epithet  may  be  purchased  too 
dearly,  if  its  dazzling  effect  blurs  the  sharp  boundaries 
of  scientific  thought.  » 


Some  Psychologists,  after  a  brief  examination  of  the 
complexity  of  volitional  acts  have  gone  so  far  as  to 
affirm  the  impossibility  of  penetrating  so  thick  a  forest 
of  psychical  elements.  Some  have  become  bewildered 
in  an  attempted  genetic  derivation  of  the  Will  from  the 
first  impulse-action  of  the  animal  or  child,  or  even 
from  the  chemico-biological  affinities  of  the  elements 
of  the  embryon  cell.  For  Harald  Hoffding. 

La  psychologic  de  la  volonte  embrasse  a  vrai  dire  tout  le  domaine 
de  la  vie  consciente.  Les  phenomenes  appeles  specialement  volon- 
taires  forment  seulement  le  sommet  d'un  processus  que  s'etend  a 
toute  la  vie  consciente. 

As  a  concrete  instance  of  difficulties  attending  on  the 
examination  of  some  Will  Phenomenon,  let  us  point  to 
the  investigation  of  our  «  consciousness  of  action  »,  or 
as  it  was  called  by  James,  «  feeling  of  effort  »,  or  acti- 
vity. Many  experimental  researches  have  been  direc- 
ted to  the  analysis  of  this  elusive,  protean-like  pheno- 
menon. It  has,  up  to  the  present,  evaded  a  firm 
grasp.  Dynamic,  fluctuating,  mysterious,  it  baffles 
our  efforts,  and  escapes  from  the  traps  set  for  it.  Its 
importance  is  undoubted.  The  solution  of  many  pro- 
blems of  the  Will  depend  on  its  discovery — yet,  it 
seems  to  defy  all  attempts  to  capture  it. 

Its  existence,  writes  James,  as  a  phenomenal  fact  in  our  con- 
science cannot  of  course  be  doubted  or  denied.  Its  significance  on 
the  other  hand  is  a  matter  about  which  the  greatest  difference  of 
opinion  prevails.  Questions  as  momentous  as  that  of  the  very 
existence  of  a  spiritual  conscience,  as  vast  as  that  of  universal 
predestination,  or  free-will  depend  on  its  interpretation. 

A  third  reason,  for  the  backwardness  of  the  science 
of  the  Will,  might  well  be  sought  in  certain  «  Psycho- 
logical Causes  ».  Moderns,  as  we  have  seen,  have  either 
been  too  sceptical  of  introspection  like  the  Germans,  or 


too  oblivious  of  the  difficulties  of  the  task,  like  some 
French  and  Americans,  to  achieve  any  important  results 
for  Will  Psychology.  In  the  middle  ages  other  causes 
were  at  work.  Quite  early  in  the  post-patristic  period 
of  philosophy,  and  even  earlier,  the  chief  theses  of 
Scholastic  Philosophy,  the  Spirituality  of  the  Soul,  and 
the  Freedom  of  the  Will  were  proved  with  sufficient 
clearness  to  command  almost  universal  acceptance. 
There  seemed  no  special  call  for  further  psychological 
investigation.  Philosophy  had  not  yet  been  turned 
«  topsy-turvy  »  by  Descartes.  It  still  tended  outwards, 
examined  the  great  questions  of  the  creation  and  destiny 
of  the  world,  and  of  man;  and  it  did  not  confine  its  spe- 
culation to  the  field  of  consciousness  and  to  episte- 
mology. 

There  was,  perhaps,  an  indifference  and  disinclina- 
tion to  pry  too  minutely  into  the  soul.  True,  from  a 
religious  point  of  view,  many  thinkers  closely  observed 
their  moral  conscience,  but  they  did  not  aim  at  a  con- 
crete knowledge  of  the  mechanism  of  the  mind.  In  a 
word  they  interpreted  Socrates'  fv&ei  creautov  religiously 
and  not  psychologically.  Their  mentality  was  toto 
coelo  different  from  our  crazy,  pedagogico-psycholo- 
gical  mentality. 

We  have  seen  how  backward  Will  Psychology  is, 
and  we  have  traced  some  of  the  reasons  for  that  back- 
wardness, dwelling  especially  on  the  contrast  between 
the  method  and  the  spirit  of  old  and  new  Psychology. 
What,  then,  is  our  exact  position  with  regard  to  the 
comparative  merits  of  the  Old  and  the  New  Psycho- 
logy? We  find  ourselves,  here,  in  complete  agreement 
with  the  eminent  Psychologist  and  Leader  of  the  Neo- 
Scholastic  movement,  Cardinal  Mercier.  We  reduce, 
to  three  points,  his  opinion. 


—     1O    — 

1°  Scholastic  Psychology  alone  has  a  solid  basis,  and 
is  in  a  condition  to  utilise  fully  scientific  data. 

Seule  la  psychologic  scolastique  possede  a  la  fois  un  corps  de 
doctrines  systematise,  et  des  cadres  assez  larges  pour  accueillir  et 
synthetiser  les  resultats  croissants  des  sciences  d'observation  (i). 

2°  Modern  Psychologists  are  often  lamentably  in 
want  of  wide,  general  conceptions,  and  directive  ideas. 

3°  Scholastic  Psychology,  while  of  course  retaining 
its  essential  principles  of  the  Spirituality  and  Substan- 
tiality of  the  Soul  and  the  Freedom  of  the  Will,  which 
are  truths  for  all  time,  is  called  upon  to  adapt  itself 
more  and  more  to  the  social  and  educational  needs  of 
the  day.  It  is  calhd  on  to  utilise  the  data  of  modern 
science,  especially  of  its  sister- science  Experimental 
Psychology.  To  quote  Cardinal  Mercier  once  more (2). 

Est-ce  a  dire  que  nous  regardions  la  psychologic  de  I'Ecole 
comme  le  monument  acheve  de  la  science,  devant  lequel  1'esprit 
devrait  s'arreter  dans  une  contemplation  sterile? 

Evidemment  non.  La  psychologic  est  une  science  vivante ;  elle 
doit  evoluer  avec  les  sciences  biologiques  et  anthropologiques  qui 
sont  ses  tributaires.  L'arret  de  developpement  est,  pour  1'etre 
vivant,  une  cause  fatale  d'anomalies  et  de  monstruosite's. 

The  New  It  is  for  these  reasons  that  the  new  Psychologists, 
mou§h  °ften  exaggerating  the  importance  of  their  exper- 
iments and  observations,  have  come  so  much  in  vogue, 
that  they  almost  seem  to  take  precedence  of  the  Older 
Psychologists.  Like  the  Romanticists,  who  rose  up 
and  overthrew  the  Classicists,  they  have  robbed  the 
older  Psychologists  of  much  of  their  glory.  Indeed  an 
analogy,  objectively  well-founded,  might  be  drawn 
between  the  Romanticists  in  Literature  and  Lie  new 
Empiricists  in  Psychology.  The  former  threw  aside 

(1)  D.  MERCIEH,  Psychologic,  Preface. 

(2)  Ibid 


the  old-fashioned,  stilted  concepts,  conventions  and 
points  of  view,  and  plunged  afresh  into  the  wild  forests 
of  nature.  They  plucked  flowers  without  sighing  over 
their  «  sweet  fragrance  »  and  harkened  to  streamlets 
without  singing  that  they  «  purled  » .  The  latter  with 
kindred  zeal  cast  off  many  lifeless  abstractions  and 
concepts  that  served  to  conceal  the  true  nature  of 
mental  activities;  they  studied  the  concrete  realisation 
of  conation,  intellection  and  attention,  and  sought  by 
close  observation  of  immediate  consciousness  to  find 
out,  the  secrets  that  lay  behind  those  abstract  words. 
In  fine,  like  the  Romanticists,  they  realised  the  prin- 
ciple, pregnantly  but  clearly  expressed  by  Maurice 
Blondel  : 

Le  dernier  effort  de  1'art  c'est  de  faire  faire  aux  hommes  ce  qu'ils 
veulent,  comme  de  leur  faire  connaitre  ce  qu'ils  savent. 

For  most  modern  Psychologists  the   standpoint  of  me  stand- 
Experimental  Will  Psychology  is  a  provisional  deter-  point  of  Expe- 

•    •         /  \        ?  -1  i_  '         •  •         TTU  rimental  Will 

minism  (i).  «  Like  every  other  science  »,  writes  Harald  Psychoiogy% 
Hoffding  «  Psychology  is  forced  to  be  determinist,  that 
is,  to  set  out  with  the  supposition  that  the  Principle  of 
Causality  holds  also  with  regard  to  Volitional  life", 
They  seek  in  previous  psychical  states  the  explanation 
of  subsequent  states.  They  are  ready  to  say  with 
Spencer  «  Psychological  changes  either  conform  to  law 
or  they  do  not.  If  they  do  not,  this  work  in  common 
with  all  works  on  the  subject  is  sheer  nonsense  ;  no 
science  of  Psychology  is  possible.  » 

This  does  not  of  course  mean  that  the  Experimental 
Psychologist  must  commit  himself  to  Determinism  as  a 
Metaphysical  Theory.  Indeed  it  would  be  strange  if 
it  did.  Experimental  Psychology  not  only  does  not 

(i)  Neo-Scholastic  psychologists  see  no  objection  to  the  assumining  of  such  a 
standpoint  (Vide,  passim,  MICHOTTE  et  P*UM,  Le  choix  volontaire). 


—    12    — 

furnish  one  scrap  of  evidence  for  Determinism,  but  it 
shows  clearly  and  undeniably  the  impossibility  of  ever 
proving  this  theory  by  recourse  to  Psychology.  It  is 
not  only  impossible  to  show  that  all  our  acts  are  deter- 
mined, but  it  is  impossible  to  show  that  even  one  single 
motived  act  is  determined. 

We  have  stated,  in  contrasting  the  old  method  with 
the  new,  that  modern  psychologists  take  immediate 
experience  as  their  starting  point.  They  examine  with 
care  and  precision  all  that  can  be  found  in  conscious- 
ness during  the  process  of  the  volitional  act.  They 
repeat,  again  and  again  the  same  act,  under  similar 
conditions  ;  and  that,  not  for  one  or  two,  but  for  many 
subjects,  so  as  to  lessen  the  risk  of  non-observation  or 
of  mal-observation.  Every  feeling,  image,  sentiment, 
tendency,  hesitation,  association,  inhibition,  etc.,  is 
carefully  noted.  Still  it  is  by  no  means  easy  to  dif- 
ferentiate a  voluntary  from  a  non-voluntary  act. 

La  volition,  writes,  M.  Paulhan,  n'est  pas  dans  ses  elements,  un 
phenomene  different  des  autres  par  sa  nature  et  qui  se  distinguerait 
d'une  emotion  et  d'une  idee,  comme  1'emotion  et  1'ideese  distinguent 
1'une  de  1'autre.  La  volition  a  toujours  pour  elements  des  etats 
intellectuels  et  des  etats  affectifs,  des  idees,  des  images  visuelles, 
auditi ves,  motrices,  etc.,  des  emotions  de  peur  ou  de  desir,  des 
tendances  diverses,  elle  n'a  pas  d'autres  elements.  Son  caractere 
propre  est  simplement  d'etre  une  synthese  nouvelle  (i). 

Though  it  is  not  yet  sufficiently  recognised,  Scholastic 
Psychologists,  have  in  recent  years  actively  participated 
in  the  work  of  experiment  and  observation,  carried  on 
in  Psychological  Laboratories  (2).  They  have  too, 
more  clearly,  perhaps,  than  others,  seen  the  advantage 
of  associating  themselves  with  modern  scientific 

(1)  La  Volonte,  p.  3. 

(2)  There   are  many   Laboratories   in   Catholic  Colleges   and  Seminaries  in 
America  and  on  the  continent. 


research.  That  this  is  so,  may  be  seen  in  the  following 
words  of  Cardinal  Mercier  (i),  where  he  announces 
the  «  policy  »  of  Scholastic  Psychologists. 

Le  meilleur  service  a  rendre  aux  doctrines  generates  de  la  psycho- 
logic scolastique,  c'est  de  les  mettre  en  rapport  avec  les  r6sultats 
acquis  en  biologic  c  llulaire,  en  histologie,  en  embryogenie  ;  de 
simplifter  autant  que  possible  les  faits  psychiques,  a  1'exemple  des 
Associationnistes  anglais;  de  chercher  a  comprendre  l'homme  adulte 
par  l'e"tude  de  la  psychologic  animale,  et  de  la  psychologic  infantile, 
I'homme  sain  par  1'observation  minutieuse  de  certains  etats  excep- 
tionnels  ou  pathologiques  qui  accusent  plus  vivement  tel  ou  tel 
caractere  fruste  du  type  normal ;  de  suivre  les  modifications  parti- 
culieres  ou  les  variations  de  1'activite  humaine  chez  les  differentes 
races  ou  a  des  epoques  differentes  de  1'histoire,  comme  1'a  fait 
Herbert  Spencer  ;  de  prendre  sa  place  enfin  dans  le  mouvement 
imprime  aux  recherches  psychologiques  par  1'ecole  experimentale 
allemande. 

It  cannot  then  be  any  longer  maintained,  that  Scho- 
lastic Psychology  is  either  hostile  or  indifferent  to  the 
progress  of  empirical  or  experimental  psychology. 

We  have  seen,  that  by  a  natural  evolution,  the  old  The  Need 
Psychology  has  gradually  made  room  for  the  new,  psychology. 
just  as  the  classicism  of  Pope,  gave  way  before  the  nas- 
cent romanticism  of  Thompson,  and  later  on,  of  Blake. 

This  new  movement  towards  a  Will  Psychology  has 
come  most  opportunely.  The  present  age,  ashamed 
of  its  weak,  flippant  spirit,  fully  conscious  of  its  trivia- 
lity and  effeminacy  compared  with  the  sterner  ages 
that  have  gone  by,  has  suddenly  grown  clamorous 
for  some  tonic  to  revive  its  decaying  virility. 

It  has,  first  of  all,  called  for  a  method  wherewith  to 
fortify  and  build  up  the  Will.  As  a  response,  such 
works  as  L Education  de  la  Volonte  by  Payot  and  Le 
Gouvernement  de  Soi-meme  by  Eymieu  have  been 

(i)  Psychologic,  Preface. 


—  14  — 

published.     Societies  too,  of  a  semi-spiritist,  semi-psy- 
chical character  are  founded  with  a  view  to  increase 
the  «  personal  magnetism  »  and  the  «  psychical  force  » 
of  their  members.     Every  means,  wise  or  foolish,  of 
winning  back  a  shred  of  manliness  and  staunchness  is 
tried.     Wordsworth  wrote  for  his  fellow-countrymen  : 
«  Milton  !  thou  shouldst  be  living  at  this  hour. 
England  hath  need  of  thee  :  she  is  a  fen 
Of  stagnant  waters  :  » 

To-day,  any  little  act  of  bravery  or  pluck  is  lauded 
to  the  skies,  published,  painted,  sung,  and  decorated 
with  medals.  Every  deed  of  heroism,  true  or  imagi- 
ned, that  history  can  produce  is  brought  forth,  edited, 
written  into  novels  and  dramatised.  Hero-worship  and 
Will  worship  have  become  the  mark  and  character  of 
this  mawkish  age.  Blondel  has  shown  in  his  Philo- 
sophy//z#/  thought  is  for  action ;  that,  de facto,  knowledge 
is  used  in  all  the  acts  of  animal  life  to  help  on  activity. 
He  has  shown  that  wiien  thought  is  used  for  thought, 
inevitable  contradictions  ensue.  He  might  indeed  have 
gone  further,  and  pointed  out  that  to-day  action  is  for 
action,  that  thought  and  action,  together,  are  subordi- 
nated to  the  development  of  action,  or  volition. 

To-day  we  need  a  Psychology  which  will  explain 
how  half  a  hundred  anarchists  could,  within  a  few 
hours,  stir  up  a  revolution  and  possess  themselves  of  a 
huge  city  like  Barcelona.  We  need  to  know  the  psy- 
chology of  the  crowd,  and  to  examine  the  laws  of 
terrorisalion,  in  virtue  of  which  Ferrer  and  his  handful 
of  minions  held  sway  for  three  days  over  half  a  million 
people,  burning  their  churches,  schools,  museums,  and 
all  they  held  most  precious. 

Then  again,  we  need  a  Will  Psychology  which  is 
capable  of  forming,  at  least  to  some  broad  principles 


—  i5  — 

of  morality,  a  youth  for  whom  the  name  of  Christ  is 
unknown.  Godless  education  is  a  jact ;  and,  will, 
alas  !  for  years  to  come,  be  a  fact  in  many  countries. 
Religious  instincts  cannot  help  the  French  educators. 
They  must  make  the  most  of  Psychology.  They  ask 
for  rules  of  Will  training.  We  must  try  to  satisfy, 
what,  under  the  circumstances,  is  a  legitimate  demand. 
Indeed  we  may  point  out,  that,  curiously  enough, 
modern  psychology  has  become  the  defender  of  religion 
for  the  young. 

Empecher  un  adolescent  qui  en  ressent  le  besoin  naturel,  d'ac- 
complir  normalement  son  evolution  religieuse,  sous  pretexte  que  la 
religion  n'est  pas  «  vraie  »,  c'est  se  conduire  en  dogmatiste  qui 
decrete  ce  qui  est  vrai  et  ce  qui  est  faux,  ce  qui  doit  elre  cru,  non 
en  psychologue  impartial,  qui  constate  ce  qui  repond  en  fait  a  un 
besoin  de  croyance,  ni  en  pedagogue  qui  doit  favoriser  1'evolution 
naturelle  de  1'esprit,  en  la  guidant  s'il  le  faut,  mais  sans  la  con- 
trecarrer  (i). 

But  apart  from  such  particular  demands,  there  are 
general  demands  which  spring  from  the  mentality,  the 
psychology,  of  the  present  generation,  which  must  be 
satisfied.  Figures,  definite  laws,  precise  proportions, 
exact  observations,  clear  and  definite  descriptions  and 
explanations,  of  all  our  psychical  activities  are  called 
for.  Litterateurs,  Orators,  Griminologists,  Statisti- 
cians, Economists,  Clergymen,  Lawyers  and  Educators 
call  for  them.  Here  again,  the  old  Psychology  is 
unable  to  satisfy  the  demand. 

In  fine,  while  from  one  point  of  view  modern  Psy- 
chology only  amplifies,  illustrates,  analyses,  and  renews 
truths,  won  long  ago  ;  from  another  point  of  view  that 
of  method,  it  has  all  the  credit  of  all  that  is  definitely 
and  surely  known  of  psychical  functioning. 

(i)  CLAPAREDE,  Psychologic  de  I' enfant,  p.  182. 


CHAPTER  I. 


MODERN   THEORIES    OF   THE   WILL. 

The  object  of  The  object  we  set  before  ourselves  in  this  chapter,  is 
this  Chapter.  not  to  gjve  a  history  of  the  problem  of  motives  and 
motivation,  for  as  yet  it  has  no  history,  but  to  expose 
briefly  some  important  Theories  of  the  Will,  with  a 
view  to  giving  a  general  historical  setting  to  the  pro- 
blem. Our  standpoint  will  not  be  critical,  but  simply 
explanatory.  During  the  course  of  this  book,  the 
divergencies  existing  between  our  views,  and  those  of 
emotionalists  like  Wundt,  or  associationists  likeEbbing- 
haus,  will  become  sufficiently  clear.  It  will  be  seen 
too  that  our  method  is  not,  like  Ribot  or  Hoffding,  to 
trace  genetically  the  origin  of  volitional  activity,  but 
rather  like  Wundt,  «  to  find  out  how  a  volition  pro- 
ceeds by  following  it  exactly  as  it  is  presented  to  us  in 
immediate  conscience  ».  The  experiment  we  use  is 
introspective  experiment,  believing  as  we  do,  with 
Kiilpe,  that  no  other  kind  of  experiment  «  can  any 
more  take  the  place  of  introspection  in  Psychology, 
than  it  can  of  observation  in  Physics  »  (i). 

We  propose  then,  to  trace  briefly,  the  growth  of 
Will  Theories  and  Will  Problems,  indicating  some 
points  of  agreement  between  various  systems,  rather 

(i)  KUPLE,  Outlines  of  Psychology,  p.  10  (Titchener). 


than  criticising  them  or  pointing  out  their  short- 
comings (i).  In  doing  this,  we  shall  introduce  the  pro- 
blem with  which  we  are  occupied  in  the  present 
researches — that,  namely,  of  motives  and  motivation. 

Wundt  well  remarks,  that   in  experiments  on  the    Thewm 
Will,  we  must  limit  ourselves  to  the    observation  of  j?S*5 

.  W.  Wundt. 

such  processes  as  can  be  easily  influenced  by  external 
means,  namely,  '  such  as  begin  with  external  stimula- 
tions and  end  in  external  acts  '.  He  regarded  ordi- 
nary reaction  experiments  as  volitional. 

A  volition  of  a  simple  or  complex  character  is  excited  by  an 
external  sense  stimulus,  and  then,  after  the  occurrence  of  certain 
psychological  processes,  which  serve  in  part  as  motives,  the  volition 
is  brought  to  an  end  by  motor  reaction.  (2) 

Wundt's  Emotional  Theory  of  the  Will  is  well 
known.  When  emotional  processes  pass  into  a  sudden 
change  in  ideational  and  affective  content,  bringing 
the  emotion  to  a  sudden  close,  such  changes  in  sensa- 
tional and  affective  content,  which  are  prepared  for  by 
an  emotion,  and  bring  about  its  sudden  end,  are  Voli- 
tional Acts.  The  emotion  together  with  its  result  is  a 
Voluntary  Process.  The  richer  the  ideational  and 
affective  contents  of  experience,  the  greater  the  variety 
of  emotions  and  the  wider  the  sphere  of  Volitions. 
Wundt  distinguishes  between  primary  and  secondary 

(1)  With  regard  to  our  order  of  treatment,  we  deal  first  with  views  that  are 
more  or  less  theoretic,  and  next  with  those  based  directly  on  experiment.  Res- 
pecting the  theoretic  views,  it  is  by  no  means  easy  to  find  a  satisfactory  basis  of 
classification.  There  are  many  cross-connexions  rendering  it  impossible  to  class- 
ify either  genetically  or  according  to  schools  of  thought.  We  have  adopted  the 
simpler  plan  of  grouping  according  to  general  resemblance  ;  Wundt  and  Kulpe, 
who  held  the  apperceptive  view  ;  James  and  Hoffding,  who  attached  great  impor- 
tance to  imagery  antecedent  to  the  Will  Act ;  and  Ebbinghaus  and  Ribot,  whose 
preoccupations  were  distinctly  physiological.  Stout  occupies  a  central  position 
and  seems  to  be  connected  with  each  of  the  different  schools. 

(2)  Outlines  of  Psychology  (trans,  by  Judd),  p.  218. 

2 


—  i8  — 

Volitions,  the  former  are  indistinguishable  from  the 
emotional  process,  the  latter  have  special  characteris- 
tics. 

In  contrast  to  the  first  stages  of  Volition  which  cannot 
be  clearly  distinguished  from  an  ordinary  emotional 
process,  the  last  stages  of  Volition  are  absolutely 
characteristic.  They  are  accompanied  by  specific  feel- 
ings. These  are  feelings  of  resolution  and  feelings  of 
decision . 

The  relatively  greater  intensity  of  the  feeling  of  decision,  is 
probably  due  to  its  contrast  with  the  preceding  feeling  of  doubt 
which  attends  the  wavering  between  different  motives,  (i) 

For  Wundt,  it  is  not  possible  that  a  Volition  should 
arise  from  pure  intellectual  considerations. 

The  assumption  that  a  volition  may  arise  from  pure  intellec- 
tual considerations,  or  that  a  decision  may  appear,  which  is  oppo- 
sed to  the  inclinations  expressed  in  the  feeling  is  a  psychological 
contradiction  in  itself.  It  rests  on  the  concept  of  a  will  which  is 
transcendental  and  absolutely  distinct  from  actual  psychical  voli- 
tion. (2) 

Wundt  has  greatly  complicated  his  theory  of  Volition 
by  identifying  Volition  with  Apperception.  Between 
active  predetermined  Apperception  preceeded  by  its 
characteristic  feeling  of  expectancy,  and  Volition,  there 
is,  he  affirms,  no  essential  difference.  He  bases  his 
theory  on  a  close  analysis  of  reactions,  in  which  Voli- 
tion (the  will  to  react)  and  Apperception  (the  intellectual 
assimilation  of  the  excitant)  seem  so  fused  and  united, 
that  they  may  only  be  distinguished  logically.  A  con- 
firmation of  his  theory,  he  finds,  in  the  close  alliance 
of  attention  (explicit  Apperception)  and  Vol  tion. 

(1)  Outlines  of  Psychology  (trans,  by  Judd),  p.  210. 

(2)  Ibid.,  p.  207. 


—  ig  — 

In  the  old  faculty  Psychology  «  attention »  and 
«  will  »  were  regarded  as  different  though  sometimes  as 
related  forces,  but  never  as  identical.  The  truth  is  that 
these  two  concepts  relate  to  the  same  class  of  psychical 
process. 

Will  was  not  explained  by  its  antecedents  because  the  central 
point  in  the  development,  namely,  the  fact  that  so-called  involun- 
tary attention  is  only  a  simpler  form  of  internal  volition  was 
entirely  overlooked  (i). 

To  conclude  our  review  of  Wund's  theory  of  the 
Will  we  give  one  more  quotation,  in  which,  will 
clearly  appear,  the  characteristics  of  the  «  Emotional 
Theory  » .  Our  reason  for  treating  his  doctrine  at  such 
length,  is,  that  it  facilitates  the  understanding  of  many 
modern  theories  of  the  Will. 

Thus  volition  proves  to  be  a  fundamental  fact  from  which 
arise  all  those  processes  which  are  made  up  of  feelings.  In  the 
process  of  apperception  which  is  found  through  psychological 
analysis,  to  have  all  the  characteristics  of  a  voluntary  act,  we  have 
the  direct  relation  between  the  fundamental  fact  of  volition  and  the 
ideational  contents  of  experience.  Volitional  processes  are  further- 
more recognised  as  being  unitary  processes  and  as  being  uniform 
in  character  in  the  midst  of  all  the  variations  in  their  components. 
As  a  result  there  arises  an  immediate  feeling  of  this  unitary  inter- 
connection, in  connection  with  the  feeling  of  activity  which  accom- 
panies all  volition.  This  feeling  of  unity  is  then  carried  over  to  all 
conscious  contents  because  of  the  relation  mentioned,  in  which 
these  conscious  contents  stand  to  volition.  This  feeling  of  the 
inter- connection  of  all  psychical  experiences  of  an  individual  is 
called  the  Ego.  It  is  a  feeling,  not  an  idea,  as  it  is  often  called. 
Like  all  feeling  however,  it  is  connected  with  certain  sensations  and 
ideas  e.  g.  idea  of  one's  own  body  (2). 

For  Oswald  Kiilpe  the  Will  is  a  subjective  power  or  o.  Kuipe. 
capacity  to  exercise  a  determining  influence  upon  cons- 

(1)  Outlines  of  Psychology  (trans,  by  Judd),  p.  247. 

(2)  Ibid.,  p.  249. 


—    20    — 

cious  processes  or  movements  of  the  body.  This 
capacity  need  not  itself  be  conscious,  at  the  same  time, 
there  must  be  consciousness  at  least  of  the  result  ot  the 
activity.  One  phenomenon  which  is  characteristic  of 
the  Will  is  the  consciousness  of  the  result,  the  end  or 
aim  of  its  activity.  Kiilpe  defines  voluntary  action  as 
«  the  internal  or  external  activity  of  a  subject  which 
is  conditioned  and  sustained  by  the  conscious  idea  of 
its  result  »  (i).  Internal  and  external  voluntary  actions 
differ  simply  in  the  special  quality  of  the  idea  of  their 
end,  and  of  the  processes  which  follow  in  its  train. 
Memory  and  Introspection  can  discover  but  a  small 
portion  of  the  psychological  conditions  of  a  volition. 
All  the  motives  cannot  be  known.  Kiiipe  regards  the 
part  played  by  the  Will  in  the  development  of  the  idea 
of  the  Ego  as  most  important. 

The  experience  that  we  are  not  wholly  at  the  mercy  of  exter- 
nal influence,  and  impressions,  but  can  hold  our  own  against  them 
by  choice  and  action  i.  e.  the  fact  of  Apperception  or  Will,  is  one 
of  the  most  important  incentives  to  the  differentiation  of  the  Ego 
and  non-Ego  (2). 

Kiilpe  sides  with  Wundt  in  his  view  of  the  Will. 

We  shall  prefer  to  adopt  Wundt's  view  which  considers  apper- 
ception and  will  as  ultimately  one  and  the  same  function. 

For  the  characteristic  energy  which  we  attribute  to  will  and  the 
energy  which  makes  it  the  supreme  power  in  our  conscious  life, 
would  seem  to  flow  from  one  single  source  —  apperception.  All 
the  peculiar  attributes  of  apperception  are  also  predicable  of  will; 
so  that  will,  we  may  say,  is  only  a  special  mode  of  apperception. 
The  phenomena  of  will  are  thus  seen  to  be  referable  partly  to  the 
laws  of  reproduction  and  partly  to  apperception  (3). 

(i)  Outlines  of  Psychology,  p.  447  (trans,  by  Titchener). 
(i)  Ibid.,  p.  449. 
(3)  Ibid  ,  p.  45o. 


—    21    — 

Kiilpe  discusses  at  length  the  question  of  an  elemen- 
tary Will  quality.  «This  elementary  quality*,  he  writes, 
«  if  it  existed,  could  not  possibly  be  the  distinguishing 
characteristic  of  voluntary  action...  Voluntary  action 
assuredly  does  not  necessarily  imply  a  feeling  of  inter- 
nal initiative,  the  sensation  of  an  effort  of  decision,  or 
the  intensity  of  desire  or  aspiration.  »  And  he  con- 
cludes finally  «  that  the  elementary  will  quality  is 
nothing  else  than  definite  sensation  qualities  (i).  » 

For  James  voluntary  movements  are  secondary,  not  w.  James, 
primary  functions  of  the  organism.  Reflex,  instinctive 
and  emotional  movements  are  all  primary.  Volition 
presupposes  foresight,  hence,  no  creature  not  endowed 
with  divinatory  power,  can  voluntarily  perform  an 
act,  to  be  done  for  the  first  time.  A  supply  of  ideas  of 
the  various  movements  that  are  possible,  left  in  the 
memory  by  the  experience  of  their  involuntary  perfor- 
mance, is  thus  the  first  prerequisite  of  voluntary  life. 
«  The  only  direct  outward  effects  of  our  will,  are,  he 
writes,  bodily  movements  (2).  »  Kinaesthetic  images, 
which  precede,  according  to  James,  all  external  volun- 
tary acts,  are  revived  memory  images  of  experienced 
acts. 

Whether  or  no  there  be  anything  else  in  the  mind  at  the 
moment  we  consciously  will  a  certain  act,  a  mental  conception 
made  up  of  memory  images  of  these  sensations,  defining  what 
special  act  it  is,  must  be  there  (3). 

This  important  sentence  expresses  James'  Classical 
Theory  of  volition,  which  we  shall  see  presently  has 
been  criticised  and  rejected  by  some  modern  psycho- 
logists. 

(i)  Outlines  of  Psychology,  p.  266  (trans,  by  Titchener). 
(a)  Principles  of  Psychology,  vol.  II,  c.  26. 
(3)  Ibid.,  p.  492. 


—   22    — 

In  James'  theory  of  the  Will,  ideo-motor  action  plays 
an  important  part.  The  idea  of  an  act  tends  to  bring 
about  the  act.  If  dwelt  on,  and  attended  to,  an  idea 
grows  stronger  and  calls  more  loudly  tor  realisation. 
Meanwhile,  the  idea  tends  to  express  itself  outwardly 
by  impulsive  movements  or  quickened  breathing.  Fin- 
ally, it  realises  itself,  if  still  dwelt  on. 

Men  have  often  jumped  from  towers,  or  plunged  into 
chasms,  from  the  gruesome  force  of  the  idea  of  the  act, 
of  which  idea  they  could  not  rid  themselves. 

James'  rejection  of  the  Feeling  of  Innervation,  which 
was  defended  and  maintained  by  Helmholtz,  Wundt, 
Bain,  Mach  and  others,  is  regarded  as  an  important 
event  in  Will  Psychology. 

All  our  ideas  of  movement,  including  those  of  the  effort  which  it 
requires,  as  well  as  those  of  its  direction,  its  extent,  its  strength 
and  its  velocity,  are  images  of  peripheral  sensations,  either  remote 
or  resident  in  the  moving  parts,  or  in  the  other  parts  which  sym- 
pathetically move  with  them,  and  in  consequence  of  the  diffusive 
wave. 

In  fine,  James  writes  that  «  we  reach  the  heart  of 
our  inquiry  into  volition  when  we  ask  by  what  pro- 
cesses it  is,  that  the  thought  of  any  given  object  comes 
to  prevail  stably  in  the  mind,...  the  essential  achieve- 
ment of  the  Will,  when  it  is  most  '  voluntary  ',  is  to 
attend  to  a  difficult  object  and  hold  it  fast  before  the 
mind.  » 

This  effort  of  attention  is  for  James  the  essential 
phenomenon  of  the  Will  Indeed  the  only  resistance 
which  our  Will  can  possibly  experience  is  the  resis- 
tance which  some  idea  offers  to  being  attended  to.  On 
the  other  hand  the  spontaneity,  and  force  of  Will  spring 
from  the  idea  which  is  attended  to. 

This  is  what  we  have  seen  in  interest,  in  emotion,  in  common 
ideo-motor  action,  in  hypnotic  suggestion,  in  morbid  impulsion,  in 


—   23    — 

'  voluntas  invita  '  —  the  impelling  idea  is  simply  the  one  which 
possesses  the  attention  ! !  The  steadfast  occupancy  of  conscience  is 
the  prime  condition  of  impulsive  power  ! !  It  is  still  more  obviously 
the  prime  condition  of  inhibitive  power,  (i) 

We  have  referred  to  the  so-called  Classical  Will 
Theory  of  James.  This  theory  of  the  Kinaesthetic 
Image  was  proposed  as  a  substitute  for  the  old  theory 
of  the  Feeling  of  Innervation,  held  by  Wundt,  Bain, 
Mach  and  others.  It  is  clearly  exposed  in  the  follow- 
ing quotations  from  James'  chapter  on  the  Will  : 

The  consciousness  of  muscular  exertion,  being  impossible 
without  movement  effected  somewhere,  must  be  an  afferent  and 
not  an  efferent  sensation  ;  a  consequence  and  not  an  antecedent  of 
the  movement  itself.  An  idea  of  the  amount  of  muscular  exertion 
requisite  To  perform  a  certain  movement  can  consequently  be  no- 
thing other  than  an  anticipatory  image  of  the  movement's  sensible 
effects. 

There  are  two  orders  of  Kinaesthetic  impressions. 
The  remote  ones,  made  on  the  eye,  ear  or  other  mem- 
ber distant  from  that  in  action  and  the  resident  ones 
made  in  the  moving  parts  themselves,  muscles, 
joints  etc.  «  An  anticipatory  image,  then,  of  the  sen- 
sorial  consequences  of  a  movement,  plus  (on  certain 
occasions)  the  fiat  that  these  consequences  shall  become 
actual,  is  the  only  psychological  state  which  introspec- 
tion lets  us  discern  as  the  forerunner  of  our  voluntary 
acts.  » 

This  theory  was  adopted  by  MacDougall,  Miinster-  criticism  of 
berg  and  Wundt,  and  opposed  by  Thorndike,  and  asjames'ctass*- 

i     11  i       TTT       j  i  j    r»  i  •     cal  Theory. 

we  shall  see  by  Woodworth  and  Burnett,  who  put  it 
to  the  test  of  experiment. 

(i)  James  was  not  the  first  to  hold  such  a  view.  It  was  defended  by  Duns 
Scotus  in  the  i3th  century.  Vide  :  DUNS  SCOTI  Capitalia  opera.  Havre  (La  Bonne 
Parole).  James,  often  betrays,  as  he  admits  himself  «  a  sneaking  fondness  for  the 
old-fashioned  soul. » 


—  24  — 

Prof.  Burnett  of  Bowden  College  made  experiments 
on  back  and  forward  movements  ol  hand  and  leg,  at 
maximum  rates,  and  found  that  the  existence  of  such 
images  was  impossible. 

In  the  limited  field  under  consideration,  that  of  voluntary 
movements  of  the  back  and  forward  type,  the  images  of  neither 
resident  sensations  from  the  limbs,  nor  of  remote  sensations  as 
from  the  eye,  ear  or  skin,  showing  how  the  moving  part,  looks  or 
sounds  or  feels,  can  furnish  an  adequate  cue  for  the  occurence  of 
actual  movements  at  a  maximum  rate.  The  protests  of  Thorndike 
and  of  others,  against  the  classical  theory  of  volition,  seem  in  so 
far  to  be  justified,  (i) 

Prof.  Woodworth  of  Colombia  University  criticised 
James'  theory  with  great  vigour  and  ingenuity,  «  It  is 
natural  to  suppose  that  if  any  idea  is  to  have  the  power 
to  produce  a  movement  it  should  be  the  idea  of  the 
movement  »  (2).  He  then  proceeds  to  quote  from 
MacDougall  and  Wundt. 

«  The  kind  of  idea  that  tends  to  issue  most  directly 
in  action,  writes  MacDougall,  is  the  idea  of  a  move- 
ment, the  Kinaesthetic  image.  »  Wundt's  formula  is 
that  voluntary  movement  considered  as  a  phenomena 
of  conscience  «  consists  simply  in  the  apperception  of 
an  idea  of  movement.  » 

Prof.  Woodworth  made  experiments  on  thirteen 
subjects,  making  them  perform  various  movements,  as, 
opening  the  mouth,  wagging  the  jaw,  winking,  opening 
and  closing  the  eyes,  manipulating  scissors  and  for- 
ceps, etc.  (3).  They  were  told  to  observe  what  kind  of 
imagery  they  had.  Of  128  single  introspections  : 

(1)  Essay  by  C.  BOBNKTT,  Studies  in  Philosophy  and  Psychology.  New  York, 
1906. 

(2)  Same  volume.  Essay  by  WOODWORTH. 

(3)  Woodworth  wa«  not  fortunate  in  the  details  of  his  method. 


—    25    — 

27  Kinaesthetic  imagery, 

27  Visual  imagery, 

17  Other  kinds  of  imagery, 

3o  Only  peripheral  sensations, 

27  Absence  of  all  sensorial  elements,  whether  exter- 
nal impressions  or  images. 

Only  in  10  °/0  of  cases  was  the  imagery  satisfactory. 
Nearly  5o  %  of  cases  showed  no  imagery. 

The  Kinaesthetic  images  were  neither  unequivocal 
nor  accurate,  often  they  pictured  a  slow  movement, 
when  a  rapid  one  was  about  to  result.  «  The  kinaes- 
thetic  imagery  of  many  and  probably  of  nearly  all 
persons  is  incapable  of  the  minute  gradations  which 
those  persons  can  introduce  into  their  voluntary  move- 
ments. »  Prof .  Woodworth  affirms  that  most  so  called 
motor  imagery  is  spurious,  consisting  in  reality  of  peri- 
pherally excited  sensations  of  movement. 

The  kinaesthetic  image  of  the  present  condition  of  a 
member  about  to  be  moved  is  however  very  important. 
The  kinaesthetic  image  of  the  future  movement  is  of 
little  importance. 

James  poses  as  the  first  pre-requisite  of  voluntary 
life  «  a  supply  of  ideas  of  the  various  movements  that 
are  possible,  left  in  the  memory  by  experience  »,  Wood- 
worth  corrects  this,  to  «  a  knowledge  of  the  various 
effects  that  can  be  produced.  »  In  voluntary  move- 
ment, not  only  is  imagery  a  bye-product  and  epi-phe- 
nomenon,  but  also  attention  and  intention  appear 
unnecessary.  The  adjusting  of  the  nervous  system  for 
the  movement  alone  seems  necessary. 

Not  only  is  the  image  inadequate  but  the  very  thought,  the 
field  of  attention  just  prior  in  the  movement,  is  often  inadequate 
as  a  distinguishing  mark  of  the  movement.  It  would  not  serve  to 
identify  the  act  among  all  the  acts  that  can  be  intended  or  executed. 


—    26    — 

The  intention  is  not  always  present,  and  is  seldom  fully  present  in 
the  field  of  attention  at  the  moment  just  preceding  the  innervation 
of  the  movement. 

Much  of  Wood  worth's  criticism  of  the  Classical  theory 
is  just.  However,  his  experiments  were  not  sufficien- 
tly methodical  or  exact.  It  demands  a  very  high  power 
of  introspection  to  speak  with  surety  on  questions  of 
imagery  and  yet  some  of  his  subjects  had  not  sufficient 
experience.  Again  exception  might  well  be  taken  to 
such  movements  as  winking  and  opening  the  mouth. 
They  are  hardly  typical  voluntary  movements.  Fur- 
ther evidence  against  James'  Theory  has  come  to  light, 
owing  to  recent  researches  at  Louvain.  The  intensely 
automatic  character  of  a  great  part  of  mental  activity, 
which  «  Will  »  researches  discover,  goes  to  show  that 
imagery  anticipatory  to  action,  muscular  or  mental,  is 
superfluous. 

e.  HBffding.  The  Theory  of  Hoffding  indeed,  differs  little  from 
that  of  James.  In  spontaneous  conation  we  have  the 
first,  in  choice,  the  later  type  of  voluntary  activity. 

La  definition  ordinaire  et  qui  convient  a  tous  les  degre's  est 
celle  qui  fait  de  la  volonte  tout  le  cote  aclif  de  la  vie  consciente  (i). 

Attention  is  fixed  on  a  Kinaesthetic  image  and  the  act 
follows  of  itself. 

Une  fois  que  nous  nous  sommes  prepares  a  executer  un  mou- 
vement  1'attention  n'a  qu'a  se  porter  sur  une  image  kinesthesique 
pour  que  le  mouvement  s'accomplisse  avec  facilite*  et  rapidite. 
Cette  preparation  interne  par  laquelle  la  conscience  adopte  en 
quelque  sorte  ou  fixe  le  mouvement  tandis  que  nous  nous  identi- 
fions  pleinement  avec  1'image  kinesthesique  et  le  sentiment  qui 
lui  correspond  ne  peut  se  decrire  plus  en  detail. 

Elle  constitue  1'element  fondamental  de  la  conscience  du  mouve- 
ment volontaire,  et  on  ne  peut  le  connaitre  que  par  Tintrospection, 

(i)  Esquisse  d'une  Ptychologie,  c.  VII,  p.  417. 


comme  aussi  d'une  maniere  ge'nerale  le  processes  interne  par  lequel 
nous  eVoquons  et  fixons  une  image  ou  une  suite  de  pensees.  De 
meme  que  dans  le  souvenir  je  m'identifie  au  moi  qui  autrefois  a 
eprouve  tel  phenomene,  de  meme  ce  qui  constitue  la  decision  de 
1'acte  volontaire  c'est  que  je  fixe  ma  pensee  sur  moi-meme  comme 
agissant  d'une  certaine  maniere  dans  un  avenir  plus  ou  moins  rap- 
proche  !... 

Tandis  que  le  souvenir  est  une  perception  dirigee  sur  le  passe 
et  en  grande  partie  passive,  1'acte  volontaire  est  une  perception 
dirigee  sur  1'avenir  et  en  grande  partie  active  (i). 

Hoffding  describes  the  Sentiment  of  Liberty  as  ari- 
sing from  our  intimate  adoption  and  assimilation  of 
the  act  of  decision  or  choice. 

C'est  en  partie  par  cette  intime  adoption  de  la  resolution  volon- 
taire, et  du  choix  dans  notre  essence,  qu'il  faut  expliquer  le  senti- 
ment de  liberte  que  nous  avons  en  toute  resolution  forte.  Nous 
sentons  Faction  comme  une  irradiation  de  notre  propre  etre  interne. 
Toutefois  ce  sentiment  de  liberte  est  dQ  aussi  a  1'etat  d'incertitude, 
d'arret  et  d'hesitation  qui  caracterise  la  deliberation  (2) . 

There  is  place  to  distinguish  between  the  sentiments 
of  unity,  of  resolution,  and  of  action.  The  last  marks 
perhaps  a  certain  consciousness  of  liberty.  The  first, 
an  intimate  adoption  of  the  choice  or  decision ;  and  the 
second  the  disappearance  of  doubt,  hesitation,  and  con- 
trary motives. 

Hoffding  has  not  sufficiently  analysed  the  contents 
of  conscience  during  a  voluntary  act,  and  seems  to 
confound  these  three  different  types  of  sentiment  into  a 
so  called  «  Sentiment  of  Liberty  ». 

The  Theory  of  Ebbinghaus,  like  that  of  MiinsterbergH.Ebbinghaus 
is    essentially   associationist.     In   infants,   he  writes, 
there  are  instincts  consisting  of  sensations  of  hunger, 
thirst,   etc.,   mostly  painful,  and  movements,  crying, 

(i)  Esquisse  d'une  Psychologic,  c.  VII,  p.  417-8. 
(a)  Ibid.,  p.  43o. 


—    28    — 

turning,  etc.  which  are  mostly  reflex,  and  which  tend 
to  banish  the  pain.  Such  instinctive  acts  being  repeated 
and  being  successful,  an  idea  of  the  final  result  of 
such  processes  is  formed  in  the  infant's  mind.  He  now 
begins  to  act  with  the  idea  of  the  pleasure,  to  be  gained, 
or  pain  to  be  avoided,  already  in  his  mind  and  fore- 
seen. In  a  word  the  representation  is  already  conscious 
before  the  process  directed  towards  its  realisation  is 
well  begun. 

The  instinct  now  «  foresees  »,  and  thereon  the  Will 
exists,  for,  writes  Ebbinghaus,  Will  is  nothing  else 
than  instinct  endowed  with  prescience.  The  Will 
then  consists  of,  i.  sensations  peculiar  to  instinct, 
2.  sensations  of  pleasure  and  pain  in  movement,  3.  pre- 
vision of  the  end  :  the  sensations  and  representations 
are  for  Ebbinghaus  the  conceptual  elements  ;  the 
instincts  and  simple  voluntary  acts  are  the  genetic  ele- 
ments of  psychical  life .  Now,  the  mind  becomes 
gradually  stored  with  representations  of  means,  conse- 
quences, difficulties,  favourable  circumstances  etc., 
which  come  into  play  when  the  mind  foresees,  and 
which  act  as  motives. 

Acts  then  which  spring,  not  from  external  impres- 
sions, but  from  internal  representations  are  called 
«free»,  for  they  are  determined,  not  by  anything  with- 
out the  soul  but  by  the  soul  itself— they  come  from 
the  very  life  of  the  soul  itself. 

This  theory  does  not  offer  an  explanation  for  certain 
psychical  facts  of  Volition,  i.  The  sentiment  of  activ- 
ity is  not  explained  2.  the  relative  value  ot  motives  is 
not  explained  3.  distinction  between  doing  an  act  with 
knowledge  of  the  end  and  doing  acts  on  account  of,  or 
to  attain  the  end  are  not  distinguished.  Surely  there 
is  a  difference  between  deliberately  '  coasting  '  down  a 


hill  on  a  bicycle  and  '  coasting  '  down  because  your 
chain  and  brakes  are  broken.  In  the  first  case  we  find 
in  consciousness  a  feeling  of  purpose  ;  of  personal 
initiative;  in  fine,  of  spontaneous  self-determined  activ- 
ity, but  not  so  in  the  second  case.  We  hear  nothing 
of  this  sentiment  of  purpose  in  Ebbinghaus'  analysis. 

Ribot  finds  in  the  Will  two  distinct  elements  :  T.  Ribot. 

L'etat  de  conscience,  le  «  je  veux  »  qui  constate  une  situation 
mais  qui  n'a  par  lui-meme  aucune  efficacite  ;  et  un  mecanisme  psy- 
cho-physiologique  tres  complexe  en  qui  seul  reside  le  pouvoir  d'agir 
ou  d'empecher  (i). 

Every  conscious  state  tends  to  express  itself  by  a 
movement  or  act.  This  active  tendency  or  ideo- 
motor  activity  is  strong,  moderate,  or  weak.  When 
it  is  moderate  the  voluntary  act  is  reasonable.  When 
the  idea  is  abstract  the  tendence  is  very  feeble,  the  Will 
is  faint.  Fixed  ideas  mean  very  intense  volitions. 

L'activite  volontaire  nous  apparait  comme  un  moment  dans 
cette  evolution  ascendante  qui  va  du  reflexe  simple,  dont  la  ten- 
dance au  mouvement  est  irresistible,  a  1'idee  abstraite  ou  la  tendance 
a  1'acte  est  a  son  minimum  (2). 

Ribot's  point  of  view  is  physiological  (3),  and  for  this 
reason,  he  regards  the  Will's  inhibitive  power,  as 
essentially  distinct  from  its  ordinary  choice  or  decision 
power. 

Pour  la  psychologic  fondee  sur  la  seule  observation  interieure 
cette  distinction  entre  permettre  et  empecher  a  peu  d'importance  ; 
mais  pour  la  psychologic  qui  demande  au  mecanisme  physiolo- 
gique  quelqu'  eclaircissement  sur  les  operations  de  1'esprit  —  et 
qui  tient  1'action  reflexe  pour  le  type  de  toute  activite"  —  elle  est 
capitale  (4). 

(1)  Les  maladies  de  la  volonte,  p.  3. 

(2)  Ibid.,  p.  12. 

(3)  Ce  n'est  pas  1'etat  de  conscience  comme  tel  mais  bien  letat  physiologique 
correspondant  qui  se  transforms  en  un  acte. 

(4)  Les  maladies  de  la  volonte,  p.  i?. 


—  3o  — 

For  Ribot  the  Will  is  the  «  Me  »  in  as  much  as  it 
reacts  to  sensations  or  impressions  —  it  is  a  «  personal 
reaction ;  »  it  only  partly  betrays  itself  under  the  form 
of  this  or  that  predominant  motive. 

Le  motif  preponderant  n'est  qu'une  portion  de  la  cause  et  tou- 
jours  la  plus  faible,  quoique  la  plus  visible ;  et  il  n'a  d'efficacite 
qu'autant  qu'il  est  choisi  c'est-a-dire  qu'il  entre  en  titre  de  partie 
integrante  dans  la  somme  des  etats  qui  constituent  le  moi  (3). 

In  fine  Ribot  attaches  very  little  importance  to  the 
introspective  data  of  Volition.  As  his  point  of  view  is 
radical  it  is  well  to  quote  the  whole  passage. 

La  volition  que  les  psychologues  interieurs  ont  si  souvent 
observed,  analysee  et  commentee  n'est,  done  pour  nous  qu'un 
simple  etat  de  conscience.  Elle  n'est  qu'un  effet  de  ce  travail 
psycho-physiologique,  tant  de  fois  de'crit  dont  une  partie  seulement 
entre  dans  la  conscience  sous  la  forme  d'une  deliberation.  De  plus 
elle  n'est  la  cause  de  rien.  Les  actes  et  mouvements  qui  la  suivent 
resultent  directement  des  tendances,  sentiments,  images  et  idees 
qui  ont  abouti  a  se  coordonner  sous  la  forme  d'un  choix.  C'est  de 
ce  groupe  que  vient  toute  1'efficacite  (4). 

His  position  is  indefensible  both  psychologically  and 
physiologically.  Psychologically,  we  have  data  of  cons- 
cience e.  g.  the  sentiment  of  action,  which  would  be 
meaningless  and  superfluous,  in  Ribot's  theory  ;  phy- 
siologically, there  is  not  a  shred  of  authenticated  fact 
with  regard  to  the  physiological  correlatives  of  volition. 
Absolutely  nothing  is  yet  known  of  cell  activity  during 
choice  or  decision. 
Bain,  Bren-  There  are  for  Bain  two  fundamental  component 

tano,  Stout.       ,  •       i      IIT-H  i-i-  »  •  /• 

elements  in  the  Will.  «  First,  the  existence  or  a  spon- 
taneous tendency  to  execute  movements  independent 
of  the  stimulus  of  sensations  or  feelings;  and,  secondly, 

(1)  Les  maladies  de  la  volonte,  p.  3a. 

(2)  Ibid.,  p.  179. 


—  3i   — 

the  link  between  a  present  action  and  a  present  feeling, 
whereby  the  one  comes  under  the  control  of  the 
other  (i).  »  Spontaneity  precedes  sensation,  and  is  at 
the  outset  independent  of  any  stimulus  from  without ; 
and  that  activity  is  a  more  intimate  and  inseparable 
property  of  our  constitution  than  any  of  our  sensations, 
and,  in  fact,  enters  as  a  component  part  into  every 
one  of  the  senses,  giving  them  the  character  of  com- 
pounds, while  itself  is  a  simple  and  elementary  pro- 
perty. Bain's  theory  of  Motives  is  at  the  root  of  his 
description  of  the  growth  of  voluntary  power.  «  The 
motives  to  voluntary  action,  he  writes,  are  unque- 
stionably summed  up  in  pleasure  and  pain(2)»  and  again 

The  immediate  operation  of  pleasure  and  pain  upon  the  Will 
receives  decisive  confirmation  when  we  study  the  lowest  forms  of 
life,  and  the  initial  stages  of  the  highest  forms.  The  processes  of 
the  understanding  in  regard  to  ideas,  are  in  these  instances  neces- 
sarily inchoate  or  imperfect,  and  their  imperfection  would  be  felt  in 
crippling  the  voluntary  activity,  supposing  it  depended  on  ideas. 
Yet  there  is  no  sign  of  such  crippling,  indeed  the  conservation  of 
life  would  be  precarious  if  the  action  of  The  will  were  not  promptly 
shown  under  present  pleasure  or  pain,  and  more  especially  pain  (3). 

It  is  interesting  to,  note  that  James  by  no  means 
allowed  so  exclusive  a  role  to  pleasure-pain.  Objects 
and  thoughts  of  objects  start  our  actions,  but  pleasure 
and  pain  which  action  brings,  modify  its  course  and 
regulate  it.  And  later  the  thoughts  of  pleasure  and 
pain  acquire  impulsive  and  inhibitive  power.  So 
widespread  and  searching  is  the  influence  of  pleasure 
—  pain  upon  our  activities  that  a  premature  philosophy 
has  decided  that  these  are  the  only  spurs  to  action. 

(1)  The  Emotions  and  the  Will,  p.  3aj. 

(2)  Notes  on  Volition.  Mind.  April,  1891. 

(3)  Ibid. 


—   32   — 

To  conclude,  I  am  far  from  denying  the  exceeding  prominence 
and  importance  of  the  part  which  pleasure  and  pain  (both  felt  and 
represented)  play  in  the  motivation  of  our  conduct,  but  I  must 
insist  that  it  is  no  exclusive  part  and  that,  conditionally  with  these 
mental  objects,  innumerable  others  have  an  exactly  similar  impul- 
sive and  inhibitive  power  (i). 

Brentano  derived  conation  from  feeling.  «  There  is 
a  germ  of  conation  in  the  longing  after  an  object ;  in 
hope  this  germ  begins  to  unfold ;  the  desire  to  procure 
the  object  and  the  courage  to  make  the  attempt  are 
progressive  stages  in  its  development  (2).  » 

Mr.  Stout  rightly  points  out  the  ambiguity  of  the 
term  feeling  and  shows  that  conation  is  essentially 
distinct  from  pleasant  and  painful  feeling,  just  as  atten- 
tion is  distinct  from  desire  or  aversion  (3).  Conation 
and  attention  agree  in  having  a  dynamic  aspect,  and  in 
the  case  of  both,  this  dynamic  aspect  seems  to  belong 
to  their  intrinsic  nature  as  modes  of  conscience. 

Attention  produces  changes  in  the  flow  of  ideas, 
desire  and  aversion  tend  to  produce  bodily  action  and 
when  they  culminate  in  voluntary  determination, 
bodily  action  takes  place  as  a  consequence.  Attention 
tends  too,  to  produce  bodily  movement,  as  thought- 
readers  show.  Simple  attentiveness  passes  into  what  is 
recognized  as  conation  by  insensible  gradations,  and  is 
never  absolutely  separable  from  it.  The  striving  aspect 
of  conscience  is  prominent  in  proportion  as  the  idea  of 
the  object  is  evasive  and  difficult  to  detain  in  the 
degree  of  distinctness  required  for  its  pleasure  giving 
effectiveness. 

Mr.  Stout's  theory  is   little  different  from  that  of 

(1)  Principles  of  Psychology.  Vol.  II,  p.  558. 

(2)  Quoted  by  Mr  STOUT  in  Analytic  Psychology,  Vol.  II.  c.  VI. 

(3)  Ibid. 


—  33  — 

Wundt,  and  Kiilpe.  «  Wundt  has  shown  that  Will  and 
attention  are  ultimately  related  and  has  employed 
the  term  apperception  to  denote  their  common  consti- 
tutent(i).  » 

Together  with  H  off  ding,  Kiilpe  and  Ribot,  Mr.  Stout 
teaches  that  the  big  factor  in  choice  and  decision  is 
hidden  away  in  the  personal  reaction  of  the  me. 

The  recognised  reasons  for  a  decision  can  never  constitute  the 
entire  cause  of  a  decision.  Behind  them  there  always  lies  the  self 
as  a  whole  and  what  this  involves  can  never  be  completely  analysed 
or  stated  in  the  form  of  definite  reasons  or  special  motives. 

We  add  one  more  quotation  from  Mr  Stout,  which 
brings  out  a  point  of  view  discovered  by  Ach  in  his 
experiments,  that,  in  true  decisions  we  find  in  cons- 
cience the  note  «  I  will  (wish)  really  »  «  je  veux  vraie- 
ment.  •»  Mr  Stout  writes. 

The  mental  attitude  of  voluntary  decision  is  distinguished  and 
characterised  by  the  dependance  of  the  act  on  the  belief  that  we  are 
going  to  perform  it.  The  predominance  of  the  idea  of  the  end 
must  be  of  such  a  kind  as  to  involve  the  mental  affirmation  that 
our  action  will  be  directed  to  its  attainment.  The  mere  vividness 
of  the  idea  is  of  comparatively  little  significance  (2). 

This  last  remark  of  Mr  Stout,  supported  as  it  is  by 
experiments  of  Ach  and  Prum,  ought  to  some  extent, 
to  modify  prevailing  theories  of  Ideo- motor  force, 
which  were  received  too  readily  from  James,  Ribot 
and  others. 

An  interesting  '  rapprochement'  between  Hofiding 
and  Stout,  might  here  be  made.  Stout  affirms  more 
than  once,  that. 

The  general  point  of  view  in  Deliberation  may  be  described  as 
follows.  A  certain  line  of  action  beirg  suggested  as  possible  I 

(i)  KULPE,  Outlines  of  Psychology,  p.  21 5. 
(j)  Analytic  Psychology.  Vol.  II,  p.  i3s. 


-34- 

contemplate  myself  as  I  shall  be  if  put  it  into  execution,  so  as  to 
make  it  part  of  my  actual  life-history  etc.  (i) 

Hoffding  too  refers  frequently  to  the  same  point  : 

De  meme  que  dans  le  souvenir,  je  m'identifie  au  moi  qui  autre- 
fois  a  eprouve  tel  phenomene,  de  meme  ce  qui  constitue  la  decision 
de  1'acte  volontaire  c'est  que  je  fixe  ma  pensee  sur  moi-meme  com  me 
agissant  d'une  certaine  maniere  dans  un  avenir  plus  ou  moins 
rapproche  (2). 

This  prevision  of  the  effects  on  self  of  the  supposed- 
act,  is  likewise  a  point  of  agreement,  between  the  two 
psychologists  mentioned  above,  and  Kiilpe.  Kiilpe 
agrees  too,  with  Stout,  Hoffding  and  Ribot  that  con- 
scious motives  represent  but  imperfectly  the  true  cause 
of  the  Will-Act. 

We  regard,  he  writes,  the  activity  of  the  Will,  as  the  expression  of 
the  totality  of  previous  experiences,  in  all  the  degrees  of  authority  and 
consequence  which  they  have  acquired  in  accordance  with  universal 
psychical  laws,  and  with  all  the  weight  of  influence  which  distin- 
guishes the  old  and  proved  from  the  new  and  strange.  It  is  for  the 
most  part,  but  a  small  and  fragmentary  measure  of  this  which  finds 
its  way  into  consciousness  :  the  reserve  of  energy  which  gives  effi- 
cacy to  the  Will  lies  below  the  conscious  limen  (3). 

Will  Theories    So  far,  we  have  considered  the  Will  Theoresi  of 
,  Psychologists   experimental   in   a  wide  sense   of  the 

Experimental       r 

Psychologists,  term.  It  remains  for  us  to  refer  briefly  to  the  Will 
Theories  of  Psychologists  who  have  actually  set  them- 
selves, by  experiment,  to  solve  Will  Problems. 

Reaction-Experiments  were  first  tried.  Wundt, 
who  experimented  on  the  Will  thus  far,  maintained 
that  Reaction  Experiments  were  really  Will-Experi- 
ments. Treating  the  question  from  the  point  of  view 

(1)  Manual  of  Psychology,  Pt  604. 

(2)  Esquisse  dune  Psychologic,  p.  417. 

(3)  Outlines  of  Psychology,  p.  215  (Titchener). 


—  35  — 

of  his  theory  of  the  identity  of  Apperception  and  Will, 
he  saw,  in  the  ordinary  Reaction,  three  stages  i.  Per- 
ception 2.  Apperception  3.  Impulsive  Apperception. 
The  latter  stage  was  for  him  Volitional. 

This  view  of  Wundt  was  strongly  criticised.  Kiilpe 
wrote 

It  follows  from  the  extraordinary  power  of  practice  to  modify 
our  actions  that  choice-reactions  in  the  strict  sense  of  the  word,  do 
not  occur  beyond  the  first  beginnings  of  experimentation,  and  that 
the  reaction-times,  taken  at  different  stages  of  practice  are  less  com- 
parable here,  than  in  any  other  department  of  reaction- work  (i). 

Ach,  in  1905,  by  systematic  researches  on  Reaction- 
Times,  totally  disproved  Wundt's  contentions.  He 
showed  that  Wundt's  three  stage  process,  was  a  mere 
logical  schema,  unjustifed  by  facts.  He  formulated 
a  law  of  «  determining  tendencies  »  directed  towards 
the  refutation  of  the  Will-Theories  of  Associationists, 
like  Miinsterberg  and  Ebbinghaus. 

By  «  determining  tendencies  »  Ach  understood  the 
influence  caused  by  the  instruction  given  to  a  subject 
in  a  Reaction-Experiment,  whereby,  the  subject,  when 
the  proper  occasion  arose  would,  even  unconsciously, 
obey  the  task  given  him.  When,  say,  the  colour  '  red ' 
appeared,  the  subject  would,  automatically,  and  with- 
out any  conscious  act  of  Will,  react  with,  say,  his  left- 
hand,  had  he  been  so  instructed  before  the  experiment. 

r  Bonders. 

Among  the  first  to  try  choice-reactions  was  Bonders. 
He  gave  his  subjects  two  series  of  experiments  :  Discri- 
mination Reactions,  and  Choice  Reactions.  In  the 
first  series,  the  subjects  had  the  task  e.  g.  of  always 
reacting  with  the  same  hand,  though  now  red,  and  now 
blue  excitants  occurred.  The  subject  simply  *  discri- 

(i)  KULPE,  Outlines  of  Psychology,  p.  414  (Titchener). 


—  36  — 

mitated '  the  colour  and  reacted.  In  the  second 
series,  the  subjects  had  to  «  choose  »  ;  they  had  to 
react  with  the  right  hand  for  red,  and  the  left  hand  for 
blue  Donders  now  estimated  the  mean-times  for  the 
two  series  ;  substracted ;  and  gave  as  Reaction-Time 
for  the  interference  of  the  Will  in  the  second  series,  the 
difference  between  the  two  times  (i). 

Dorr.  Loosky  (2)  and  Dewey  (3),  Diirr  (4)  experimented  in 
the  same  direction.  They  introduced,  however,  much 
novelty  into  the  method  outlined  by  Wundt.  Theyused 
i.  introspections  2.  various,  complex,  external  move- 
ments calculated  to  call  for  voluntary  effort.  Diirr, 
for  instance,  made  his  subjects  pull  hair  out  of  their 
moustaches,  sing,  whistle,  or  sit  on  the  ground.  As 
a  result,  one  would  suspect,  i .  that  the  subjects  would 
be  disconcerted  2.  that  the  Reaction-Times  would  be 
so  long,  that  exact  introspection  would  be  impossible. 

In  recent,  years,  many  minor  researches  have  been 
carried  on  in  America.  While  in  Europe,  Dr  Narziss 
Ach  (5),  and  Drs  Michotte  and  Priim  of  Louvain  have 
made  the  first  important  contributions  to  experimental 
Will  Psychology. 

DrAch.  Dr  Ach,  contemporaneously  with  the  Louvain  res- 
earches, investigated  the  phenomenology  of  the  univocal 
Will  Act  :  that  is  of  the  decision  taking  the  following 
form  «  I  will  do  X  when  Y  appears  ». 

Drs  Michotte  and  Priim  (6)  studied  the  bilateral  Will 
Act.  «  1  will  do  X  or  Z  when  Y  appears  >•.  Here 

(1)  Donders  methrd  rested  on  the  false  supposition  that  the  only  varying  ele- 
ment in  the  conditions  of  the  experiments  was  the  «  chooting  ». 

(2)  Eine  Willenstheorie . 

(3)  The  Psychology  of  Effort. 

(4)  Die  Lehre  von  der  Aufmerksamkeit . 

(5)  Ueber  der  Willensakt  und  das  Temperamen'.  i  »io. 

(6)  MICHOTTE  AND  PRUM,  Le  Choix  volontaire.  19  o. 


-37- 

there  was  a  real  choice  to  be  made  —  that  between  X 
and  Z.  Here  too,  the  Will-Act,  was  made  during  the 
experiment  —  on  the  appearance  of  the  excitant  Y, 
while  in  Ach's  experiments  the  Will-Act  preceded  the 
appearance  of  the  excitant  —  it  preceded  the  experi- 
ment. 

The  method  of  Dr  Ach  was  as  follows  : 
The  subjects,  by  way  of  preparation,  memorised 
series  of  non-riming  syllables ,  until  strong  associations 
were  formed.  Next  they  received  the  instruction  «  to 
find  a  riming  syllable  for  the  syllable  that  would 
appear  ».  The  card-presenting  apparatus  (karten- 
wechsler)  then,  (after  due  signals  etc)  exhibited  one  of 
the  syllables  of  the  memorised  series.  Naturally  the 
following  member  of  the  series  tended  to  present  itself 
as  a  result  of  the  formed  associations.  However, 
the  subject,  had  in  accordance  with  the  instruction  to 
find  a  rime  and  to  react.  Naturally  the  effort  required 
was  somewhat  violent. 

Dr  Ach  creait  par  avance,  writes  M.  Michotte,  une  influence  des- 
tinee  a  contrecarrer  la  decision,  et  il  cherchait  ensuite  par  une  inter- 
vention volontaire  a  lutter  centre  cette  influence.  La  mesure  de  la 
force  de  volonte  est  donnee  par  la  grandeur  de  1'influence  contre 
laquelle  il  est  possible  de  lutrer.  L'influence  creee  e'tait  une  influence 
associative,  des  tendances  a  la  production  formees  par  un  certain 
nombre  de  repetitions  et  dans  i'experience  de  volonte  meme  le  sujet 
devait,  par  exemple,  trouver  une  syllabe  qui  rimait  avec  celle  don- 
nee com  me  excitant  et  qui  e'tait  liee  a  une  troisieme  differenie  par 
des  tendances  a  la  reproduction  plus  ou  moins  fortes  provenant  de 
1'exercice  de  memoire.  Dans  ce  cas  c'etait  le  nombre  des  repetitions 
qui  mesurait  indirectement  la  force  de  la  volonte".  L'auteur  a 
obtenu  par  ce  moyen  des  actes  de  volonte  tres  energiques  qu'il  a 
pu  analyser.  Ce  sont  done  des  actes  univoques.  Ils  portent  sur 
une  seule  alternative,  ce  que  le  sujet  doit  faire  d'apresl'instruction. 
Theoriquement  on  peut  toujours  voir  la  un  acte  de  choix  entre  agir 
et  ne  pas  agir,  mais  c'est  la  de  fait  une  distinction  purement  dia- 


lectique,  la  question  est  en  eflfet  de  savoir  si  le  sujet  envisageait  oui 
ou  non  les  deux  alternatives  d'agir  et  de  ne  pas  agir  ;  en  fait,  ce 
n'est  pas  le  cas. 

Ach  distinguished  four  factors  A.  the  subjective 
B.  the  objective  C.  the  actual  D.  the  conscience  of 
effort.  While  D.  was  only  found  in  energetic  deci- 
sions ;  the  subjective  factor  A,  feelings  of  strain  in 
the  head,  forehead,  and  organs  called  into  play,  were 
felt  in  almost  all  decisions.  Ach  well  analysed  these 
feelings,  although  they  had  already  been  treated  of  by 
Hoffding,  Ribot  and  others.  The  objective  factor 
B,  was  the  representation  of  the  end  in  view.  It  was 
present,  either  «  intentionally  »,  or  as  a  verbal  image, 
or  figuratively.  The  actual  factor  C.  was  the  «  Je 
veux  vraiment ;  »  a  personal  identification  of  the  deci- 
sion with  the  self;  an  activity,  felt  and  lived  and 
embraced.  The  «  Je  veux  vraiment »  excluded  other 
possibilities ;  it  is  a  simple,  unanalysable,  concrete  fact 
of  conscience. 

DrProm.  Priim's  method  was  perhaps,  better  planned  and 
more  searching.  He  offered  to  his  subject  two  alter- 
natives —  one  of  which  «  was  to  be  chosen  for  a  serious 
reason  ».  Two  numbers  were  presented  to  the  sub- 
ject. They  might  be  added  or  subtracted.  The  sub- 
ject then,  discussed  the  pros  and  cons,  and  reacted. 
Before  the  apparition  of  the  card  with  the  figures,  he 
had  been  instructed  «  that  two  numbers  would  appear, 
that  he  should  add  or  subtract,  and  that  for  serious 
reasons.  »  Full  introspections  were  noted  down  and 
reaction  times  carefully  taken.  For  the  subject,  the 
movement  of  reaction  gave  physical  expression  to  his 
voluntary  act. 

Nous  avons  pu  constater,  writes  Dr  Priim,  que  ie  mouvement 
prenait  spontanement  la  valeur  symbolique  d'une  realisation. 


Comme  si  le  mouvement  executait  1'alternative,  comme  si  Ton 
commandait  une  machine  qui  realisait  ou  bien  comme  si  le  mouve- 
ment communiquait  un  ordre  a  une  autre  personne. 

In  Priim's  experiments  the  act  of  choice  was  made 
during  the  reaction,  after  a  deliberation,  and  discussion 
of  motives.  In  Ach's  experiments  the  Will  act  was 
made  before  the  Excitant  appeared.  For  Ach  there 
was  no  discussion  of  motives;  this  formed  a  most 
fertile  and  interesting  element  in  Priim's  researches. 
There  were  three  stages  A,  B,  and  C  in  Dr  Priim's 
experiments. 

A.  —  PRIMARY  STAGE. 

Feelings  of  surprise,  and  feelings  of  pleasure  or 

pain  on  perceiving  the  excitant. 

Discussion  of  Motives. 

Presence  of  Alternatives. 

(After  motivation  there  is  always  a  halt.) 

B.  —  INTERMEDIATE  STAGE. 

Feelings  of  doubt  and  expectation,  and  sensa- 
tions of  tension.  Muscular  tension  is  strong 
Subjective  Factor         ,  .     ,      ,  . 

with  untrained  subjects,  or  when  motives  are 

strongly  negative. 

Objective  Factor     Presence  of  Alternatives  and  Notions  of  Moti- 
vation. 

G.  —  FINAL  STAGE. 

(Feelings  of  Doubt  give  place  to  a  feeling  of 

Subjective  Factor  <  Certitude  ;  feelings  of  expectation  disappear  ; 

'  sensation  of  tension  becomes  one  of  relaxation. 

(The  chosen  alternative  is  designated  by  a  judg- 
ment «  ce  sera  93,  »  or  the  prononciation  of  a 
wj^t.r*,  *  ~,,»v.   <  word,  or  a  «  conscious  turning  towards  » ;  also 
/  the  chosen  alternative  is  fixed,  and  some  notions 
Von  motivation  remain. 


—  40  - 

Dr  Priim  was  thus  able  to  trace  a  very  interesting 
development  of  the  objective  and  subjective  elements  in 
choice-acts.  He  differentiated  well  the  three  stages, 
primary,  intermediate  and  final,  and  analysed  very 
delicately  the  various  factors  in  play  in  choices. 

To  signalise  two  points  of  especial  interest,  we  may 
mention  : 

A.  the  psychological  differentiation  of  Decision  and 
Consent, 

B.  the  analysis  of  the  Consciousness  of  Action. 

A.  Decision  has  a  content,  «  direction  »,  «  designa- 
tion »  with  an  accompanying  «  consciousness  of  action  ». 
Consent  has  no  such  content.     It  is  a  mere  «  laissez 
faire  »,  an  internal  «  soit  ».    «  Dans  les  cas  les  plus  nets 
la  decision  comprend  une  indication,  sous  une  forme 
ou  1'autre,  tandis  que  ce  facteur  est  absent  au  consen- 
tement  qui  ne  comprend  qu'un  deciic,  c'est  la  cons- 
cience de  lecher  tout.  »     Decision  is  found,  when  the 
choice  is  made  at  once,  after  the  motivation,  or  when 
it  is  made  after  a  long  pause.     Consent  is  found,  when 
the  favoured  alternative  reappears  alone,  immediately 
before  the  choice,  or  when  the  thought  comes  cest  ceci 
quil  faut  choisir  at  the  moment  of  the  choice.     The 
character  of  the  choice  is  in  immediate  relation  with 
the  nature  of  the  motivation. 

B.  With  regard  to  the  Consciousness  of  Action  much 
controversy,    and    much  experimentation    has    been 
devoted  to  this  point.     James  wrote  of  this  sentiment, 
or  feeling.     «  The  existence  of  the  feeling  of  effort  as 
a  phenomenal  fact  in  our  conscience  cannot  of  course 
be  doubted  or  denied.  »     Kiilpe  describes  it  as  «  an 
urgency   from  within  outward,  a  mental  strain,  an 
activity  of  the   self  ».     Thanks   to    this    «  feeling  of 
liberty  »  writes  Hoffding  «  nous  sentons  1'acte  comme 


—  41  — 

une  irradiation  de  notre  propre  etre  intime.  »     Wundt 
describes  it  with  admirable  skill. 

At  the  moment  when  the  volitional  act  begins,  the  feeling  of 
resolution  gives  place  to  the  specific  feeling  of  activity  which  has 
its  sensational  substratum,  in  the  case  of  external  volitional  acts, 
in  the  sensations  of  tension  accompanying  the  Will. 

As  a  total  feeling,  this  feeling  of  activity,  according 
to  Wundt,  is  a  rising  and  falling  temporal  process, 
extending  through  the  whole  act  and  finally  passing 
into  widely  different  feelings  such  as  those  of  fulfil- 
ment, satisfaction  or  disappointment,  or  into  feelings 
and  emotions  connected  with  the  specific  result  of  the 
act. 

We  must  begin  by  distinguishing  the  consciousness 
of  action  from  the  feeling  of  strain  or  tension  wich  is 
located  in  the  organ  used  during  a  muscular  move- 
ment, or  even  in  the  skin  of  the  forehead  or  whole 
head. 

Lorsque  1'attention  est  fortement  tendue,  les  muscles  du  reste  du 
corps  sont  plus  ou  moins  interesses,  la  marche  s'arrete,  la  respira- 
tion est  retenue,  le  regard  devient  fixe  et  re" tat  general  peut,  par 
suite  de  la  forte  concentration,  donner  1'expression  d'une  extase  (i). 

Indeed,  Mosso  and  Carpentier  affirm  that  when  we 
make  a  voluntary  effort  to  analyse  a  mental  image, 
blood  flows  to  the  head  and  the  image  in  consequence 
grows  clearer. 

The  Feeling  of  Activity  or  tension  or  effort  was  con- 
founded with  the  consciousness  of  action  by  Wundt, 
James  and  others.  Even  in  Ach's  experiments  the 
same  confusion  remains.  It  is  a  sensible,  an  organic 
feeling,  passing  into  a  feeling  of  relaxation  (as  described 
by  Wundt)  during  the  voluntary  process.  It  is  not 

(j)  HOFFDING.  Esquisse  d'une  Psychologic,  p.  415. 


-  42  — 

found  in  every  voluntary  act ;  it  is  found  in  dynamic 
non-voluntary  states  ;  it  coincides  with  the  muscular 
tension  of  imperfectly  adapted  subjects,  and  of  experi- 
ments where  negative  motivation  is  strong.  It  some- 
times persists  even  after  the  decision,  and,  at  times,  in 
eminently  voluntary  decisions  it  is  absent. 

The  Consciousness  of  Action  on  the  other  hand 
characterises  truly  voluntary  acts.  It  takes  the  form 
of  a  personal,  intimate,  turning,  towards  one  of  the 
alternatives,  that  is,  of  an  active  designation. 

Dr  Priim  describes  it  clearly  : 

La  conscience  de  1'action  donne  precisement  le  cachet  de  volon- 
taire.  Elle  est  fusionnee  avec  ces  facteurs  que  nous  avons  cites,  de 
fa^on  a  constituer  un  phenomene  unique.  Elle  consiste  en  ceci  que 
le  sujet  a  non  seulement  conscience  d'une  direction  mais  qu'il  est 
conscient  de  se  tourner  vers ;  non  seulement  d'une  designation, 
mais  de  designer ;  non  seulement  d'avoir  une  representation  verbale 
mais  de  dire  le  mot.  Ce  phenomene  s'oppose  absolument  au  cours 
mecanique  de  la  conscience  et  c'est  ce  qui  est  tres  remarquable,  on 
ne  peut  pas  dire  «  j'ai  eu  une  designation,  »  comme  on  peut  dire 
«  j'ai  eu  telle  ou  telle  representation  »  ou  «  il  y  a  eu  une  desi- 
gnation •  mais  «  j'ai  designe  »,  «  j'ai  eu  conscience  de  designer.  » 
Cela  ne  peut  s'exprimer  que  par  rinfinitif. 

This  Consciousness  of  Action  is  opposed  to  that  of 
passivity  or  neutrality.  It  means  that  the  me  is  fully 
identified  with  the  voluntariness  of  the  act.  Again, 
«  Le  caractere  du  volontaire  provient  de  la  conscience 
de  faction  et  non  de  la  reunion  des  autres  facteurs 
comme  dans  les  theories  de  Wundt,  Ebbinghaus,  Mun- 
sterberg,  etc.  »  We  may  indeed,  basing  ourselves  on 
Priim's  results,  affirm  that  this  Consciousness  of  Action 
is  in  some  sort  the  phenomenal  form  of  the  «  Me  ». 


CHAPTER  II. 


THE  OBJECT  AND  METHOD  OF  THE  PRESENT 
RESEARCH. 


We  have  seen  that  the  recent  experimental  researches  object  of  the 
of  Ach,  Michotte  and  Prtim  aimed  at  an  analysis  of  the     Present 
phenomena  which  accompany  voluntary  decision  and 
voluntary  choice.     These  researches  have,  incidentally, 
supplied  interesting  data  to  the  Psychology  of  Motive, 

In  his  turn  the  writer  of  these  pages  has  taken  up 
directly  the  investigation  of  motives  and  motivation, 
and  has  examined  the  problems  of  the  strengthening  of 
motives,  the  measurement  of  motive  force,  and  the 
evolution  of  motivation.  He  has  also  traced  as  far  as 
possible,  the  various  influences  of  hedonism,  hesitation 
and  automatism  on  motivation,  and  has  devoted  the 
last  chapter  to  the  study  of  character  from  the  point 
of  view  of  motivation. 

It  is  hardly  necessary  to  dwell  on  the  great  practical 
importance  of  the  Psychology  of  Motive.  In  every 
sphere  of  life  the  problem  of  motives  is  in  evidence.  Motive. 
The  man  who  would  be  master  of  the  art  of  strengthen- 
ing motives  ,  and  of  measuring  their  force  ,  would 
indeed,  be  powerful.  The  teacher  who  could  incul- 
cate habits  of  serious  motivation  would  be  the  best 
trainer  of  character.  Indeed  the  problem  of  character- 
formation  is  reducible  to  that  of  motivation. 


—  44  — 

To  choose  capriciously  is  to  spoil  one's  character. 
To  choose  without  appeal  to  a  clear  and  definite  scale 
of  values,  to  choose  in  a  hesitating,  indecisive  manner, 
or  to  allow  oneself  to  repine  over  past  choices,  is  to  run 
counter  to  good  habits  of  motivation  —  and  true 
strength  of  character. 

Again  the  question  of  motive-force  is  important  in 
every  walk  of  life.  Can  I  get  so  and  so  to  do  this, 
means,  can  I  propose  to  him  a  suitable,  and  sufficiently 
strong  motive  ?  If  the  motive  already  proposed  be  too 
weak,  how  can  it  be  strengthened?  What  circum- 
stances tand  to  strengthen  it  ?  And,  suppose  there  is 
question  of  a  pupil,  is  it  advisable  to  propose  to  him 
hedonic  motives.  What  effect  will  they  have  on  his 
character  ?  Will  it  be  injurious  to  him  to  offer  such 
and  such  a  reward,  or  to  threaten  such  and  such  a 
punishment?  Again,  if  it  be  considered  permissible 
to  propose  a  hedonic  motive,  of  what  force  is  it  to  be. 
What  economy  of  motive-force  is  to  be  made  ? 

Suppose  too,  the  pupil  in  question  be  of  a  hesitating, 
indecisive  character,  what  steps  are  to  be  taken  to 
teach  him  to  make  his  choices  in  a  resolute,  decided 
way.  How  may  hesitation  be  cured  ? 

General        These  are  very  practical  questions,  the  answers  to 
Method  of  Wj1ic}1   cau  for  a  very  considerable  knowledge  of  the 

Research.  .     J  . 

Psychology  of  Motives  and  Motivation. 

The  first  requirement,  for  the  scientific  investigation 
of  motives  is  to  have  a  great  number  of  records  of 
choices,  giving  accurate  accounts  of  the  motives,  con- 
ditions and  phenomena  of  the  choices.  Such  a  require- 
ment is  difficult  to  satisfy.  It  is  true  that  from  time 
to  time,  in  newspapers  or  letters,  we  find  good  des- 
criptions of  the  circumstances  of  some  choice  or  other. 
But  such  records  are  few  in  number ,  and  generally 


-45  - 

wanting  in  precision.     It  is  no  easy  task  to  give  a  good 
introspection,  and  as  Wundt  writes 

It  is  impossible  to  find  out  how  a  volition  proceeds,  in  any  other 
way,  than  by  following  it  exactly  as  it  is  presented  to  us  in  imme- 
diate experience. 

Again,  such  records  of  motives  and  choices  as  might 
come  to  hand,  would  deal  with  cases,  differing  so 
widely  in  circumstances  and  conditions  that,  laws 
based  on  analyses  of  them,  would  be  of  little  scientific 
value. 

It  is  then,  by  force  of  necessity,  that  Will  Psycholo- 
gists must  prepare  and  plan  out  in  their  laboratories 
precise  sets  of  choices,  to  be  made  by  Subjects,  well 
trained  in  Psychology,  and  accustomed  to  Introspec- 
tions. In  this  manner  records  of  choices,  of  sufficient 
number,  and  of  good  quality  can  be  obtained.  Such 
records  are  much  more  valuable  from  a  scientific  point 
of  view,  than  the  occasional  records  found  in  news- 
papers or  letters. 

The  observation  of  volitional  processes ,  writes  Wundt , 
which  come  into  experience  by  chance,  is  an  inadequate  and  easily 
misleading  method  for  establishing  the  actual  facts  of  the  case. 
Wherever  internal  or  external  volitional  acts  are  performed  in  meet- 
ing either  the  theoretical  or  pratical  demands  of  life,  our  interest 
is  too  much  taken  up  in  the  action  itself,  to  allow  us  at  the  same 
time  to  observe  with  exactness  the  psychological  processes  which 
are  going  on.  (i) 

Our  method,  in  a  word,  was  to  propose  to  our  Sub- 
jects, who  were  well-trained  students  of  Psychology, 
certain  definite  choices,  twenty-eight  in  all,  in  a  care- 
fully planned  order.  The  choices  were  presented 
under  tidentical  conditions.  Full  introspections  were 

(i)  Outlines  of  Psychclogy,  p.  2i5  (Judd). 


-46- 

made  after  each  choice.  Time-durations  were  marked 
by  chronoscopes.  The  precautions  prescribed  by  the 
best  exponents  of  the  Psychical  method  were  observed. 
There  was  absolutely  no  communication  between  the 
Subjects,  with  respect  to  the  experiments.  The  Sub- 
jects too,  as  far  as  was  possible,  were  kept  in  the  datk 
as  to  the  object  of  the  experiments.  They  had  not  the 
slightest  clue  as  to  detailed  points  of  enquiry, 

The  Subjects,  to  whom  we  shall  refer  in  the  course  of  this  work 
as  S*,  S*,  S3,  etc.  (i)  were  the  following  : 

Prof.  A.  Michotte  (Dr  Phil.)  Louvain  Univ. 
F.  Fransen  (Dr  Med.)  Louvain  Univ. 
J.  Vance        (B.  A.)       Cambridge  Univ. 
A.  Centner    (Dr  Phil.)  Louvain  Univ. 
The  present  writer. 

The  experiments  were  all  conducted  in  the  Psycho- 
logical Laboratory  of  the  Superior  Institute  of  Philo- 
sophy at  Louvain  University,  which  is  in  charge  of 
Prof.  Michotte. 

The  Method      The  material  of  the  alternatives  to  be  proposed  in  the 
in       choice  experiments  had  first  to  be  decided  on.     After 

Detail 

Technique,  consideration,  eight  liquids,  carefully  graduated  from 
the  point  of  view  of  agreeableness  were  chosen.  The 
liquids  were  colourless,  so  as  to  be  indistinguishable 
when  presented  in  glasses.  They  were  maintained 
constantly  at  the  same  degree  of  strength.  Some  were 
very  agreeable,  some  indifferent,  some  extremely  un- 
pleasant. These  eight  liquids  were  given  «  nonsense  » 
names  of  a  kind  unlikely  to  be  associated  with  other 
words  of  French,  English,  German  or  Flemish,  the 
languages  spoken  by  the  Subjects.  The  liquids  and  the 
names  were  as  follows  : 

(i)  The  order  of  the  letters  S1,  S2,  S-3  etc.  is  not  to  be  taken  as  corresponding 
to  that  of  the  names. 


—  47  ' 

Bef...      Sulphuric  Acid.  i  gr.     1000     H*O. 

Choux... Carbonate  of  Soda  10  gr.        »  » 

Jor...       Ethyl.  Alcohol  5o  gr.        »  » 

Kum...    Saccharose  5o  gr.        »  » 

Laix...    Salicylate  of  Soda  5o  gr.        »  » 

Vaw...    Sodium  chloride  5o  gr.        »  » 

/Essence  of  Anis  3-5  centigrams. 
Ziv...     <  Alcohol  20  c.  c.  Syrup  304  c.  c. 

I  H2O  676  c.  c.  a  trace  of  Saponin. 

I  Essence  of  bitter  Orange  Peel,  6  centigrams. 
Tauk... |  Alcohol  6  c.  c.  Symp  iy5  c.  c.  H*O  819  c.  c. 

|  A  trace  of  Saponin. 

For  brevity  we  shall,  in  future,  refer  to  these  liquids,  The  Different 
by  the  first  letter  of  the  nonsense  name.     This  Z  means   sta?es  of 
Ziv,  B,  Bef  etc.     Again  Z-B  means  the  choice  between 
Ziv  and  Bef. 

There  were  three  stages  in  our  method,  i.  The 
tastes,  just  now  described,  were  learned,  associations 
between  the  names  and  the  tastes  being  formed.  2.  The 
strength  of  these  associations  was  tested  by  means  of 
the  Recognition  Experiments.  3.  The  choice  Expe- 
riments began. 

The  first  stage  consisted  in  this,  that  the  Subjects        » 

i  •     ,  ,  .  ,    Hie  Forming  of 

tasted  the  eight  substances,  thrice  every  morning,  and  Assertions. 
thrice  every  evening,  repeating  aloud  the  names  of  the 
substances  before  tasting  them.  These  repetitions  lasted 
from  Nov.  ythto  Nov.  24^(1910).  Each  substance  was 
tasted  about  eighty  times  by  each  Subject.  The  liquids 
and  their  names  were  thus  perfectly  well  learned  ; 
strong  associations  being  formed  between  the  tastes  and 
the  names.  The  tasting  of  the  substances  continued 
until  the  end  of  the  Recognition  Experiments. 

When  the   tasting  repetitions   had   lasted   a  week,        b 
(each  Subject  having  tasted  each  substance  thirty  times)1^^0" 
the  second  stage  of  the   experiments  began.      These 


-48- 

experiments  aimed  atm  easuring  the  Reaction-Times  of 
the  associations  formed.  The  method  was  as  follows. 
The  nonsense  names  Z,  T,  etc.  were  printed  on  cards 
and  presented  to  the  Subjects,  as  in  ordinary  Associa- 
tion Experiments,  by  Ach's  card-changing  machine. 
The  instruction  given  to  the  Subjects  was  : 

«  React  when  you  know  what  it  is  » . 

After  each  experiment  the  Subject's  introspection  was 
carefully  written  down.  These  introspections  proved 
to  be  of  great  utility  subsequently  in  tracing  motive- 
evolution,  and,  when  put  in  contrast  with  the 
introspections  of  the  choice-experiments,  they  served 
to  bring  to  light  the  phenomena  peculiar  to  volitions. 

We  give  two  examples  of  these  introspections,  taken 
at  hasard. 

1.  S1.  The  word   Tank  appeared.     Reaction   Time 
790  sigma 

Immediately  on  reading  the  word  it  was  identified.  I  can  hardly 
say  how.  I  had  immediately  the  same  impression  as  when  I  drink 
it  —  an  impression  of  softness  with  a  feeling  of  pleasure.  Also  I 
had  a  vague  image  of  something  green.  The  taste  is  associated  with 
an  incident  that  happened  twenty  years  ago. 

2.  S*.  The  word  Tauk  appeared.     Reaction  Time 
633  sigma 

Had  a  feeling  of  pleasure  on  seeing  the  word.  The  word  pleases 
me.  I  pronounced  the  word  Tauk  in  an  affectionate  manner.  The 
expression  «  very  good  »  came  to  me,  but  no  reproduction  of  taste. 
I  understood  that  the  taste  was  very  good. 

The  number  of  Recognition- Experiments,  with  the 
mean  reaction-times  for  each  Subject  was  as  follows  : 

Mean  Reaction  Time 
S1  71  eiperiments  641  sigma 

S*  8 1  »  691       n 

S»  41  »  588      » 

S*  67  »  556      » 


—  49  - 

The  Recognition  Experiments  served  i .  to  strengthen 
the  Associations  already  formed  between  the  names 
and  the  tastes  2.  to  make  the  Reaction-Times  of  Repro- 
duction regular  (when  they  became  regular,  for  each 
Subject  the  series  was  brought  to  a  close)  3.  to  accustom 
the  Subjects  to  the  technique  of  the  choice-experiments. 
The  Recognition  Experiments,  besides  being  useful  in 
themselves,  were  a  excellent  immediate  preparation  for 
the  choice-experiments. 

When  the  Recognition  Reaction-Times  grew  regular 
the  series  was  brought  to  a  close,  and  each  Subject  then 
wrote  down  from  memory  the  eight  tastes,  in  their  order 
of  hedonic  value  for  him.  The  lists  were  as  follows  — 

S*  S»  S«  S* 

Z  K  Z  Z 

T  Z  V  T 

K  T  K  B 

J  V  L  K 

B  B  B  J 

V  J  T  V 

L  L  J  L 

C  G  C  C 

It  is  interesting  to  notice  the  considerable  differences, 
due  to  subjective  likings  and  dislikes.  C  alone  holds 
the  same  place  in  the  four  lists.  Z,  B  and  L,  hold  the 
same  place  in  three  lists,  T,  K  and  V  hold  the  same 
place  in  two  lists,  while  J,  which  was  regarded  as 
4  mysterious  ',  '  unknown  ',  and  *  enigmatic  ',  in  spite 
of  all  the  tasting  repetitions,  holds  a  different  place  in 
each  of  the  four  lists. 

The  Subjects  were  now  in  possession  of  definite, well 
known  scales  of  values.  All  four  as  we  have  seen,  put 
C  down  as  the  worst  of  all,  while  for  three  subjects  Z 
was  best  of  all,  B  fifth  best,  and  L  the  worst  but  one. 

4 


—  5o  — 

The  names  were  now  printed  on  cards  in  their 
twenty-eight  combinations.  These  twenty-eight  cards 
were  divided  into  four  sets  of  seven— not  more  than 
seven  choices  being  made  the  same  day.  The  cards 
were  so  arranged  that  the  same  word  never  reappeared 
on  two  successive  cards.  At  each  sitting  one  set  of 
seven  experiments  was  done,  and  since  for  each  Subject 
there  were  four  sittings  per  week,  each  Subject  com- 
pleted the  whole  set  of  twenty-eight  choices  every  week. 
The  series  was  recommenced  the  following  week  in  a 
different  order. 

The  experiments  were  conducted  in  a  small  room 
off  the  main  apartment  of  the  Laboratory.  The  Sub- 
ject was  seated  at  a  small  table  with  his  finger  pressing 
the  reaction-key.  Just  before  him,  on  a  specially  con- 
structed stand,  were  placed  two  glasses  containing  two 
of  the  substances,  which  as  we  have  said,  were  colour- 
less. 

The  stand  which  was  constructed  by  Prof.  Michotte 
consisted  of  a  piece  of  wood  on  which  two  small  woo- 
den plates  were  hinged.  The  plates,  on  which  the 
glasses  were  placed,  rested  on  springs  and  were  pro- 
vided with  electric  contacts,  so  arranged,  that  when 
the  glasses  rested  on  them  an  electric  circuit,  connected 
with  the  Vernier  chronoscope  was  closed,  and  when  a 
glass  was  raised  by  the  Subject,  this  circuit  was  broken. 

On  a  shelf,  a  little  higher  than  this  stand,  Ach's  card- 
changer  was  so  placed,  that  when  the  cards  with  the 
printed  names  e.  g.  Z  —  B,  appeared,  the  names  would 
be  seen,  just  over  the  glasses  to  which  they  correspon- 
ded. The  experiments  were  all  conducted  by  electric 
light,  the  blinds  being  drawn,  so  as  to  maintain  iden- 
tical conditions.  Two  electric  lamps  were  used  one 
over  the  head  of  the  Subject,  the  other  close  to  Ach's 


card-changer,  throwing  a  bright  light  on  the  aperture 
so  that  the  card  could  be  seen  at  once.  There  was  a 
minimum  of  noise  as  the  Laboratory  is  fortunately 
situated  on  the  top  story  of  a  high  building  in  a  quiet 
part  of  the  city,  and  as  the  Hipp  chronoscope,  used 
during  the  experiments  was  at  a  considerable  distance, 
in  the  far  corner  of  another  room. 

The  Subject  seated  himself  at  the  small  table  just  The  Course 
described,  with  his  hand  on  the  reaction-button.     The     of  *he  t 

.  .  .  Experiment. 

Experimenter  then  gave  the  following  *  instruction  . 

«  Two  words  will  appear  corresponding  to  the  sub- 
stances in  the  two  glasses.  You  are  to  choose  between 
these  substances  and  to  drink  at  once  the  liquid  which 
you  have  chosen  ( \ )  * . 

The  Experimenter  now  retired  into  an  adjacent 
apartment,  pressed  a  button  which  gave  a  signal  to 
the  Subject  that  the  card  was  about  to  appear.  Next, 
i  1/2"  (approximately)  after,  he  pressed  another  button 
and  the  card  appeared. 

Meanwhile  the  Subject,  on  hearing  the  signal,  con- 
centrated his  attention,  recalling  perhaps  at  the  same 
time  the  task  that  was  given  him.  On  seeing  the  card 
appear  he  read  it,  weighed,  more  or  less  the  merits  of 
the  alternatives  proposed,  reacted,  and  putting  out  his 
hand  took  up  and  drank  the  chosen  substance. 

The  Experimenter  now  reentered  and  wrote  down 
at  the  dictation  of  the  Subject,  all  that  had  passed  in 
the  Subject's  mind  during  the  choice.  These  «  intro- 
spections »  carefully  dated  and  numbered,  were  the 
material  to  be  analysed  later  on,  with  a  view  to  deter- 
mining the  laws  of  motives. 

It  will  be  noticed  that  there  were  two  periods  in  the 
choice  act. 

(i)  This  '  instruction  '  was  repeated  before  every  experiment  in  the  following 
shortened  form  «  Choose  a  glass  and  drink  it. » 


A.  The  period  between  the  appearance  of  the  card 
(the  excitant)  and  the  reaction. 

B.  The  period  between  the  reaction  and  the  reali- 
sation of  the  choice  by  taking  up  the  glass  to  drink. 

These  two  periods  were  measured  by  chronoscopes 
A.  by  the  Hipp  and  B.  by  the  Vernier  chronoscope. 
The  Hipp  chronoscope  commenced  to  mark  time  when 
the  card  appeared,  and  was  stopped  by  the  reaction; 
the  same  reaction  started  the  Vernier  chronoscope  by 
means  of  Ewalds'  Key.  The  raising  of  the  glass  from 
the  stand  by  the  Subject  released  a  spring  and  cut  an 
electric  current  which  enabled  the  Vernier  to  mark  the 
time  B.  by  freeing  its  second  pendulum. 

During  the  experiments  the  same  conditions  as  to 
time,  place,  and  all  external  circumstances  were  main- 
tained. The  present  writer  was  always  personally 
present  to  take  down  the  introspections  and  to  conduct 
the  experiments. 

Every  thing  that  could  trouble  or  interfere  with  the 
faithful  reproduction  of  the  immediate  data  of  conscience 
was  avoided.  Practically  no  questions  were  asked, 
during  the  course  of  the  experiments  to  avoid  their 
possible  interference,  with  the  Subject's  introspections 
by  suggesting.  After  the  last  series  was  finished,  and  all 
the  experiments  were  over,  a  questionaire  was  given  to 
the  Subjects  dealing  with  their  interpretation  of  the 
instruction,  and  their  interpretation  of  the  word '  motive'. 
The  four  In  the  Choice  Experiments,  just  explained,  there  were 
stages  of  the  four  stages,  about  each  of  which  we  must  say  a  few 

Choice  Act. 

words. 

A.  The  Perception  of  the  Excitant  (the  card). 

B.  The  Motivation. 

C.  The  Choice. 

D.  The  Realisation  of  the  Choice. 


—  53  — 

A.  There  is  little  of  importance  to  be  said  about  this 
first  stage  of  the  experiment.  Usually  the  Subjects 
were  well-prepared,  and  adapted  to  react  quickly.  Excitont- 
They  were  conscious  of  which  alternative  they  had 
seen  first,  and  of  their  manner  of  passing  from  the  first 
to  the  second  alternative.  They  used  such  expressions 
as  «  read  » ,  «  glanced  at », «  saw  while  passing » ,  «  fixed  » . 
«  rested  on  »,  «  saw  or  recognised  superficially  », 
«  saw  in  indirect  vision  »  etc.  S*  noticed  that  there 
was  a  relation  between  the  value  of  the  alternative  and 
the  manner  in  which  it  was  seen.  To  investigate  this 
point,  all  the  «  superficial  recognitions  »  were  exami- 
ned and  it  was  found  that  92  %  of  them  were  in  the 
case  of  good  substances.  Distincly  disagreeable  sub- 
stances were  rarely  seen  superficially 

Again,  there  was  a  distinct  relation  between  the 
value  of  the  alternative  and  the  manner  in  which  it 
was  quitted.  Subjets  used  such  expressions  as  «  was 
repelled  by  » ,  «  passed  swift'y  or  slowly  from  » , 
«  rebounded  from,  or  jumped  away  from  »  etc.  We 
shall  have  occasion  later  on,  to  enquire  into  this  matter. 

I  have  explained  that  the  card  was  brightly  lighted 
up,  so  as  to  be  easily  legible.  Now,  the  Subjects  had 
different  manners  of  reading.  S1  and  S3  read  from  left 
to  right,  S*  from  right  to  left.  The  question  at  once 
arose,  as  to  the  effect  which  priority  in  perceiving 
an  alternative  might  have  on  the  motivation. 

In  the  experiments  of  Michotte  and  Priim  the  effect 
was  noticeable. 

Dans  certains  cas  le  seul  fait  d'etre  la  premiere  alternative  envisa- 
gee  a  deja  une  repercussion  sur  le  nombre  de  chances  que  cette 
alternative  a  d'etre  choisie  (i). 

(i)  Le  Choix  volontaire.  General  conclusions.  N.  B.  This  quotation  does  not 
imply  that  the  influence  was  direct.  It  was,  according  to  Prof.  Michotte  only 
indirect. 


-  54- 

The  experiments  of  Michotte  and  Priim  were  diffe- 
rent from  ours  in  this ,  that  the  alternatives  were 
unknown  to  the  Subjects  before  the  excitation — where- 
as in  ours,  the  Subjects  were  perfectly  conscious  of 
the  values  of  the  alternatives  and  so  were  far  less  likely 
to  be  directly  influenced  by  so  trivial  a  fact  as  the  seeing 
of  this  or  that  alternative  first.  Besides  the  Subjects 
habitually  read  the  cards  in  the  same  way — and  quite 
mechanically. 

The  reading  of  an  alternative  first  had  an  indirect 
influence,  for  that  alternative  being  longer  in  conscious- 
ness was  «  more  familiar  » ,  «  more  present  to  con- 
sciousness »  to  use  expressions  of  Subjects,  and  in  cases 
of  indecision  the  alternative  that  was  «  more  familiar  » 
and  «  more  at  the  focus  of  consciousness  »  was  fre- 
quently chosen.  Again,  there  seemed  to  be  a  certain 
rhythmn  in  the  motivation  at  times.  S2  for  instance 
affirmed  that  he  felt  a  trochaic  metre  in  his  moti- 
vation. 

r  w  i 

K  J  K 

and  he  felt  a  tendency  to  choose  the  alternative  empha- 
sised last. 

S4  also  experienced  something  of  the  same  nature. 

It  would  be,  however,  too  much  to  affirm  that  such 
rhythmical  mouvement  in  motivation  was  an  influence 
of  any  serious  importance. 

A  careful  examination  of  the  actual  results  of  the 
choices,  considered  in  connection  with  a  table  of  the 
figures  for  alternatives  seen  first,  convinced  us  that,  in 
our  experiments  at  least,  the  seeing  of  an  alternative 
first  had  no  direct  influence  on  the  choice  subsequently 
made. 
b  B.  By  Motivation  we  mean  the  phase  of  the  choice- 

The  Motivation.  J  r 

process  which  follows  the  Perception  of  the  Excitant. 


—  55  — 

This  phase  comprises  the  valorisation  of  the  alterna- 
tives and  the  discussion  of  motives.  The  perception 
of  an  alternative  is  sometimes  accompanied  by  an  im- 
pression of  its  value,  that  is  to  say,  the  value  of  the 
alternative  is,  so  to  speak,  found  in  the  word  itself, 
directly  and  immediately.  Sometimes  the  valorisation 
takes  the  form  of  a  judgment  of  value,  '  this  is  agreeable' 
or  *  this  is  very  good '.  When  the  alternatives  are 
valued,  at  times  a  conflict  of  motives  occurs,  at  times 
the  choice  follows  directly,  with  the  briefest  possible 
discussion.  In  fine,  the  motivation  includes  the  cons- 
ciousness and  weighing  of  values ;  it  is  the  centre-piece 
of  the  choice-process.  We  do  not  explain  in  detail  its 
various  aspects  here,  as,  they  are  dealt  with  further  on 
in  separate  chapters. 

From  the  point  of  view  of  our  researches  the  moti- 
vation was  the  most  important  stage  in  the  experiment, 
and  so  the  attention  of  the  Subjects  was  especially  direc- 
ted towards  it.  The  conditions  of  observation  were 
most  favourable,  as  the  alternatives  were  thoroughly 
well  known,  and  as  they  had  strong  hedonic  values — 
Z,  a  strong  positive,  G,  a  strong  negative,  etc. 

The  time-duration  of  the  choice-act,  depended  prin- 
cipally on  the  brevity  or  length  of  the  motivation  (i). 
If  a  conflict  of  motives  or  a  hesitation  occurred,  the 
time  was  naturally  longer.  In  the  early  choices  too, 
where  there  was  much  concrete  imagery,  and  where 
actual  feelings,  and  explicit  comparative  judgmentswere 
frequent  the  choices  lasted  longer.  Owing  to  images, 
judgments  or  impressions  of  value,  impulses,  feelings, 
hesitations,  mental  pauses  and  voids  of  many  kinds, 
associations,  and  so  forth,  choice  acts  are  extremely 

(i)  Owing  to  our  records  of  the  Reaction-Times  of  the  Recognition  Experi- 
ments we  were  able  to  demonstrate  this  with  comparative  certainty. 


—  56  — 

complex.  They  are  variable  in  a  thousand  ways  and 
their  duration  is  likewise  very  variable.  It  would  in- 
deed be  very  remarkable  if  two  choice-acts  (between 
the  same  things),  in  spite  of  all  this  complexity  were 
realised  in  exactly  equal  times. 

Our  method  permitted  us  to  compare  the  time-dura- 
tions of  the  same  choices,  made  under  similar  condi- 
tions, at  intervals  of  several  days.  Remarkable  as  it 
may  seem,  on  no  less  than  four  occasions,  the  same 
choices  were  realised  in  times  exactly  identical  to 
1/1000  (a  thousandth  of  a  second)  (i). 

These  repetitions  of  the  choices  in  exactly  equal 
times  would  point  to  a  very  great  precision  of  method, 
and  to  absolute  identity  of  the  conditions  of  the  expe- 
riments, if  they  were  not  mere  coincidences. 

That  they  were  not  coincidences  seems  clear  when  the  following 
additional  facts  are  considered .  On  two  occasions  the  same 
choices  were  realised  with  only  a  difference  of  i/iooo"  ;  on  fifteen 
other  occasions  the  differences  were  less  than  i  i/iooo"  (4,  4,  5,  5, 
5,  5,  6,  6,  7,  7,  8,  9,  9,  9,  10  thousands  of  a  second)  nearly  200 
times,  of  the  574  experiments  of  the  second  series  the  differences  of 
time  were  less  than  i/io"  or  100  sigma. 

c  We  adduce  the  facts  to  show  that  the  conditions  for 

The  Choice. 

exact  observation  or  motivation  were  very  favourable. 
C.  We  were  not  concerned  in  our  researches  with 
the  investigation  of  the  phenomena  of  Choice  or  Deci- 
sion.    This  work  had  already  been  done  by  Ach,  and 
by  Michotte  and  Priim. 
d  D.   An    original   and   important   character    of  our 

The  Realisation  D  r 

of  the  choice,  method,  was  the  Realisation  of  the  Choice  made  by  the 
Subjects.     This  Realisation  consisted  in  taking  up  and 

(i)  Thus  S'  chose  B  in  B-C  choices  in  the  following  times  :  869.  471.  466. 
471.  sigma,  and  Z  in  the  Z-C  choice  in  the  following  times  :  456.  53 1.  53 1.  440. 
407.  sigma. 


57  

drinking  the  chosen  substance.  It  formed  a  new  and 
interesting  phase  of  the  choice-act  and  afforded  much 
useful  material  for  the  investigation  of  the  Relativity  of 
Values. 

This  realisation  never  ceased  to  be  a  very  serious 
consideration.  To  the  very  end  a  great  effort  was 
required  in  order  to  drink  the  disagreeable  substances, 
so  much  so,  that  a  few  times  Subjects  could  not  get 
themselves  to  drink  the  chosen  liquid  —  it  was  too 
disagreeable.  On  the  other  hand  the  agreeable  sub- 
stances were  drunk  with  great  pleasure. 

The  Realisation  of  the  Choice  tended  then  to  keep  the 
values,  symbolised  by  the  words,  real  and  constant. 
It  also,  as  we  have  said,  brought  to  light  the  Relativity 
of  Values.  It  often  happened  that  a  glass  was  chosen 
swiftly  and  eagerly  on  account  of  the  unpleasantness  of 
the  alternative,  and  yet,  when  it  came  to  drinking  the 
chosen  substance  it  was  a  very  different  matter.  Thus 
S2  for  instance  remarked  in  a  J-C  choice,  that  he  took  J 
eagerly  as  though  it  were  very  good,  but  that  when  he 
had  it  in  hand  he  drank  it  slowly  and  hesitatingly  as 
though  it  were  very  bad. 

It  happened  at  times  that  a  Subject  reacted  with  the 
determination  to  take  a  certain  alternative,  and  yet, 
before  his  hand  had  reached  it,  he  had  changed  his 
mind  and  resolved  to  take  the  other.  At  times  the 
hand  was  already  touching  one  glass  when  it  suddenly 
swerved  to  the  other,  and  took  it.  Such  post-reaction 
phenomena  were  of  great  advantage  in  the  study  of 
motives. 

It  was  with  a  view  to  measuring  the  time  taken  Measurement 
between  the  reaction  and  the  raising  of  the  glass  that ofthetimeof 
the   Vernier   chronoscope   was   used.      The   Subjects 
affirmed  that  there  was  a  relation  between  the  value  of 


—  58  — 

the  alternative  chosen  and  the  manner  of  seizing  the 
glass,  good  substances  being  more  eagerly  taken  up 
than  the  others. 

Investigation  of  the  Vernier  reaction-times  supported 
this  opinion  of  the  Subjects  and  also  showed  that  there 
was  a  relation  between  the  reaction-times  for  the  choice, 
and  the  reaction-times  for  the  realisation. 

In  the  second  half  of  our  Experiments  we  abandoned 
the  measurement  of  the  time  of  Realisation.  Our 
reasons  were  as  follows.  The  act  of  taking  up  the  glass 
became  quite  automatic  ;  it  followed  the  reaction 
automatically.  The  real  hesitation  before  drinking 
only  began  when  the  glass  was  in  the  hand  close  to  the 
lips.  The  measurement  of  such  delays  would  have 
been  possible  by  means  of  specially  constructed  con- 
tact-glasses connected  by  electric  wires  to  a  chronos- 
cope.  We  did  not  believe  that  the  advantage  of  using 
such  an  apparatus  would  have  been  very  great. 

Again,  we  found  by  experience  that  little  could  be 
concluded  with  certainty  from  the  time-measurement 
of  such  acts  as  those  of  putting  ont  the  hand  and  taking 
up  a  glass.  There  are  many  conditions,  too,  capable 
of  interfering  with  their  normal  performance. 
The  In  our  researches  the  Subjects  were  instructed  to 
instruction.  u  choose  a  glass  and  drink  it  » (i).  This  instruction  was 
understood  by  the  Subjects  to  mean  that  the  best  was 
to  be  taken.  The  instruction  also,  of  course  implied 
that  the  reaction  should  be  as  quick  as  possible,  and 
that  the  motives  for  the  choice  should  be  serious. 

A  point  of  importance  should  here  be  noticed.     The 
i 

(i)  A  distinction  is  to  be  drawn  between  the  instruction  given  by  the  Experi- 
menter, and  the  task  (Aufgabe,  tache)  which  is  the  Subject's  interpretation  of  the 
instruction.  All  Subjects  do  not  understand  the  instruction  in  the  same  sense. 
(See  Bovet.) 


instruction,  implying  that  the  best  should  be  taken, 
naturally  strengthened  the  motive  for  the  alternative 
which  was  fixed  on  as  the  best,  and  stimulated  an 
immediate  reaction.  Again  the  agreeable  qualities  even 
of  the  best  substances  would  be  hardly  strong  enough 
of  themselves  to  provoke  a  spontaneous  desire  or  ten- 
dency to  drink  them,  if  there  were  not  a  foregoing 
resolution  to  choose  one  of  the  two.  Subjects  at  times 
affirmed  :  «  I  felt,  if  I  were  perfectly  free  I  should  have 
chosen  neither.  »  This  indicates  the  influence  of  the 
task,  in  the  carrying  out  of  the  choice  act. 

We  need  not  dwell  here  on  the  law  of  Determining  Determining 
Tendencies  formulated  by  Ach.     This  law  means  that  Tendencies- 
when  a  Subject  accepts  an  instruction  bidding  him  to 
do  a  certain  thing  in  a  certain  way,  the  thing  is  done  at 
the  tim2  and  in  the  manner  determined  —  or,  at  least, 
a  tendency  towards  doing  it  is  experienced.     Should 
something  occur  to  disturb  the  Subject's  obedience  to 
this  tendency  an  '  inhibition  '  and  '  trouble '  are  felt. 

This  law  brings  to  light  the  fact  that  an  interval  may 
exist  between  the  resolution  to  do  a  thing  (the  Subject's 
acceptation  of  the  instruction)  and  the  doing  of  that 
thing.  In  the  interval  there  is  no  conscious  renewal  of 
the  resolution. 

This  law  is  interesting  from  the  explanation  that  it 
atfords  of  the  genesis  of  certain  feelings,  such  as  those 
of  inhibition.  Ach  too,  has  the  credit  of  restating  in 
scientific  form,  the  traditional  doctrine  of  volition. 

As  a  result  of  the  instruction,  the  Subjects  in  our 
experiments,  had,  to  use  Ach's  terminology,  a  tendency 
to  see  the  two  alternatives,  one  first,  then  the  other. 
This  tendency  grew  stronger  and  then  gradually  disap- 
peared, when,  towards  the  end,  the  seeing  of  the  two 
alternatives  was  in  many  cases  unnecessary.  Thus 


—  60  — 

S2  speaks  of  a  «  conflict  between  being  drawn  to  take  Z 
at  once,  on  seeing  it,  and  the  habit  of  seeing  the  two 
glasses  ». 

Under  the  influence  of  automatism  the  tendency  to 
see  this  or  that  glass,  became  a  tendency  to  take.  Now 
the  Subject  felt  a  strong  movement  or  tendency  to  take 
the  glass  at  the  right,  or  if  he  had  seen  that  it  was  bad, 
to  take  the  glass  on  the  left.  A  still  further  stage  of 
automatism  was  reached,  when,  immediately  on  the 
appearance  of  the  card,  the  Subject,  without  recognising 
either  name,  felt  a  strong  tendency  '  to  take  one  or  the 
other,  no  matter  which '  —  a  kind  of  blind  tendency 
towards  anything,  something. 

The  Researches  consisted  of  three  series  A.  B.  C. 

A.  June  and  July  1910. 
The  First       This  series  was  tentative  ( i ) .     The  method  was  not 
^Gt  Per^ecte<^-     The  number  of  experiments  was  i38 — 
all  introspections. 

Instead  of  there  being  only  two  glasses  before  the 
subject  there  were  six — and  these  were  marked  F.  E. 
C.  D.  B.  A.  The  card  was  pointed  thus,  e.  g.  A — D, 
indicating  that  the  choice  was  to  be  made  between  the 
corresponding  glasses.  The  substances  were  only  learn- 
ed during  the  course  of  the  experiments,  hence  moti- 
vation was  at  first  quite  extrinsic.  The  subjects  took 
time  to  find  out  the  positions  of  the  glasses  indicated  by 
the  cards,  hence  the  reaction  times  were  long.  Trouble 
also  was  caused  by  associations  of  certain  tastes  with 
certain  positions.  The  method  was  on  the  whole  im- 
perfect. The  introspections  were  however  well  made, 

(i)  Though  this  series  was  tentative  (an  'orientation'  research)  it  afforded 
interesting  soluticns  to  some  questions  which  served  as  useful  confirmations  of 
the  results  acquired  from  the  principal  series,  e.  g.  re  Motivation-Tracks  and 
Motive-Evolution. 


—  61   — 

and  proved  useful  in  suggesting  points  for  further  exa- 
mination. The  subjects  for  this  series  were  Prof. 
Michotte,  Dr  Centner,  and  the  present  writer. 

B.  The  second  series  which  lasted  from  Oct.   1910  The  second 
to  Feb.  1911  was  the  longest  and  most  important  of 

our  researches — it  consisted  in  884  experiments,  of 
which  the  574  choice  experiments,  which  form  the 
nucleus  of  our  material,  were  divided  as  follows. 

Prof.  Michotte  175 
Dr  Fransen  224 
M.  Vance  ij5 

The  method  was  that  which  we  have  described  in 
the  early  part  of  this  chapter.  The  introspections  were 
very  carefully  made ;  the  subjects  being  well  trained 
introspectors. 

During  this  series  there  was  a  break  of  three  weeks 
for  the  Christmas  Holidays.  This  interval  caused  a 
regression  in  the  automatism  which  was  already  far 
developed  before  the  Holidays.  In  order  to  determine 
precisely  the  extent  of  this  '  regression '  the  figures  and 
percentages  for  the  pre-holiday,  and  post-holiday  expe- 
riments were  made  up  separately  (i).  Comparison  of 
these  figures  and  percentages  threw  light  on  interesting 
features  of  automatism. 

C.  The  Third  series  (Feb.  1911)  was  much  shorter  The  Third 
than  the  second.     It  consisted  simply  in  this,  that  the 
instruction  was  reversed,  while  all  other  conditions 
remained  precisely  the  same.     The  former  instruction 

«  Choose  a  glass  and  drink  it  »  implied  that  the  best 
should  be  taken.  The  instruction  «  Choose  the  worst 
and  drink  it  »  was  now  given. 

The  object  was  to  test  the  degree  of  the  automatism 
developed  in  the  second  series,  and  to  experiment  on 

(i)  There  were  278  choice  experiments  before,  and  3oi  after  the  holidays. 


—   62   — 

the  relativity  of  values.     The  number  of  experiments 
was  91  which  was  considered  sufficient. 

Prof.  Michotte  28  experiments 
Dr  Fransen        28 
M.  Vance  35 

The  introspections  were,  of  course,  carefully  re- 
corded. 

The  total  number  of  introspections  recorded  during 
the  course  of  the  researches  was  io63.  There  were 
besides  several  hundred  preparatory  experiments,  and 
the  tedious  *  tastings  '—all  together  numbered  a  few 
thousand. 

Reaction       We  have  seen  that  there  were  two  periods  in  the 
Times-     experiments;     A  and  B. 

A.  The  interval  between  the  excitation  and  the  reac- 
tion. 

B.  The  interval  between  the  reaction  and  the  reali- 
sation. 

A.  Was  *  the  time  of  choice'  and  was  marked  by  the 
Hipp  chronoscope.  B.  Was  'the  time  of  realisation' 
and  was  marked  by  the  Vernier  chronoscope.  We 
shall  give  tables  showing  the  A  duration  for  the  second 
and  third  series  (distinguishing  between  the  two  parts 
of  the  second  series)  and,  also,  show  that  a  relation 
existed  between  A  and  B. 

i.  Times  of  Second  Series.  zj3  experiments  before  the  Holidays. 

Experiments.  1-20.  20-40.  40-60.  60-80.      80-100. 

S*     1219         8o3  716.4  5gi            437 

S*     iou.8  1012.3      998.8  952           785 

S3     1461  i3i8  1245  1418 

Times  of  Second  Series.  3oi  experiments  after  the  Holidays, 
i -20.      20-40.     40-60.     60-80.      80-100.     100-120. 

S1     58i.8      545.7      495.5      478.7  —  — 

S8  1057.6      953         934         8i6.5         668.2        615.7 
S*  1020.3      875.1      746.2      654.9          574.2  — 


—  63  — 

These  figures  are  «  Arithmetical  means  »  —  times  are  marked 
in  sigma. 

2.  Times  for  the  Third  Series. 

51  mean  time  for    28  experiments     5g3.7 

52  28  723.2 
S»                                     35  564.5 

With  regard  to  B.  the  reaction-times  were  less  regu- 
lar, and  less  reliable.  From  a  comparison  however 
of  the  two  following  tables — times  of  choice,  and  times 
of  realisation  of  choice — for  the  278  experiments  of 
Nov.-Dec.  1910 — it  would  seem  that  a  relation  existed 
between  the  two  durations.  The  realisation  times  are 
counted  in  Vernier  '  beats'. 

3.  Experiments  i-3o  3o-6o  60-90 

Realisation  Times 

S1  3i  27  23 

S8  27  22  21 

S3                      28  26  3o 
Choice  times  (in  Sigma) 

S1                     1096  717  526 

S*                    1060  943  859 

S3  1461  1221  I43r 

It  will  be  noticed  that  while  for  S1  and  S2  both  tables 
show  a  fairly  regular  decrease,  for  S3,  both  tables  show 
a  great  increase  in  the  last  figure.  We  have  not  suffi- 
cient data  to  establish  the  existence  of  the  relation  of 
which  we  spoke.  The  figures  adduced  cannot  of  course 
prove,  they  are  merely  indicative. 

Referring  to  the  tables  given  on  the  last  page,  we  may 
point  to  their  great  regularity.  Seldom  in  the  last  5oo 
experiments  did  the  reaction  time  last  over  a  second 
(save  in  cases  of  Hesitation).  These  times  proved  a 
most  useful  objective  check,  and  were  of  constant 
help  in  investigations  about  Automatism  and  Hesita- 
tion. A  few  hundred  of  our  experiments  lasted  less 
than  or  little  more  than  half  a  second. 


_64  - 

The  chief  advantage  of  our  Method,  was  that  it 
enabled  us  to  trace,  from  the  very  beginning  the  building 
up  of  a  certain  number  of  Motives,  based  on  the  known 
qualities  of  the  different  substances  Z.  B.  C.  etc.  We  were 
enabled  to  watch,  day  by  day,  the  development  of  real 
Motives,  in  real  choices.  We  could  watch,  clearly  and 
plainly,  the  Evolution  of  Motivation  under  the  various 
influences  of  Relativity,  Automatism,  and  Hedonism. 
We  could  examine,  feeling  confident  that  we  were  in 
possession  of  the  chief  conditions  at  work,  various 
modes  of  Strengthening  of  Motives,  and  various 
influences  of  Hesitation. 

We  were  able,  under  favourable  conditions  of  obser- 
vation, to  analyse  various  types  of  Motivation,  as  seen 
in  different  choices,  and  various  aspects  of  like  Motiva- 
tions in  the  same  choices.  By  bringing  together  the 
records  of  the  various  repetitions  of  the  same  choice, 
we  were  in  a  position  to  examine  how  far  like  choices, 
in  like  circumstances  repeat  themselves,  and  we  were 
able  to  formulate  our  theory  of  Motivation  Tracks. 

With  regard  to  possible  objections  against  our  method 
we  shall  consider  two.  It  might  be  objected  ;  A.  that 
the  Experiments  were  not  Will  Experiments,  the  Will 
not  being  called  into  play  ;  B.  or  if  Will  Experiments, 
that  they  were  artificial  and  unnatural. 

A.  It  is  by  no  means  easy  to  prove  that  in  one  parti- 
cular case  the  Will  was  in  play,  and  in  another  case, 
not.  It  seems  best,  to  appeal  to  the  Subjects  themselves, 
and  quote  from  their  introspections.  Two  Subjects, 
S*  and  S3,  are  perfectly  explicit  :  we  quote,  first, 
from  S*  : 

'  a  deliberate  choice," '  '  a  voluntary  decided  choice,  '  '  I  feel 
myself  responsible  ',  '  choice  was  free,  (i)  a  true  choice,  an  easy 

(i)  We  are  not  here  trying  to  prove  that  the  choices  \verefree.  That  does 
not  concern  us  here.  We  are  adducing  evidence  to  show  that  the  will  was  in  play. 


—  65  — 

choice,  '  '  I  chose  and  preferred  Z  to  C  deliberately  and  freely  ', 
'  I  think  the  Will  comes  into  play,  I  often,  not  always,  take  one 
or  other  decidedly  ',  *  like  a  choice  in  ordinary  life  ';  many  simi- 
lar instances  are  found.  Also  S2  often  speaks  of  resisting  tenden- 
cies and  of  comflicts  e.  g.  «  a  kind  of  struggle  between  the  fact 
of  being  drawn  by  Z  and  the  habit  to  see  the  two  words  and  to 
know  both.  » 

We  now  quote  from  S3  :  «  I  was  aware  that  this  was  in  some 
sense  a  perfectly  free  choice ;  that  I  might  at  another  time  choose 
B ;  »  «  My  Will  was  as  much  present  in  choosing  L  as  in  any  act 
of  my  life  —  a  distinct  motived  choice,  »  «  I  think  that  the  Will 
enters  actually  now,  each  time  before  I  make  my  choice.  '  I  think 
it  is  a  definite  choice,  a  definite  motion  of  the  Will '  —  many  simi- 
lar instances  are  found.  S1  gives  also  much  evidence  of  the  presence 
of  the  Will,  several  times  he  records  decisions,  consents,  resisting  of 
tendencies,  etc. 

In  the  following  chapters  many  forms  of  manifes- 
tation of  the  Will,  occurring  in  our  experiments  will  be 
brought  to  light.  Often  feelings  of  effort,  of  responsi- 
bility, of  '  taking  the  line  of  least  resistance ',  of  con- 
sistency and  inconsistency  occurred,  indicating  the 
presence  of  Will  in  the  choices.  We  have,  already, 
perhaps  dwelt  too  long  on  this  first  objection. 

B.  With  regard  to  the  supposed  artificiality  and 
unnaturalness  of  such  choices  as  ours,  a  misunder- 
standing seems  to  exist.  Some  Psychologists  take 
exception  to  the  pettiness  of  the  choices,  the  tension  and 
unreality  of  the  reaction-experiment,  etc.  The  best 
answer  to  give  to  such  objectors,  is  «  Come  and  see.  » 

True,  the  choices  are  slight,  but  they  are  none  the  less 
real,  and  the  motives  are  real.  Subjects  constantly 
say  that  they  are  just  like  the  choices  of  ordinary  life. 
Prof.  Michotte  writing  of  his  experiments,  in  which  the 
choices  were  less  real  than  ours,  being  between  simple 
arithmetical  calculations,  says  (i). 

(i)  Le  Choix  volontaire,  sec.  3. 


—  66  - 

Tous  les  motifs  qui  se  manifestent  dans  la  vie  reelle,  nous  les 
trouvons  representes  ici,  et  cela  est  tellement  frappant  que  nous 
trouvons  soulignee  a  tout  instant,  dans  les  proces-verbaux,  1'analo- 
gie  frappante  que  les  sujets  constatent  entre  ces  experiences  et  des 
discussions  de  motifs  qu'ils  ont  observers  dans  la  pratique  courante 
de  leur  existence.  L'interet  est  tellement  absorbe  par  1'experience 
meme  que  les  decisions  sont  prises,  dit  1'un  des  sujets,  avec  le  meme 
serieux,  avec  la  meme  anxiete  que  s'il  s'agissait  d'une  chose  de  toute 
premiere  importance. 

In  fine  there  seems  to  be  a  confusion  between  the 
reality  of  a  choice  and  its  importance.  That  the  two 
things  are  not  identical  may  be  seen  in  the  case  of  a 
party  playing  a  game  (e.  g.  Cards)  «  for  love  ». 

The  game  would  be  more  important  (at  least  from 
the  point  of  view  of  our  bank-account)  if  we  played  at 
a  guinea  a  point  —  but  it  would  be  no  more  real,  and, 
perhaps,  no  better  played,  than  in  the  former  case. 

S3,  who  was  by  no  means  inclined  to  exaggerate  the 
merits  of  the  new  methods  wrote,  after  our  researches 
were  over. 

On  the  whole  I  can  say,  that  nearly  every  choice  that  I  made 
at  your  direction  has  been  as  real  to  me,  as  I  think  any  choice 
that  depended  upon  reproduced  and  represented  elements  could 
be  :  nor  do  I  mean  to  say  that  such  choices  need  be  less  real  than 
the  ordinary  immediate  choices  of  everyday  life. 

As  regards  objections  based  on  the  presence  of  feel- 
ings of  tension,  and  constraint,  we  have  only  to  say 
that  these  feelings,  in  the  case  of  practised  Subjects 
have  either  completely  disappeared,  or  become  quite 
negligible.  In  fine,  the  best  practical  answer  to  such 
objections,  as  those  I  have  here  discussed,  is  to  be 
found  in  a  polite  invitation  «  Come  and  see  ». 


CHAPTER   III. 


MOTIVES. 


The  practice  of  considering  Motives  apart  from  their  Motives  and 
natural  setting,  in  the  Motivation  of  the  Will-Act,  seems  Motlvatlon- 
hardly  justifiable.  Motives  are  neither  separate  entities 
nor  independent  forces.  They  do  not  follow  lonely 
tracks,  nor  do  they  fight  little  battles  among  themselves. 
They  are  not  individual  nor  absolute,  but  are  by  nature 
relative.  Motives  are  integral  parts  of  the  Motivation. 
Apart  from  it  they  are  meaningless.  They  depend  on 
Motivation  for  their  form,  and  their  force,  and  even 
for  their  existence.  With  Motivation  they  evolve,  and 
they  partake  of  its  nature,  being  concrete  when  it  is 
concrete,  and  abstract  when  it  is  abstract. 

Motives,  then,  should  be  considered  as  phases  of  the 
Motivation.  It  is  the  whole  man  who  deliberates  and 
chooses.  It  is,  as  Hoffding  well  said,  the  nature  of 
our  whole  self  alone  which  decides  if  something  can 
become  a  motive  for  us. 

C'est  la  nature  de  notre  etre  qui  decide  si  une  chose  peut  devenir 
un  motif  pour  nous. 

We  propose,  then,  in  this  thesis  to  emphasise  this 
dependence  of  the  Motive  on  the  Motivation,  dwelling 
especially  on  the  Relativity  of  Motives.  It  is  never- 
theless necessary,  for  didactic  reasons,  to  consider 


—  68  — 

Motives  apart,  (in  this  chapter  and  the  next),  so  as  to 
explain  what  we  mean  by  the  Psychological  Consti- 
tution, and  the  Force  of  Motives. 

Provisional  Placing  ourselves  at  the  point  of  view  of  one  who 
Definition  of  observes  directly,  what  passes  in  the  mind,  during  a 
Will- Act,  we  define  motives,  provisionally,  as  our 
reasons  for  acting.  We  do  not  mean  to  imply  that 
motives  are  always  conscious,  or  that  what  appear  to 
us  as  «  our  reasons  for  acting  » ,  are  really  «  our  rea- 
sons for  acting » ;  nor  do  we  imply  that  motives 
always  appear  under  the  aspect  of  reasons,  we  merely, 
give,  the  common  sense  view  of  motives. 
Division  of  Motives  may  be  considered  from  the  point  of  view 
otives.  Qf  form  or  from  the  point  of  view  of  content.  From 
the  point  of  view  of  form,  motives  appear  as  judgments, 
impressions  of  value,  representations,  tendencies  and 
feelings  :  these  forms  may  in  turn  be  assumed,  by  one 
and  the  same  motive,  and  that,  not  by  chance,  but 
owing  to  definite  laws  of  motive-evolution  : 

II  existe,  psychologiquement,  une  dependance  gdnetique  entre  les 
differentes  formes  sous  lesquelles  apparait  un  motif  donne.  Le  con- 
cept de  motif  s'applique  a  toute  la  serie  genetique  et  le  motif  comme 
tel,  la  raison  qui  justifie  le  choix  en  derniere  analyse,  peut  etre 
repre"sente,  dans  un  cas  donne  par  des  phenomenes  totalement 
etrangers  a  son  contenu  originel  (i). 

By  «  content  »  of  motives,  as  distinguished  from  their 
form,  we  mean  that  which  constitutes  the  motive,  and 
makes  it  distinguishable  from  other  motives.  It  is  the 
meaning  or  signification  of  the  motive  —  which  mean- 
ing can,  as  we  have  seen,  appear  under  various  forms  : 

Les  differentes  formes  d'un  motif  constituent  une  serie  evolutive 
dont  1'ensemble  seul  peut  nous  donner  1'explication  de  la  valeur,  da 
tel  ou  tel  phenomene  particulier  (2). 

(i)  Le  choix  volontaire,  p.  210. 
(a)  Ibid.,  p.  324. 


-69- 

From  the  point  of  view  of  content,  motives  may  be 
divided  into  subjective  motives;  (cases  of  blind  impulse 
and  capricious  tendencies)  and  objective  motives.  The 
latter  motives  are  intrinsic,  when  their  basis  lies  in 
some  quality  of  the  object  itself,  and  extrinsic,  when 
their  basis  is  some  merely  accidental  character  of  the 
object,  as  for  instance  its  '  position '  or  its  '  rarity '. 

Thus  if  I  buy  a  stick,  because  it  is  strong  and  light — 
my  motive  is  intrinsic,  for  strength  and  lightness  are 
qualities  belonging  to  the  stick  itself.  If  I  buy  it, 
because  it  is  the  only  one  1  can  get,  my  motive  is 
extrinsic— it  is  not  based  in  a  quality  of  the  stick. 

Objective  and  subjective  motives  alike  may  be  posi- 
tive or  negative.  When  a  subject  feels  himself  attracted 
or  drawn  by  something,  with  a  feeling  of  pleasure,  and, 
even,  a  muscular  tendency  to  react  and  to  take  it— we 
say  that  the  motive  is  positive.  On  the  other  hand, 
when  a  subject  is  repelled  by  something ,  hesitates 
perhaps,  has  feelings  of  fear  or  disgust,  and  feels  an 
impulse  to  turn  away  from  it,  and  to  take  something 
else  in  preference— we  say  that  the  motive  is  negative. 
In  fine  attractions  and  likings  mark  positive,  and  dis- 
likes mark  negative  motives. 

For  Wundt  the  combination  of  ideas  and  feelings    Different 
which  in  our  subjective  consciousness  are  the  imme-    .v(1(;wsof 

1  Motives. 

diate  antecedents  of  the  volitional  act  are  called  the 
motives.  Every  motive  has  thus  an  ideational  and  an 
affective  part.  The  former  part  is  the  moving  reason, 
the  latter  the  impelling  feeling— the  moving  reason  and 
impelling  feeling,  the  objective  and  subjective  aspects, 
are  often  fused  together. 

Considered  in  itself  a  motive  consists  of  a  feeling  accompanied  by 
a  more  or  less  clear  representation,  or  even  a  mass  of  representa- 
tions gathered  into  one  complexion  (i). 

(i)  Outlines  of  Psychology  (Judd)  sec.  14. 


—  70  — 

Wundt  emphasises  the  fact  that  the  feelings  are  the 
springs  of  action  and  not  the  representations.  He 
shows  too  how  feelings  combine  into  a  unitary  whole 
which  gives  a  new  impelling  feeling.  This  new  impel- 
ling feeling  plays  the  chief  role  in  volition. 

This  follows  from  the  fact  that  the  feelings  are  integral  compon- 
ents of  the  Volitional  process  itself,  while  the  ideas  are  of  influence 
only  indirectly  through  their  connections  with  the  feelings,  (i) 
Mr  Stout.  In  the  more  developed  forms  of  deliberation,  writes  Mr  Stout, 
there  is  a  kind  of  mental  see-saw.  Now  one  alternative,  and  now 
another  comes  predominantly  before  consciousness,  and  the  mind 
is  variously  attracted  and  repelled  by  each  in  turn.  The  desires 
and  aversions  which  arise  in  this  way  are  called  motives.  Hence 
the  process  of  Deliberation  is  often  called  a  conflict  of  motives. 
Motives  are  not  mere  impulses.  They  come  before  con- 
sciousness as  reasons  why  I  should  act  in  this  way  or  that  way. 
They  are  not  independent  forces  fighting  out  a  battle  among  them- 
selves, while  the  Ego  remains  a  mere  spectator.  On  the  contrary 
the  motives  are  motives,  only  in  so  far  as  they  arise  from  the  nature 
of  the  self,  and  presuppose  the  conception  of  the  self  as  a  deter- 
mining factor.  From  this  it  follows,  that  the  recognised  reasons 
for  a  decision  can  never  constitute  the  entire  cause  of  a  decision. 
Behind  them  there  always  lies  the  self  as  a  whole,  and  what  this 
involves  can  never  be  completely  analysed  or  stated  in  the  form  of 
definite  reasons  or  special  motives.  (2) 

w.  James.  James  begins  by  hinting  in  his  half-mysterious  way 
that  we  are  ignorant  of  the  true  source  of  motives  for 
«  the  connection  of  the  reality  of  things  with  their  effec- 
tiveness as  motives  is  a  tale  which  has  never  yet  been 
fully  told.  » 

He  speaks  in  the  same  vague  manner  as  Mr  Stout. 

It  is  where  the  normally  less  efficacious  motive  becomes  more 
efficacious,  and  the  normally  more  efficacious  one  less  so,  that 
actions  ordinarily  effortless,  or  abstinences  ordinarily  easy,  either 

(»)  Outlines  of  Psychology  (Judd)  sec.  14. 
(2)  Manual  of  Psychology,  p.  6o5. 


become  impossible  or  are  effected  if  at  all,  by  the  expenditure  of 
effort,  (r) 

We  have  seen  his  just  criticism  of  the  pleasure-pain 
motive  theory  of  Bain.  He  himself  proposes  five  types 
of  character,  to  which  correspond  five  types  of  moti- 
vation. 

Thus  for  the  reasonable  type  «  the  arguments  for 
and  against  a  certain  course  seem  gradually  and  almost 
insensibly  to  settle  themselves  in  the  mind,  and  to  end 
by  leaving  a  clear  balance  in  favour  of  one  alternative, 
which  alternative  we  then  adopt  without  effort  or 
constraint.  » 

James,  in  spite  of  his  vagueness  and  dramatic  style, 
perhaps  because  of  them,  gives  some  useful  suggestions, 
as  when  he  speaks  of  *  the  urgency  with  which  an  idea 
(motive)  is  able  to  compel  attention  and  dominate  in 
conscience. ' 

HofFding  like  Stout,  Ribot,  Ward  and  James,  views  H.Hoffding. 
motives  from  a  general  standpoint. 

En  realite,  le  motif,  la  force  qui  determine  la  volition  c'est 
toujours  nous-memes  pris  sous  une  forme  ou  sous  une  face  deter- 
minee.  Nos  motifs  sont  des  parties  de  nous-memes.  Indeed,  he 
adds,  that  all  acts  truly  ours,  are  necessary  manifestations  of  our 
intimate  being.  «  C'est  la  nature  de  notre  etre  qui  decide  si  une 
chose  peut  devenir  un  motif  pour  nous.  » 

He  adds  that  our  motives  are  not  determined  solely 
by  our  original  nature,  but  also  by  our  will,  and  by 
our  anterior  actions.  In  fine,  he  agrees,  more  or  less 
with  Ribot  that  «  le  motif  preponderant  nest  quune 
portion  de  la  cause  et  toujours  la  plus  faible  quoique 
la  plus  visible  »  (2). 

(1)  Principles  of  Psychology.  Vol.  II,  p.  536. 

(2)  Esquisse  dune  Psychologic.  (Section)  La  volonte  et  la  vie  inconsciente. 


Mr  Mackenzie.     The  term  «  motive  »,  writes  Mr  Mackenzie (i),  is  not 
less  ambiguons  than  «  intention  ». 

The  motive  means  of  course,  what  moves  us  or  causes  us  to  act 
in  a  particular  way.  Now  there  is  an  ambiguity  in  the  term 
a  cause.  »  A  cause  may  be  either  efficient  or  final...  There  is  a 
similar  ambiguity  in  the  use  of  the  term  «  motive.  »  A  motive 
may  be  understood  to  mean  either  that  which  impels  or  that  which 
induces  us  to  act  in  a  particular  way.  In  the  former  sense  we  say 
that  we  are  moved  by  feeling  or  emotion... 

Moral  activity  or  conduct  is  purposeful  action  ;  and 
action  with  a  purpose  is  not  simply  moved  by  feeling  ; 
it  is  moved  rather  by  the  thought  of  some  end  to  be 
attained.  This  leads  us  to  the  second  and  more  correct 
sense  in  which  the  term  «  motive  «  may  be  used. 
The  case  of  a  man  moved  by  pity  brings  this  distinc- 
tion to  light.  The  mere  feeling  of  itself  is  not  a  suffi- 
cient inducement  to  action. 

When  a  man  is  moved  to  action  he  must  have,  besides  the  mere 
feeling,  the  conception  of  an  end  to  be  attained...  The  motive,  that 
which  induces  us  to  act,  is  the  thought  of  a  desirable  end. 

Mr  Mackenzie  quotes  Aristotle  '  del  Kivei  TO  opexrov '  (it 
is  always  the  desired  object  that  moves  to  action). 

Motive  is  used  in  various  senses,  by  Kiilpe,  Diirr, 
Ebbinghaus  and  others.  For  Prof.  Dewey  «  the  fore- 
seen, ideal  consequences,  are  the  end  of  the  act,  and  as 
such  form  the  motive  ».  Pfander  describes  the  motive 
as  that  by  which  I  feel  myself  lead  to  tend  towards 
something  or  to  do  something;  Meumann  distinguishes 
between  a  broader  and  narrower  meaning  of  motive  ; 
the  sum  of  all  the  processes  which  prepare  the  act, 
and  the  conscious  reasons  of  the  act ;  and  shows, 
as  does  Mackenzie,  that  the  importance  of  feelings  in 
action  has  been  exaggerated  by  most  psychologists. 

(i)  Manual  of  Ethics,  p.  6a. 


In  general,  psychologists,  have  dwelt  either  on  the 
presence  of  feelings,  or  on  the  presence  of  a  represen- 
tation of  the  end.  A  thorough  analysis  of  motives  has 
not  yet  been  made.  As  Dr  Michotte  and  Dr  Prtim 
well  point  out,  the  constant  factor,  if  there  be  one, 
which  characterises  motives  has  not  yet  been  disco- 
vered. 

Nous  n'avons  pu,...  decouvrir  de  facteur  constant  caracteristique 
du  motif,  et  qui  serait  propre  a  cet  element  de  la  vie  psychique  (i). 

We  propose,  before  going  into  the  problem  of  the  summary  of 
Psychological  Constitution  of  motives,  to  give  a  brief    Motiyes- 
summary  of  the  motives  which  occurred  in  our  expe- 
riments.    This  will  show  the  scope  of  our  material, 
and  will  render  more  intelligible  our  subsequent  ana- 
lyses of  motives . 

We  shall  give  first ,  some  examples  of  subjective 
motives,  and  next  some  examples  of  intrinsic  and 
extrinsic  (objective)  motives. 

Subjective  motives  were  rare  in  our  experiments,  Subjective 
mainly  because  the  values  of  the  alternatives  were  well 
known,  and  because  the  subjects  took  the  motivation 
seriously,  and  based  their  choices  on  the  known,  good 
or  bad  qualities  of  the  substances,  instead  of  on  sub- 
jective impulses  At  times,  nevertheless,  the  choices 
were  made  in  virtue  of  such  impulses  —  the  Subjects 
often  not  being  able  to  account  for  them.  Feelings  of 
astonishment  and  regret  usually  followed  choices  of 
this  kind.  A  few  examples  may  be  given  : 

'  The  moment  I  saw  D  I  felt  inclined  or  drawn  towards  D  ;  no 
judgment,  only  a  feeling '  '  I  have  for  T  an  inexplicable  attraction, 
I  feel  drawn  towards  it, without  knowing  why ';  etc.  Subjects  often 
felt  active  tendencies  to  take  this  or  that  alternative,  such  tenden  - 
cies  were  liable  to  recur  when  the  same  choice  was  presented  again. 

( i)  Le  Choix  volontaire,  p.  209. 


—  74  — 

Capricious  choices  occurred  at  times.  The  Subject,  according  to 
the  mood  of  the  moment,  rejects  his  habitual  favourite  and  '  in  a 
whim  '  takes  something  else.  He  usually  feels  ashamed,  or  feels 
inconsistent  on  such  occasions.  At  times  too,  in  a  mocking  or  con- 
temptuous way,  or  even  in  a  kind  of  spite,  without  any  objective 
reason,  Subjects  reject  an  alternative  :  '  I  felt  angry  against  B,  so 
I  took  C ' ;  '  I  took  it  with  a  contemptuous  glance  at  the  other '  etc. 
Fair-play  and  '  do-it-for-luck '  impulses  appear  at  times  :  «  111  take 
this  for  luck  »,  «  I  said  to  myself,  I'll  give  the  other  one  a 
chance  »  etc. 

A  type  of  choice  which  occurred  somewhat  fre- 
quently was  what  I  have  called  *  inexplicable  choices  ». 
The  Subject,  at  a  given  moment,  would  react  and  take 
a  glass  without  having  the  faintest  notion  why  he  did 
so  —  and  with  a  feeling  of  astonishment  at  having  done 
so  :  «  I  took  B  without  knowing  why  » ,  «  at  a  given 
moment  I  reacted  and  took  T  without  knowing  why,  » 
were  often  to  be  found  in  the  introspections.  Now,  it 
is  clear,  that  such  choices  may  be  explained  in  many 
ways 

They  may  be  due,  and  we  believe  usually  are,  to 
what  is  called  the  «  temporal  determination  ».  The 
Subject  when  he  feels  that  the  Experiment  is  lasting 
too  long,  reacts  automatically  and  takes  the  nearest 
glass,  or  the  glass  about  which  he  is  thinking,  without 
having  any  conscious  motive  for  his  choice.  Support 
tor  this  view  is  found  in  a  phenomenon  that  we  noticed 
during  our  researches.  Some  Subjects  e.  g.  S1  often 
reacted  and  realised  his  choice  when  the  duration  had 
reached  a  certain  number  of  sigma  ;  and  that,  even  in 
successive  choices  of  a  different  type. 

E.  G.  V  K         699  sigma  |      V  K        478  sigma  \ 

Z  L         700     —    I     Z  L        477     —    j 

j   V         539     —    >     J   V         532     —    \ 
Z  C          53i      —    (     Z  C         53i      —    } 


-75- 

Inexplicable  choices,  are  due  at  times  however,  to 
sudden  subjective  impulses,  and  in  such  cases  Subjects 
e.  g.  S2  regret  having  chosen  tellement  a  la  legere. 
Somewhat  similar ;  is  the  following  choice  of  S4 ;  «  Saw 
C  with  pleasure,  remembering  it  was  good,  but  hesi- 
tated a  little  as  if  waiting  for  an  order  to  take  it.  The 
order  came  and  I  took  and  drank  it  automatically* 
S4  was  of  opinion,  that  the  «  order  »  which  came  was 
nothing  more  than  a  subjective  impulse. 

The  motives  which  occured  most  frequently  in  our  objective 
researches  were  intrinsic  (objective)  motives  of  a  more      otives' 
or  less  developed  form.     They  were  mostly  hedonic(i),     intrinsic 
being  based  on  the  agreeable  or  disagreeable  qualities 
of  the  substances.  At  first  they  were  concrete  in  form, 
and  accompanied  by  imagery,   or  reproduced  tastes. 
Later  on  they  became  more  and  more  abstract  and 
intentional.     Naturally  the  forms  were,  various  : 

i.  Judgments  :  '  K  is  excellent  ' ;  '  Z  is  very  agreeable  '  :  2.  im- 
pressions of  value  :  «  I  had  an  impression  of  E's  goodness  in  rea- 
ding the  letter  E  »  :  2.  active  tendencies  :  «  I  turned  away  from  C 
in  disgust  »  ;  «  C  repelled  me  to  the  other  »  :  4.  feelingsl(based  on 
objective  qualities)  «  feeling  of  profound  pleasure  on  seeing  K  »  etc. 
The  usual  type  of  intrinsic  motive  took  the  form,  however,  of  a 
knowledge  or  consciousness  that  e.  g.  '  Z  was  excellent '  or  '  bet- 
ter than  the  other  '  or  '  best  of  all  '.  As  motivation  developed, 
the  motives  became  so  attenuated  in  form  that  the  choices  were 
made  4  by  a  kind  of  abstract  algebra  '. 

When   Hesitations  were  very  strong  the  Subjects,        b 

J  Extrinsic 

unable  to  fix  on  an  intrinsic  motive,  often  saved  them- 
selves from  the  pain  of  further  indecision  by  '  taking 
the  glass  nearest  the  right  hand  ';  or  'by  reacting  just 
to  finish ' ;  or  'by  taking  the  one  that  seemed  most 
familiar'.  In  these  cases  the  motivation  was  evi- 

(s)  At  times  the  basis  was  the  quality  of  healthiness  or  harmlessness  :  i  I  took 
V  as  it  is  healthy  drink  >  «  washarmless,  I  took  it.  i  Such  motives  are  not  strictly 
speaking  hedonic  though  they  are  intrinsic. 


_76- 

dently  inferior  in  quality  —  less  *  serious'  so  to  speak. 
As  a  result  Subjects  often  felt  dissatisfied  after  the  choice . 
—  They  felt  they  had  reglected  the  duty  or  task  impo- 
sed by  the  instruction,  of  making  a  serious  choice. 

Extrinsic  motives  occurred  frequently  in  our  prepar- 
atory series,  because,  the  glasses  were  at  first  unknown, 
and  choices  had  to  be  made  for  reasons  wholly  ab 
extra.  *  C  just  before  me  »  «  D  seemed  clearer  »  «  Saw 
A  last  this  was  against  A  »  «  B  was  far  away,  this  was 
against  B  »  etc. 

Something  like  an  aesthetic  motive  occurred  at  times  in  the  case, 
at  least,  of  T.  This  substance  was  regarded  as  '  enigmatic  '  and 
4  mysterious  '.  It  exercised  an  attraction,  hard  to  define  which  at 
least  was  neither  hedonic  nor  deontological.  e.  g.  «  One  has  for 
Tan  inexplicable  preference,  because  the  value  of  T  is  not  expressible 
in  terms  of  goodness  or  badness  !  Its  value  is  in  the  word  itself. 
This  value  is  a  middle  value,  deprived  of  all  feelings  of  disgust  or 
pleasure.  » 

Many  motives  are  so  closely  associated  with  imagery 
that  the  imagery  seems  to  be  in  part  the  motive. 
Sometimes  a  scale  of  values  was  present  as  a  concrete 
image  ;  figures  or  positions  high  or  low  were  seen  ; 
sounds,  colours,  reproduced  tastes,  associations,  motor 
images  appeared,  and  seemed,  to  subjective  conscious- 
ness to  exercise  influence  on  the  choice  : 

Motive  for  F  was  hearing  the  words  '  B  is  worse  '  ;  the  figure 
3  came  to  my  mind  in  connection  with  some  imaginery  table  (here 
the  Subject  took  the  glass  symbolised  by  3  and  rejected  the  other 
which  was  symbolised  by  7) ;  my  motive  was  that  I  had  '  a  vivid 
kinaesthetic  image  of  taking  C  ' ;  «  K  and  Z  both  sweet,  but  Z  stood 
out  as  it  were  from  a  back-ground,  which  back-ground  was  iden- 
tified with  K  »  ;  '  V  was  associated  with  an  image  of  childhood  '; 
at  times  one  substance  appeared  as  a  '  coloured  '  taste  in  contrast 
with  its  companion  '  colourless  '  taste. 

The  greater  or  lesser  degree  or  duration  of  conscious- 
ness with  respect  to  an  alternative  was  distinctly 


—  77  — 

influential  in  motivation.  The  degree  of  consciousness 
was  at  times  affected  by  seeing  a  word  more  or  less 
clearly,  owing  to  its  being  printed  perhaps,  more  darkly, 
or  more  in  the  middle  of  the  card.  «  J  was  more  pre- 
sent to  consciousness  »  ;  «  V  had  occupied  my  attention 
longer  than  K  »  ;  «  V  was  not  taken  by  distraction  but 
because  it  was  looked  at  a  long  time  ».  The  fact  of 
«  resting  on  »  or  «  fixing  »  an  alternative,  which  hap- 
pened frequently,  rendered  that  alternative  more  fami- 
liar, and  in  consequence,  more  likely  to  be  taken  — 
especially  in  cases  of  doubt.  «  Took  the  more  fami- 
liar »  was  frequently  found  in  the  introspections  ;  also 
such  instances  as  «  V  was  not  conscious  as  being  more 
pleasant  but  as  being  more  known,  more  intimate  ». 

Motives  of  adeontological  nature  occurred  frequently.  Deontoiogicai 
The  Subject,  in  view  of  the  instruction  received,  felt    Motives. 
bound  to  do  this  or  that ;  '  to  see  the  other  alternative'; 
'  to  choose  Z  as  it  was  at  the  top  of  his  scale  ' ;  *  to  reject 
C  as  it  was  the  worst  of  all ',   etc.     The  instruction 
implied  that  the  best  should  be  taken,  and  so  there 
often  appeared  feelings  of  satisfaction,  of  Tightness,  of 
certitude  in  taking  the  best.     Somewhat  akin  was  the 
motive   of  consistency.     Subjects   felt   they   ought  to 
choose  '  in  view  of  their  past  preferences  '. 

Feeling  of  surprise  at  seeing  D  again.  Immediately  felt  certain 
as  to  what  to  do.  My  last  decision  was  all  right.  I  did  not 
again  enter  into  motives  or  look  for  D.  I  chose  A  at  once,  in  vir- 
tue of  my  last  decision,  with  a  feeling  of  satisfaction. 

In  our  preparatory  series  the  motive  of  Rarity  occur- 
red fairly  often — but  nearly  always  in  connection  with 
a  deontological  motive — •  that  I  ought  to  try  the  new 
one '.  e.  g.  «  I  '11  take  this  glass  because  it  is  new 
and  because  I  should  know  all  the  glasses  as  soon  as 
possible  ». 


-78- 

In  view  of  the  duty,  to  react  quickly,  Subjects  at 
times  reacted  without  having  a  fully  formed  motive  : 

Consciousness  that  it  was  time  to  react.  Looked  at  B  and  took 
B.  Motive  was  certainly  that  it  was  time  to  react.  Or  again , 
«  Hesitation.  No  motive  for  deciding.  Felt  the  experiment  was 
lasting  too  long.  Chose  D  almost  without  a  motive.  » 

It  will  be  seen,  from  these  examples,  that  a  great 
variety  of  motives  came  to  light  in  our  researches, 
although  the  choices  were  as  simple  as  possible. 

We  shall  now  examine  the  question  of  the  Psycholo- 
gical Constitution  of  Motives — and  seek  to  determine 
the  phenomena  characteristic  of  Motives. 

Psychological      Our  method   of  investigating  the  problem   of  the 
constitution  psycnological  Constitution  of  Motives  was  as  follows. 

of  Motives.         J 

It  will  be  remembered  that  '  recognition '  experiments 
proceeded  the  'choice'  experiments.  In  the  former 
the  Subjects  read  the  word  e.  g.  Ziv  and  reacted  when 
they  were  conscious  '  of  what  it  was  '.  Similarly  for 
K,  C,  etc.  (i) 

Now  in  the  Choice  experiments  the  card  presented 
two  words  e.  g.  K— C  between  which  a  choice  was  to 
be  made.  Motives  at  once  sprang  up.  These  motives 
e.  g.  that  for  K,  had  much  in  common  with  the  Sub- 
ject's recognition  of  K,  when  it  appeared  by  itself  in  the 
Recognition  Experiments.  Naturally,  in  the  Recogni- 
tion Experiments  there  were  absolutely  no  motives, 
strictly  so  called,  but  there  were  judgments  and  appre- 
ciations of  value;  '  motives'  in  fine  in  an  embryonic 
state.  By  comparing  then,  the  Recognition  and  the 
Choice  introspections,  we  could  trace  the  genesis  and 
evolution  of  motives  and  determine  their  Psychological 
Constitution. 

(i)  K,  C  stand  for  Kum,  Chouc  etc. 


—  79  — 

An  example  will  make  this  matter  clear.  We  shall 
consider  K  and  C,  as  they  appeared  for  S3,  first  in  the 
Recognition  Experiments,  and  secondly  in  the  Choice 
Experiment  K — C. 

1.  K  appeared.     Reaction-time,  y53  sigma. 

No  local  image  ;  feeling  of  complete  indifference.  Awareness 
that  K  represented  a  slightly  sweet,  insipid  taste  which  I  dislike. 
Per  se  it  is  objectionable.  Per  accidens  (when  compared  with  the 
others)  it  is  slightly  pleasant. 

2.  C  appeared.     Reaction-time,  455  sigma. 

A  nasty,  sharp,  sickening  flavour,  recalling  to  me  an  emetic. 
Had  image  of  glass  and  mark.  Reaction  was  regular.  Judgment 
of  value  against  C. 

3.  The  choice  K — C  in  which  K  was  chosen.     Reac- 
tion-time, 1070  sigma. 

First  I  read  both  in  the  order  K — C  without  identifying  them. 
Then  coming  back  I  recognised  K,  merely  as  something  sweet, 
and  C  as  an  unpleasant,  sickening  liquid.  I  excluded  C  as  though 
putting  back  something,  and  chose  K  definitely  as  my  preference, 
basing  myself  on  sensations  of  taste. 

We  see,  here,  that  K  and  C,  appear  in  the  Choice  act  Attitudes  of 
under  their  characteristic  aspects  —  K  *  as  something  Rec°9ntstn9 

.....  and  of 

sweet  ;   C   '  as  an   unpleasant  sickening  liquid  .     In    choosing 
the  Recognition  Experiments   the  attitude  is  that  of  contrasted. 
remembering,  and  becoming  aware  of;  in  the  Choice 
Experiments  the  attitude  is  that  of  valuing,  comparing 
and  prefering.  «  I  excluded  C  as  though  putting  back 
something.  » 

In  the  Recognition  Experiments  visual  and  local 
images,  reproductions  of  taste ;  specifications  of  tastes 
as  'sweet',  'bitter',  'salty';  associations  ;  with, 
from  time  to  time  appreciations  of  value,  were  the 
characteristic  phenomena.  In  the  Choice  Experiments, 
judgments  of  value  and  comparisons,  explicit  and  im- 


—  8o  — 

plicit,  impulsive  tendencies,  actual  feelings,  hesitations, 
consciousness  of  duty,  static  states  of  conscience,  etc., 
were  the  usual  phenomena.  Each  Subject,  naturally, 
took  up  a  personal  standpoint,  and  chose  in  his  own 
way.  Nevertheless  a  certain  uniformity  prevailed  in 
the  *  choosing'  attitude,  as  did,  likewise,  a  uniformity 
prevail  in  the  'recognising'  attitude.  In  the  former 
case  the  '  me'  seemed  to  be  more  present,  there  was  a 
practical,  '  selfish'  effort  to  make  the  best  of  the  choice. 
In  the  latter,  recognitions  were  often  very  impersonal. 
There  was  an  awareness,  but  no  '  personal'  interest. 

In  the  light  of  this  contrast  between  the  Psychology 
of  the  Chooser,  and  the  Psychology  of  the  Recogniser, 
we  can,  perhaps,  better  understand  the  Psychological 
constitution  of  motives  —  that  is  to  say,  the  character- 
istic marks  of  motives,  as  they  are  observable  in 
introspection. 

Let  us  take  one  more  example  of  a  substance  as  it 
appeared  in  the  Recognition  Experiments  and  after- 
wards in  the  choices.  C  appeared  usually  in  the  Re- 
cognition Experiments  thus  : 

Remembered  C  at  once.  Conscious  it  was  horrid.  Hardly  any 
hesitation.  The  card  seemed  to  token  a  horrid  thing.  My  mind 
did  not  go  beyond  the  card. 

In  the  choices  C  appeared  thus  : 

Looked  at  C.  Immediately  had  consciousness  «  O  !  its  that 
one  » ,  with  knowledge  that  it  was  an  awful  thing  and  a  feeling  of 
repulsion.  It  was  something  dynamic.  Something  like  an  im- 
pulse not  to  take  it. 

We  have  here,  in  our  opinion,  the  characteristic 
marks  of  a  hedonic  (in  this  case  negative)  motive  : 

1 .  conscousness  of  value  :  «  it  was  an  awful  thing  » 

2.  accompanying  feeling    :  «  feeling  of  repulsion  » 

3.  tendency  (dynamic)  «  impulse  not  to  take  it  ». 
Needless  to  say  the  «  Psychological  Constitution  »  of 


—  8i  — 

motives  is  not  always  so  evident.  When  automatism 
develops  the  feelings  disappear,  and  the  consciousness 
of  value  becomes  so  faint  that  it  is  hard  to  say  if  it  is 
still  present.  The  tendency  however  remains ,  and 
grows  stronger.  This  tendency  becomes  more  and 
more  impetuous,  and  often  leads  to  mistaken  choices, 
not  directly,  but  indirectly.  Subjects  for  instance,  ac- 
customed to  find  good  things  at  the  right  hand,  gradu- 
ally tended  impulsively  towards  that  side,  before  even 
having  read  the  card. 

Two  points,  of  interest,  with  respect  to  the  question 
of  the  Psychological  Constitution  of  motives,  may  be 
added,  i.  We  have  said  that  when  automatism  deve- 
lops, the  feelings  and  judgments  of  value  disappear. 
The  same  effect  follows,  if  a  choice  is  made,  in  dis- 
traction. Not  only  does  the  'content'  of  the  motive 
become  more  meagre,  but  also  its  form.  The  motive 
becomes  attenuated. 

In  choice  N°  i5o  —  of  S2,  for  example. 

The  experiment  passed  in  distraction,  so  that  all  judgment  of 
value,  and  all  feeling  of  pleasure  or  displeasure  were  absent ;  they 
did  not  come. 

2.  The  second  point  is  this.  Motives  are  subject  to 
the  laws  of  *  constellation  '  in  an  interesting  way.  If, 
for  instance,  in  the  choice  Z —  T,  Z  being  valued  first, 
is  appreciated  as  «  sweet  »,  the  motive  for  T  takes  the 
same  aspect,  and  appears  as  more  or  less  sweet  (i).  If 
Z  is  judged  as  definite  and  distinct  in  flavour,  T  appears 
as  more  or  less  so.  Motives  are  thus  relative  to  acci- 
dental circumstances,  as  well  as  being  relative  to  the 
general  nature  of  motivation. 

(i)  This  fact  is  not  due  to  an  explicit  or  implicit  judgment  of  comparison,  but 
to  the  mechanism  of  association. 


CHAPTER  IV. 


MOTIVE-FORCE   AND   ITS   MEASUREMENT. 


The  Meaning     Motive-force  was  often  spoken  of  by  our  Subjects. 
of       They  felt  this  or  that  motive  strong  or  weak.     They 

Motive-Force.  J  .  .  r  .  „.  J 

were  conscious  at  times  or  a  certain  conflict  between 
motives,  as  though  two  motives  were  measuring  their 
strength.  They  were  aware  too,  of  the  augmentation 
or  diminution  of  the  force  of  this  or  that  motive,  and  at 
times,  ventured  to  explain  the  cause  of  such  pheno- 
mena ;  for  instance,  S2  in  an  introspection  says ;«  Having 
only  superficially  seen  K,  the  motive  for  it,  was  not  so 
strong,  as  if  I  had  seen  it  well.  The  other,  B,  a  nega- 
tive motive,  wakened  up  and  strenghtened  the  motive 
for  K  » — or  to  take  an  example  from  S3;  «  I  chose  V  for 
its  quality,  reinforced  by  the  thought  of  its  intensity  ». 

It  seems  admissible  to  use  this  metaphor  of  the 
«  Strengthening  of  Motives  »  as  it  was  used  naturally 
and  spontaneously  by  our  Subjects.  Some  metaphor 
must  be  used  in  order  to  make  this  matter  clear,  and 
the  present  seems  to  have  least  against  it  (i). 

Motives,  as  we  shall  see  presently,  are  liable  to 
fluctuations  during  the  choice  act.  They  grow  stronger 

(i)  Mr  Stout,  in  his  Manual  of  Psychology,  e.g.  p.  63 1,  speaks  of  strengthen- 
ing Motives  :  «  We  may  find  that  a  certain  motive  or  group  of  motives  has  not 
the  strength  or  prominence  it  ought  to  have.  We  may  then  attempt  to  give  it 
this  strength...  etc. » 


—  83  — 

or  weaker  according  to  various  circumstances  of  con- 
trast, of  degree  of  consciousness,  and  so  forth.  They 
seem  to  mount  and  to  descend,  to  trace  a  veritable 
curve.  It  is  not  sufficient  that  one  motive  should 
predominate  over  another,  in  order  that  the  choice 
may  be  made  in  its  favour.  It  must  predominate  by 
a  certain  surplusage.  It  does  not  suffice  that  it  should 
be  stronger  than  the  other,  in  order  that  it  may  win. 
It  must,  itself,  first  reach  a  certain  degree  of  strength  or 
force — it  must  reach  what  we  shall  call  its  Critical 
Point. 

By  the  Critical  Point  of  Motives  we  mean,  that  The  Critical 
point  or  degree  of  strength,  which,  being  reached 
by  the  motive,  the  choice  results  automatically.  The 
hypothesis  of  the  Existence  of  such  a  Critical  Point  or 
Zone,  is  suggested  by  the  consideration  of  certain  effects 
of  motive  strengthening  which  we  shall  study  presently. 
If  we  may  be  pardoned  for  using  a  diagram,  indicating 
the  fluctuations  of  motivation,  and  the  final  attainment 
of  the  Critical  Point  by  one  motive,  we  should  construct 
it,  as  follows. 


Crjfait  t 


Critical  /one,    of  B 


The  fluctuations  upwards  are  meant  to  represent  the 
fluctuations  of  the  motive  for  A ;  and  the  fluctuations 
downwards,  those  of  the  motive  for  B.  At  a  given 


-84- 

moment  the  motive  for  A  is  strengthened;  (this  is 
indicated  by  the  arrow  arriving  from  the  right) ;  then 
the  Critical  Point  is  reached  and  the  choice  follows 
automatically  (i). 

The  points  which  we  consider  important  in  this 
hypothesis  of  the  Critical  Point  of  Motives,  and  those 
for  which  we  shall  adduce  evidence  forthwith,  are  A 
and  B  : 

A.  The  fact  that  motives  are  strengthened. 

B.  The  fact  that  there  is  an  economy  of  motive- force 
— that,   when   motives  are  brought   up   to  a    certain 
degree  of  strength,  the  reaction  or  the  choice  automati- 
cally follows;   there   being  no  further   '  wastage  '    of 
motive  force. 

The          Motives   are   strengthened   in   various    ways.     The 
strengthening  process   at  tjmes  jasts  long,  as  when  a  Subject,  having 

of  Motives.   *  •  •        ,     r 

only  a  weak  motive,  waits  patiently  for  another  motive 
to  come.  No  other  motive  comes,  but  in  the  mean  time, 
owing  to  its  being  a  long  time  at  the  focus  of  conscious- 
ness, or  to  its  being  rendered  stronger  by  the  conside- 
ration that  *  it  is  the  only  motive  to  be  found  ',  the 
weak  motive  reaches,  at  last,  the  Critical  Point  and  the 
choice  is  effected.  At  times,  however,  the  process  is 
very  short,  and  the  Critical  Point  is  reached  at  once, 
with  almost  explosive  results.  This  was  often  the  case 
when  C  a  very  disagreeable  substance  was  seen  first, 
e.  g.  «  I  saw  C  and  immediately  jumped  on  J  »  or 
«  I  saw  C  and  rebounded  at  once  on  B  ».  Here  the 
motive  for  the  second  alternative  was  at  once  driven  up 
to  the  Critical  Point  even  though,  in  both  these  cases, 
the  second  alternatives  were  unpleasant.  They  were 
however  much  less  unpleasant  than  C. 

(i)  We  are  conscious  of  the  shortcomings  of  such  an  image — we  use  it  merely 
for  didactic  reasons. 


—  85  — 


The  various   modes  of  Motive-Strengthening  must    Modes  of 
now  be  examined.     They  are  chiefly  four  : 

J  J  Strengthenmj 

1.  The  Effects  of  the  Instruction.  a 

T-L      r-rr  c  s*  Effects  of  tke 

2.  The  Effects  of  Contrast.  instruction. 

3.  The  Personal  Factor. 

a.  Subjective  Impulse. 

b.  Appeal  to  a  principle. 

4.  Accidental  Causes. 

The  Instruction  given  to  the  Subject  « Choose  a  glass 
and  drink  it  »  implied  that  he  should  choose  the  best. 
The  Subject  was  also  under  the  Instruction  «  to  react 
as  quickly  as  possible,  » 

In  virtue  of  the  duty  of  choosing  the  best,  motives 
became  in  form  partly  deontological  e.  g.  «  Z  may  be 
taken  »  ;  «  It  is  allowable  to  take  K  »  ;  «  Z  must  be 
taken  »  ;  «  C  may  not  be  taken  »  etc.  This  meant  that 
the  positive  motives  for  Z  or  K,  or  negative  against  C, 
were  rendered  stronger,  in  virtue  of  their  fulfilling  a 
certain  condition,  viz,  the  condition  imposed  by  the 
instruction  of  choosing  the  best.  The  instruction  gave 
such  additional  force  to  the  motive  for  the  best  that  : 
i .  feelings  of  certitude  sprang  up  «  Z  may  certainly  be 
taken  »  ;  «  judged  «  it  is  Z  »  with  feeling  of  certitude  », 
also  feelings  of  pleasure  at  having  'a  clear  choice'  or 
'an  easy  choice'.  2.  the  choice  was  effected  in  such 
cases,  rapidly  and  without  further  ado. 

In  virtue  of  the  task  of  reacting  rapidly,  when,  the 
Subject  felt  the  time  duration  was  becoming  too  long,  he 
chose  at  once,  the  motive  at  that  moment  present  to 
consciousness  being  strengthened,  and  brought  up  to 
the  Critical  Point.  «  Conciousness  that  it  was  time 
to  react.  Looked  at  B  and  took  B.  Motive  was  cer- 
tainly that  it  was  time  to  react  »  There  was  here  a 
motive  for  B  due  to  the  fact  that  B  was  at  that  moment 


—  86  — 

present  in  consciousness.  This  motive  was  strengthened 
by  the  necessity  of  reacting.  An  other  example  is  that  of 
a  Subject,  who,  feeling  the  experiment  was  lasting  too 
long,  and  at  that  moment  noticing  that  a  certain  glass 
was  at  the  right  hand  and  easier  to  take,  took  it  for  that 
reason.  The  motive,  again,  was  strengthened  by  the 
necessity  of  reaction  quickly  —  '  the  temporal  determi- 
nation', as  it  is  called. 
b  When  an  indifferent  substance  was  found  beside  a  bad 

Effects  of  11. 

contrast,  one,  the  former  was  taken  eagerly  as  though  it  were 
very  good.  Its  relative  value  was  considerable.  The 
effect  of  the  contrast  being  to  reinforce  it.  In  our 
chapter  on  the  Relativity  of  Values  we  shall  give  many 
examples ;  one  will  suffice  here.  *  V  revived  thoughts 
of  past  pleasure  ;  C  of  past  disagreeableness.  So  I 
chose  V,  for  its  intrinsic  quality,  helped  by  the  intellec- 
tual recognition  of  the  fact  that  V  and  G  were  extremes 
of  my  Scale  of  Values  ». 

Owing  to  the  effects  of  contrast  the  value  of  an  alter- 
native was  frequently  exaggerated  ;  so  much  so,  that 
whereas  it  was  chosen  swiftly  as  something  good,  when 
the  Subject  had  it  in  hand  to  drink  it,  he  found  he  had 
caught  aTartar.  «  When  I  have  J  in  my  hand  I  am  not 
so  enthusiastic  about  drinking  it,  as  I  am  to  take  it,  in 
preference  to  C  ». 

This  shows  that  Motive-Strengthening  is  indeliberate, 
and  even  an  unconscious  process.     It  is  none  the  less 
real. 
<=  In  '  caprice '  choices,  a  substance  is  taken  on  impulse, 

The  Personal  .  '  ' 

Factor,  or  for  the  whim  of  the  moment.  The  Subject,  for 
subjective  instance,  decides  quite  impulsively,  that,  intensity 

impulse,  should  prevail  over  quality,  and  takes  a  sharp,  bitter 
taste  in  preference  to  a  sweet  one.  At  another  time, 
in  a  weaker  mood,  he  chooses  the  sweet  '  and  feels  he 


-87  - 

is  following  the  line  of  least  resistance' ;  or  perhaps  he 
feels  an  unaccountable  dislike  to  a  certain  substance, 
not  to  its  quality  or  intensity,  but  to  itself,  and  he 
rejects  it  with  mockery  or  a  feeling  of  contempt. 

The  most  interesting  cases  of  Motive- Strengthening 
were,  when  a  Subject  appealed,  in  cases  of  equivalent 
motives,  to  some  one  of  his  principles  e.  g.  «  I'd  better 
be  consistent »  ;  «  Better  take  the  more  familiar  »  ;  « I  '11 
take  the  safer  one  »  ;  «  B  is  more  definite ;  I  like  what  is 
definite  »  etc.  In  these  and  similar  cases  we  see  the  Sub- 
jects, spontaneously  bringing  one  of  their  life-principles 
to  bear  on  the  Motivation,  and  thereby  strengthening 
the  favoured  Motive,  and  effecting  their  choice.  The 
taking  of  the  more  familiar p,  for  instance,  which  was  a 
principle  applied  again  and  again  by  S2  in  various  cir- 
cumstances, during  our  researches,  expresses,  we  feel 
we  may  say  it,  the  salient  note  of  his  character. 

There  were  many  other  modes  of  Motive-Strengthen-        * 

...  ,  •         j          M  i         r  Accidental 

ing  into  which  we  need  not  enter  m  detail  :  the  tact    cause. of 
that  a  motive  was  more  present  to  consciousness  streng- 
thened  that  motive  e.  g.  «  C  was  more  present  to  con- 
sciousness.    I  had  waited  longer  on  it.     I  took  it  ». 

Sometimes  a  choice  was  made  with  evident  energy  and  effort  : 
I  chose  K  as  though  its  greatest  concurrent  was  beside  it  »  ;  some 
times,  a  close  analysis  of  the  good  qualities  was  made  with  a  view 
to  strengthening  one  or  other  motive  :  «  K  was  sweet,  but  Z,  over 
and  above  sweetness,  had  an  agreeable  complexity  of  taste  »  :  again, 
at  times,  the  Subject  seems  to  try  to  suppress  or  prevent  the  aug- 
menting force  of  a  rival  motive  by  a  contemptuous  expression  of 
some  kind  :  for  instance  S2,  N°  58  says  :  «  When  I  saw  Z  I  was 
already  moving  towards  K,  to  take  it.  The  judgment  came  «  Z 
is  also  good.  »  Z  seemed  to  protest.  A  contemptuous  «  Soit  » 
suppressed  Z's  protest,  and  I  judged  «  K  is  better  all  the  same  ». 

In  the  terms  of  our  hypothesis,  this  last  judgment  «  K  is  better 
all  the  same  »  had  a  special  role;  that  namely  of  giving  K  the  requi- 
red force  to  reach  the  Critical  Point. 


—  88  — 

Another  interesting  case  of  Motive  Strengthening  was 
that  of  S3.  «  There  was  a  kind  of  kaleidoscope  move- 
ment of  the  motives  in  favour  of  V  » . 

Economy  of  In  our  chapter  on  Automatism  we  shall  see  how,  as 
pce'  motivation  evolves,  motives  become  rarer.  They  grow 
more  abstract  in  form,  and  the  choice  becomes  simpler, 
swifter  and  more  continuous.  It  grows  more  automa- 
tic, and  '  algebraical ',  and  passes  like  a  swift  move- 
ment in  consciousness.  All  this  implies  Economy  of 
Volitional  Activity  ;  motivation  is  curtailed  and  motives 
are  economised. 

Here,  however,  we  are  not  dealing  with  Economy 
of  Motives,  but  with  Economy  of  Motive-Force.  By 
this  we  mean,  that  when  motives  are  strengthened  or 
reinforced,  to  a  certain  degree,  the  reaction  or  choice 
follows  automatically ;  there  being  no  further  wastage 
of  Motive-Force. 

This  section  follows,  as  a  logical  consequence,  of 
our  Hypothesis  of  the  Critical  Point.  It  the  reaction 
follows,  immediately,  when  the  motive  reaches  the 
required  strength,  there  must  evidently  be  an  Economy 
of  Motice-Force. 

Still,  the  point  calls  for  some  explanation,  and  some 
examples.  Let  us  take,  for  instance,  the  following  in- 
trospection, N°  53  of  S2. 

I  preferred  Z  for  itself.  L  did  not  come  into  the  choosing  of  Z. 
That  is,  because  Z  is  so  good.  If  B  or  V  were  beside  L,  L  would 
have  entered  into  the  choice. 

Here  we  see  that  Z  of  itself  was  able  to  reach  the 
Critical  Point  without  any  strengthening — there  was 
Economy  in  the  tact  that  L  was  not  taken  into  account. 
Had  Z  been  less  strong,  like  V  or  B,  L  would  have 
been  taken  into  account  and  strengthening  would  have 
become  necessary. 


-  89- 

Economy  of  Motive- Force  is  clearly  seen  in  cases 
where  Subjects,  without  allowing  motives  to  develop, 
register  their  choice  '  in  virtue  of  implicit  reasons  '  ;  or 
'  being  conscious  of  being  able  to  define  the  values 
in  detail '.  Here  motives  were  not  allowed  to  grow 
stronger  than  was  necessary — the  reaction  intervened 
and  cut  off  further  development  —  motive-force  was 
Economised. 

In  many  cases  subjects  were  quite  startled  at  the 
manner  in  which  the  reaction  happened.  They  had 
been,  perhaps,  dwelling  on  a  positive  motive,  when 
suddenly,  they  reacted  without  being  able  to  explain 
why.  Usually,  and  this  point  is  an  important  piece  of 
evidence  for  our  Hypothesis,  some  mental  fact,  a  judg- 
ment, a  half -formed  decision,  came  to  add  itself  at  the 
last  moment,  to  the  consideration  of  the  motive. 

I  chose  J  (after  a  long  hesitation)  with  the  idea,  at  the  very 
moment  of  the  choice,  that  J  was  better.  Hardly  had  I  the  glass 
in  hand,  than  I  was  convinced  that  I  was  deceived.  Again  I  repented 
of  having  taken  it,  of  having  been  deceived.  I  dont  know  why 
I  should  have  preferred  to  have  taken  the  other. 

Here  the  motive  for  J,  strengthened  by  the  sudden, 
unfounded  thought,  that  '  it  was  better  than  the  other  ', 
seemed  just  to  have  been  able  to  reach  the  Critical  Point. 
The  reaction  at  once  followed.  Immediately  after,  the 
choice  was  repented  of. 

Again  subjects  often  said,  «  I  had  hardly  decided, 
when  the  reaction  occurred  »  This  would  imply,  that 
the  selection  of  a  motive,  strengthened  it  sufficiently, 
and  at  once,  came  the  reaction.  The  frequent  cases  of 
'  inexplicable  choices  '  ;  and  many  choices  which  fol- 
lowed instantaneously  on  the  perception  of  a  very  good, 
or  a  very  bad  substance,  point  to  the  same  conclusion. 

We  are  aware  that  these  phenomena  could  be  inter- 


—  90  - 

preted  in  the  sense  of  '  temporal  determinations  to 
react'  but  we  believe  that  such  an  explanation  does 
not  suffice. 

For  instance  in  cases  of  Hesitation,  it  is  evident  that 
the  '  temporal  determination '  to  react  quickly  is  not 
obeyed.  On  the  other  hand,  immediately  a  motive  is 
strengthened  to  the  Critical  Point,  the  reaction  follows, 
not  in  virtue  of  the  '  temporal  determination  '  which  is 
no  stronger  then,  than  at  any  other  time,  but  in  virtue 
of  the  Economy  of  Motive- Force  which  we  have  ex- 
plained, and  which  is  an  inherent  law  of  the  Will.  In 
ordinary  life,  where  there  is  no  strict  instruction  '  to 
react  quickly  ',  that  is,  no  *  temporal  determination ', 
we  still  feel  an  impulse  to  make  our  choice  at  once, 
when  the  winning  motive  has  reached  a  certain  strength. 
On  certain  occasions,  however,  the  reaction  seems  to 
result  from  the  joint  effect  of  '  temporal-determina- 
tion '  and  Economy  of  Motive- Force.  This  is  the  case 
in  choices  which  are  identical,  or  practically  identical 
in  content,  and  which  are  identically  in  duration — to 
the  thousandth  of  a  second.  Here  it  would  seem  that, 
the  motive  reached  the  Critical  Point,  and  the  reaction 
occurred  owing  to  a  certain  mental  habit  which  we 
have  described  as  a  habit  of  motivation — Motivation 
Tracks.  The  '  temporal  determination '  counted  for 
something,  as  did  everything  else  implied  in  the 
instruction. 

Critical  point     During  our  experiments  Subjects  frequently  mentio- 
Hypothesis  nec[  having  experienced  a  feeling  of  pleasure  on  rinding 

and  the  , 

Genesis  of  a  strong  motive.     They,  so  to  speak,  looked  forward 

Feelings,   with  pleasure  to  making  the  choice  since  they  knew 

they  had  a  good  motive  in  their  pockets.     «  Feeling  of 

pleasure,  because  I  knew  I  had  a  good  motive  for  this 

choice  ».     A  kindred  feeling,  or  the  same  feeling  ex- 


—  91  — 

pressed  differently,  appeared  :  «  On  seeing  Z  I  had  a 
feeling  of  pleasure  because  I  knew  that  my  choice  was 
immediately  determined.  »  «  Saw  K,  feeling  of  pro- 
found pleasure,  because,  with  that,  the  question  was 
solved.  »  «  Feeling  that  my  choice  was  practically 
made.  »  Again,  to  take  an  instance  from  S1,  N°  58. 

«  Read  Z.  and  B.  together.  Z  remained  at  focus  of 
consciousness.  Immediately  had  consciousness,  «oh! 
its  this  one  »  with  a  feeling  of  certitude  ;  a  feeling  that 
there  is  no  doubt  about  it.  » 

These  feelings  indicate  an  internal  anticipation  of  a 
swift  touching  of  the  Critical  Point.  Indeed,  fairly 
often,  feelings  of  '  easy  choice  '  and  *  swift  choice'  were 
had,  but  they  were  concomitant  with,  rather  than  anti- 
cipatory of,  the  touching  of  the  Critical  Point. 

When  the  Critical  Point  was  reached,  seemingly 
against  the  wish  of  the  subject,  or  at  least  in  an  unex- 
pected way — feelings  of  regret  were  experienced.  In 
cases  where  the  concurrence  between  two  motives  was 
fairly  close,  and  where,  so  to  speak,  a  creditable  vic- 
tory was  won,  feelings  of  pleasure  were  at  times  felt — 
thus  S2,  N°  77,  says  ; 

«  The  agreeable  quality  of  K  gives  me  more  pleasure 
because  I  can  prefer  it  to  T.  The  other  preferences 
pass  more  simply  »  (i). 

It  seems  quite  in  keeping  with  the  common  sense  view  Evidence 
of  things,   that  the  Will  yields  when  Motives  reach  a  cJ 
certain   strength.     Moral  compulsion   means  nothing  Hypothesis 
else  than  this.     People,  for  instance,  terrorised  into 
doing  something,  are  not  accounted  responsible.     We 
do  not  deny  that  some  Wills  have  a  power  of  resistance, 
which,   it  may  be,  is  practically  invincible,  but  this  is 

(i)  S2  regarded  both  K  and  T  as  good.    The  K— T  choice  was  always  closely 
contested. 


not  usually  the  case.     The  Critical  Point  for  the  mo- 
tives of  many  people  is  fairly  low. 

Again,  it  is  admitted  among  Psychologists  that  a 
degree  of  value  can  be  so  fixed  by  the  instruction,  that 
when  it  is  reached,  the  Subject  reacts. 

L'action  d'une  tendance  determine  nte  creee  par  1'instruction  peut 
etre  conditionnee  par  «  la  valeur  »  en  ce  sens  que  la  venue  d'un 
phenomene  (le  choix)  peut  etre  subordonnee  a  la  presence  d'un 
certain  degre  de  valeur  fixe  dans  1'instruction,  comme  elle  peut  etre 
subordonnee,  a  la  presence  d'une  propriete  logique  (i). 

We  maintain  nothing  more,  save  that,  according 
to  our  view  this  zone,  on  the  arrival  at  which  the  reac- 
tion occurs,  is  not  fixed  by  the  instruction,  but  by  the 
very  nature  of  the  Will  itself. 

Again,  such  an  hypothesis  as  ours,  is  required  by  those 
who  hold,  as  we  do,  to  the  Unicity  of  Motive.  Motives 
are  not  accumulated  as  a  bunch  of  brambles,  or  platted 
together  like  so  many  cords.  To  say  that  we  act  for 
two  or  perhaps  three  motives,  is  to  imply,  that  the  Will 
has,  so  to  speak,  a  wide  breast  into  which  the  three 
motives  are  simultaneously  plunged  like  swords. 
The  Will  is  no  such  thing.  It  is  spiritual,  and  a  unity, 
—  unilateral  if  the  word  may  be  pardoned  —  and  is 
moved  by  the  one  and  only  motive  which  it  assimilates, 
and  in  the  sense  of  which  it  tends.  This  one  motive 
may  have  been  strengthened  by  other  motives  ;  but 
that  is  quite  different  form  affirming  that  the  Will  acts 
from  more  motives  than  one.  The  Will  is  neither 
a  boat,  to  be  pulled  by  many  ropes,  nor  a  car  to  be 
pulled  by  many  horses. 

Admitting  then,  that  the  Will  acts  from  one  motive 
when  it  acts,  and  admitting  as  it  is  evident,  that  there 

(i)  Le  Choix  volontaire .  General  Summary. 


-  93  - 

are  many  modes  of  Strengthening  Motives,  it  remains 
still  to  be  shown  that  the  Will  yields  automatically 
(that  is,  of  course,  in  ordinary  circumstances)  when  the 
motives  reaches  a  certain  strength,  determinable  by 
certain  inherent  principles  of  economy  of  effort. 

We  cannot  hope  to  prove  this  by  any  other  means 
than  a  general  appeal  to  the  facts  brought  forward  in 
this  chapter,  and  a  metaphysical — «  ca  convient».  For 
instance,  the  point  referred  to  more  than  once,  that, 
when  a  motive  had  been  strengthened,  at  a  certain 
instant,  without  any  apparent  reason,  the  reaction 
occurred  ;  seems  to  us  to  postulate  strongly  such  an 
hypothesis  as  ours. 

We  do  not  pretend  that  it  is  possible  to  measure      The 
Motive-Force,  as  accurately  as  Physical-Force.     Nor  Measurement 
do  we  pretend,  that  apart  from  favourable  conditions,  Motive-Force. 
any  serious  attempt  at  such  measurement  can  be  made. 
But,  we  believe  that  with  such  data  as  were  at  our  dis- 
posal in  the  present  researches,  it  is  possible  to  guage 
fairly  accurately  the  relative  strength  of  the  motives 
which  occurred. 

In  the  present  researches  the  same  motives  reappear- 
ed several  times,  under  identical  conditions.  Occas- 
ionally, the  same  choices,  were  repeated  in  a  manner 
identically  the  same — so  much  so,  that  the  duration 
was  the  same  to  the  thousandth  of  a  second.  Every 
detail  of  the  motivation,  and  every  phase  and  form  of 
the  motives  were  so  observed,  that  facilities  for  mea- 
surement, not  usually  to  be  had,  were  at  our  disposal. 

The  problem  of  the  measurement  of  Motive-Force 
is,  nevertheless,  so  delicate  and  so  complex,  that  in 
spite  of  the  opportunities  afforded  by  our  method,  we 
can  only  hope  to  '  measure '  some  of  the  motives,  and 
that,  in  an  imperfect  way. 


-  94  - 

We  shall  confine  ourselves  to  the  hedonic  motives, 
which  were  the  normal  type  in  our  researches;  such 
for  instance,  were  the  motives  for  K  or  Z. 

We  propose  too,  with  a  view  to  rendering  the  problem 
less  complex,  to  make  the  following  suppositions. 

i.  That  the  Motive-Force  of  the  same  motive  (in  the  same 
choices)  remained  constant,  throughout  the  experiments.  2.  That 
subjective  estimates  of  Motive-Force,  as  given  in  the  intros- 
pections have  the  value  of  objective  evidence.  3.  That  the  hedonic 
motives,  with  which  we  are  dealing,  were  purely  hedonic. 

We  base  ourselves  on  the  574  experiments  of  the 
second  series.  As  each  subjects'  motives  must, of  course, 
be  considered  apart,  we  propose  to  deal  with  those  of 
S2,  the  number  of  whose  experiments  in  this  series  was 
224.  As  data  for  this  research,  we  have  : 

1.  The  Actual  Results  of  the  various  choices  made. 

2.  Reaction-Times. 

3.  The  Introspections  in  which  Motive-Force  was  spoken  of,  and 
motives  compared. 

4.  Cases  of  Hesitation  and  Inconsistency, arising  from  equivalence 
of  values. 

5.  Certain  aspects  of  our  '  Critical  Point '  Hypothesis. 

6.  Certain  aspects  of  the  Relativity  of  Values. 

The  Actual  Results  of  the  choices  made  by  S2  give  us 
at  once,  a  working  Scale  of  Values — they  are  as  fol- 
lows : 

K.     T.     Z.     V.     J.      B.     C.     L. 

\  Number  of  Times 
ctuaiResuUs  \ Presented  56      56     53     55     56     55     60     57 

of  cho^.    -  Number  of  Times    5 1      46    43     3 1     22     21       8      2 

I Chosen 

This  gives  the  following  percentages,  representing 
the  actual  efficiency  of  the  forces  of  the  motives  for 
these  different  substances — it  also  represents ,  as  we 


-95  - 

shall  see  from  our  chapter  on  Hedonism,  the  scale  of 
Hedonic  Values. 

K.     91.7  %.        T.  82.1  o/o.        Z.  8 1. 1  %.        V.  56.3  %. 
J.      3g.2°/o.         B.  38.i  o/o.        C.  i3.3°/o.         L.    3.5  °/0. 

2.  We  next  determined  the  mean-reaction  time  for 
choices  resulting  in  each  one  ot  these  alternatives (i). 
As  we  were  concerned  with  hedonic  motives  alone,  we*e 
omitted  choices  in  which  the  motivation  was  non- 
hedonic  (2).  We  found  that  a  correlation  existed  be- 
tween the  quickness  of  the  reaction  and  the  hedonic 
value,  or  motive-force  of  the  alternative  chosen. 

This  enabled  us  to  formulate  a  principle  of  conside- 
rable importance,  holding,  of  course,  only  for  choices 
made  under  conditions  such  as  those  of  our  experi- 
ments ;  viz. 

That  the  quickness  of  the  choice-act,  is  in  direct  relation  to  the 
motive  force  of  the  alternative  chosen. 

This  principle,  which  was  verified  in  the  results  of 
all  three  Subjects,  enabled  us  to  approach  the  problem 
of  the  measurement  of  Motive-Force  with  considerable 
confidence.  It  was,  as  we  shall  see,  liable  to  variation 
from  one  source,  which  we  were  able  to  determine 
definitely.  In  the  case  of  a  choice,  where  one  mo- 
tive is  slightly  negative,  and  the  other  strongly  nega- 
tive e.  g.  as  J — C,  the  slightly  negative  motive  is  chosen 
with  great  swiftness,  on  account  of  its  Relative  Value. 
We  shall  deal  fully  with  this  matter  in  our  chapter  on 
the  Relativity  of  Motives.  In  the  list  now  to  be  given, 
it  will  be  noticed  that  J,  for  the  reason  just  given,  has 
an  unduly  low  Reaction-Time. 

(1)  All  the  experiments  of  S-  which  resulted  in  the  choice  e.  g.  of  K,  were 
taken  together ;  the  mean  reaction  time  being  then  determined. 

(2)  See  our  chapter  on  Hedonism. 


-  96  - 

Percentages  showing  Mean  Reaction  Times. 

*  the  Hedonic  Value  of  the  motives. 

Scale*  of  Value.  K      9 1 .7  °/o  K  76 1    Sigma 

T  82.1  °/0  T  8o3  » 

Z  81.8%  Z  909  » 

V  56.3«/o  V  970  » 

J  39.2  %  J  827  » 

B  38.i  o/o  B  991  » 

C  1 3. 3  %  G  i3oo  n 

L  3.5  •/.  L(i) 

We  see  that,  save  in  the  case  of  J,  the  two  scales 
correspond — and  as  we  have  said,  the  results  for  the 
other  Subjects  showed  a  like  concordance.  We  have 
then  here,  a  scale  of  Motive-Forces,  to  aid  us  in  a 
further  determination  of  strength  of  the  particular 
motives. 

scaiewith       An  interesting  confirmation  of  this  scale  of  Motive- 
respect  to  the  Forces   is   given   by   reference  to  our   Critical   Point 

Critical  Zone.  .     D  J 

Hypothesis. 

There  were,  we  pointed  out,  cases  in  which  motives 
of  themselves,  without  any  apparent  process  of  streng- 
thening, could  reach  the  Critical  Zone.  Other  motives 
always  needed  to  be  strengthened.  Finally,  two  mo- 
tives, L  and  C  invariably  resulted  in  the  sudden  streng- 
thening of  the  antagonistic  motive  :  in  the  words  of  S2: 
«  C  gives  me  always,  an  immediate  preference  for  what 
is  beside  it.  » 

Now,  comparing  the  cases  in  which  there  was,  or 
was  not,  a  strengthening  of  motives  required,  we  find, 
that  for  S2,  K,  T,  and  Z  were  able  of  their  own  proper 
force  to  reach  the  Critical  Zone.  At  times,  they  too 
were  strengthened,  but  normally,  they  could  of  them- 
selves reach  the  Critical  Point.  On  the  other  hand 
V,  J,  and  B,  invariably  required  to  be  strengthened. 

(i)  As  L  was  only  chosen  twice  its  '  Mean  Reaction  Time '  has  no  value. 


-  97  — 

Their  motive-force  was,  of  itself,  too  weak.  L  and  C 
never,  save  when  one  was  pitted  against  the  other, 
reached  the  Critical  Point — they  sank  invariably. 

This  consideration,   then,  gives   us  a  third   Scale, 
which  concords  with  the  other  two. 

K) 

T  \     Motives  having  su  fficient  force  to  reach  the  Critical  Zone  alone. 

z) 

v) 

Motives  requiring  to  be  Strengthened. 
B) 

C  /  Motives  never  reaching  the  Critical  Zone,  save  when  one  is 
L  i  pitted  against  the  other. 

Another  confirmation  arises  from  the  consideration        s 

r  -11  i   •          •  rrvi  i   •  -11  i         Confirmation 

or  a  possible  objection.  This  objection  might  thus  be 
formulated.  «  If  the  choice  is  swift  in  proportion  to 
the  value  or  force  of  the  winning  motive,  it  would 
seem  that  the  nature  of  the  value  of  the  rejected  motive 
counts  for  nothing  ?  But  this  would  imply  that  motives 
were  independent  of  one  another,  whereas  it  was  said 
that  they  are  extremely  relative,  both  to  one  another 
and  to  the  general  nature  of  the  motivation  ». 

In  order  to  find  an  answer  to  this  difficulty  we 
examined  various  cases,  where  two  strong  positive 
motives  were  opposed— where  there  was,  so  to  speak, 
a  conflict  of  values.  We  prescinded  from  cases  where 
Hesitation  occurred,  for,  as  we  shall  see,  serious  moti- 
vation disappears  once  Hesitation  comes.  We  found 
in  most  cases,  that,  contrary  to  what  might  be  expected, 
the  choices  were  swifter  when  the  rejected  alternative 
was  itself  good,  than  when  it  was  bad.  This  result  was 
confirmed  in  an  interesting  way  by  introspections, 
such  as  that,  in  which  S*  said  that,  «  he  took  K  (his 
favourite)  with  all  the  more  pleasure  (and,  de  facto, 

1 


-98- 

with  all  the  more  speed)  because  T,  another  really 
good  motive,  was  against  it  ». 

Again  S2  says  :  «  I  chose  K  as  though  its  greatest 
concurrent  was  beside  it  »  meaning  thereby,  that  he 
chose  it  with  all  the  more  energy. 

These  facts  lead  us  to  formulate  another  principle, 
correlative  with  that  already  announced  ;  holding  only 
for  choices  made  under  conditions,  like  those  of  our 
researches  :  viz. 

That  the  quickness  of  the  choice-act  is  also  in  direct  relation  to 
the  motive  force  of  the  rejected  alternative. 

This  principle  was,  however,  subject  to  variations 
from  many  sources.  Swiftness  in  choosing,  due  to 
'  Relativity  of  Values'  caused  many  exceptions.  Little 
help  towards  the  measurement  of  motive-force  could  be 
thereby  gained.  Nevertheless  some  indications  were 
afforded. 
other  We  propose  to  sketch  briefly  two  other  methods  of 

methods  of  measuring  Motive- Force ;  that,  by  means  of  the  Ana- 
Measuring    ,  _  _°   , .  .      .  ,     ; ,     .  .    , 
Motive-Force.  lysis  of  Feelings  connected  with  Motives,  and  that,  by 

a        means  of  Ratios. 

Analysis  of  f~,  .          /.      , .  , 

Feelings.  Certain  feelings  occur  when  a  very  strong  motive 
appears  unopposed,  or  at  least  without  a  serious  rival 
— such  feelings  were  usually  described  as  '  feelings  of 
certitude'  or  *  of  evidence  ' — they  were  pleasureable  in 
tone.  On  the  other  hand,  when  no  strong  motive 
appeared,  a  feeling  of  tension,  and  often  of  discourage- 
ment was  experienced.  The  '  tone '  was  then  painful. 
Feelings  of  various  kinds  and  intensities,  accompanied 
the  different  phases  of  motive-conflict,  so  much  so, 
that  it  seemed  to  us,  were  sufficient  material  to  hand, 
the  analysis  of  such  feelings,  would  be  a  possible  solution 
of  the  problem  of  motive-measurement.  Doubtless  the 


-  99  — 

task  would  be  delicate  and  difficult,  but  it  would 
likely  prove  fruitful.  Such  a  method,  too,  would  be 
applicable  in  some  degree,  to  the  motives  of  ordinary 
life.  Indeed,  in  a  certain  way,  we  judge  the  force  of 
the  motives  acting  on  this  or  that  man,  by  his  various 
manifestations  of  feeling  while  under  the  assault. 

From  a  consideration  of  the  Scales  of  Values  already        b 

Measurement 
glVen    I  by  means  of 

KTZVFBCL  Ratiot- 

91.7    82.1     81.1    56.3    39.2     38.i    i3.3     3.5 
761      8o3      909     910     827      991     i3oo     — 

we  should  expect  that,  in  terms  of  Motive-Force,  cer- 
tain proportions  should  hold.  For  instance,  K  :  C  :: 
Z  :  L  — that  is  to  say,  bearing  in  mind  that  the 
Motive-Force  for  K  is  indicated  by  91.7,  Z  by  81.1, 
C  by  1 3. 3  and  L  by  3.5  ;  we  should  expect  the  propor- 
tion K  :  C::  Z  :  L,  to  hold. 

Again  bearing  in  mind  that,  according  to  the  two 
principles  which  we  formulated,  the  Reaction  Times 
may  (under  the  conditions  of  our  researches)  be 
regarded  as  representative  of  the  proportion  existing 
between  the  Motive-Forces  in  the  choice,  we  should 
expect,  that,  in  choices,  where  the  ratio  or  propor- 
tion between  the  Motive-Forces  is  equal  (e.  g.  the 
choices  K-C  and  Z-L,  for  as  we  have  just  seen  (K  :  C  :: 
Z  :  L)  the  Reaction  Times  should  be  equal. 

Taking  the  mean  reaction  time  for  the  K-C  choices 
we  get  886  sigma,  and  for  the  Z-L  choices  we  get 
866  sigma  —  hence,  our  expectation  in  this  case  is 
realised  (the  difference  of  20  sigma  being  negligible). 
Hence  the  proportion  K  :  C  ::  Z  :  L  which  is  in  terms 
of  Motive-Force,  has  been  justified  by  an  appeal  tojthe 
Reaction  times  of  the  choices  K-C  and  Z-L. 

In  a  similar  manner  many  other  proportions  were 


—    1OO   — 

justified  ;  not  merely  for  S2  but  for  S1  and  S3.  In 
many  cases,  however,  owing  to  disturbing  causes  of 
various  kinds,  as  the  law  of  Relativity  of  Motives,  the 
proportions  were  not  provable  in  the  manner  explained. 
This  method,  as  a  method  of  Measurement  of  Motive- 
Forces,  can  only  have  theoretic  interest ;  its  practical 
utility,  needless  to  say,  is  little  or  nothing. 

From  an  examination  of  the  scales  of  Motive-Force 
given,  it  will  be  noticed  that  T  and  Z,  and  B  and  J, 
appear  as  approximately  equal.  For  T  the  percen- 
tage is  82.1  for  Z  81.1  while  for  B  38.  i  and  for 
J  3g.2.  True  the  Reaction-Times  corresponding  do 
not  maintain  the  same  proportions,  but  that  fact  seems 
due  to  the  troubling  effect  of  Relativity. 

introspective     Some  interesting  evidence  is  found  in  the  introspec- 
£^dence    tions  of  S2  with  regard  to  equivalency  of  Motive- Force  in 

Motive-Force,  these  cases.  In  the  T-Z  choices,  and  in  the  B-J  choices 
there  are  hesitations,  inconsistencies,  avowals  of  the 
difficulty  of  choosing  between  things  so  equal  in  value 
etc.  For  instance,  of  the  eight  B-J  choices,  J  is  chosen 
twice  and  B  six  times.  J  was  chosen  a  third  time, 
but  at  the  last  moment  the  decision  was  reversed.  Of 
the  T-Z  choices  T  was  chosen  three  and  Z  four  times  : 
two  quotations  from  these  experiments  will  show  the 
equivalence,  or  quasi-equivalence  of  T  and  Z. 

Saw  T  at  right,  then  Z  at  the  left,  then  T  at  right,  then  came 
my  preference  for  Z  while  still  seeing  T.  The  experiment  passed, 
as  it  were,  with  a  feeling  of  indecision  ;  when  all  was  finished  I  had 
a  strong  feeling  of  discontent, which  was  not  caused  by  the  badness 
of  the  substances  but  because  I  had  a  difficulty  to  decide  for  one 
the  other. 

Again  «  I  saw  T  first  and  found  it  good  ;  then  Z.  I  considered 
both  as  good  ;  then  I  came  back  to  T,  then  to  Z,  which  I  preferred... 
I  always  considered  Z  and  T  as  tastes  similar  with  respect  to 
quality,  but  Z  is  more  intense.  T  appears  as  something  more 
feeble. 


101    

We  see  from  a  general  comparison  of  the  introspec- 
tions of  S2 ;  i.  that  he  always  considered  K  as  excellent 
— he  has  a  strong  hedonic  attraction  forf  K — «  In  that 
attraction  for  K,  he  says,  there  is  the  memory  that  K 
is  always  good...  it  becomes  as  it  were  a  habit  to  choose 
K...  it  is  an  easy  choice  for  K,  etc.  »  ;  2.  that  he  always 
regards  C  and  L  as  bad,  disgusting,  as  strongly  objec- 
tionable ;  3.  that  V  seems  for  him,  neither  good  nor 
bad  ;  it  lies  on  a  neutral  ^one  ;  4.  that  he  dislikes  J  and 
B  ;  they  are  distinctly  negative,  though  less  so  than  C 
and  L  (they  seem  for  him  equally  negative)  ;  5.  that  Z 
and  T  are  positive  motives,  but  less  strong  than  K. 

To  draw  up,  then,  a  final  Scale  of  Motive-Force  for  Final  scale 
S2,  we  place  V  as  zero — as  a  neutral  zone.     We  are  „ 

.        .  ~    j    .  .  a  .  iMotive-Force. 

justified  m  this  i.  by  introspective  evidence,  e.  g. 
where  S2  says  «  there  was  absolutely  no  reason  which 
pleaded  for  or  against  V.  »  2.  by  the  fact  that  V  is 
chosen  and  rejected  almost  an  equal  number  of  times 
— the  percentages  of  its  victories  with  respect  to  its 
defeats  is  56.3  %. 

Next  we  place  K  as  the  strongest  motive,  and  repre- 
sent its  force,  symbolically,  by  +  5 .  Our  Final  Scale 
is  then  : 

K  +5 

T 

+  2 

Z 

V    Q       Neutral  Zone 

O 


TT^T5  A  T?Y 


—    1O2   — 

This  scale  is  simply  meant  to  express,  symbolically, 
the  evidence,  which  we  have  been  able  to  accumu- 
late (i),  regarding  the  Motive- Forces  of  82. 

We  do  not  flatter  ourselves  that  this  enquiry  into 
possible  methods  of  measuring  the  Force  of  Motives, 
can  have  any  but  a  purely  theoretic  value. 

(i)  S2  said  in  an  introspection  in  the  third  series  c  il  est  une  chose  acceptee  que 
B  et  J  se  valent  au  point  de  vue  de  leur  valeur  >. 


CHAPTER  V. 


MOTIVATION    TRACKS. 


The  Will  is  a  process,  vital,  immanent,  dynamic.    Thewm 
«  Not  a  permanent  thing  » ,  writes  Wundt,  «  but  a  rising,      as  a< 
progressing,  subjective  process  ».     It  is  a  process  to  be 
found  in  this  or  that  concrete  Will-Act,  and  not  else- 
where.    Now  it  is  a  decision,  now  a  consent,  now  a 
choice.      It   is   in   all    cases   a   synthesis  ;    it  has   its 
moments  —  its  rise,  and  its  fall  —  it  has,  above  all,  its 
proper  unity  just  like  a  process  of  inference. 

The  choice-process,  with  which  we  are  here  con- 
cerned, is  not  something  purely  psychical,  nor  yet 
purely  physical.  It  is  not  like  an  abstract  thought,  nor 
is  it  like  a  sensation  or  a  memory  image.  It  is  structural, 
that  is  to  say,  it  holds  together  its  parts ;  and  these  parts 
constitute  the  whole.  The  choice-process  too,  has  its 
feeling  tone  ;  it  is  pleasant  or  painful  ;  it  is  smooth  and 
continuous,  or  jerky  ;  it  is  swift  and  easy,  or  slow  ;  it 
varies  too  in  degree,  sometimes  being  «  a  typical  choice, 
a  real  choice  »  and  at  other  times  «  hardly  a  choice  at 
all  »  (i). 

Though,  it  may  seem  strange,  we  are  conscious  in 
choosing,  of  the  general  nature  of  our  choice-process. 
We  are  conscious  that  for  different  choices  the  process 
is  different  and  for  the  same  choices,  the  same.  We 
are  aware  when  the  same  process  is  repeated  and  we 

(i)  We  quote  the  words  of  Subject*  in  these  paragraphs. 


—  104  — 

feel  «  that  our  mind  is  running  in  a  kind  of  mould  », 
«  or  passing  along  a  curve  or  beaten  track  » .  We  are 
conscious  too,  that  when  we  have  made  several  choices 
of  like  kind,  «  there  is  a  general  type  of  motivation 
which  results  from  practice  ». 

Wundt,  writing  of  Volitional  Processes  says,  that 
« the  only  way  in  which  a  thorough  psychological 
investigation  of  them  can  be  made  is  through  experi- 
mental observation ».  He  is  doubtless  right  in 
this,  but  the  task  which  he  imposes  on  psychologists 
is  by  no  means  easy.  How  are  we  to  observe  Voli- 
tional Processes  ?  He  suggests  himself  that  we 
should  do  so  by  means  of  simple  reaction-expe- 
riments. Such  a  method  however  is  utterly  inadequate. 
Nothing  can  be  learned  of  the  Will,  apart  from  syste- 
matic introspections  of  Will-Acts. 

But  even  with  systematic  introspections  how  are  we 
to  study  Volitional  Processes  ? 

Clearly  the  task  is  not  easy, 
me  starting-  It  was  to  some  extent  by  chance  that  we  hit  on,  what 
must  be  considered,  as  a  satisfactory  method  of  study- 
ing Will- Processes.  We  were  led  to  investigate  a 
peculiar  phenomenon  which  occurred  in  our  prepara- 
tory series.  This  investigation  brought  us  afield,  and 
finally  a  method  for  studying  Will-Processes  presented 
itself.  Our  first  investigation  was  based  on  the  data  of 
our  preparatory  series — it  was  made  early  in  Novem- 
ber, 1910.  Our  next  investigation  was  on  the  data  of 
the  first  part  of  our  second  series  ;  it  was  made  the  first 
days  of  191 1.  Later  on,  in  1911,  we  completed  these 
inquiries  (i). 

(i)  In  this  chapter  we  reprint  without  change  the  notes  we  made  on  these 
occasions;  this  method  of  exposition  will  be  the  simplest,  and  perhaps  interest- 
ing from  the  fact,  that  it  will  reveal  the  gradual  evolution  of  our  own  thought 
on  the  matter. 


—  io5  -- 
I. 

Notes  on  '  Motivation-Tracks  J  from 
data  of  Preparatory  Series.  Nov.  1910. 

During  the  experiments  we  felt  very  often  that  the 
different  subjects  had  quite  different  habits  of  Motiva- 
tion. It  seemed  too,  that  each  subject  had,  for  each 
type  of  choice  a  certain  curve  or  line  of  movement 
which  he  unconsciously  and  inevitably  followed.  A 
peculiar  incident  in  the  29th  and  3oth  Expts  ,  of  S4,  lent  a 
certain  show  of  plausibility  to  this  hypothesis.  Further 
analyses  of  introspections,  presently  to  be  related,  ad- 
ded still  more  probability. 

We  do  not  wish  what  we  call  Motivation-Tracks  to 
be  understood  in  a  materialistic  sense.  Nothing  is 
further  from  our  mind.  To  do  so,  would  be  to  for- 
mulate a  metaphysical  theory  without  evidence.  We 
merely  wish  to  give  a  special  name  to  a  peciliar  pheno- 
menon of  Volition,  just  as  the  «  Quadrille  des  Centres  » 
named  a  peculiar  supposed  fact  of  cell  division. 

The  incident  of  interest  in  the  2gth  and  3oth  Expts  , 
o(  S*,  was  as  follows.  The  2Qth  Expt.  proposed  the 
choice  :  B — F,  and  B  was  taken,  after  the  following 
stages  : 

1.  Feeling  of  disappointment;  B  unknown. 

2.  Looked  for  glasses,  saw  F  first. 

3.  Felt  I  did  not  like  and  did  not  want  F. 

4.  Looked  at  B;  repelled  by  its  appearance. 

5.  Hesitation.  B  unknown  and  therefore  slightly  interesting. 

6.  Took  B,  a  motive  of  Rarity  prevailing. 

Now  the  next,  the  3oth  Expt..  presented  exactly  the 
same  features  in  every  detail,  with  the  exception  that  A 


—  io6  — 

took  the  place  of  B.     This  note  was  added  :  «  I  felt  my 
mind  was  following  a  form  of  curve.  » 

The  feeling  was  peculiar,  vivid,  unquestionable — 
unlike  any  feeling  hitherto  experienced.  It  left  the 
subject  in  a  state  of  considerable  emotion.  It  was  not 
so  much  a  feeling  of  brain  mouvement,  as  a  conscious, 
continuous,  easy  psychical  effort,  along  a  rail  or  beaten 
track. 

In  Experiments  29  and  3o,  the  choice,  as  we  have 
seen,  was  different  in  each  case.     The  thought  imme- 
diately presented  itself—  if  the  two  choices  had  been  the 
same,  would  not  the  same  phenomenon  have  occurred, 
and  perhaps  in  a  manner  more  accentuated  ? 
The  Method      The  phenomenon  seemed  worth  investigating  and  a 
investigation,  method  of  investigating  it  presented  itself  at  once,  and, 
as  we  shall  see,  brought  confirmatory  facts  to  light. 

The  method  was  to  examine  all  the  choices  of  the 
same  nature.  Thus  for  S1  the  choice  A— B  was  pre- 
sented four  times — i3th,  3oth,  43rd,  5ist  Experiments. 

1 3,  AB  took  B  Reaction  Time  41 36 
3o,  AB     »     A        »  »      36 1 8 

43,  AB     »     A         »  »      3684 

5i,  AB     »     A         »  »      2014 

N.  B.  It  should  be  remembered  that  these  were  experiments  in 
the  Preparatory  Series.  Hence  the  Reaction-Times  were  very  long. 

Number  i3  cannot  be  counted,  as  both  A  &  B  were 
unknown ;  B  being  chosen  for  a  motive  of  Rarity  after 
Hesitation.  The  other  three  choices ,  occurring  at 
widely  separated  intervals,  presented  the  following 
remarkably  interesting  features,  which  seem  to  support 
our  Hypothesis. 

A  was  chosen  each  time,  for  the  same  motive,  coming 
from  the  same  source,  after  the  same  preliminary  move- 
ments. Taking  3o — as  an  example — I  mark  with 
letters  a,  b,  c,  d,  e,  etc.  different  stages. 


—  ioy  — 

A — B  appeared. 

First  moment  (a)  did'nt  know  anything  about  them,  (b)  Impres- 
sion of  knowing  A  without  remembrance  of  its  taste,  (c)  B  awak- 
ened nothing,  (d)  Then ,  after  a  while ,  I  looked  at  glasses  ; 
beginning  from  left;  saw  A,  recognised  its  place,  its  position,  (e)  then 
looked  at  B.  (f)  Remembered  at  that  moment  «  A  is  Sugar  »  (g) 
Immediately  let  go  button  mechanically  and  drank. 

Now,  in  the  three  experiments  3o,  48,  5i,  every  one 
of  these  stages  a,  b,  c,  d,  e,  f,  g,  are  reproduced.  A  at 
first  awakens  nothing,  then  the  glasses  are  looked  at 
from  the  left,  A  is  remembered  as  «  Sugar  »,  the  word 
comes,  the  reaction  follows  immediately,  «  took  it  at 
once  and  drank  it.  » 

In  no  one  of  these  three  is  there  hesitation,  or  dis- 
cussion of  motives,  or  feeling  of  repugnance  for  B,  or 
indeed  any  phenomenon  which  deviated  from  the 
curve  of  choice  formed  in  Experiment  3o. 

//  would  seem  as  though  in  reality  the  mind  followed 
in  the  furrow  already  ploughed. 

A  case,  still  more  interesting,  of  the  Motive  Curve  is 
given  in  the  choices  C— F.  This  choice,  for  Sd,  occur- 
red five  times  (12,  3i,  38,  54,  63),  presenting  (except  in 
the  first,  N°  12,  where  the  substances  were  unknown) 
the  same  striking  features. 

Reaction  Time  Motive 

12  C  F  took  F  3 1 97            accidental 

3 1   C  F  »     C  2686             «  C  not  so  bad  as  F  » 

38  C  F  »     C  3199 

54  C  F  »     C  741 

63  C  F  »     C  1 534 

In  each  case,  F  was  recognised  as  bad  ;  on  looking  at  glasses, 
C  occasioned  Judgment,  «  C  is  salty  »,  followed  always  by  compa- 
rative Judgment  of  Value ;  <r  But  C  is  not  so  bad  as  F  »  ;  a 
mechanical  or  impulsive  reaction  followed. 


—  io8  — 

In  these  experiments  too  the  Evolution  of  Motivation  was 
remarkably  exemplified.  As  an  example  : 

1 3.  F  appeared  as  salty.  As  not  yet  well-known. 

3i.  Conscious  F  was  Ammonia.  Word  «  Ammonia  »  and  letter  F 
made  me  know  it  was  unpleasant. 

38.  Looked  at  F— consciousness  «  It's  that  bad  thing  »  Words 
not  there  save  word  Bad ;  then  tendency  to  react. 

54.  Looked  at  F — immediately  conscious  that  it  was  bad.  Word 
Bad  perhaps  there. 

63.  Immediately  after  seeing  F,  conscious  «  Then  it's  the  other.  » 

We  see  clearly  here  that  F  appears  in  a  more  and 
more  abstract  way.  The  word  «  Ammonia  »  and  the 
judgments  disappear.  The  mind  economises  effort. 
The  word  «  bad  »  was  only  vaguely  present  in  5  ;.  In 
63,  F  suggests  an  immediate  reaction,  no  words  appear 
at  all.  The  letter  F  is  symbolic  of  a  bad  thing.  This 
evolution  of  form,  in  the  motive  for  F,  traceable  in 
these  five  experiments,  is  in  no  way  inconsistent  with 
our  hypothesis  of  Motivation  Tracks.  It  even  com- 
pletes it.  While  maintaining  that  in  similar  choices 
the  mind  goes  through  similar  manoeuvres,  we  maintan 
that,  at  the  same  time,  the  ultimate  manoeuvres  mani- 
fest an  economy  of  effort  not  apparent  in  the  first. 

For  S4 — the  choice  A — B  which  occurred  as  i5th, 
22nd  and  2g\h  Expts.,  were  practically  identical.  In 
each  case  A  was  chosen,  as  «  the  lesser  of  two  evils  », 
after  a  hesitation  ;  and  by  an  effort  to  overcome  repu- 
gnance. In  each  the  appearance  of  the  card  caused  an 
unpleasant  feeling,  which  was  accentuated  on  seeing 
the  glasses. 

The  choices  C — F,  for  S4,  occurred  as  1/j.th,  26th, 
45th,  5yth.  The  first  three  were  identical,  as  regards 
feeling  of  pleasure  on  seeing  card ;  vague  feelings  that 
F  was  unpleasant ;  impulses,  hesitations,  emotions  and 
final  automatic  taking  of  C.  The  fourth  choice,  5yth, 


—   log  — 

was  what  we  have  drawn  attention  to  as  a  Caprice 
choice. 

The  Subject  felt  repugnance  and  disgust  for  both 
glasses  and  for  the  experiment,  and  F  was  taken  for  a 
purely  capricious  reason. 

It  would  seem  then,  that,  when  confronted  with  certain 
circumstances,  the  Mind  acts  spontaneously,  in  a  defi- 
nite characteristic  manner.  Just  as  birds  fly  round 
their  cages  in  certain  ways,  on  certain  similar  occasions, 
seeking  vaguely  for  an  exit,  the  Mind  seems,  normally, 
to  have  definite  lines  of  action  for  definite  occasions. 


II. 


Notes  on  '  Motivation-Tracks '  from  data 
of  the  first  part  of  the  Second  Series.  Jan.  1911. 

We  now  come  to  what  we  consider,  rightly  or 
wrongly,  to  be  the  most  interesting  fact  brought  to  light 
by  our  experiments.  We  have  already  spoken,  in  our 
first  series  of  Motivation-Tracks.  The  second  series 
supplied  additional  and  much  stronger  evidence  for 
what  we  then  felt  justified  in  affirming. 

Having  analysed  in  minute  detail,  all  the  experi- 
ments of  each  Subject  we  recommenced  our  work,  and 
placing  in  groups,  in  chronological  order,  like  choices, 
we  once  more  went  through  the  process  of  analysis,  to 
secure  still  greater  accuracy. 

Each  group  of  choices  presented  the  following  appea- 
rance—  e.  g.  for  S*. 


—     1  1O    — 


ALTER- 

N° OF  KX- 

CHOICE 

NATIVE 

HIPP.    TIME 

VERNIER 

ANALYSIS 

PERIMENT. 

CHOSEN 

TIME 

23 

Z-K 

Z 

860 

34 

3i 

Z—  K 

Z 

687 

21 

58 

Z—  K 

Z 

682 

25 

79 

Z—  K 

Z 

457 

23 

The  space  devoted  to  the  analysis  was  thus  further  divided,  for 
example  : 


STRUCTURAL 
PHENOMENA 

PSYCHICAL  PHENOMENA 

FEELINGS 

PRESENCE   OF 
VALUE 

JUDGMENTS 

VARIA 

i  Saw  Z  first 
2  Then  Saw  K 
3  Saw  Z  again 
4  And  took  Z 





"~~ 

This  method  brought  clearly  to  light  quite  a  number 
of  interesting  facts,  and  bore  out  the  truth  of  our 
remarks  about  automatisation. 

The  same  choice,  at  different  stages  of  evolution,  was 
thus  readily  examined;  and  the  individual  charact- 
eristics of  the  three  subjects  might  easily  be  seen.  Coin- 
cidences of  a  remarkable  nature  became  noticeable  and 
invited  investigation.  It  may  be  well  to  give  a  concrete 
example. 

In  the  list  of  choices  that  we  have  just  given  ;  if  the 
Reaction  Time  columns  be  looked  at,  we  see  a  interest- 
ing gradual  lessening  of  the  Reaction  Time. 


Date 

Reaction  Time 

i  Dec. 
5  Dec. 
1  6  Dec. 

869  sigma 
471       » 
466       » 

In  practically  all  the  groups  of  choice  this  gradual 
quickening  was  seen.  Sometimes,  however,  the  same 
choices,  though  a  week  or  more  elapsed  between  them , 
were  realised  in  practically  the  same  time.  In  the  case 
given  we  have  seen  how  only,  5  sigma,  1/200  difference 
of  time,  existed  between  S1  's  3ist  and  58th  experiments. 
So  small  a  difference  of  time  might  well  be  due  to  an 
error  in  the  Chronoscope.  Still  we  are  not  driven  to 
make  this  hypothesis,  for  in  another  example  we  found 
a  much  more  extraordinary  coincidence  : 

The  choice  was  C — B,  for  S1. 

N°  of  Expt. 

12 
33 

75 

96  20  Dec.  471       » 

It  is  quite  a  remarkable  coincidence  that  so  complex 
a  process  as  a  choice  act  could  be  gone  through  three 
times,  twice  in  471  sigma,  and  once  in  466  sigma  (1/200 
of  a  second  quicker).  When  we  consider  how  minu- 
tely small  is  1/1000  of  a  second  ;  and  how  difficult  it  is 
to  avoid  changes  of  conditions,  the  slightest  of  which 
would  have  affected  the  Reaction -Time  by  many, 
perhaps  100  sigma,  we  cannot  but  be  surprised  at  this 
result.  That  it  was  not  a  mere  coincidence,  but  due 
in  great  part,  to  the  exactness  of  our  method,  we  can 
show  by  appealing  to  the  following  figures.  We  exa- 
mined all  the  other  groups  of  like  choices  and  found  in 
many  other  cases  small  differences  in  the  reaction 
times,  such,  for  instance  ;  (in  figures  indicating  sigma) 
i,  5,  5,  5,  6,  7,  8,  9,  9,  9,  12,  i3,  i5,  17,  20,  22,  26,  29, 
3o,  3i,  33,  36,  36  etc.  Indeed,  more  than  69  times  (in 
the  273  experiments  of  this  part  of  the  second  series)  the 


—    112    — 

difference  was    less   than    100   sigma,   or    1/10   of  a 
second  (i). 

Being  struck  by  the  closeness  of  the  Reaction  Times, 
we  naturally  subjected  to  a  careful  analysis,  the  data 
given  in  the  introspections,  with  a  view  to  discover  the 
explanation.  Very  soon  we  found  : 

1.  A   striking   resemblance   between  the  choices  of 
which  the  durations  were  so  close. 

2.  A  gradual  diminution  of  the  Reaction-Times. 

3.  A  gradual  diminution  in  the  number  of  Psychical 
Phenomena    recorded  ;    which   diminution  continued 
step  by  step,  with  the  diminution  of  the  time  duration. 

We  found  too,  the  desirability  of  distinguishing  be- 
tween, what  we  call  the  Structural  Phenomena  of 
choice;  the  actions  of  «  looking  at  one  »,  «  then  pas- 
sing to  the  other  »,  «  then  going  back  to  the  first  »,  etc., 
and  the  purely  Psychical  Phenomena  of  choice ;  such 
as  judgments,  valuations,  etc. 

It  occurred  to  us  then,  to  take  a  few,  normal  series 
of  like  choices  and  classify  them  in  a  semi-schematic 
manner.  The  following  example  will  show  what  we 
mean. 

In  it  the  judgments,  etc.  are  written  in  the  briefest 
form  possible  ;  though  the  contractions  are  faithful 
expressions  of  the  original  form.  The  sign  +  means 
that  the  substance  was  valued  as  more  or  less  good, 
the  sign  — ,  as  more  or  less  bad. 

Experiments  N°  28,  42,  63,  84,  and  90  of  S1.  They 
took  place  respectively  on  the  3rd,  7th,  12th,  igth  and 
20th  December  1910.  The  choice  was  in  each  case 
J — L,  and  J  was  chosen  each  time. 

(i)  This  fact  has  already  been  referred  to  in  our  chnpter  on  method. 


Table  showing  the  five  J — L  choices  of  S1. 


PSYCHICAL  PHENOMENA 

STRUCTURAL 

REACTION 

TIMES 

PHENOMENA 

FEELINGS 

PRESENCE 
OF 

JUDGMENTS 

VARIA 

VALUE 

i.  SawJ.  first 

+ 

I  l6l 

2.  Looked  at 



«  not  this  » 

Void 

L 

3.  Looked  again 

Pleasure  and 

+ 

«  that's  right  » 

at  J 

certitude 

4.  Took  J 

i.  Saw  J.  first 

» 

763 

2.  Looked  at 



«  It's  the  other  » 

designation 

L 

3.  Looked  again 

+ 

atJ 

4.  Took  J 

i.  Saw  J.  first 

+ 

772 

2.  Looked  at 

«  It's  the  other  » 

Presence 

L 

of  Word 

3.  Looked  again 

at  J 

4.  Took  J. 

i  .  Saw  J  .  first 

+ 

«  It's  possible  » 

4i3 

2.  Looked  at 

«  It's  well  » 

L 

3           __ 

4.  Took  J 

i.  Saw  J.  first 

Void 

493 

2.  Looked  at 

«  It's  the  other  » 

L 

3. 

4.  Took  J. 

114  — 

Explanation      This  table  holds  apart  the  *  structural '  from   the 
of  the     psychical  phenomena  of  the  choice-process  in   each 

Foregoing  •*  •*  r . 

Table,  case.  It  will  be  seen,  on  reading  the  2nd  column,  that 
the  same  '  structural '  phenomena  recur  in  the  same 
order.  They  tend,  too,  to  persist.  It  is  only  in  the 
fourth  experiment  that  a  structural  phenomenon  disap- 
pears— that  of  seeing  J  for  the  second  time.  This 
became  unnecessary — it  dropped  out,  atrophied. 

With  regard  to  the  psychical  phenomena,  the  feel- 
ings disappear  at  once.  They  only  occur  in  the 
first  experiment.  We  have  already  pointed  out  that 
choices  quickly  become  abstract  and  «  algebraical  •, 
and  that  imagery,  associations,  and  feelings  quickly 
disappear.  In  the  fourth  column  we  see  the  gradual 
disappearance  of  «  presences  of  value  ».  In  the  fifth 
column  we  find  the  main  phenomenon,  of  the  experi- 
ments, repeating  itself  in  slightly  altered  forms — it  is  the 
judgment  :  «  not  this  »  which  evolves  into  «  it's  the 
other  ».  This  phenomenon  is  «  the  psychical  back- 
bone *  of  the  processes,  it  has  not  disappeared  even  in 
the  fifth  experiment.  In  the  two  J — L  choices  of  S1, 
in  the  2nd  part  of  the  2nd  series,  it  reappeared.  We 
have  no  evidence  to  indicate  that  it  would  have  disap- 
peared, even  if  the  experiments  had  been  continued 
indefinitely. 

In  the  fifth  experiment,  we  notice  a  '  void '  occurs, 
at  the  point  where  in  earlier  experiments  phenomena 
used  to  occur. 

By  counting  now,  the  Structural,  and  Psychical 
phenomena  (as  far  as  such  phenomena  may  be  counted) 
we  find. 

Structural  phenomena       Psychical  Phenomena 

irt  Experiment  4  8 

2nd          ,  4  5 


—  u5  — 

Structural  phenomena 
3rd  Experiment  4 

4th  »  3 

5th  »  3 


Psychical  Phenomena 
3 
3 

2 


This  result  gives  us  the  following  curve  showing  the 
gradual  disappearance  of  the  Psychical  Phenomena  (i). 


Curves 
Showing 

the  dis- 
appearance 

of  the 
Psychical 

Phen- 
omena and 
the  dim- 
inution of 
the  Reac- 
tion-Time. 


The  curve  for  the  Reaction-Times  of  these  choices 
is  as  follows  (i). 


1000,0- 


SOO/r 


We  shall  now  take  an  example  from  the  experiments 
of  S1.     The  choice  was  Z — J.  Z  was  chosen  on  each 


(i)  We  have  continued  the  curve  to  represent  tw>  subsequent  J-L  choice! 
of  Si. 


—  n6  — 


occasion.  The  experiments  were  the  26th,  4yth,  6ist 
and  89th  of  S2,  and  occurred  on  the  2nd,  9th,  12th,  and 
19th  of  December  1910,  respectively. 

Table  showing  the  four  Z — T  choices  of  S*. 


REACTION 
TIMES 

STRUCTURAL 
PHENOMENA 

PSYCHICAL  PHENOMENA 

FEELINGS 

PRESENCE 
OF 

JUDGMENTS 

VAR1A 

VALUE 

i.  Saw  J. 

understood 

first 

1260 

2.  Saw  Z 

4. 

«  This  is 

understood 

3.  Saw  J 

Doubt. 

better  » 

again 
4.  Took  Z 

Rhythm. 

fixed 

i.  Saw  J 

understood 

first 

i3i8 

2.  Saw  Z 

-f. 

understood 

3.  Saw  J. 

Astonish- 

« The  other 

again 
4.  Took  Z 

ment. 

is  better  » 

i.  Saw  J 

Examined 

980 

2.  Saw  Z 

+ 

«  better  » 

Examined 

4.  Took  Z 

i  .  Saw  J 

971 

2.  Saw  Z 
3. 

«  Knew  it's 
value  » 

Hesitation 

4.  Took  Z 
(brusquely) 

—  n7  — 


By    counting  now,   the   Structural  and   Psychical 
Phenomena  we  find  : 


ist  Experiment 

2nd  » 

«th 


Structural  Phenomena 

4 
4 
3 

3 


Psychical  Phenomena 


Drawing  a  curve,  as  before,  to  show  the  gradual 
disappearance  of  the  Psychical  Phenomena  we  have  : 


5-00,9- 


Curas 
Showing  the 

Disappear- 
ance of 

Psychical 

Phenomena 
and  the 

Diminution 
of  the 

Reaction- 
Time. 


The  curve  for  the  Reaction-Times  of  these  choices  is: 


We  see  in  general  the  same  marks  of  Evolution  and 
Automatism  as  in  the  previous  example. 

Once  again,  one  of  the  physical  phenomena  disap- 
pears, being  unnecessary.  Feelings  and  presences  of 
value  also  disappear.  One  judgment,  at  first  compa- 
rative in  form,  later  on,  a  kind  of  direct  valuation, 
persists,  being  in  fact  the  main  psychical  factor  «  the 
psychical  back-bone  ». 

Some  special  points  are  here  worthy  of  notice.  In 
the  first  two  experiments  the  Subject  felt  that  a  second 
seeing  of  J  was  unnecessary,  and  tries  to  explain  why, 
giving  different  reasons.  De  facto,  it  was  unnecessary, 
and  in  the  third  experiment  it  dropped  out,  atrophied. 

The  Subject  in  the  third  experiment  spoke  as  follows  : 
This  experiment  is  for  me  the  type  of  choice  in  general,  calm, 
without  repugnance  or  feelings  of  pleasure ;  a  reasonable  choice. 
I  took  Z  regularly  without  hurrying  and  without  being  slow.  I 
should  have  had  to  go  against  a  natural  desire  to  take  J.  Like  a 
choice  in  ordinary  life ;  it  would  have  cost  me  to  take  the  worst 
of  the  two. 

This  analysis  of  the  choice-process  brings  to  light  the 
following  facts. 

General        i .  The  '  Structural '  Phenomena  tend  to  persist, 
conclusions.      2  The  .  psychical '  Phenomena  tend  to  disappear. 

3.  The  Reaction-Time  naturally  tends  to  diminish. 

4.  The  same  choices  repeat  themselves  in  practically 
the  same  manner.     Indeed,  at  times,  three  successive 
choices  are  word  for  word  the  same.  So  much  so,  that 
we  feel  justified  in  affirming  that  a  habit  of  choice  is 
formed — in  the  sense  we  have  explained — that  of  Moti- 
vation Tracks. 

Conciousness     The  question   now  arose.     '  Is  the    Subject  ever 

of  toe     conscious  of  what  we  have  described  as  the  structure 

of  ttTSofce-  °f  me  Choice-process '  ?    We  believed  the  answer  to  be 

Process,    in  the  affirmative.     Many  of  the  introspections  of  the 


•  iig  — 

Subjects  pointed  in   this    direction.     We    give  some 
examples. 

It  came  immediately  to  conscience  that,  that  way  of  Reacting 
.  happened  once  before ;  as  I  think,  for  the  same  words. 

Same  process  as  last,  flashed  through  my  mind. 

I  was  conscious  not  only  of  the  matter  of  the  process,  but  of  the 
sameness  of  the  form  of  the  process. 

Same  as  last  ex  periment. 

On  seeing  K,  a  certain  habit  of  preferring  it  plays  an  important 
role. 

Somewhat  similar  to  this  «  Consciousness  of  Structure  »  is  a 
phenomenon  noticed,  four  times,  by  S2,  called  by  him  Brusquerie. 
At  first  this  phenomenon  seemed  to  be  muscular  in  origin, «  a  veri- 
table opposition  between  the  muscular  sensations  on  seeing  C  and 
those  for  K  » ;  «  brusque  passage  from  passive  muscular  state  to 
state  of  movement  »,  «  the  act  of  moving  the  arm  seemed  to  me 
heavier,  intenser,  as  though  before  the  muscles  were  quite  relaxed.)) 

Later  on,  however,  S*  while  holding  to  the  same  term,  was 
inclined  to  regard  the  phenomenon  as  a  brusque  passage  of  the 
mind  from  one  psychosis  to  another  quite  different;  there  being  no 
intermediary  stages.  In  this  light,  a  '  Brusquerie '  consciousness, 
would  be  evidence  for  the  theory  we  maintain  that  the  '  structure ' 
as  well  as  the  '  content '  of  a  choice  process  is  conscious  to  the 
individual. 

In  addition,  it  may  be  well  to  notice,  that  Subjects  are  fully  con- 
scious of  the  manner  in  which  they  pass  from  one  alternative  to 
another — quickly,  slowly,  jumping,  rebounding,  tending  to  or  from 
impulsively,  being  drawn  by — are  words  used  in  descriptions  of 
such  passages.  Thus  S*,  says,  N°  33  «  Then  I  passed  to  the  other 
in  a  special  way,  which  I  will  call  «  sauter  sur  Vautre  ».  Some- 
thing different  from  the  ordinary  passage  occurred.  I  felt  C  was 
well  present  to  conscience^  then  B;  there  was  no  intermediate 
stage ;  from  one  to  the  other  at  once.  » 

To  conclude  this  section  on  Motivation-Tracks,  we  significance 
may  sum  up  its  significance.     Choices,  when  of  the of  MotiTation- 
same  kind,  normally  run  along  fixed  lines.     The  gene- 
ral structure  of  the  choice  act,  and  the  psychical  con- 
tents remain  the  same,  save  for  the  inevitable  evolution 


—    12O  — 

and  shortening  in  point  of  time  and  content.  The 
motives  which  recur  are  usually  the  same,  though  in  a 
gradually  modified  form — they  evolve.  These  motives 
and  the  whole  choice  act,  so  to  speak,  pass  along  beaten 
tracks.  We  speak  figuratively,  to  make  the  matter 
clearer,  not  to  tinge  it  with  a  materialism  or  a  determi- 
nism for  which  we  see  no  shred  of  evidence. 


III. 

Final  notes  on  Motivation-Tracks. 
April  1 91 1. 

The  notes  which  we  have  given  so  far,  almost 
exhaust  what  we  have  to  say  of  this  matter.  It  seems 
clear  to  us,  from  the  great  number  of  groups  of  choices 
which  we  have  examined,  that  in  general,  the  same 
choices,  when  made  under  similar  conditions,  are 
made  in  the  same  way. 

Additional      For  the  moment  then,  we  shall  content  ourselves, 
Evidence.  ^^  adducing  some  more  evidence  for  our  theory,  from 
the  data  of  the  second  part  of  the  second  series,  and 
from  the  third  series  of  our  experiments. 

Subjects  were  frequently  conscious  of  the  nature  of  the  choice- 
process  as  a  whole  :  thus  S*  says  «  I  was  aware  that  my  thoughts 
in  orienting  towards  the  choice  were  running  in  the  same  mould  » 
and  again  ;  «  I  recognised  the  process  that  I  had  gone  through  in 
the  preceding  experiment.  I  was  conscious  of  that  process  as  a 
whole.  »  On  another,  similar  occasion,  S3  has  a  feeling  of  effort, 
together  with  a  consciousness  «  that  my  thought  had  been  knocked 
out  of  its  ordinary  groove  ». 

Frequently  Subjects  were  conscious  of  the  general  resemblance 
between  two  successive  choices,  if  the  choice-processes  happened  to 
be  the  same,  or  nearly  so. 


—    121    — 

An  example  will  make  this  clear. 

The  two  choices  Z  -  L  and  K — B  resembled  strongly.  Z  and 
K  were  very  good  ;  B  and  L  were  bad.  In  each  case,  recognition 
of  the  first,  and  a  glance  at  the  second  alternative  would  suffice 
well.  One  should  expect  that  the  choice-processes  would  be  very 
similar,  especially  for  S1  and  S*  whose  tastes  with  respect  to  Z,  K, 
L  and  B  were  much  alike.  Now,  here  is  what  happened. 

S*  made  the  choice  Z — L,  took  Z  ;  made  next  the  choice  K — B, 
took  K,  and  remarked  o  just  like  the  preceding  choice.  » 

S*  next,  made  the  choice  Z — L  chose  Z  ;  then  made  the  choice 
K — B,  chose  K,  and,  struck  as  S1  was  by  the  resemblance  of 
the  choice-processes,  said  «  Identically  the  same  thing  ».  This 
coincidence  is  of  interest,  in  view  of  the  fact,  that  neither  Subject 
had  the  faintest  idea  of  the  import  of  his  remark,  or  of  what  the 
other  Subject  had  said. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  in  the  3rd  Series  the  Sub- 
jects were  instructed  to  «  Choose  the  worst  and  drink 
it.  » 

This  task  was  calculated  to  bring  to  light  the  pre-  Motivation- 
sence  of  Motivation-Tracks.    The  Subjects  had  become  ™ac*scin  the 

Third  Series. 

accustomed  to  find  the  best,  in  various  ways,  according 
the  the  nature  of  the  choice.  At  times  it  was  by  reject- 
ing at  once  a  bad  alternative,  at  other  times  it  was  by 
seizing  at  once  a  very  good  alternative.  The  general 
process  was,  however,  to  find  out  the  best  and  take  it. 
This  habit  now  persisted,  even  though  the  Subjects 
were  instructed  '  to  choose  the  worst '  and  even  though 
they  concentrated  their  attention  strongly  on  the  task. 
They  practically  always  first  found  out  the  best,  just 
as  they  had  done  before.  Next  they  rejected  it  and 
took  the  worst.  At  times,  even,  their  habit  of  taking 
the  best  prevailed  and  they  still  took  it.  In  an  experi- 
ment of  this  3rd  series,  S4  says;  «  I  pass  almost  always  by 
the  best  ».  Again,  «  the  fact  that  K  is  better  than  B  is 
more  present  to  consciousness,  than  the  fact  that  B  is 
worse  than  K  » — again,  he  says,  «  I  did  'nt  judge  B 


worst,  but  /  judged  T  to  be  best ;  the  choice  is  made  in 
a  certain  way  by  habit,  and  it  is  hard  to  change  » .  He 
adds  that  for  him  the  process  is;  «  T  is  best  .'.I  ought 
to  take  the  other  ». 

The  strong  persistence  of  the  old  habit  of  choosing, 
in  the  various  choices,  testifies  clearly  to  the  fact  that 
the  Motivation  Tracks  were  well-beaten  and  familiar. 
Continuity,      Subjects  became  more  and  more  conscious  of  the 
andjfert^eness  continuity  of  the  Motivation      At  times  they  spoke  of 
Choice-    its  smoothness  and  evenness ;  at  times  of  its  jerkiness 
Process.    an£j  unevenness.     The  latter  feeling  was  quite  charac- 
teristic. 

For  S*  and  S3  alike  it  was  a  «  brusque  passage  from  one  mental 
state  to  another.  »  Sometimes  it  was  «  an  awareness  of  a  contrac- 
tile influence  »  in  the  mind.  S3  affirmed  «  I  always  know  when  it 
is  there  ;  it  seems  to  be  connected  with  a  nerve  process.  » 

S2  frequently  called  attention  to  the  difference  between  the  pas- 
sage, say  from  V  to  Z,  and  from  G  to  K.  «  There  is  a  difference 
between  the  passage  from  V  to  Z  and  from  C  to  K.  I  am  not 
repelled  by  V.  I  see  V  and  the  act  of  seeing  the  other,  comes  as  a 
cVoyons  1'autre  aussi.  »  Again,  he  says;  «  These  two  perceptions 
of  K  and  L  are  quite  separate  and  apart.  Pas  de  glissement  de 
1'un  a  1'autre.  » 

All  these  facts  tend  to  establish  our  theory,  that,  for 
the  various  choice-processes  there  is  a  characteristic 
structure,  and  a  characteristic  manner  of  motivation, 
which  we  call  Motivation  Tracks.  They  tend  to  prove 
too ,  that  Subjects  recognised  the  existence  of  such 
*  Structures  ',  and  are  conscious  of  the  differences 
between  various  choice-processes. 
The  Expiana-  Owing  to  the  instruction,  the  Subjects  had  a  tendency 

tionof  Motiva-j    to  make  ancj  realise  the  choice,  2.  to  do  so  for  serious 
tion-Tracks.  ,      ,       , 

reasons.  The  latter  tendency  meant  that  both  alterna- 
tives should  be  seen.  When  the  first  was  seen  there 
was  a  tendency  to  see  the  second.  These  tendencies 


—    123   — 

explain  to  some  extent,  the  reappearance  of  the  same 
'  structural '  form  in  the  various  groups  of  choices. 
To  some  extent  too,  the  reappearance  of  the  same 
motive,  may  be  accounted  for  by  Association. 

Still,  it  seems  clear,  that  what  we  have  called  *  Moti- 
vation Tracks '  is  not  fully  accounted  for,  either  by 
Association  or  by  Determining  Tendencies.  The  per- 
severance of  the  chief  psychic  phenomenon  (the  back- 
bone of  the  motivation) ,  its  evolution  in  form  ,  the 
gradual  disappearance  of  non-essential  phenomena,  the 
maintenance  of  the  same  choice-process  in  spite  of  its 
gradual  evolution — the  subjective  consciousness  that 
the  mind  was  running  in  a  familiar  mould,  or  following 
a  beaten  path — these  facts  when  considered  together, 
exhibit  volitional  functioning  under  a  new,  and  perhaps 
interesting  aspect. 

It  is,  of  course,  a  fact  which  common-sense  folk 
would  be  inclined  to  expect,  that  a  great  resemblance 
should  exist  between  like  choices  made  under  similar 
conditions. 

Still  it  is  important  that  this  fact  should  be  scientifi- 
cally investigated  and,  that  the  laws  of  the  perseverance 
of  the  structural  and  psychical  phenomena  of  the 
choice-act  should  be  determined. 

It  is  important  too,  we  believe,  to  analyse  what  was 
meant  by  *  Volitional  Process  ' — in  the  case  of  choices, 
and  to  study  the  nature  of  the  choice-process. 

The  investigation  of  Motivation  Tracks  possesses  we  Advantages 

believe  a  double  utility.  °*  , 

T—  e    11    r  i  •         v     •  r       •       -n  Investigating 

First  of  all,  from  the  point  of  view  of  scientific  psy-  Motivatioa- 
chology,  it  furnishes  a  method,  and  perhaps  the  only    Tracks, 
method,  for  the  investigation  of  the  Evolution  of  Moti- 
vation— and,  also,  Automatism  in  Choices.     We  have 
already  stated  that  there  seems  little  to  be  gained  from 


—  124  — 

the  study  of  the  evolution  of  motives.  Motives  cannot, 
save  by  a  very  arbitrary  abstraction,  be  taken  out  of 
their  setting,  to  be  studied  apart. 

The  Evolution  of  Motivation  however  may  be  profi- 
tably studied,  in  the  manner  indicated  in  this  chapter. 
Its  study  will  inevitably  throw  much  light  on  voli- 
tional functioning. 

The  second  advantage  to  be  gained  from  the  investi- 
gation of  Motivation  Tracks  is,  that  it  throws  much 
light  on  the  formation  of  habit  and  character.  We 
shall  return  to  this  point  in  our  last  chapter.  For  the 
moment  it  suffices  to  say,  that  a  much  more  lenient 
view  might  be  taken  of  evil  habits  if  the  strength  of 
Motivation  Tracks  was  taken  into  account. 


CHAPTER  VI. 


THE   EVOLUTION    OF    MOTIVATION. 


The  motivation  is  the  chief  phase  of  the  choice-pro-  Motivation- 
Evolution  and 
Automatism. 


cess.     If  it  is  thorough,  the  choice  is  a  good  one.     If  it Evolution  and 


is  careless  or  indecisive  the  choice  is  likely  to  be  un- 
sound. Whatever  sense  of  certitude  or  satisfaction  is 
experienced,  in  making  a  resolute  decision,  is  due  to 
the  efficiency  of  the  motivation  which  preceded  it. 
A  man  of  decisive  character  is  one  who  has  the  power 
of  quick  and  sure  motivation,  and  who,  having  a  defi- 
nitely fixed  and  thoroughly  understood  scale  of  values, 
judges  according  to  it. 

Motivation  varies  in  length  and  in  quality.  When 
a  strange,  unexpected  difficulty  occurs  to  us,  our  moti- 
vation is  complex  and  long  (i).  When  such  a  diffi- 
culty has  reappeared  many  times,  and  we  are  familiar 
with  it,  our  motivation  is  simple  and  short.  At  first, 
motivation  is  concrete  and  touches  us  closely,  we  seem 
to  be  absorbed  in  it,  and  identified  with  every  phase  of 
it.  Later  on,  it  becomes  abstract  and  impersonal,  pas- 
sing as  it  were  outside  of  us — in  the  words  of  one  of 
our  Subjects  ;  «  all  passed  swiftly  as  one  continuous 
idea,  or  representation,  at  which  I  seemed  only  to  play 
the  part  of  a  spectator.  » 

As  motivation  grows  more  simple,  it  becomes  swift 
and  '  continuous '.  It  is  no  longer  jerky  or  disconnect- 
ed. It  passes  by  like  a  streak  or  flash  of  light.  It 
flows  smoothly  or  easily,  and  when  no  troubling  cir- 

(i)  JAMES,  Principles  of  Psychology,  vol.  II.  p.  53 1.  «  Where  the  emergency 
belongs  to  a  species  without  precedent,  to  which  consequently  no  cut-and-dried 
maxim  will  apply,  we  feel  most  at  a  loss  and  are  distressed  at  the  indetermina- 
teness  of  our  task.  As  soon,  however,  as  we  see  our  way  to  a  familiar  classifica- 
tion we  are  at  our  ease  again. » 


—    126    — 

cumstance  occurs,  its  tone  is  pleasant.  It  is  an  agree- 
able experience  to  go  through  a  choice  well. 

Then,  again,  motivation  grows  abstract.  Images, 
associations,  actual  feelings,  and  inhibitions  of  various 
kinds  disappear ;  the  motivation  passes  into  a  higher 
region  of  the  mind,  becoming  more  '  intentional '  and 
finally,  it  presents  the  appearance  of  *  a  kind  of  abstract 
algebra '.  The  whole  aspect  of  the  motivation  changes 
and  the  motives  which,  to  use  the  words  of  S3,  «  at  first 
were  real,  individual,  substantial  definite  forces,  now 
are  like  shadowy  unreal,  indistinct  parts  of  a  whole  ». 

When  motivation  has  passed  through  many  stages, 
and  grown  more  and  more  abstract,  it  finally  reaches 
the  stage  of  Automatism.  Indeed,  Automatism  is  the 
final  term  towards  which  motivation  naturally  tends. 
Volitional  effort  must  be  economised  and  it  is  best 
economised  by  Automatism.  The  repeated  decisions 
and  choices  have  now  formed  a  habit.  Effort  and 
special  attention  are  no  longer  necessary. 

The  dispositions  left  behind  by  previous  conation  facilitate  sub- 
sequent conation  in  the  attainment  of  its  end.  When  this  process 
of  facilitation  reaches  a  point  at  which  conscious  endeavour  is  no 
longer  necessary,  the  action  becomes  automatic,  (i) 

As  Automatism  comes  to  prevail  Hedonic  motives 
grow  rarer — especially  Hedonic  positive  motives. 
Deontological  motives  and  automatic  tendencies  take 
their  place.  The  whole  aspect  of  motivation  is 
changed. 

The  following  table  illustrates  this  fact,  of  the  gra- 
dual disappearance  of  hedonic  preferences.  The 
figures  are  for  the  last  3o  i  experiments  of  our  second 
series— that  is  to  say  the  period  during  which  Automa- 
tism was  developing. 

(j)  Manual  of  Psychology,  p.  6o5. 


127  — 


TABLE  SHOWING  THE  GRADUAL  DISAPPEARANCE 
OF  HEDONIC  PREFERENCES. 


PREFERENCES 

SUBJECTS 

EXPERIMENTS 

1-20 

20-40 

40-60 

6080 

80-100 

1OO-12O 

S1 

9 

5 

2 

I 

._ 

x 

H.  P. 

S2 

9 

8 

4 

I 

— 



S3 

7 

6 

I 

I 

S1 

7 

5 

5 

I 

— 



H.  N. 

S2 

7 

5 

5 

3 

5 

2 

S3 

7 

6 

6 

3 

S1 

3 

2 

_ 



H.  (P  +  N) 

s« 

2 

4 

2 

— 

— 

I 

S3 

4 

5 

I 

i 

S1 

___ 

__ 



i 

Extr.  P 

S2 

i 

2 

I 

— 

— 



S3 

— 

I 

— 

i 

S1 



2 

8 

6 

Deont. 

S2 

i 

I 

2 

2 

2 

2 

S3 

i 

— 

— 

I 

S1 

i 

6 

5 

II 

Auto. 

S8 

— 

— 

4 

I  I 

II 

13 

S3 

i 

2 

ii 

i3 

S1 

__ 



__ 

__ 

Inexpl. 

s* 

— 

— 

2 

3 

2 

2 

S3 

— 

— 



i 

H.  P.  Hedonic    Positive  Preference 

H.  N.  »          Negative        i 

H.  (P  +  N)    Hedonic    Positive  and  Negative  Preference 

Eitr.  P.  Extrinsic    Positive  Preference 

Deont.  Deontological          » 

Auto.  '  Automatic '          » 

Inexpl.  '  Inexplicable '        » 


—     128   — 

It  will  be  noticed  that  the  only  hedonic  preferences 

which  tend  to  persist  are  the  '  negative '  hedonic.     In 

the  cases  of  *  deontological '  and  *  automatic '  preferences 

there  is  an  increase  with  the  Evolution  of  Motivation. 

Methods  of      From  what  we  have  said  of  Motivation-Evolution 

studying    ancj  Automatism,  it  will  be  seen  that  there  are  two 

Motivation-  ' . 

Evolution,  matters  to  be  studied. 

1 .  The  various  stages  in  the  Evolution  of  Motivation 
towards  Automatism. 

2.  The  Economising  of  Volitional  effort  by  Auto- 
matism. 

In  the  present  chapter  we  shall  study  the  first, 
leaving  the  second  to  be  treated  in  the  next  chapter. 

Two  methods  of  studying  Motivation- Evolution  pre- 
sent themselves — one  indirect,  the  other  direct.  The 
first,  the  indirect  method  is  that  of  considering  parti- 
cular motives  apart,  and  tracing  the  evolution  of  form 
manifested  in  them.  The  second,  the  direct  method 
of  studying  Motivation-Evolution  is  that  exposed  in 
our  last  chapter  on  Motivation-Tracks. 

In  the  present  section  we  shall  employ  the  indirect 
method,  and  in  the  next  section  the  direct. 
The  indirect      The  method  of  our  first  series  afforded  exceptional 
Method,    opportunities  for  studying  the  genesis,   development, 
and  evolution  of  motives. 

The  reason  was  the  following.  The  substances  were 
at  the  beginning,  unknown.  Motives  for  or  against 
them,  only  sprang  up  during  the  course  of  the  experi- 
ments, and  hence  they  could  be  followed  from  birth  to 
death. 

We  propose  then  to  study  the  various  appearances  of 
the  motive  for  E,  as  seen  in  the  introspections  of  S,1 
with  a  view  to  determining  its  general  evolution. 

E  was  chosen  by  S1  twenty  times,  out  of  a  possible 


—  129  — 

twenty- one  times.     It  will  be  remembered  that  E  was   Evolution 
a  strong  positive  motive — it  represented  a  very  agreeable     of  the 

,    .    .        .        ,     j       .  ,  ,  Motive  for  E. 

drink — its  hedonic  character  tended   to  hasten    and 
facilitate  its  evolution  as  a  motive. 

We  give,  practically  in  full  (quoting  the  exact  words 
of  the  introspections),  the  motivation  provoked  by  E 
on  each  occasion.  The  numbers  refer  to  the  chrono- 
logical order  of  appearances  with  respect  to  S1  's  experi- 
ments. The  signs  CE/E  or  DE/E  mean  that  G — E  or 
D — E  were  presented  as  alternatives,  and  that  E  was 
chosen.  We  note  what  we  consider  to  be  different 
stages  of  the  Evolution  of  the  motive  for  E,  after  each 
extract. 

It  is  important  to  recall  to  mind  that  there  were 
(in  this,  the  first  series)  usually  four  stages  in  the 
Experiments. 

1 .  Perception  of  the  Card  with  the  letters. 

2.  Perception  of  the  Glasses. 

3.  The  Motivation,  which  comprised  valuations  of 
alternatives,  discussion  of  motives,  tendencies  followed 
or  resisted,  etc. 

4.  The  Choice,  which  was  realised  by  drinking  the 
chosen  substance. 

We  now  proceed  to  give  the  twenty-one  appearances 
of  E,  in  the  experiments  of  S1. 

i .  CE/E    One  is  as  good  as  another.  Extracts 

N.  B.  Neither  G  nor  E  are  yet  known.  from  the 

6.  DE/E.    On  seeing  card,    E  seemed   agreeable.     Loked  atIntr°osP^t10 

glasses  and  recognised  E  as  agreeable  ;  but  in  an  intellectual  way, 

without  agreeable  feelings. 

N.  B.  We  see  here,  well  marked,  three  stages  of  the  experiment 

(a)  Perception  of  card  (b)  The  perception  of  glasses  (c)  Judgment  or 

awareness  of  value. 

8.  BE/E.  Read  E.  Conscious  after  a  while  that  E  was  pleasant. 

I  knew  (savoir)  that  E  was  pleasant.     Pressed  button  impulsively 

9 


—  i3o  — 

and  took  E.  The  card  with  E  printed  seemed  «  an  agreeable 
card  ». 

N.  B.  Motivation  is  concrete.     E  is  judged  to  be  pleasant. 

9.  AE/E.  Conscious  I  had  taken  E  just  before.  That  con- 
sciousness about  E  is  agreeable.  The  agreeableness  is  in  some 
way  conscious.  I  had  knowledge  about  pleasureableness  of  E  and 
feeling  of  pleasure.  Judged,  «  Cesl  bon  comme  ca  »  a  Consent, 
less  accentuated  than  in  the  last  experiment. 

1 5.  EF/E.  Conscious  of  knowing  that  E  was  very  good.  Reac- 
ted at  once  without  seeing  F.  Motive  for  taking  E  was  conscious- 
ness that  it  was  very  pleasant. 

N.  B.  This  marks  a  further  stage  of  development.  The  glass  F 
was  not  even  looked  at  or  considered,  once  E  was  recognised. 
The  choice  is  impulsive. 

17.  CE/E.  Looked  at  E.  Consciousness  that  it  was  pleasant. 
Took  and  drank  it  mechanically.  Taste  agreeable. 

N.  B.  Mechanism  and  Automatism  now  appear  regularly. 

21.  DE/E.  Knowledge  of  E's  goodness  is  not  separated  from 
perception  of  E.  E  is  •  that  good  thing.  9  Had  something  like 
an  acceptation  of  E ;  it  seemed  something  automatic  and  not  volun- 
tary. Whole  seemed  very  short.  Took  E  impulsively  and  drank. 

27.  CE/E.  Immediately  on  reading  recognised  D  and  then  E. 
Had  consciousness  «  Cest  tout  decide  »  and  took  E.  When  I  say 
recognised  I  mean  I  have  no  distinct  consciousness,  outside  con- 
sciousness of  D  and  E  :  but  the  letters  D  and  E  have  worth  of 
symbols,  which  represent  all  about  D  and  E.  D  is  a  bad  thing, 
the  worst  of  all.  E  is  a  good  thing,  the  best  of  all.  I  am  not 
formally  conscious  of  those  properties ;  it  is  included  in  the  percep- 
tion. 

N.  B.  This  marks  a  further  stage  of  development.  The  mind 
is  wholly  occupied  in  the  perception  of  the  symbolic  letters.  The 
Motivation  coincides  with  this  act  of  perception  and  is  contained 
in  it.  The  Motivation  has  become  more  abstract. 

29.  BE/E.  Just  as  in  preceding  case,  B  did  not  awaken  any 
idea.  E  appeared  to  me  «  that  well-known  thing  ;  a  symbolised 
known  thing.  »  After  a  moment,  consciousness  like  this  :  «  I  have 
E  there,  then  it  is  E.  » 

N.  B.  The  motive  here  takes  the  form  of  a  general  rule. 

84.  EF/E.  Looked  at  E.  Suddenly  recognised  E,  and  had 
consciousness,  «  Oh  !  it's  E  ».  Again  aware  of  goodness  of  E  but 


in  a  purely  intentional  way — not  formally  contained  in  conscious- 
ness. Immediately  let  go  button  and  took  E  very  rapidly. 

36.  AE/E.  Looked  at  E.  Then  had  actual  feeling  of  pleasure, 
Immediately  I  recognised  it,  I  let  go  button  very  impulsively* 
took  E  and  drank. 

N.  B.  Automatism  develops. 

41.  BE/E.  Saw  E  at  first  with  indifference.     Then  at  a  given 
moment  came  recognition  :  «  Oh  !  it's  E  ».    Then  immediately  took 
and  drank.     The  recognition  of  E  was  like  recognising,  «  Some  - 
body  I  know  »;  «  Oh  !  it's  that  well-known  thing  ».     It  brought  a 
slight  feeling  of  pleasure. 

N.  B.  The  whole  value  is  contained  in  the  recognition. 

42.  GE/E.  Saw  E,  «  Oh  !  it's  E.  »  No  words,  but  only  sense,  or 
consciousness  was  there.     Simply  recognised  E.     A  vacant  moment 
followed,  then  I  reacted  and  took  E.     Can't  say  if  I  had  any  feel- 
ing.    I  don't  think  there  was  any  other  consciousness  than  recog- 
nition of  E.     E  is  a  symbol ;  that  something  E. 

N.  B.  The  Subject  now,  for  the  third  time,  remarks  that  E  has 
become  a  more  or  less  indifferent  taste — just  slightly  pleasant. 
Still  he  takes  it  eagerly  through  habit. 

48.  EF/E.  Read  letters,  and  immediately  conscious  «  Ah !  it's  E  » . 
I'm  not  sure  but  that  the  agreeableness  of  E  was  present  under 
some  form  or  another.  N.  B.  Motivation  more  abstract — fusion 
of  intermediate  stages  of  the  choice. 

5o.  CE/E.  On  reading  E  immediately  conscious  «  Ah  !  it's  E  »* 
In  this  consciousness  all  that  relates  to  E  is  contained,  without 
being  formally  present  to  me;  perhaps  a  slight  feeling  of  pleasure. 
Reacted  impulsively  and  took  E. 

53.  EF/E.  Looked  at  E.  Conscious  of  recognising  it,  and  had 
feeling  of  pleasure.  Then  looked  again  at  F  without  any  special 
idea.  Reacted  and  took  E.  It  is  hard  to  say  why  I  took  E.  The 
whole  is  automatic.  I  can't  say  I  acted  from  any  motive.  Reflect- 
ing now,  it  seems  I  took  E  as  it  was  best.  During  this  experiment 
no  motives,  such  as  used  formerly  occur  came.  The  whole  thing 
runs  of  itself .  N.  B.  Motives  escape  consciousness — Automatism 
develops. 

55  DE/E.  Read  simply  D  and  E.  Then  a  rery  short  moment 
of  blankness — then  took  impulsively  E  and  drank.  Can't  discover 
anything  else  than  the  perception  of  D  and  E.  They  are  directly 
symbolic.  No  motives  ;  all  was  impulsive. 


—    132   — 

56.  AE/E.  Looked  at  E.     Recognised  E.     Let  go  button  impul- 
sively and  took  E.     No  Motives. 

57.  BE/B.  Conscious  first  that  B  was  citric.     Then  saw  E — 
immediate  tendency  to  take  it.     Then  came  rememberance  that  I 
had  already  taken  it  several  times.     I  hesitated,  remembering  that 
B  was  bad.     Then  occured  a  blank  moment,  and  afterwards  some 
idea  corresponding  to  the  words  «  Bah  !  what  matter  that  it  is 
bad.  »     Had  feeling  of  indifference  for  the  badness  of  B.     (I  made 
no  judgment).     I  took  B.     I  took  B  to  change,  and  because  the 
unpleasant  feeling  of  taste  appeared  to  me  as  of  no  importance. 
B  was  taken  for  its  absolute,  not  for  its  relative  value. 

N.  B.  This  is  a  very  interesting  introspection.  It  shows  the 
impossibility  of  arriving  at  absolute  Automatism  when  dealing  with 
human  beings.  This  is  a  type  of  '  Capricious  Choice  '. 

It  is  however,  the  only  time  out  of  the  21  presentations  of  E  n 
which  E  was  rejected. 

62.  AE/E.  Looked  at  E.  Very  impulsive  tendency  to  react.  I 
think,  before  reacting,  came  very  vaguely,  the  consciousness  or 
idea  «  I  don't  know  A  ».  Let  go  button  and  took  E  impulsively. 
No  Motives.  Entirely  automatic. 

Considering  broadly  and  generally  this  evolution  of 
the  motive  for  E,  we  find  three  distinct  stages  : 

I.  At  the  Beginning.  E  was  a  strong,  positive,  hedo- 
nic  motive.   «  I  had  knowledge  of  pleasureableness  of 
E  and  a  feeling  of  pleasure.  » 

9th  Experiment. 

II.  Later  on.   E  occasioned  little  or  no  feeling.     It 
was  regarded  intentionally  or  intellectually  as  an  idea. 
«  Aware  of  goodness  of  E  in  a  purely  intentional  way.» 

34th  Experiment. 

III.  At  end.  The  recognition  of  E  was  simply  the 
first  term  of  an  automatic  act.  «  Looked  at  E.  Very 
impulsive  tendency  to  react.  » 

62nd  Experiment. 

Again  this  evolution  might  be  thus  described.  E  is 
at  first  only  vaguely  known;  '  E  seemed  agreeable,  no 


—  i33  - 

feelings ' —  next  E  is  definitely  judged  as  pleasant,  agree-    General 
able,  or  very  good ;  l  conscious  that  E  was  '  that  good  DescriP^on 
thing".   E  is  'that  well   known   thing',   'that  good  Evolution  of 
thing ',  '  the  best  of  all '.     At  this  stage  too,  E  is  spoken  the  Motive 
of  rather  as  good  than  as  pleasant.     Good  is  a  more 
abstract  term.     The  general  principle  too  is  formed  : 
«  When  I  have  E  there,  then  it  is  E.  * 

At  a  further  stage  the  Motivation  becomes  '  a  kind  of 
abstract  algebra  '.  The  knowledge  of  E's  goodness  is 
now  purely  intentional.*  Had  consciousness  «Oh  !  it's 
E  !  »  but  in  a  purely  intentional  way  »;  motives  finally 
disappear — '  no  motives,  all  impulsive  ' — intermediate 
stages  are  fused  and  Automatism  reigns. 

If  we  put  the  evolution  just  described  in  comparison 
with  the  evolution  of  the  motive  of  Rarity,  in  the 
work(i)  of  Michotte  and  Priim,  we  find  many  points  of 
agreement.  In  both  cases  the  first  stage  is  that  of 
immediate  judgments  of  value,  though  in  our  case  as, 
the  basis  of  the  motive  is  identical  with  its  content  (2), 
it  is  not  given  apart  from  it.  The  second  stage  of  the 
evolution  of  the  motive  of  Rarity  is  that  '  it  becomes  a 
general  norm '.  This  stage  is  also  found  in  the  evolu- 
tion of  the  motive  for  E.  The  presence  of  impulsive- 
ness in  this  latter  evolution,  corresponds  to  the  growing 
predominance  of  subjectivity  in  the  evolution  described 
by  Michotte  and  Priim.  The  last  stage  of  their  evo- 
lution is  thus  described  : 

«  Enfin  dans  les  dernieres  experiences  le  jugement 
de  valeur  devient  de  plus  en  plus  vague  ;  il  n'apparait 
plus  que  sous  une  forme  extremement  abstraite,  et  1'etat 
sentimental,  par  centre,  s'accentue  ». 

(1)  Le  choix  volontaire,  p.  232-237. 

(2)  Agreeableness  is  the  basis  and  content  of  such  motives  as  :  '  Conscious  E 
was  pleasant'. 


—  134  — 

Perhaps,  the  chief  difference  between  the  two  evolu- 
tions, is  that,  in  that  of  Michotte  and  Priim,  the  ten- 
dencies of  the  Subject  P  were  exceptionally  '  sentimen- 
tal' :  «  les  motifs  du  sujet  P.  a  1'inverse  de  ce  que  Ton 
trouvait  chez  les  autres  sujets,  avaient  une  tendance  a 
prendre  une  forme  subjective.  » 

Apart  from  this  fact,  we  may  say,  that  in  general  the 
two  schemes  of  evolution,  confirm  one  another. 
Cont«»t and      In  the  evolution  of  the  motive  for  E  we  have  been 
Evoiutionof  considering  the  evolution  of  the  form  of  a  motive. 
Motives.    Now,  in  a  certain  sense  there  is  also  an  evolution  of 
the  content  (i)  of  a  motive. 

We  must  first  show  that  a  relation  exists  between 
the  content  and  form  of  a  motive.  And  next  that 
there  is  a  parallel  evolution  of  the  content  and  form. 

i .  That  there  is  a  relation  between  the  content  and 
the  form  of  a  motive  appears  from  the  fact,  that  when, 
say,  owing  to  distraction,  a  substance  was  only  super- 
ficially seen,  and  not  fully  understood,  the  motive  both 
in  form  and  in  content,  was  meagre  and  attenuated. 
«  Having  only  superficially  seen  K  the  motive  for  it 
was  not  so  strong  as  if  I  had  seen  it  well.  »  Again, 
«  the  experiment  passed  a  little  in  distraction,  so  that 
all  judgments  of  value  and  feelings  of  pleasure  or  dis- 
pleasure were  absent.  They  did'nt  come.  »  Here, 
owing  to  distraction,  there  was  little  or  no  content  in 
the  motive  for  K.  The  form  was  correspondingly 
vague  and  weak.  In  the  following  case,  however,  the 
content  was  very  full  and  the  form  was  cnaracteristi- 
cally  strong — viz.  an  attraction. 

«  I  was  drawn  immediately  by  K.  In  that  attraction 
for  K  there  was  the  memory  that  K  was  always  good; 

(i)  We  understand  'content'  of  motive  in  a  -wider  sense  than  that  of  Michotte 
and  Prtim. 


—  i35  — 

that  it  played  an  important  role.  I  recalled,  so  to 
say,  all  the  decisions  already  made  for  K,  so  that  it 
becomes  as  it  were  a  habit  to  choose  K.  It  was  a 
choice  for  K  but  very  easy  because  1  have  the  habit  of 
making  it.  For  K  there  is  a  reason  of  agreeable  qual- 
ity, which  is  always  at  the  basis  of  the  preference  which 
I  have  for  it.  » 

Here  the  Subject  gives  in  detail  the  content  of  his 
motive  for  K,  which  is  very  full,  and  lets  us  see  that 
the  form  of  the  motive  was  a  strong  attraction.  We 
add  one  more  example,  which  shows  how  distinctness 
(separateness)  of  form,  and  defmiteness  of  content  go 
together  :  «  Read  T — K.  T  appeared  as  '  good  ',  I  had 
an  impression  of  value ;  I  looked  at  K  and  the  consci- 
ousness *  good  '  came,  I  don't  know  how.  That  value 
was  much  more  conscious  than  for  T.  It  was  a  sepa- 
rate consciousness,  not  a  vague  impression.  » 

2.  That  there  is  a  parallel  evolution  of  content  and 
form  will  appear  from  an  examination  of  the  evolution 
of  the  motive  for  E.  It  will  be  seen,  for  instance,  that 
while  in  N°  9,  the  content  is  full  and  the  form  strong 
and  definite,  in  e.  g.  N°  42,  the  content  is  meagre  and 
the  form  is  a  mere  consciousness.  Towards  the  begin- 
ning, the  form  and  content  are  definite,  towards  the  end 
both  become  vague,  and  attenuated. 

So  far  we  have  employed  the  *  indirect '  method  of 
studying  Motivation-Evolution.  This  method,  we  are 
aware,  is  open  to  objection.  First  of  all,  it  means  that 
motives  are  considered  apart  from  their  natural  setting 
in  the  Motivation  of  the  choice.  Secondly,  it  supposes 
that  e.  g.  the  motive  '  E ',  in  the  choice  D — E,  is  the 
same  motive  as  '  E  ',  in  the  choice  G — E  ;  and  that  '  E' 
in  each  case  is  at  the  same  stage  of  evolution,  there  being 
a  uniform  evolution  for  *  E ',  which  embraces  all  its 


—  i36  —    . 

appearances  in  no  matter  what  choices.  Such  a  sup- 
position, was  also  made  by  Michotte  and  Priim,  in 
their  method  of  studying  the  evolution  of  the  motive  of 
Rarity.  It  seems  to  us  arbitrary.  We  have  only  made 
it,  and  employed  this  indirect  method,  which  we  con- 
sider imperfect,  with  a  view  to  throwing  light  on  the 
general  nature  of  Motivation  -Evolution. 

The  Direct      We  now  come  to  our  second  method  of  studying 
Method  of  Motivation-Evolution.     It  is  that  employed  also  in  our 

Studying  r     * 

Motivation-  chapter  on  Motivation-Tracks.  This  method  is  by  no 
Evolution,  means  open  to  the  objections  indicated  above.  Motives 
are  here  considered  in  their  natural  setting  in  the  choice 
act,  and,  only  motives  occurring  in  exactly  similar 
choices  are  CDmpared.  The  Motivations  of  the  ist  ,  2nd, 
3rd,  etc.  repetitions  of  the  same  choice  are  considered 
together,  and  the  laws  of  the  formation,  developmen 
and  evolution  of  Volitional  habits  are  seen  . 

When  Motivation  evolved  normally,  it  grew  swifter, 
simpler,  and  more  automatic. 

When  on  the  other  hand  Motivation  was  interfered 

with  by  Hesitation,  it  devolved,  rather  than  evolved. 

It  became  irregular,  longer,  and  the  opposite  to  auto- 

matic.    In   our  chapter   on  Hesitation  we  shall  see 

some  examples  of  the  '  Devolution  of  Motivation  '. 

The  Evolution     We  shall  now  give  some  examples  of  the  Evolution 

ofthej-v  of  Motivation—  the  first  is  the  J—  V  choice  of  S3.     V 

Choices  of  S3.  . 

chosen  in  each  case.     The  Reaction-  limes  were 


respectively  1487,  1406,  1162,  1047,  ioo5,  761, 
706  sigma  —  the  shortening  of  the  duration  being  quite 
regular.  These  times  give  the  following  curve. 


i37- 


We  give  extracts  from  the  seven  introspections  so  as 
to  show  the  gradual  Evolution  of  the  Motivation . 

1 .  Nov.  3o.  I  recognised  both  J  and  V  at  once.  They  stood  for 
the  '  tastes  '  in  terms  of  quality  and  intensity.     I  chose  V,  in  virtue 
of  my  preference  for  it  in  terms  of  quality  and  intensity . 

N.  B.  Motivation  is  full  and  deliberate.  Both  tastes  arc  held  in 
comparison. 

2.  Dec.  10.  I  recalled  J  as  not  preferable  in  itself.     I  knew  that 
I  could  identify  it  to  any  given  extent.     I  went  on  to  Vand  remem- 
bered that  the  taste  of  V  was  pleasant.     I  chose  V.     All  more 
and  more  automatic — it  is  just  like  a  question,  '  Tea  or  milk  for 
Breakfast '  ?  One  would  say  Tea  at  once. 

N.  B.  Motivation  full  and  concrete — but  sligthly  curtailed.     J  is 
not  completely  indentified . 

3.  Dec.  i3.  Immediate  recognition  of  J.     Passed  to  V.  Steady 
recognition  of  V  followed.     Chose  it  positively. 

N.   B.  Motivation  more  direct  and  brief.     J  was  not  taken  into 
account. 

4.  Jan.  19.  Immediate  recognition  in  order  J — V.     Interval  of 
mooning,  followed  by  a  conscious  effort  to  make  up  my  mind.     V 
chosen  for  its  quality  and  intensity. 

5.  Jan.  3o.  Immediate  recognition  in  order  J — V.  Had  immediate 
tendency  to  choose  V,  and  I  followed  it,  feeling  that  I  could  if 


—  i38  - 

necessary  give  reasons — though  the  reasons  were  not  in  any  way 
explicit. 

N.  B.  Motivation  impulsive  and  automatic  ;  V  is  taken  at  once 
without  a  pause. 

6.  Feb.  i .  Immediate  recognition  in  order  J — V.     Some  instants 
of  mooning,  followed  by  an  immediate  choice  of  V  for  its  quality 
and  intensity.     There  was  only  a  slight  comparative  reference  to 
J  — it  was  not  very  explicit. 

7.  Feb.  8.  Immediate  recognition  in  order  J — V.     Moment  of 
bewilderment  (mooning) ;  deliberate  choice  of  V. 

N.  B.  Motivation  now  follows  in  a  groove.  The  two  names  are 
recognised  ;  there  is  a  slight,  habitual  pause  (i),  then  V  is  seized 
at  once,  with  increasing  swiftness.  Motivation  has  become  quite 
automatic. 

Another  example,  also  from  S3,  shows  how  (in  the 
third  choice)  an  effort  to  be  consistent  was  made,  and 
how,  nevertheless,  '  a  line  of  least  resistance '  was  fol- 
lowed—there were  six  choices. 

Tke Evolution      i.  Nov.  28.     Kum  chosen.     Reaction-Times  5gS  sigma. 
of  the  K— L      Passed  from  one  to  the  other  without  recognising  one  or  the 

Choices  of  S3.  other.  Came  back  from  the  second  to  the  first ;  recognised  that 
the  contrast  was  between  bitter  and  sweet ;  chose  the  sweet,  liking 
sweet  tastes  as  such  better  than  bitter.  No  images,  or  feelings,  or 
tension — standard  only  came  to  mind  when  reacting. 

2.  Dec.  7.     Kum  chosen.     Reaction-Time  1224  sigma. 
Slightly  distracted  when  the  card  appeared...  I  came  back  to  K 

in  an  *  abstract '  manner  and  recognised  it  as  something  sweet. 
Was  aware  of  a  distinct  feeling  of  power  to  recall  in  any  required 
detail  its  taste.  I  passed  on  to  L.  It  appeared  to  me  as  some- 
thing vaguely  objectionable.  I  chose  K  by  excluding  L. 

3.  Jan.  1 8.     Kum  chosen.     Reaction-Time  1469  sigma. 
Immediate  recognition  of  both  in  the  order  K — L  followed  by 

an  automatic  tendency  to  choose  K.  The  thought  then  super- 
vened, I  had  in  the  past  chosen  L  in  this  choice,  therefore  in  view 
of  my  desire  to  be  consistent,  I  had  to  have  some  reason  for  chang- 
ing. At  that  moment  I  was  aware  of  an  instinctive  recoil  from 
the  bitterness  of  L,  which  occasioned  an  association  (at  margin  of 

(i)  Vide  Motivation  Tracks. 


—  i3g  — 

consciousness)  with  a  past  illness.  Further  I  knew  that  K  was  not 
intense,  though  rather  insipid.  I  chose  K  in  my  present  mood  in 
view  of  its  harmlessness,  being  conscious  that  in  a  more  vigorous 
moment  I  might  have  chosen  L. 

4.  Jan.  23.     Kum  chosen.     Reaction-Time  1120  sigma. 
Immediate  recognition  in  the  order  K — L.     I  remembered  that 

this  choice  had  been  present  before.  I  was  aware  that  my 
thoughts,  in  orienting  towards  the  choice, Were  running  in  the  same 
mould.  I  was  conscious  that  my  mind  had  been  in  the  same 
frame  before  vis  a  vis  of  a  choice.  L  appealed  to  me  as  intense,  K 
as  qualitatively  agreeable  ;  consciousness  that  I  was  shirking  the 
bitter  and  taking  the  sweet,  was  present  to  me.  I  chose  K. 

5.  Feb.  4.     Chose  Kum.     Reaction-Time  714  sigma. 
Recognition  in  order  K — L.     K   was   slightly  more  distinct. 

I  had  an  instinctive  tendency  to  reject  L,  followed,  after  a  compa- 
rative judgment  of  value,  by  actual  rejection. 

6.  Feb.  1 1      Chose  Kum.     Reaction-Time  36g  sigma. 
Immediate  recognition  in  order  K— L.     Feeling  of  contrast,  and 

of  the  great  difference  between  the  intensities  of  the  two  liquids. 
I  chose  K,  feeling  that  I  was  taking  the  line  of  least  resistance. 

The  Reaction-Time  curve  for  these  choices   is   as 
follows  : 


1500,0- 


—  140  — 

From  the  point  of  view  of  character  this  Motivation- 
Evolution  is  interesting.  The  Motivation  in  i.  is 
swift  and  decisive — the  *  sweet  '  is  chosen.  In  2. 
owing  to  distraction  the  time  is  longer,  the  Motivation 
too,  is  more  negative.  In  3.  the  Subject,  feeling  he  is 
not  '  consistent '  makes  a  '  moral  '  effort  towards  a 
serious  Motivation.  Still  he  chooses  K  in  a  weak 
moment.  The  decline  begins.  In  n°  4  he  is  conscious 
of  '  shirking  '.  Choices  grow  rapid.  In  n°  5  he 
instinctively  turns  from  L,  and  in  n«  6,  he  avowedly  '  is 
following  the  line  of  least  resistance '. 

General        We  see  that  the  natural  tendency  is  towards  auto- 
Remarks  on  matic  choosing.     The  times  grow  shorter,  the  number 

Motivation- 
Evolution,   or  phenomena  grows   less,    only    one    alternative    is 

considered ,  there  is  economy  in  every  sense,  and 
finally,  the  Motivation  reaches  such  a  point,  that  it 
never,  or  practically  never  deviates  from  a  certain 
curve  or  '  Motivation-Track '.  This  final  stage  of  deve- 
lopment may  be  reached  sooner  or  later.  In  some 
cases  it  is  reached  swiftly — then  the  effect  is  striking. 

An  instance  of  this  kind  is  found  in  the  T — J  choices 
of  Ss.  These  choices  always  resulted  in  an  easy  prefer- 
ence for  T.  The  Motivation  evolved  rapidly.  After 
six  choices  it  had  reached  its  final  stage.  The  last  three 
choices  were  simple  repetitions  of  the  same  nine 
words  (i). 

«  Saw  T,  then  J,  I  took  T  while  seeing  J.  » 
Automatism,  which  we  shall  now  consider  in  detail, 
is  thus  the  natural  issue  of  normal  Motivation.     If 

( i)  They  were  as  follows  —  i°.  Jan.  3i.  «  T  first,  then  J,  took  T  while  seeing 
J.»  Reaction-Time  58a  sigma. 

2°.  Feb.  6.  «  T,  then  J,  took  T  while  I  was  seeing 
J.»  Reaction  Time  661  sigma. 

J°.  Feb.  10.  «Saw  T,  very  superficially,  then  J, 
I  took  T  while  seeing  J  »  Reaction-Time  667  sigma. 


Automatism  is  not  attained,  it  is  because  some  such 
troubling  cause  as  Hesitation,  has  interfered  with  the 
normal  course  of  Motivation,  and  upset  its  Evolution. 
Automatism  should  not  then  be  considered  as  an  evil, 
but  on  the  contrary  as  a  manifestation  of  the  protective, 
and  economising  tendency  of  volitional  functioning.  It 
shows,  that,  as  Mr  Stout  writes  (i), «  it  lies  in  the  essen- 
tial nature  of  conation  that,  conative  processes  should 
cease,  if  and  so  far  as  their  end  is  attained  '  ». 

(i)  Manual  of  Psychology,  p.  111. 


CHAPTER  VII. 


AUTOMATISM. 


Automatism      In  our  last  chapter  we  studied  the  various  stages  of 
™       the  Evolution  of  Motivation  towards  its  final  term, 

Choice-  .        . 

Processes,  which  is  Automatism.  In  the  present  chapter  we  pro- 
pose to  dwell  on  Automatism  as  a  manifestation  of  the 
economising  tendency  of  volition. 

We  understand  Automatism  in  a  wide  sense,  as  being 
the  state  arrived  at  by  the  Will,  when  it  functions, 
evenly,  swiftly,  and  regularly,  and  in  a  manner,  more 
or  less  independent  of  conscious  attention.  We  do  not 
imply  that  consciousness  is  altogether  absent  in  auto- 
matic actions.  It  seems  to  us  that  facts  show  that  there 
is  usually  present  some  trace  of  consciousness.  We 
quite  agree  with  Mr  Stout  (i)  that,  in  automatic  actions 
«  the  diversity  of  attention  is  probably  never  absolutely 
complete.  The  musician  for  instance  is  more  or  less 
aware  that  he  is  playing  a  piece  of  music,  and  the  ab- 
sent minded  walker  is  not  utterly  oblivious  to  the  fact 
that  he  is  in  a  crowded  street  and  in  motion.  What 
can  be  asserted  is,  that  in  such  cases  there  is  no  persis- 
tent and  discriminating  attention  to  the  details  of  the 
action.  » 

Again  there   is   no  evidence,  that  such  Automatic 

(i)  Manual  of  Psychology,  p.  109. 


—  143  — 

actions  are  no  longer  free.  Neither  of  course,  is  there 
evidence  of  the  presence  of  an  internal  fiat,  or  of  a 
feeling  of  effort ;  such  phenomena  are  most  likely  totally 
absent.  Still,  to  affirm  that  because  actions  happen 
regularly,  evenly,  and  swiftly,  and  that  because  they 
seem  to  pass  outside  of,  or  apart  from  us,  they  are  no 
longer  free,  is  to  quit  the  empirical  standpoint  and  for- 
mulate a  metaphysical  theory. 

Automatic  actions  too,  should  be  considered  as  vol- 
untary. They  imply  as  we  have  seen,  a  highly  deve- 
loped, or  rather  an  abstract,  and  attenuated  state  of 
volition.  They  are  nevertheless  acts  of  the  Will. 

De  meme,  writes  M.  Paulhan,  qu'il  reste  beaucoup  d'automa- 
tisme  dans  la  volonte",  il  reste  de  la  volonte  dans  1'automatisme,  ou. 
plutot  des  elements  de  la  volonte,  des  caracteres  affaiblis  de  la 
volition,  de  sorte  que  nos  divers  etats  ne  sont  jamais  tres  purement 
automatiques,  ni  absolument  volontaires.  Us  sont  composes  des 
memes  elements  mais  en  proportions  variables  et  de  telle  fa£on 
qu'en  certains  cas,  1'automatisme  est  a  son  maximum  et  les  elements 
de  volonte  a  leur  minimum,  tandis  que  d'autres  fois  c'est  le  contraire 
qui  se  produit  (i). 

Though  Automatism  is  difficult  to  define  from  an 
4  outside '  point  of  view,  it  by  no  means  presents  the 
same  difficulty  to  those  who  are,  so  to  say,  experien- 
cing it.  They  know  usually  when  their  actions  are 
really  automatic.  Often  our  Subjects  said,  in  the  in- 
trospections, «  it  was  so  automatic  that  I  can  hardly  tell 
how  it  happened  »,  «  if  my  attention  were  not  very 
concentrated  I  could  not  say  how  the  process  passed.  » 

At  times  they  were  struck  by  the  fact  that  the  choice  process 
seemed  to  take  place  quite  independently  of  them.  «  I  am  as  a 
spectator  watching  what  is  going  on  within  me,  without  taking 
part  in  it.  »  In  such  cases  the  Subjects  make  movements  or  effect 

(i)  PAULHAN,  La  volonte,  p.  27. 


—  144  — 

choices  in  a  way  which  is  wholly  unaccountable  to  them.  «  I  am 
still  asking  myself  why  I  did  that  »,  or  «  I  chose  X  without  know- 
ing why  I  did  so  » .  At  times,  they  were  struck  by  the  very 
'  continuous '  nature  of  the  choice — the  whole  process  would  seem 
to  pass  a  all  in  one  continuous  movement  » .  On  these  occasions 
the  choice  was  affirmed  to  be  automatic,  or  even  a  absolutely  auto- 
matic ».  «  The  whole  mental  state, «  in  the  words  of  one  Subject, 
<  seemed  like  one  continuous  movement  towards  C  ».  More  strik- 
ing testimony  to  the  presence  of  Automatism  was  found  in  such 
introspections  as  the  following —  «  I  should  not  have  known,  were 
it  not  for  the  displaced  glass,  that  I  took  Z,  so  automatic  was  it  ». 

Aids  towards  In  our  experiments  there  were  certain  circumstances 
Automatism.  caicuiated  to  render  the  choices  quickly  automatic.  First 
of  all,  there  was  the  sameness  of  external  conditions. 
The  choices  were  made  in  the  same  surroundings,  in 
the  same  order  and  manner,  and  between  combinations 
of  well-known  objects.  Secondly,  the  instruction 
implied  that  the  Subject  should  react  as  quickly  as  pos- 
sible. Thirdly,  motives  for  the  choices  were  readily 
forthcoming,  as  the  alternatives  were  well-known, 
and  as  they  had  well-differentiated  hedonic  values. 
Fourthly,  there  was  that  «  proness  to  act  or  to  decide  », 
of  which  James  speaks,  which  is  felt  in  choices  made 
under  a  certain  tension,  and  which  tends  to  make  us 

act  automatically.     James  regards  it  as  a  motive  (i). 

/ 

Certain  motives  are  more  or  less  constantly  in  play.  One  of 
these  is  impatience  of  the  deliberative  state  ;  or  to  express  it  other- 
wise, proness  to  act  or  to  decide  merely  because  action  and  deci- 
cision  are  as  such  agreeable,  and  relieve  the  tension  of  doubt  and 
hesitancy.  Thus  it  comes,  that  we  will  often  take  any  course 
whatever,  which  happens  to  be  most  vividly  before  our  minds,  at 
the  moment  when  this  impulse  to  decisive  action  becomes  extreme. 

With  regard  to  this  latter  point,  we  have  noticed  that 
such  hap-hazard,  inexplicable  choices —  «  choices  with- 

(i)  Principles  of  Psychology,  vol.  II,  p.  53o. 


-  145- 

out   motives  » — occur    when    Automatism    is    deve- 
loped (i). 

Other  causes  favouring  the  development  of  Automa- 
tism were  the  absence  of  distractions ;  simplicity  of  the 
choices;  and  a  certain  slight  indifference  or  diminution 
of  interest. 

Certain  circumstances  tended  to  prevent  and  delay  the  Tendencies 
development  of  Automatism.     First  of  all,  the  instruc-    a°ainst 

.         ,.     ,    .          ,         ,  ,        ,  ,  ,  ,  .         Automatism. 

tion  implied  that  the  choice  should  be  made  for  serious 
reasons;  that  is,  that  the  motivation  should  be  thorough. 
Secondly,  the  presence  of  a  kind  of  introspective  self- 
consciousness,  necessary  for  a  Subject  anxious  to 
observe  all  that  passed  within,  naturally  told  against 
Automatism.  Thirdly,  the  frequency  of  hesitations 
with  one  Subject,  and  with  another,  the  habit  of 
resisting  tendencies  and  impulses,  opposed  it.  Then, 
again,  what  James  calls  «  the  dread  of  the  irrevocable  » 
fought  against  impulsive  choosing. 

In  spite  of  these  hostile  tendencies  Automatism 
increased  steadily.  In  the  second  series  (already  at 
Christmas),  after  2j3  experiments,  it  was  noticeable. 
Naturally  the  break  of  a  few  weeks,  for  the  holidays, 
threw  it  back  considerably,  but  before  long,  it  became 
strong  once  more,  and  towards  the  end  of  the  second 
series  many  remarkable  signs  of  the  presence  of  Auto- 
matism were  found. 

The  clearest  manifestation  of  the  presence  of  Auto-    signs  of 
matism  is  found  in  a  comparative  examination  of  Reac-  Automatism. 
tion-Times. 

Let  us   take,    for  instance,  the  Reaction-Times  for        i 
the  last  3oi    experiments  of  the  second  series,  when 
Automatism  was  on  the  increase. 

(i)  Vide  Chapter  VI.  The  choices  in  which  E  was  taken  '  without  motives'. 

IO 


—  146  — 


EXPERIMENTS 

1-2O 

20-40 

40-60 

60-80 

80-100 

100-120 

S1 

58i.8 

545.7 

495.5 

478.7 

456.3(i) 

S» 

1057.6 

953 

934 

8i6.5 

668.2 

6i5.7 

S3 

1020.3 

875.1 

746.2 

654.9 

574.2 

As  will  be  seen,  in  our  section  on  Reaction-Times  (2)  the  gra- 
dual shortening  of  times  was  likewise  uniform  in  the  other  series, 
with  the  exception  of  one  figure  of  S3. 

We  have  seen,  in  our  chapter  on  Motivation-Tracks 
of  Phenomena,  that  various  phenomena  tend  to  disappear  from  the 
choices  such  as,  images,  feelings,  and  comparative 
judgments.  This  disappearance  of  phenomena  is  a 
sign  of  increasing  Automatism,  and  continues  con- 
comitantly  with  its  increase.  It  is  naturally  difficult  to 
give.a  numerical  appreciation  of  this  fact.  All  we  can 
do  is  to  count  such  as  are  recorded  in  the  introspections 
of  the  Subjects.  Having  done  so,  we  give  a  table, 
corresponding  to  that  of  the  Reaction-Times  just  given. 
It  shows  the  total  number  of  phenomena,  recorded  in 
the  introspections  of  each  Subject — for  each  20  experi- 
ments of  the  last  3oi  experiments  of  the  second  series. 

Phenomena  recorded  during  the  a1"1  part  of  the  and  series. 


EXPERIMENTS 

1-2O 

2O-40 

40-60 

60-80 

80-100 

100-120 

S» 

76 

61 

44 

4i 

— 



s« 

54 

36 

34 

35 

26 

16 

s« 

89 

5i 

46 

3o 

16 

— 

2I9 

i  48    |    i  24 

1  06 

1 

(1)  This  figure  only  represents  the   mean   of  four  choices.    S'   only   did 
84  experiments  of  this  3oi. 

(2)  Vide  Chapter  II. 


—   147 


To  explain  in  detail,  what  such  a  gradual  disappear- 
ance of  phenomena  means,  let  us  take  another  table. 

Table  showing  the  gradual  disappearance  of  certain 
phenomena  during  the  first  273  experiments  of  the  Second  Series. 


PHENOMENA 

SUBJECTS 

EX 

,--  —  -*^ 

i-3o 

PERIMENTS 

3o-6o    60-90 

Impressions  of 

S1 

29 

16 

4 

4  Positive  '  value 

s« 

20 

8 

7 

S3 

IO 

8 

i 

Impressions  of 

S1 

18 

>9 

3 

4  Negative  '  value 

ss 

20 

8 

8 

S3 

i3 

8 

4 

Comparative 

S1 

i5 

9 

9 

Judgments 

S2 

i3 

8 

3 

S3 

20 

i5 

8 

Judgments  of 

S1 

10 

3 

o 

'  Absolute'  value 

S2 

2 

i 

o 

«  Best  »,  «  Worst  » 

S3 

12 

9 

4 

Feelings  of 

S1 

9 

3 

o 

Decision  or 

S2 

5 

6 

i 

Consent 

S3 

o 

o 

i 

Hesitations  of 

S1 

14 

5 

7 

Various  kinds 

S» 

7 

8 

1  1 

S3 

12 

5 

4 

Reproductions 

S1 

3 

2 

o 

of  Tastes 

S8 

2 

O 

o 

S3 

7 

I 

o 

Movements 

S1 

3 

2 

0 

or  Choices 

s« 

4 

I 

2 

Changed 

S3 

0 

I 

O 

Impulsive 

S1 

5 

4 

6 

Choices  and 

S* 

ii 

7 

6 

Movements 

S8 

8 

4 

3 

Judgments 

S* 

i5 

8 

ii 

i  That's  right  »  or 

S* 

2 

2 

0 

«  That  will  do  » 

S3 

I 

O 

o 

—  148  — 

These  numbers  are  for  each  phenomenon  and  for  each 
Subject.  This  table  is  based  on  the  first  278  experi- 
ments of  the  2nd  series,  as  the  phenomena  were,  during 
this  early  period,  numerous,  and  their  disappearance 
was  easily  observable.  We  divide  the  experiments 
into  three  groups  of  thirty.  Certain  abbreviations  are 
used,  but  they  will  be  easily  understood.  The  figures 
should  be  regarded  only  as  approximations,  though  we 
believe  they  represent  the  reality  faithfully.  As,  many 
phenomena  occurred  frequently  with  some  Subjects, 
and  rarely  or  never  with  others,  we  were  forced  to 
select  such  as  were  to  be  found  in  the  introspections 
of  all  three  Subjects. 

We  have  seen  that  increasing  swiftness,  and  (owing 
to  the  disappearance  of  many  phenomena)  increasing 
simplicity ,  mark  the  presence  of  Automatism.  We 
now  come  to  the  third  sign,  that  of  the  Regularity  of  the 
Choices.  This  regularity  is  manifested  both  in  the  qua- 
litative nature  of  the  choice  and  in  its  time-duration. 
With  regard  to  qualitative  regularity  we  have  such 
incidents  as  that  of  the  last  three  T — J  choices  of  S*  (i), 
where  thrice  the  whole  introspection  is  the  same.  We 
have  seen  too,  in  our  chapter  on  Motivation-Tracks 
how  the  same  choice  tends  to  repeat  itself  in  an  identical 
manner. 

With  regard  to  regularity  in  time-duration  we  have 
seen  that  at  times  the  same  choice  was  repeated  in  the 
same  time,  to  a  thousandth  of  a  second.  And  that  very 
often,  there  was  a  very  slight  difference  between  the 
duration-times  of  the  same  choices,  altough  there  was 
of  course,  a  general  tendency  towards  quickening  the 
reactions.  We  adduce  some  series  of  choices  as  exam- 
ples—from the  *  times  '  of  S1 

(i)  See  the  last  chapter. 


—  H9  — 

S1  choice  C — B  574  497  323       869  (i)  471  466      471 

S1  »  Z -C  4§6  53i  53i       440  407  817(1)572 

S1  »  J— V  5o6  SSg  532       58g(i)  5io 

S1  »  Z— J  393  3g3  689(1)758  601  3ig 

S1  »  Z— K  482  432  860 (i)  687  682  457 

A  similar  uniformity  was  found  in  the  Reaction- 
Times  of  S2  and  S3. 

Regularity  was  manifested  in  every  phase  of  the 
choice-process,  in  the  manner  of  reading  the  card,  in 
the  manner  of  reacting,  and  of  realising  the  choice. 
Automatism  entered  into  every  detail  of  the  experiment. 
Even  the  experimenter,  came  to  perform  the  various 
functions  in  a  perfectly  automatic  way,  so  much  so, 
that  the  salient  note  of  the  whole  experiment,  towards 
the  end  of  the  series,  was  its  mechanical  regularity. 

I  have  referred  already  to  the  fact,  that  Subjects  were 
struck  by  the  Evenness  and  Continuity  of  the  choices 
when  Automatism  was  developed.  They  frequently 
notified  in  their  intropections  that  the  choice  was  even 
and  smooth.  All  jerkiness  and  discontinuity  was 
absent. 

All  seemed  one  continuous  act.  The  process  seemed  a  single 
continuous  one.  I  had  a  feeling  of  easy  effort  all  through. 

They  were,  during  this  period  particularly  obser- 
vant of  anything  like  disparity  or  contrast  between  the 
alternatives.  At  times  such  disparity,  tor  instance,  the 
finding  of  something  very  good  at  the  side  of  something 
very  bad ,  occasioned  a  jerk  or  sudden  change  of 
level  (2)  in  the  choice-process.  This  phenomenon  was 

(1)  This  choice  was  the  first  after  the   interval  for  Holidays   and   so  was 
somewhat  longer. 

(2)  To  quote  from  a  Z — C  choice  of  S3.  «  Felt  a  great  unevenness  in  the 
elements  of  the  choice.  Things  very  different  (like  Z  and  C)  seem  to  me  to  be 
situated  on  two  banks  of  a  ravine — visual  image  not  clear — still  Z  and  C  appeared 
as  separated  by  a  ravine.  » 


—   i5o  — 

called  «  brusquerie  »  by  S2  and  was  described  as  a 
sudden  passage  from  one  stale  of  mind  to  another,  or 
as  a  passage  from  a  state  of  activity  to  one  of  passivity. 
This  mental  «  brusquerie  «  was  also  noticed  on  similar 
occasions  by  the  other  Subjects  ;  it  occurred  however 
rarely. 

I  have  dwelt  on  this  point,  here,  with  a  view  to 
emphasising  the  fact  that  when  Automatism  is  present, 
there  is  a  sense  or  feeling  of  evenness  experienced. 
s  The  presence  of  Active  Tendencies  of  all  kinds,  mus- 

Antom»tism,  cular  and  mental,  marks  developed  Automatism.  The 
Subjects  often  felt  a  tendency  towards  an  alternative, 
although  they  did  not  know  what  it  was,  just  because  it 
was  at  the  left  side — the  alternatives  at  the  left  being 
more  frequently  the  best.  Then,  again,  if  the  first 
alternative  seen  was  not  good,  there  was  an  immediate, 
often  a  violent  tendency,  to  take  the  other. 

«  I  rebounded  to  T  when  I  saw  G  ».  «  I  fell  on  B  when  I  saw 
C  ».  —  «  I  had  decided  for  J  before  seeing  it.  »  Sometimes  a  ten- 
dency was  felt,  not  towards  the  alternative  at  the  right,  nor  towards 
that  at  the  left,  but  towards  «  any  thing  at  all  »  ;  a  pure  tendency 
towards  effecting  a  choice. 

The  presence  of  '  inexplicable  '  choices  also  marks  a  highly 
developed  Automatism.  Take  for  instance  the  following  examples 
from  the  introspections  of  S2.  «  I  dont  quite  know  how  or 
why  I  took  C.  Was  it  confusion  ?  Automatism  ?  or  a  hidden 
choice  ?  »  Or  again,  a  I  took  T  all  the  same,  although  I  judged  K 
better.  It  is  impossible  to  explain.  It  was  late  when  I  saw  my 
error  and  I  was  astonished.  Yet  I  felt  this  change  was  explicable. 

Such  introspections  generally  began  with  the  announcement  that 
something  strange  had  happened.  The  effect  on  the  Subject's 
mind  being  almost  startling. 

Another  sign  of  the  Automatism  is  the  Subject's  feeling 
that  he  is  choosing  according  to  a  habit ;  that  the  choice 
is  running  easily.  Thus  S2,  N°  68,  says  ;  «  On  seeing 


K  a  certain  habit  of  preferring  it  plays  an  important 
role  y> ;  *  it  becomes  as  it  were  a  habit  to  choose  K  » . 
Finally,  there  is  the  point  to  which  we  have  already 
called  attention,  that  the  choice  seems  to  take  place 
quite  independently  of  us.  We  seem  only  to  play  the 
part  of  spectators.  It  passes  as  it  were  outside  of  us, 
and  we  look  on. 

All  passed  swiftly,  as  one  continuous  idea,  or  representation,  at 
which  I  seemed  only  to  play  the  part  of  a  spectator. 

In  early  introspections  Subjects  had  much  to  remark,  volitional 
There  were  often  many  motives  to  record,  many  Economy  in 
feelings  to  describe,  and  judgments  to  formulate. 
Towards  the  end  introspections  were  short  and  laconic ; 
«  L— Z,  I  took  Z  »  ;  «  K— C,  I  took  K,  nothing  else  to 
record  »  ;  «  I  was  decided  for  K  once  I  saw  it  » .  This 
brevity  and  simplicity  was  not  due  to  any  carelessness 
on  the  part  of  Subjects.  The  fact  was  that  there  was 
nothing  more  to  remark.  There  were  no  feelings , 
hesitations  or  motives  to  describe.  The  mental  act  had 
become  direct  and  simple — at  least  as  far  as  it  was 
observable  in  consciousness.  The  Will  had  gradually 
ceased  to  expend  useless  effort.  Volitional  force  was 
economised.  Motivation  was  reduced  to  a  minimum. 
Automatism  held  sway,  and  there  was  nothing  to 
record. 

This  natural  economising  tendency  of  the  Will  is 
interesting  to  study.  It  appears  in  every  phase  of  the 
choice  process.  We  have  seen,  in  our  chapter  on 
Motivation-Tracks,  that  when  some  structural  item  of 
the  Choice-Process  becomes  unnecessary,  it  disappears. 
We  have  seen  too,  how,  if  the  choice  can  be  safely  made 
by  a  consideration  of  only  one  of  the  alternatives,  only 
one  is  considered.  Indeed,  towards  the  end,  whenever 
C  was  seen  first,  its  alternative  was  at  once  taken  with- 


—    152 

out  even  being  looked  at.  And  whenever  Z  was  seen 
first,  it  was  at  once  taken,  without  the  other  even  being 
looked  at.  Then,  again,  Subjects  began  to  save  them- 
selves the  trouble  of  re-entering  into  a  full  discussion  of 
Motives.  They  took  various  short-cuts  towards  their 
choice,  or  rather  guided  themselves  in  their  choices 
by  various  means,  other  than  that  of  entering  into  a 
discussion  of  Motives. 

Now  it  was  by  means  of  memory  ;  «  they  remembered  that  such 
an  alternative  was  their  favourite  »,  or  to  quote  S3,  N°  40  ;  «  I  feel 
I  can  now  truthfully  stake  my  choice  in  the  light  of  past  experi- 
ments by  a  kind  of  abstract  algebra  » — or  again,  an  appeal  is  made 
to  an  image-scale  which  comes  to  mind,  and  the  choice  is  at 
once  registered  in  favour  of  the  alternative  symbolised  by  the 
higher  position.  For  instance,  in  the  K—  C  choice  of  S3 :  «  Imme- 
diate recognition  in  the  order  K — C.  K  was  associated  with  the 
figure  «  2  ».  C  was  some  other  figure  beyond  6 — the  image  was 
faintly  visual  and  quite  distinctly  auditive.  I  chose  K.  » 

The  fact  that  the  choice  was  present  to  consciousness 
as  a  unit,  as  one  block-piece,  which  had  to  be  broken 
up  mentally,  whereas  formerly  it  had  been  present  to 
consciousness  in  separate  parts  which  had  to  be  put 
together  and  synthesised  mentally,  struck  the  Subjects 
very  much.  S3,  for  instance  said  :  N°  62. 

In  the  past  my  thought  (in  these  choices)  was  synthetic.  I  com- 
pounded reasons  for  my  choice.  Now  it  is  primarily  analytic. 
I  have  to  break  up  the  whole  introspection  by  force  into  its  parts. 
It  would  be  impossible  did  I  not  already  have  practice  and  expe- 
rience at  the  work.  At  first  Motives  were  real,  individual,  sub- 
stantial, definite  forces.  Now,  motives  are  like  shadowy,  unreal, 
indistinct  parts  of  a  whole.  Motives  come  to  be  set,  as  it  were,  in 
one  block  thought-act.  Motives  and  Decision  are  all  in  one 
action  of  the  mind — so  knit  together  that  without  careful  analysis 
no  knowledge  of  them  is  possible. 

For  S3,  choices  became  so  direct  and  simple  owing 
to  Volitional  Economy  that  they  resembled  for  him 


—  i53  — 

such  questions  as  «  Tea  or  milk  for  breakfast  ?  »  to 
which  an  immediate  reply  would  be  given  « Tea 
please  »  !  «  I  choose  Z,  he  says,  in  a  perfectly  and 
absolutely  abstract  manner,  just  as  I  might  say  7  is 
greater  than  3.  » 

We  shall  now  dwell  for  a  moment  i .  on  Economy 
in  Motivation  2.  on  Economy  and  Hesitation,  and  then 
conclude  this  chapter,  by  examining  a  method  of  testing 
the  Degree  of  Automatism. 

Volitional  effort  in  Motivation  may  be  economised  Economy^ 
in  three  ways.     A.  in  neglecting  to  analyse  the  charac-  Motmtlon- 
ter  of  the  alternatives,  B.  in  neglecting  to  compare  them 
formally,  C.  in  neglecting  to  hold  the  reasons  of  the 
choice  before  consciousness  at  the  moment  of  choosing. 

Now,  in  our  researches,  Economy  was  practised  in 
each  of  these  three  directions.  We  adduce  examples. 

A.  S3  had  the  habit,  at  first,  of  taking  account  of  the 
nature  of  the  tastes  of  the  alternatives  proposed,  in 
more  or  less  detail ;  he  did  so  explicitly.     Later  on,  he 
finds  that  in  the  choices,   he  no  longer  analyses  the 
nature  of  the  alternatives,  but  contents  himself  with 
feeling  that  he  could  do  so.     Finally,  he  no  longer  feels 
that  he  could  do  so,  but,  in  an  abstract  way  he  knows 
he  could,  if  he  tried.     In  the  choice  T— C,  for  instance, 
he  says. 

I  apperceived  T  immediately,  and  its  meaning  for  me  was  just 
vaguely  something  which  I  knew,  and  which  vaguely  I  knew  suffi- 
ciently well,  to  contrast  with  anything  else.  I  had  no  feeling  of 
power  to  define  it,  but  had  an  abstract  knowledge  that  I  had  the 
power  to  define  it.  Then  I  went  to  C.  Exactly  the  same  process 
for  it. 

B.  We  have  seen  in  discussing  the  signs  of  Automa- 
tism, how  comparative  judgments  grew  less  frequent 
in  the  first  part  of  the  2nd  Series.     In  the  last  3oi  expe- 


154 


riments  (the  2nd  part)  of  this  Series  they  almost  disap- 
peared. 


1-20 

20-40 

40-60 

60-80 

8o-iOO 

100-120 

S1 

2 

6 

2 

2 

_ 

S2 

8 

4 

4 

I 

3 

— 

S3 

i3 

6 

3 



__ 

Again  comparative  judgments,  as  introspective  evidence  tends  to 
show,  were  no  longer  consciously  present  towards  the  end  of  this 
series.  The  Subjects  frequently  affirmed  that  there  was  no  compa- 
rison made  between  the  alternatives.  In  some  cases  the  alternatives 
offered  no  ground  for  a  comparison. 

«  No  weighing  or  comparison.  The  two  tastes  were  too  dissimi- 
lar »—  or  e.  g.  S2,  N°  116;  «  I  understood  L  as  bad  from  the 
beginning.  I  went  to  Z,  which  I  decided  to  take,  because  it  was 
good.  There  was  no  comparison.  The  two  facts  were  quite 
apart ;  L  =  bad  ;  Z  =  good.  » 

As  we  shall  see,  in  our  chapter  on  Relativity  of 
Values,  the  value  of  one  alternative  was  usually  condi- 
tioned by  that  beside  it.  Nevertheless,  at  times,  it 
seemed  as  if  alternatives  were  taken  or  rejected  on  their 
absolute  values;  there  being  no  appreciable  mutual 
influencing,  and  certainly  no  conscious  comparison. 

We  may  affirm  then,  that  Volitional  Economy  is 
manifested  in  this,  that  explicit  comparisons  gradually 
disappear  altogether,  or  at  least  become  implicit,  and 
so,  escape  observation. 

C.  Volitional  Economy  is  also  seen  in  this,  that 
choices  are  made  and  realised,  without  there  being 
present  to  the  mind,  at  least  clearly,  any  motives  or 
any  values. 

Thus  S1  says  :  «  1  had  no  consciousness  of  values  ;  two  words, 
then  immediately  the  judgment  :  It's  the  other  »— again  «  Looked 


—  i55  — 

at  B,  and  took  it  automatically  without  any  consciousness  of 
value.  «From  S3  we  take  the  following  example — experiment  N°  82. 
«Immediate  recognition  in  the  order  Z — J;  immediate  choice  of  Z. 
No  formal  reasons  for  the  choice  were  present,  but  I  knew  I  could 
give  them  if  necessary  in  any  required  detail.  I  think  this  was  an 
instance  of  subconscious  impulsion — my  reasons  were  not  in  the 
least  conscious.  They  were  however,  near  the  threshold  of  cons- 
cience and  I  was  aware  I  could  give  them.  » 

It  suffices  for  the  moment  to  point  out  that  Hesitation   volitional 
is,  so  to  say,  the  natural  enemy  of  Volitional  Eco-  Economy  and 

T  .  .  Hesitation. 

nomy.  It  upsets  Automatism,  causes  the  mind  to 
weary  itself  and  waste  its  force  by  useless  oscillations. 
It  doubles  and  trebles  the  usual  number  of  phenomena, 
lengthens,  often  immensely,  the  time-duration,  upsets 
the  continuity  and  evenness  of  the  choice-process  and 
introduces  irregularity  and  inconsistency.  On  such 
occasions,  Automatism  sometimes  seems  «  to  take 
revenge  »,  for  the  Hesitation  may  close  abruptly  by  the 
lightning  flash  of  an  automatic  tendency  towards  the 
Critical  Zone;  the  choice  thus  finishes  suddenly,  and 
the  Hesitation  is  stopped. 

James  well  describes  such  motivations  (i). 

It  often  happens,  when  the  absence  of  imperative  principles  is 
perplexing,  and  suspense  distracting,  that  we  find  ourselves  acting, 
as  it  were  automatically,  and  as  if  by  a  spontaneous  discharge  of 
our  nerves,  in  the  direction  of  one  of  the  horns  of  a  dialemma. 
But  so  exciting  is  this  sense  of  motion  after  our  intolerable  pent-up 
state  that  we  eagerly  throw  ourselves  into  it.  «  Forward  now  », 
we  inwardly  cry,  c  though  the  heavens  fall  ». 

This  reckless  and  exultant  espousal  of  an  energy,  so  little  preme- 
ditated by  us  that  we  feel  rather  like  passive  spectators  cheering  on 
the  display  of  some  extraneous  force  than  like  voluntary  agents,  is  a 
type  of  decision  too  abrupt  and  tumultuous  to  occur  often  in 
humdrum  and  coldblooded  natures.  But  it  is  probably  frequent 
in  persons  of  strong  emotional  endowment  and  unstable  or  vacil- 
lating character. 

(i)  Principles  of  Psychology.  Vol.  II,  p.  532. 


—  i56  — 

Measurement      Fortunately  we  were  in  a  position,  owing  to  our  third 
ofuie      Series,  to  test  the  force  or  degree  of  the  Automatism, 

Degree  of  .  p 

Automatism,  manifested  in  the  different  choices,  by  our  Subjects. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  in  the  third  Series  the 
instruction  was  reversed  and  the  Subjects  were  told  to 
«  choose  the  worst  and  drink  it  » .  All  the  other  condi- 
tions of  the  experiment  remained  the  same. 

Up  to  this  time  the  Subjects  had  chosen  the  best,  or 
what,  for  the  moment,  seemed  to  them  to  be  the  best. 
Naturally  a  strong  automatic  habit  of  taking  the  best 
sprang  up.  This  Automatism  had  now  suddenly  to  be 
fought  against ;  the  worst,  not  the  best  substance  was  to 
be  chosen  and  that  '  as  quickly  as  possible  '. 

The  question  now  arose;  in  what  type  of  choices 
was  the  Automatism  strongest.  In  order  to  answer  this 
question,  a  means  of  measuring  or  estimating  the  degree 
of  Automatism  had  to  be  found.  This  task  proved 
less  difficult  than  might  be  expected. 

When  enumerating  the  various  signs  of  the  presence 
of  Automatism,  we  mentioned  among  others. 

A.  The  shortening  of  Reaction-Times; 

B.  The  occurrence  of  Active  Tendencies. 

A.  From  an  examination  of  the  Reaction-Times  we 
found,  that  they  were  shortest  in  choices,  where  the 
Subject  chose  his  favourite  substances  ;  and,  that  in 
general ,  there  was  a  direct  proportion  between  the 
shortness  of  the  Reaction-Time  and  the  value  of  the 
substance  chosen  (i).  This  fact  seemed  to  indicate, 
that  in  general,  Automatism  was  strongest  in  agreeable 
Hedonic  choices.  We  could  not  however,  from  this 
coincidence  alone  affirm  this  law,  as  the  shortness  of 
Reaction-Times  in  the  cases  mentioned,  might  be  solely 

(i)  See  our  section  on  the  Measurement  of  Motive-Force. 


-  i57- 

due  to  the  force  of  the  motives  at  work,  and  not  to  the 
increasing  Automatism. 

B.  An  analysis  of  the  introspections  of  the  third 
Series,  with  a  view  to  discovering  in  what  cases,  Active 
tendencies  to  take  the  best,  still  prevailed,  in  spite  of 
the  changed  instruction  (i),  gave  us  a  better  means  of 
estimating  the  degree  of  Automatism  in  the  case  of  the 
different  choices. 

A  few  examples,  of  these  introspections  will  make     Active 
this  matter  clear.  Tendencies, 

Showing  a 

1.  Ss.  Feb.  1 7th.  Choice  K— L.     L  (the  worst)  taken.     R.  T. high **r.M of 
C2o  ,  v  Automatism. 

Saw  K,  then  L.  I  took  L,  still  I  felt  there  was  a  tendency  to 
take  K — there  was  a  mental  intention  for  K.  The  movement  was 
for  L,  but  there  was  a  certain  deviation. 

2.  S*.  Feb.  17th.  Choice  Z— J.    J  (the  worst)  taken.     R.  T.  610. 
Immediately  after  reading  Z,  there  was  a  tendency  to  react  and 

to  take  it.  The  consciousness  came  in  some  way, '  the  worst,  take 
the  worst '.  I  read  J  and  then  there  was  the  consciousness,  *  Its 
this  one  '.  I  took  it. 

3.  S2.  Feb.  i7th.   Choice  J— K.     J  (the  worst)  taken.     R.  T. 
534. 

I  saw  K.  A  movement  destined  for  K  began  at  once.  Then  I 
turned  the  movement  to  J. 

4.  S3.  Feb    1 5th.  Choice  T— J.     J  (the  worst)  taken.     R.  T. 
562. 

Immediate  recognition  in  the  order  T — J.  T  appeared  as  a 
pleasant  neutral  taste,  J  as  an  unpleasant  neutral  taste.  I  chose  J 
as  obviously  the  worst.  In  taking  the  glass  I  tended  to  take  T. 
A  tendency  which  I  repressed. 

Our  method  of  procedure  was  as  follows,  i.  All 
the  appearances  of  the  various  alternatives  for  each 
Subject  in  the  third  Series  were  counted.  2.  All  the 
«  active  tendencies  •»  (to  take  the  various  substances) 
were  also  counted.  The  lists  were  as  follows  : 

(1)  See  above. 

(2)  R.  T.  means  Reaction-Time. 


i58  — 


NUMBER 

NUMBER 

NUMBER 

OF  TIMES 

TENDENCY 

OF  TIMES 

TENDENCY 

OF  TIMES 

TENDENCY 

PRESENTED 

TO  TAKE 

PRESENTED 

TO  TAKE 

PRESENTED 

TO  TIKE 

B 

7 

O 

7 

O 

9 

O 

C 

7 

O 

8 

0 

9 

O 

J 

7 

0 

6 

O 

8 

O 

K 

7 

2 

8 

5 

8 

2 

L 

7 

O 

7 

0 

9 

2 

T 

7 

I 

6 

3 

7 

I 

V 

7 

0 

7 

o 

9 

2 

Z 

7 

2 

7 

2 

9 

3 

Automatism  On  comparing  these  lists,  with  the  lists  of  the  Sub- 
in  Agreeable  jecls  favourite  tastes  ( i )  it  will  be  seen  that  the  active 
tendencies  occurred  in  the  cases  of  the  Subject's  favou- 
rite tastes.  For  S2,  for  instance,  K,  T,  and  Z  were  in 
order,  his  favourite  substances,  and  his  active  tenden- 
cies were  for  K,  5,  for  T,  3,  and  for  Z,  2  (2).  These 
active  tendencies,  due  directly  to  the  strength  of  Auto- 
matism, show  that  Automatism  is  strongest  in  the  case 
of  agreeable  hedonic  choices. 

Further  confirmation  of  this  theory,  that  the  strength 
of  Automatism  is  in  direct  relation  to  the  agreeableness 
of  the  choice,  is  found  in  the  fact  that  such  choices  are 
simpler  i.  e.  are  less  encumbered  with  phenomena,  and 
are  more  regular  than  choices  of  different  nature.  In  a 
word  the  signs  of  the  presence  of  Automatism  are  con- 
stantly found  in  such  choices. 

(i)  Vide  Chapter  II. 

(a)  N.  B.  K  was  a  great  favourite  with  S*.  He  spoke  of  the  choosing  of  it  as 
being  a  perfect  habit.  Here,  I'M  spite  of  his  duty  to  reject  it,  he  tends  towards  it 
five  times  out  of  eight.  Automatism  in  such  cases  clearly  grows  very  strong. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 


HESITATION. 


So  far  we  have  treated  of  normal  Motivation,  and  Hesitation 
have  studied  its  evolution,  and  gradual  progress  to-       and 

,  -ji  •   •  c  Motiyatiotu 

wards  Automatism  under  the  economising  tendency  of 
Volition. 

In  the  present  chapter  we  shall  examine  some  cases 
of  abnormal  Motivation,  and  shall  see,  in  Hesitation, 
an  anti-economic,  and  injurious  influence  which  affects 
the  Will. 

Hesitation  occurred  frequently,  and  in  various  forms 
during  the  course  of  our  experiments.  At  times  it 
caused  a  great  lengthening  of  the  duration  of  the 
reaction,  at  times  it  did  not  seem  to  affect  it.  On  some 
occasions  it  was  accompanied  by  oscillations,  to  and 
fro,  between  the  alternatives,  or  by  a  series  of  slight 
nervous  movements  in  the  hand  or  arm.  On  other 
occasions  there  were  no  oscillations,  but  the  mind 
seemed  to  hang  in  anxious  suspense  between  the  two 
decisions.  Hesitations  were  usually  accompanied  by 
painful  or  depressing  feelings ;  such  as  feelings  of  dis- 
couragement, disappointment,  regret  and  annoyance, 
effacement,  lassitude,  disgust,  and  even  anger. 

Many  words,  adjectives  and  substantives,  were  used 
to  describe  it,  in  its  various  degrees  of  intensity,  and  in 
its  various  stages  of  development ;  such  as  confusion, 
indecision,  bewilderment,  perplexity,  dazzled,  dallying, 
mooning,  «  at  a  loss  »,  and  perhaps  even  a  certain  kind 
of  «  listlessness  »  or  «  vacuous  hesitation  ».  The  spe- 


—  160  — 

cific  feeling  of  Hesitation  was,  however,  the  phenome- 
non usually  recorded. 

Examples  of      It  may  be  well  to  give  one  or  two  examples  of  Hesi- 
Hesitation.  tation,  in  the  form  it  commonly  took  in  our  introspec- 
tions. 

1.  S8,  Dec.  9.  Choice  V— B.     R.  Time  1854. 

The  experiment  lasted  long  because  I  did'nt  and  could'nt  arrive 
at  a  decision.  I  saw  V  first  and  then  I  commenced  a  '  va  et  vient' 
movement  at  least  five  times. 

I  took  at  the  end  V,  without  having  made  a  decision  by  prefer- 
ence— but,  just  to  finish.  When  I  had  the  glass  in  my  hand  I 
made  a  grimace,  indicating  disgust  and  fatigue.  A  feeling  of  pain 
came  after  the  experiment ;  the  cause  of  which  was  that  I  had  to 
take  a  glass  without  having  preferred  it.  I  took  it  with  a  gesture  of 
indecision. 

2.  An  example  from  an  introspection  of  S*  in  the  first  series. 

Remembered  X  and  J  as  being  both  unpleasant.  1  was  disap- 
pointed and  hesitated,  looking  blankly  at  the  card.  Next  I  looked 
slowly  for  the  glasses.  In  saw  X  first  and  turned  from  it  with 
disgust.  Then  I  saw  J  and  remembered  it  was  anything  but  nice. 
Again  I  hesitated — I  could  not  take  X  and  I  did  not  want  J.  At 
a  given  moment  I  reacted  mechanically  and  took  J. 

These  examples  of  Hesitation  bear  out  James'  gra- 
phic description  (i)  of  such  psychical  states  :  «  We  grow 
tired  of  long  hesitation  and  inconclusiveness,  and  the 
hour  may  come  when  we  feel  that  even  a  bad  decision 
is  better  than  no  decision  at  all.  Under  these  condi- 
tions it  will  often  happen,  that  some  accidental  circum- 
stance (2),  supervening  at  a  particular  moment  upon 

(1)  Principles  of  Psychology.  Vol.  II.  p.  53a. 

(2)  Very  frequently  Hesitations  end  in  abrupt,  inexplicable  choices.  Mr  Stout 
too  (Manual  of  Psychology,  p.  608)  notices  this  point  and  draws  from  it,  the 
conclusion,  that  a  psychological  disproof  of  Free-Will  is  impossible.  We  quite 
agree  with  his  conclusion,  for  the  reason  he  adduces,  as  well  as  for  others.  His 
words  are.  c  Now  it  must  be  admitted  that  the  transition  from  the  state  of  inde- 
cision to  that  of  decision  is  often  obscure,  and  that  it  frequently  appears  to  be 
unaccountably  abrupt.  This  makes  it  difficult  or  impossible  to  give  a  definite 
disproof  of  the  libertarian  hypothesis  on  psychological  grounds. » 


our  mental  weariness,  will  upset  the  balance  in  the 
direction  of  one  of  the  alternatives,  to  which  then  we 
feel  ourselves  committed,  although  an  opposite  accident 
at  the  same  time  might  have  produced  an  opposite 
result.  » 

Hesitations,  as  we  shall  see  presently,  vary  in  degree 
or  intensity.  Whether,  however,  there  are  different 
species  of  Hesitation,  it  is  difficult  to  decide.  The  fact 
that  some  Hesitations,  cause  a  great  lengthening  of  the 
Reaction-Time,  while  others  do  not  affect  it,  suggested 
to  us  that  there  might  be,  so  to  speak,  a  purely  psy- 
chical species  of  Hesitation,  and  also  a  semi  physiolo- 
gical species.  This  supposition  was  strengthened  by 
the  fact,  that  in  some  very  quick  reactions,  wherein 
there  were  painful  Hesitations,  the  Subjects  spoke  of 
«  mental  suspense  »  and  «  purely  mental  Hesitation  ». 
On  the  other  hand,  the  semi-physiological  Hesitations 
seemed  to  be  accompanied  by  feelings  of  fatigue,  dis- 
gust, and  physical  oscillations  of  the  hand  or  the  eye. 
Oscillations  were  found  in  both  the  supposed  species. 


Different 

Kinds  of 

Hesitation. 


«  Saw  alternatives  six  times.  Could'nt 
decide.  »  R.  T.  2i3i  (i). 
«  Saw  alternatives  five  times ;  Dis- 
gust and  fatigue  ».  R.  T.  1854. 
«   Strong   Hesitation.  Saw   Alterna- 
tives twice.  R.  T.  2554. 


«  Saw  alternatives  five  times.  Could'nt 
decide  ».  R.  T.  678. 
«  Saw    alternatives    three    times    » 
R. T.  378. 
«  Strong  Hesitation  »  R.  T.  669. 


There  were  many  other  similar  cases  of  long  and  short-duration 
Hesitations.  In  order  to  determine  if  they  marked  two  different 
species  of  Hesitation ,  a  «  curve  of  dispersion  »  was  made  out,  for 
all  the  Hesitations  of  S*  (the  Subject  who  hesitated  most).  The 
curve  was  based  on  his  126  experiments  of  the  second  half  of  the 
2nd  series.  There  were  in  all  17  Hesitations — three  were  under 
5oo  sigma  ;  twelve  were  i25o  sigma  ;  and  four  were  between  5oo 
and  1 25o  sigma.  There  was  therefore  no  indication  of  the  existence 

(i)  R.  T.  means  Reaction-Times.  It  will  be  noticed  that  the  Reaction-times  on 
the  left  are  much  longer  than  those  on  the  right. 

1 1 


—    l62   — 

of  two  species  of  Hesitation,  discernible  from  the  point  of  view  of 
Reaction-Times. 

Another  division  of  Hesitations  was  suggested  by  the 
fact,  that  sometimes  Hesitations  were  accompanied  by 
oscillations  and  sometimes  not.  This  fact,  however, 
seemed  rather  to  indicate  that  distraction  of  mind  and 
confusion,  from  which  oscillations  arise,  are  not  neces- 
sary parts  of  Hesitation. 

Still  another  division  of  Hesitations  was  suggested 
by  the  description  of  states  of  mind  like  the  following  : 

«  There  was  an  interval  of  mooning,  followed  by  a 
conscious  effort  to  make  up  my  mind ;  that  interval 
seemed  to  be  a  complete  void  ;  listlessness ;  my  mind 
was  blank  and  passive.  » 

There  seems  to  be  something  in  common  between 
such  states  of  consciousness,  and  Hesitations  in  the 
ordinary  sense.  Doubtless  the  essential  feature,  the 
feeling  of  indecision,  is  absent,  but  there  is  something 
of  hesitancy  present.  Let  us  take  further  examples. 

«  Immediate  recognition,  of  the  words,  followed  by  a  slight 
lull  in  mental  activity,  I  was  not  dazed  but  there  was  a 
lull.  »  Such  lulls  are  thus  described.  «  I  found  my  mind 
wholly  intent  on  the  card,  immovably  attached  to  it,  passively 
rather  than  actively  fixed  on  it,  »  «  it  seemed  to  occupy  all  my 
attention  and  to  hold  me  »,  «  I  sat  there  stupidly,  before  it,  looking 
at  it,  and  nothing  came,  »  «  I  rested  on  T,  querying  it,  T  ?  T  ?  » 
Such  vacuous,  indecisive,  states  of  mind  seem  to  resemble  Hesita- 
tion very  much.  On  the  other  hand,  they  differ  little  from  the 
«  fixations  »  of  mind,  spoken  of  by  Psychologists  who  study 
Associations,  and  although  their  occurrence  in  volitional  actions 
may  seem  remarkable,  it  is  probably  safer  to  regard  them  rather 
as  «  voids  »  and  «  fixations  »  than  as  forming  a  special  class  of 
Hesitations. 

Hesitation       To   illustrate  the  frequency  of  Hesitations  in  our 

incur     researches  let  us  take  the  second  series  which  corn- 
Researches.         '        •,   C  '  1    J-     -J      -^  •  ^1 

prised  574  experiments,  and  divide  it  into  three  groups 


—  i63  — 

of  191  experiments.  We  find  that  in  the  first  group 
there  were  Hesitations  (i)  in  approximately  25  %  of  the 
experiments,  in  the  second  group  23  °/0,  and  in  the 
third  group  20  °/0.  The  Subjects  S*  and  S3  were  equal 
with  respect  to  Hesitations;  S2  had  considerably  more 
Hesitations  than  the  others,  and  of  a  more  violent 
nature. 

Hesitations  occurred  both  during  the  choice-process, 
and  after  it,  when  the  choice  had  to  be  realised.  Dur- 
ing the  choice-process,  they  occurred  (2),  for  instance  : 

1 .  At  the  moment  the  Apparition  of  the  Excitant,  if 
Recognition  did  not  at  once  follow. 

2.  At  the   moment   of  Recognition ,    if  both   were 
recognised  as  very  bad,  or  as  equivalently  bad  or  good. 

3.  On  the  occasion   of  distractions,   of  absence  of 
motives,  or  of  «  thought  getting  too  abstract  and  too  far 
from  sensations  and  images.  » 

4.  In  the  case  of  choices  where  a  mental  habit  of 
hesitating  had  been  contracted. 

We  shall  now  consider  as  far  as  possible,  the  causes  The  Evolution 
of  the  origin,  development,  and  final  disappearance  of of  Hesltatl°n- 
Hesitation  (3).     In  order  to  do  so  clearly  we  have  had 
to  trace  the  whole  history  of  various  types  of  Hesitation. 
Our  method  was  that  indicated  in  our  chapter  on 
Motivation- Evolution. 

All  the  introspections  dealing  with  a  certain  choice, 
in  which  Hesitations  occurred,  e.  g.  the  L — C  choice 
of  Sf,  were  examined  in  chronological  order.  The 
Hesitations  did  not,  perhaps  appear  at  first,  then  they 

(1)  We  understand  Hesitations  here  in  a  very  wide  sense,  so  as  to  include 
those  types  oi  «  moodiness  »,  etc.,  just  described. 

(2)  We  do  not  here  give  a  complete  list.  For  each  Subject  the  occasions  of 
Hesitations  were  different. 

(3)  This  process  may  be  considered  either  as  an  Evolution  of  Hesitation  or  a 
Devolution  of  Motivation  ;  vide,  chapter  VI. 


—  164  — 

came,  developed,  and  disappeared,  or  if  we  may  say 
so,  they  were  «cured.»  We  were  thus  enabled  to  watch 
the  whole  history  of  the  Hesitation,  to  determine  its 
causes,  and  to  examine  how  it  was  got  rid  of.  By 
drawing  Reaction-Time  curves  we  could  contrast  and 
compare  various  Hesitations,  getting  thus  a  certain 
insight  into  their  different  degrees  of  intensity. 

As  a  first  example,  we  take  the  L — C  choices  of  Sa. 
There  were  nine  in  all.  We  give  the  introspections  in 
full.  It  will  be  seen  that  the  Hesitation  begins  in  N°  3, 
and  ends  with  N°  7 — the  Subject  having  got  rid  of  it 
by  making  an  effort  to  choose  decidedly.  It  will  be 
remembered,  that  both  L  and  G  were  very  unpleasant 
substances. 

TheL— C        i.  Nov.  3oth  R.  T.  739. 

Choices'of  S2.  I  first  saw  L  without  understanding  it.  I  turned  to  see  C, 
which  I  recognised  immediately  as  bad.  I  saw  again  L  and  took 
it,  with  a  feeling  of  disappointment.  I  understood  that  C  was  per- 
haps not  as  bad  as  L.  I  had  a  feeling  of  regret  and  disappointment. 
I  did  not  drink  L  until  long  after.  I  had  it  in  my  hand  without 
wishing  to  drink  it. 

2.  Dec.  10.     R.  T.  i5i3. 

I  was  a  little  distracted  first.  I  saw  L  but  I  understood  it  only 
superficially.  I  did  not  make  an  appreciation  of  its  value.  Then 
I  saw  C  which  made  me  return  immediately  to  L. 

I  took  L  probably  because  I  was  driven  back  from  C.  For 
when  I  had  the  glass  in  my  hand  the  veritable  value  of  L  then 
came  home  to  me.  I  had  a  profound  regret  for  taking  it,  but  that 
regret  had  nothing  to  say  to  C.  It  was  for  L. 

When  I  had  the  glass  in  my  hand  I  had  feelings  of  displeasure 
and  annoyance.  I  did  not  compare  the  two  values.  I  consider 
myself  responsible  for  taking  L. 

3.  Dec.  i3th.     R.  T.  2i3i. 

I  saw  C  then  L.  I  passed  from  one  to  the  other  about  six  times. 
It  became  impossible  to  decide  for  one  or  the  other.  I  was  dis- 
couraged, that  is  to  say,  I  was  even  effaced  a  little.  I  had  no  mind 
to  take  a  glass.  I  raised  a  glass  to  react  but  did  not  drink  it.  I 


—  i65  — 

had  no  feeling  of  disgust  all  the  same.  I  did  not  compare  the  two. 
I  had  no  preference  for  C.  I  took  it  just  to  react.  I  did  not 
decide  for  either.  There  was  no  question  of  a  preference  as  I  only 
took  it  to  react.  It  came  to  mind  that  I  was  to  drink  it.  I  said 
«  I'm  not  going  to  drink  it.  »  For  a  moment  I  thought  I  ought 
to  drink  it.  I  held  it  in  my  hand  for  some  time  I  did'nt  replace  it 
at  once.  » 

4.  Dec.  2oth.     R.  T.  678. 

I  don't  know  which  I  saw  first.  I  saw  both  about  five  times. 
I  could'nt  make  up  my  mind.  There  was  no  spontaneous  decision. 
Then  I  wished  or  felt  the  duty  to  decide  for  one  or  the  other.  I 
could'nt  still  decide.  Then  I  took  C  by  lassitude,  with  a  gesture 
of  indifference. 

I  could  not  get  myself  to  drink  it,  although  I  felt  (I  was  con- 
scious) that  I  ought  to  drink  it.  I  considered  the  case  as  though 
that  duty  was  «  hors  de  cause  ».  After  the  experiment  I  remem- 
bered that  I  considered  that  L  and  C  are  equally  bad. 

5.  Jan.  1 8th.     R.  T.  not  recorded. 

I  saw  C,  then  L,  then  immediately  I  came  back  to  C.  Then  the 
choice  to  be  made  between  G  and  L  came  back  to  my  conscience, 
with  the  memory  of  what  a  task  it  was  formerly.  That  discour- 
aged me  from  the  beginning.  Then  I  remembered  that  discussion 
was  useless.  I  took  C  to  finish  the  matter.  I  probably  took  G 
because  it  was  more  present  to  consciousness  and  because  I  had 
waited  longest  on  it. 

I  took  the  glass  very  slowly,  as  though  the  taking  of  it  disgusted 
me.  I  felt  a  repugnance  to  drinking.  Then  with  enormous 
difficulty  I  drank,  thinking  I  must  all  the  same  drink. 

6.  Jan.  24th.     R.  T.  1904. 

I  saw  C  first,  then  L,  then  C,  then  L.  I  could'nt  get  out  of  it. 
The  apparition  of  the  excitant  was  irregular  and  that  fact,  increased 
my  discontent.  I  took  C  by  duty. 

Then  I  found  it  almost  impossible  to  drink  it.  Then  I  put  it 
away,  but,  afterwards,  by  duty  I  drank  it.  C  is  more  known  to 
me  than  L.  C  drives  me  back  quicker  and  more  spontaneously 
than  L.  Still  I  felt  that  I  could  take  C  quicker  as  it  is  more 
familiar  to  me.  L  is  more  mysterious  and  unknown.  The  choice 
was  not  entirely  hazardous,  «  i.  e.  without  motivation  ». 

7.  Jan.  3oth.     R.  T.  1141. 

I  read  C,  then  L.     Then  I  had  the  consciousness  that  it  was 


i66 


Reaction- 
Time 
curve  of 
theL— C 
Choices. 


those  two  which  made  so  difficult  a  choice  in  previous  experiments. 
I  made  up  my  mind  that  that  was  not  going  to  happen  now.  All 
the  same  I  felt  very  distinctly  the  tendency  to  go  from  one  to  the 
other.  But  I  fixed  my  eyes  on  L.  Then  I  took  C.  C  seemed 
to  me  more  familiar.  I  took  it  quickly  enough.  In  taking  it  I 
had  a  consciousness  of  my  duty  to  choose. 

8.  Feb.  i  st.     R.  T.  987. 

I  read  C,  then  L.  Always  the  same  thing — I  gave  a  laugh  of 
discouragement  more  or  less.  I  took  C  quickly.  Then  I  recalled 
a  similar  choice  in  a  previous  experiment.  The  choice  was  very 
easy  for  me;  there  was  no  judgment  of  comparison  between  the  two. 

I  recalled  all  that  passed  before.  I  did  not  take  the  trouble  to 
prefer  one  to  the  other.  I  chose  C  automatically.  I  do  not  wish 
to  say  that  C  is  better  than  L. 

9.  Feb.  8*.     R.  T.  860. 

I  saw  L,  then  C.  Then  I  had  a  slight  recollection  of  long  dis- 
cussions I  used  to  have  between  them.  Then  I  decided  brusquely 
to  take  C. 

We  find  in  these  introspections  all  the  signs  of  Hesi- 
tation. 

i .  An  irregular  Reaction-Time  curve. 


if oo,  <r 


I6oo,tr 


—  167  — 

This  curve  shows  the  extreme  irregularity  intro- 
duced by  Hesitation  into  the  normal  descending  curve 
of  shortening)  Reaction-Times.  From  N°  7  onwards, 
the  curve  is  normal — as  the  Hesitation  was  cured. 

2.  There  are  inconsistencies  or  changes  in  the  choos- 
ing.    C  is  taken  seven  times  and  L  twice.     Yet  C  is 
not  considered  better  than  L.  (vide.  N°  8.)  «  I  took  C 
automatically.     I  do  not  wish  to  say  that  C  is  better 
than  L  »,  or  N°  3 ;  «  1  had  no  preference  for  C  ». 

3.  The  duty  of  drinking  is  disobeyed  twice,  in  the 
third  and  fourth  experiments.     This  refusal  of  the  task 
imposed  was  quite  exceptional.     It  only  occurred  in 
cases  of  violent  Hesitation. 

4.  Oscillations   occurred  three  times  ;   feelings  of 
discouragement,  annoyance,  regret,  and  disgust  also 
occurred. 

5.  The  «  abrupt  decisions  »  to  which  we  have  referr- 
ed, and  about  which  James  writes,  are  also  to  be  found 
several  times ;   «  I  took   C  to  finish  the  matter  »   or 
«  I  took  C  as  it  seemed  more  familiar  »,  imply,  of 
course,  purely  contingent,  extrinsic  motives. 

This  Hesitation  was  prepared  for  by  the  careless,   TheL— c 
superficial  motivation  of  the  first,  and  second  choices.  Hesitation» 
Doubtless,   Hesitation  usually  presupposes  a  certain     oriin. 
equivalence  of  values  between  two  alternatives.     Still 
its  immediate  cause  must  be  looked  for  in  other  cir- 
cumstances.    In  the  present  case  careless  motivation, 
plus  the  repining  over  the  two  first  decisions  of  this 
L — C  series,  predisposed  S2  to  hesitate.     In  N°  i  he 
says ;  «  I  saw  L  and  took  it  with  a  feeling  of  disap- 
pointment...    I  had  a  feeling  of  regret  and  disappoint- 
ment »,  and  in  N°  2;  «  I  had  a  profound  regret  for 
taking  it  (L)  ». 

The  third,  fourth,  fifth  and  sixth  experiments  consti-        * 
tute  the  development  or  process  of  the  Hesitation  ;  in-  DeveIopm*Bt- 


—  168  — 

consistencies,  fatigue,  discouragement,  etc.,  are  here 
found.  The  choice  becomes  a  kind  of  martyrdom. 
«  The  choice  to  be  made  between  C  and  L  came  back 
to  my  conscience,  with  the  memory  of  what  a  task  it 
was  formerly.  Then  I  remembered  that  discussion 
was  useless.  »  Indeed  the  Subject,  in  these  choices 
felt  as  if  he  were  in  the  clutches  of  a  powerful  enemy, 
from  whom  there  was  no  escaping  :  «  It  became  im- 
possible to  decide  »  ;  «  I  could'nt  make  up  my  mind  »; 
«  I  could'nt  get  out  of  it  » . 
3  The  third  stage  in  the  series  of  L — C  choices  was 

Tbe  Healing 

ofthe  the  Healing  of  the  Hesitation.  In  N°  7,  the  Subject 
calls  to  mind  that  the  L — C  choice  meant  inevitably  a 
Hesitation,  and  at  once  makes  up  his  mind  that  such  a 
state  of  things  must  cease.  «  I  made  up  my  mind  that 
that  was  not  going  to  happen  now  ».  Feeling  neverthe- 
less, the  tendency  to  begin  the  oscillation,  he  resolutely 
fixes  his  eyes  on  L.  This  action  helped  him  out  of 
the  accustomed  Motivation -Track.  The  familiarity 
of  C  now  strikes  him.  He  seizes  on  it,  at  once,  as  a 
motive ;  chooses  C — and  saves  himself  from  the  Hesita- 
tion. In  the  next  two  choices ,  the  eighth  and  the 
ninth,  he  acts  swiftly  and  decidedly,  in  the  same  sense, 
and  escapes  Hesitation. 

This  Evolution  of  Hesitation  lasted,  from  Nov.  3oth, 
to  Feb.  8th,  1911.  Its  chief  interest  lies  in  the  fact, 
that  it  shows  how  a  habit  of  Hesitation  may  arise,  and 
how  it  may  be  cured.  Once  the  Subject  realised  that 
a  discussion  of  reasons  was  for  him,  useless  and  dan- 
gerous in  the  matter  in  question,  and  that  a  swift  move- 
ment towards  the  most  familiar  alternative  was  his 
wisest,  and  only  course,  he  was  saved.  Hesitations 
disappeared,  and  with  it  irregularities  in  Motivation 
and  in  Reaction-Times. 

It  may  be  of  interest  to  give  a  few  more  examples  of 


—  169  — 


Hesitation  curves.     We  take  them  also  from  the  exper- 
iments of  S2  in  order  that  they  may  be  comparable 
with  that  already  given, 
i.  J— V  choice  of  S*  (i). 


3.000,0- 


1000,' 


Hesitation 
Curves  of  the 

J— V,  and 

J— B,  Choices 

ofS*. 


7          « 


2.  J — B  choice  of  82(1). 


foo.tr 


/  A  3  f  5~ 

(a)  Vide  appendix,  for  the  Introspections  corresponding. 


—    170  — 

In  the  J— V  series,  to  which  the  first  of  these  curves 
corresponds  we  find  some  further  points  worthy  of  note. 

i.  Irresponsible  choices  occur,  "  I  regretted  to  have  chosen 'tel- 
lement  a  la  le"gere  ".     «  I  took  J  in  an  irresponsible  way.  » 
Additional       2.  Changes  are  made  at  the  last  moment.     S5  was  just  on  the 
-Characteris-  point  of  taking!,  when  the  thought  came,  c  the  other  is  not  so 
bad  »  ;  he  changed  at  once  and  took  it. 

I  chose  J.  At  the  moment  of  choice  I  had  the  idea  that  J  was 
better.  Hardly  had  I  taken  the  glass  into  my  hand  when  I  was 
convinced  that  I  was  deceived. 

3.  Actual  feelings  of  despair  are  experienced.     «  Un  veritable 
tatonnement  d'ou  je  sors  par  desespoir.  » 

4.  Incertitude  as  to  relative  values  appears  to  be  due  to  over- 
hasty  valuations. 

5.  The  feeling  of  hurry  and  <i  fuss  »  accompanies  some  Hesita- 
tions.    «  There  was  no  discussion,  one  is  in  too  great  a  hurry  ;  if 
in  the  beginning  one  were  resolved  to  weigh  the  values,  it  would  go 
quicker  ;  now  we  «  fuss  about  »  to  see  which  of  the  two  is  going  to 
attract  us.  » 

6.  The  most  violent  Hesitations  seem  to  be  those  in  which  there 
is  no  oscillation,  and  in  which  we  grow  angry,     c  A  Hesitation 
such  as  I  never  had  as  far  as  I  can  remember.     In  the  L — C  choices 
I  found  a  difference  with  respect  to  familiarity.    Here  I  found  no  dif- 
ference whatever.    There  was  absolutely  no  reason  which  pleaded 
for  one  or  the  other.    Then  I  swore  with  a  gesture  of  discontent... 
During  my  Hesitation  I  did  not  pass  from  one  to  the  other,  but 
hung  anxiously  between  the  two. 

In  the  J — B  series  (corresponding  to  the  second 
curve  given  above)  we  find  the  following  additional 
points  of  interest. 

1 .  S2  rids  himself  of  Hesitations  by  taking  the  more  familiar. 
This  happened  in  the  three  series  of  Hesitations  given. 

a  I  took  B  as  it  seemed  the  more  familiar.  » 
«  I  took  C  as  it  seemed  the  more  familiar  »  etc. 

2.  Hesitation  then  is  healed  by  recalling  the  uselesness  of  dis- 
cussions of  motives  in  such  cases,  and  by  a  quick  taking  of  the 
more  familiar.     «    I   recalled   the  difficulty   I   always  have  for 
choosing  between  the  two.     I  took  B  immediately.    The  word  B 


-seems  to  me  more  familiar.  »  It  is  interesting  to  notice  that  Ss, 
here  employs  precisely  the  same  method  of  curing  himself  which  he 
employed  in  the  L— C  Hesitations  —  he  uses  almost  the  same 
words. 

I  had  the  consciousness  that  it  was  these  two  which  made  so 
difficult  a  choice  in  previous  experiments...  Then  I  took  C.  C 
seemed  to  me  to  be  more  familiar. 

Examining  the  three  series  of  Hesitations  of  S2,  from  Hesitation 
the  point  of  view  of  Consistency  and  Inconsistency,  we,     an<* 

r  J  J  Inconsistency, 

found  : 

In  the  L— G  choice,  he  took  G  seven  times  and  L  twice. 
In  the  J — V  choice,       —     V  five  —       J  thrice. 

In  the  J— B  choice,       —      B  six  —      J  twice. 

Having  examined  his  other  «  Hesitation  series  »  we 
found  likewise  that  they  were  choices  in  which  he 
constantly  changed  his  stand-point. 

The  question  now  arose.  What  relation  exists 
between  Hesitation  and  Inconsistency  ?  We  have  ass- 
igned the  presence  of  Inconsistencies  as  a  mark  of 
Hesitation.  Are  they  a  direct  consequence?  That  is 
to  say,  does  Hesitation  invariably  cause  Inconsistency? 
Or,  are  both  Inconsistency  and  Hesitation  consequences 
of  Equivalence  of  Values? 

It  was  first  of  all  necessary  to  prove  the  correlation 
of  Hesitation  and  Inconsistency.  This  was  done  as 
follows. 

1.  For  each  Subject  a  list  of  choices  in  which  Incon- 
sistencies occurred  (in  which  he  now  chose  one,  now 
another  alternative)  was  drawn  up. 

2.  For  each  Subject  a  list  of  choices  in  which  Hesi- 
tations occurred  was  drawn  up. 

3.  The  two  lists  were  put  in  comparison. 

When  this  was  done  it  was  found  that  the  two  lists 
corresponded  in  8y,5  %  cases. 


—  172  — 

For  S1  there  were  three,  for  82  seven,  and  for  S3  six 
uncertain  choices-,  that  is  to  say,  choices  in  which  now 
one,  now  the  other  alternative  was  chosen.  In  each 
of  these  cases  we  counted  1°,  the  number  of  times  the 
standpoint  was  changed,  2°  the  number  of  Hesitations 
occurring  in  these  choices. 

Table,  showing  coincidence  of  Hesitation  and  Inconsistency. 


CHOICES  in 

WHICH  CHANGES 
OCCURS  ED 

S*                |     S2               |     S3 

NUMBER 
OF 
CHANGES 

NUMBER 
OF 
HESITATIONS 

NUMBER 
OF 
CHANGES 

NUMBER 
OF 
HESITATIONS 

NUMBER 
OF 
CHANGES 

NUMBER 
OF 
HESITATIONS 

J—  B 

I 

2 

2 

3 

I 

2 

j   T—  K 

I 

— 

4 

3 

— 

— 

V-B 

2 

5 

— 

— 





L-C 

— 

— 

2 

5 

— 

— 

V-K 

— 

— 

I 

2 

I 

2 

J—  V 

— 

— 

3 

5 

— 

— 

C—  B 

— 

— 

i 

2 

— 



Z—  T 

— 

— 

3 

§ 





T—  B 

— 

— 

— 

•— 

2 

2 

L—  B 

— 

— 

— 



3 

2 

J-L 

— 

— 

— 

-  

2 

2 

T—  L 

— 

— 

— 

— 

I 

— 

It  will  be  noticed  that  only  in  two  cases,  Hesitations 
were  absent  when  Inconsistencies  were  present.  It 
will  be  noticed  also,  that  there  are  indications  of  the 
existence  of  a  relation  between  the  frequency  of  Incon- 
sistencies and  the  frequency  of  Hesitations. 

From  this  table  we  cannot  conclude  that  Hesitation 


is  the  cause  of  Inconsistency.     Twice  we  have  Incon- The  cause  of 
sistency  without  any  Hesitation.     In  some  cases  welnconsistency- 
have  Hesitation  without    Inconsistency   e.  g.    in  the 
V — C,  V — L,  and  K — L  choices.     There  is  then  no 
perfect  concomitance  between  the  two. 

We  cannot  however  admit ,  that  Equivalence  of 
Values  explains  all  cases  of  Inconsistency.  The 
choices  J — L,  L — B,  V — K,  T — B,  were  certainly  not 
cases  of  Equivalence  of  Values  (i),  and  yet  Inconsis- 
tencies are  found  in  these  choices. 

What  then  is  the  cause  or  condition  of  Inconsistency? 
We  are  unable  to  answer  this  question  definitely. 
There  seems  to  us,  to  be  a  close  relation  between  it 
and  Hesitation,  as  introspective  evidence  also,  tends  to 
show,  but  that  such  a  relation  is  one  of  Causality  we 
are  not  in  a  position  to  affirm. 

Prescinding  from  the  personal  character  of  the  Sub-  Conditions 
jects,we  found  that,  if  having  made  a  choice,  they  allow- of  Hesitatlon- 
ed  themselves  to  repine  over  it,  or  to  be  annoyed  for 
having  made  it ;  or  if  they  made  a  choice  in  a  hap- 
hazard, irresponsible  manner,  that  is  without  careful 
motivation,  or  if  they  chose  without  clear  knowledge 
of  the  relative  values  of  the  alternatives,  they  were  ex- 
tremely likely  to  hesitate  when  the  same  choice  occur- 
red again.  Indeed  careless  and  superficial  valuations, 
and  futile  repinings  over  past  choices,  seem  to  predis- 
pose strongly  towards  future  Hesitations  (2). 

There  is  too  a  correlation  between  Hesitation  and 
Discouragement.  When  one  hesitates  or  anticipates 
Hesitation,  one  is  instantly  discouraged.  «  The  choice 

(1)  For  a  like  reason  Equivalence  of  Values  cannot  be  considered  as  the  cause 
of  Hesitation.  Hesitations  often  occur  where  there  is  no  Equivalence  of  Values. 

(2)  S3  stated  in  one  of  his  introspections,  that  when  his  thought  became  «  too 
abstract  and  too  far  from  sensations  and  images  he  grew  doubtful. »  This  points 
to  another  condition  of  Hesitation. 


C — L  came  back  to  my  consciousness  with  the  memory 
of  what  a  task  it  was  formerly.  That  discouraged  me 
from  the  beginning.  Then  I  remembered  that  discuss- 
ion was  useless.  » 

A  more  important ,  though  kindred  correlation  is 
that  between  Hesitation  and  Negative  Values  ;  that  is 
to  say,  between  Hesitations  and  disagreeable  choices. 
When  the  Subject  recognises  that  he  has  to  chose  be- 
tween two  bad  substances,  he  is  at  once  discouraged, 
and  predisposed  to  hesitate.  He  finds  himself  between 
the  devil  and  the  deep  sea.  We  were  able  to  confirm 
numerically,  this  correlation  between  Hesitation  and 
Negative  Values. 

We  drew  up  the  following  list  of  choices,  in  which  all  three  Sub- 
jects hesitated,  with  the  approximate  number  of  Hesitations. 

J — V  1 1     Hesitations 

V-B  9  » 

L— G  8  » 

J-L  7  » 

J— B  7  » 

L— B  7  » 

K-L  6  » 

V— K  6  » 

V— G  5  » 

V— L  5  » 

We  notice  here,  that  in  nearly  every  case,  the  choices  are  between 
unpleasant,  negative  substances.  L  and  V  occur  five  times  each, 
J  and  B  three  times  each,  C  and  K  twice  each.  Now  C,  L,  J  and 
B  were  disliked  by  all,  K  was  disliked  by  S8,  and  V  was  not  very 
popular.  Both  T  and  Z  are  absent — they  were  the  «  good  sub- 
stances »  par  excellence  (i). 

Hesitation*"ttid  not  occur  in  cases  of  agreeable  choices  save 
rarely  (2).  When  they  did  occur,  they  were  by  no  means  so  pain- 
ful as  Hesitations  in  the  case  of  disagreeable  choices.  To  quote  S* 

(1)  T  was  not  popular  with  S3. 

(2)  In  no  case  of  an  agreeable  choice  did  all  three  Subjects  hesitate. 


-   i75  - 

—  «  I  believe  all  the  same,  that  the  choice  between  two  good  sub- 
stances does  not  provoke  so  long  a  discussion  as  that  between  two 
bad  substances.  One  is  more  at  one's  ease  in  the  choice.  » 

In  general,  then,  Hesitations  occur  much  more  fre- 
quently in  disagreeable  choices,  and  seem  in  a  certain 
sense  to  be  conditioned  by  them,  just  as  they,  in  a  cer- 
tain sense  seem  to  condition  Inconsistencies.  Indeed 
the  unpleasant  experience  of  choosing  between  two 
disagreeable  substances  tended  to  inhibit  volitional 
functioning — and  to  justify  the  theory,  formulated  by 
Mr  Stout  (i)  :  «  In  principle  it  seems  a  safe  generali- 
sation that  agreeable  experience  is  favourable,  and  dis- 
agreeable experience  is  unfavourable,  to  the  effective 
discharge  of  mental  functions.  » 

In  speaking  here  of  the  conditions  of  Hesitation  it  is 
necessary  to  refer  to  the  tendency  to  hesitate,  due  to 
the  persistence  of  the  choice- habit  formed.  In  our 
chapter  on  Motivation-Tracks  we  have  pointed  out  that 
such  phenomena  as  Hesitations  tend  to  reappear  when 
the  same  choices  recur. 

We  are  not  in  a  position  to  inquire  into  the  physio- 
logy of  Hesitation.  In  any  case  little  is  yet  known  of 
the  state  of  the  brain  cells  during  volition.  It  is  evi- 
dent, nevertheless,  to  the  plain  man,  that  when  one  is 
in  robust  health,  in  good  humour,  and  when  the  wea- 
ther is  bright  and  fine,  that  one  is  far  less  likely  to  hesi- 
tate, than  at  other,  less  congenial,  times. 

Indecision,  scrupulousness,  and  Hesitation  are  un- The  Healing 
fortunalety  by  no  means  rare.     Many  people  are  al- of  hesitati»n« 
most  incapable  of  acting  decisively  and  of  choosing 
resolutely.     They  waver,   and   change,   and   doubt, 
wasting  time  and  energy  in  endless  deliberation.     They 
fret,  and  repine,  now  tending  this  way,  now  that. 

(i)  Manual  of  Psychology,  p.  242. 


—  176  — 

They  are  never  satisfied  with  a  decision  made,  and 
never  confident  about  future  choices.  Other  persons, 
without  being  at  all  so  irresolute,  now  and  again  find 
themselves  surprised  by  disagreeable  and  painful  states 
of  indecision  and  doubt. 

As  we  have  already  entered  fully  into  the  analysis  of 
these  *  Hesitations ',  we  shall  confine  ourselves  here  to 
a  few  suggestions  as  to  the  method  of  healing  Hesita- 
tion. 

1.  To  prevent  giving  way  to  the  various  signs  of  Hesitation  which 
we  have  pointed  out.     e.  g.  repining  or  getting  annoyed  or  angry 
over  past  choices  (i). 

2.  To  prevent  causes  of  Hesitation  e.  g.  careless  and  irrespon- 
sible motivation,  choosing  without  a  precise  knowledge  of  the 
relative  values  of  the  alternatives,  or  choosing  in  a  hurry. 

3.  To  formulate  some  principle,  corresponding  to  that  of  S2, 
i.  e.   «  choose  the  most  familiar  in  cases  of  Hesitation  »,  and, 
when  we  recognise  the  presence  of  a  tendency  to  hesitate,  to  act 
at  once  blindly,  according  to  the  said  principle. 

In  general  then,  the  method  to  cure  Hesitation,  must 
be,  firstly,  to  banish  everything  that  is  calculated  to  pre- 
dispose us  to  it,  and  secondly,  to  hold  firm  to  one  maxim 
or  principle  in  times  of  doubt. 

Later  on,  in  our  last  chapter,  we  shall  dwell  on  the 
immense  profit  to  the  Will  and  Character  to  be  had,  by 
clearly  fixing,  and  defining,  the  various  scales  of  values 
which  we  utilise  in  our  various  spheres  of  occupation, 
and  by  knowing  them  so  well,  that  almost  automati- 
cally we  may  apply  them  in  daily  life.  By  this  means 
we  economise  Motivation ,  and  store  up  Volitional 
Energy.  We  choose  swiftly  and  easily,  in  a  word, 
automatically,  and  thus  leave  no  place  for  Hesitation. 

(i)  These  suggestions  are  based  on  the  consideration  of  the  actual  results  of 
our  experiments. 


—  177  — 

From  what  we  have  said  of  Hesitation  it  will  readily    General 
be  seen  that  it  is  a  malady  or  disease  of  the  Will.     It  Remarkson 

...  .  » .     .        -  Hesitation. 

renders  impossible  serious  Motivation,  it  runs  counter 
to  Volitional  Economy,  wastes  the  force  of  the  mind, 
fatigues,  and  discourages.  It  leads  to  habits  of  irres- 
ponsible, hap-hazard  choosing,  and  even  neglect  of 
duty.  Indeed  the  only  times  that  Subjects,  in  our  in- 
trospections ,  disobeyed  the  instruction ,  were  after 
Hesitations.  Doubtless  they  found  themselves  too  fati- 
gued and  dispirited  to  make  the  necessary  additional 
effort  to  drink. 

What  we  regard  as  the  chief  evil  of  Hesitation  is,  that 
it  destroys  all  possibility  of  acting  on  strictly  reaso- 
nable grounds,  of  deciding  for  intrinsic  motives.  Sub- 
jects in  Hesitation  seize  on  the  first  motive  which  comes 
to  mind,  no  matter  how  unimportant.  To  save  them- 
selves the  pain  of  further  deliberation  they  choose  reck- 
lessly ;  «  I  could'nt  arrive  at  a  decision.  Then  I 
preferred  B  without  really  knowing  the  reason  »  ;  «  I 
chose  X,  to  escape  the  Hesitation,  without  having  any 
conscious  motive  for  X  ».  Such  motivations,  in  which 
purely  extrinsic  motives  win,  naturally  lead  to  habits 
of  random  choosing. 

To  conclude,  we  quote  a  passage  from  James  who 
writing  of  «  obstructed  *  and  «  explosive  »  Wills,  which 
represent  the  two  extremes ,  Hesitation  and  Teme- 
rity, and  which,  nevertheless,  as  it  seems  to  us,  are 
closely  akin,  says  (i)  : 

«  Unhealthiness  of  will  may  come  about  in  many 
ways.  The  action  may  follow  the  stimulus  or  idea, 
too  rapidly,  leaving  no  time  for  the  arousal  of  restrain- 
ing associates — we  then  have  a  precipitate  Will.  Or, 

(i)  Principles  of  Psychology.  Vol.  II,  p.  535. 

12 


-  ITS- 

although  the  associates  may  come,  the  ratio  which  the 
impulsive  and  inhibitive  forces  normally  bear  to  each 
other  may  be  distorted,  and  we  then  have  a  will  which 
is  perverse.  The  perversity  in  turn  may  be  due  to 
either  of  many  causes — too  much  intensity  or  too  little 
here,  too  much  inertia  or  too  little  there  ;  or  elsewhere 
too  much  or  too  little  inhibitory  power.  » 


CHAPTER  IX. 


HEDONISM. 

We  do  not  intend,  in  the  present  chapter,  to  enter  object  of 
into  the  discussion  of  Hedonism  as  an  Ethical  tneory.  ^  Present 
Our  opinion  coincides  with  that  of  James,  that,  «  the  **3?tep' 
silliness  of  the  old-fashioned  pleasure-philosophy  saute 
aux  yeux  »  (i).  Neither  do  we  propose  to  discuss 
what  we  regard  as  the  completely  erroneous  theory  of 
Bain,  «  that  the  motives  to  voluntary  action  are  un- 
questionably summed  up  in  pleasure  and  pain  »  (2). 
We  are  of  opinion  that  there  is  not  a  shred  of  evidence 
for  such  a  theory.  In  our  own  researches,  although 
our  aim  was  to  exclude  the  possibility  of  any  but 
hedonic  motives,  and  although  we  took  every  means 
calculated  to  bring  about  hedonic  motivation,  there 
was,  always,  a  considerable  percentage  of  non-hedonic 
motives.  And,  it  was  but  rarely  that  purely  hedonic 
motivation,  that  is,  motivation  uninfluenced  by  deon- 
tological,  aesthetic  or  other  considerations,  occurred. 

It  might  be  that  to  reflection,  writes  James,  such  a  narrow 
teleology  would  justify  itself,  that  pleasures  and  pains  might  seem 
the  only  comprehensible  and  reasonable  motives  for  action,  the 
only  motives  on  which  we  ought  to  act.  That  is  an  ethical  propo- 
sition in  favour  of  which  a  good  deal  may  be  said.  But  it  is  not  a 

(1)  Principles  of  Psychology .  Vol.  II,  p.  55. 

(2)  Notes  on  Volition.  The  Mind.  April  1891. 


—  i8o  — 

psychological  proposition,  and  nothing  follows  from  it  as  to  the 
motives  upon  which  as  a  matter  of  fact  we  do  act.  These  motives 
are  supplied  by  innumerable  objects  which  innervate  our  voluntary 
muscles  by  a  process  as  automatic  as  that  by  which  they  light  a 
fever  in  our  breasts.  If  the  thoughts  of  pleasure  may  impel  to 
action,  surely  other  thoughts  may  (i). 

It  may  seem  quite  superfluous  to  enter  into  an  ana- 
lysis of  the  manifestations  of  Hedonism  in  choices. 
This  work  has  already  been  done  by  artists  and  litte- 
rateurs in  every  age.  The  psychology  of  pleasure-pain 
is  no  hidden  book.  All  the  signs  of  likes  and  dislikes, 
whims  and  fancies,  all  the  outward  marks  and  typical 
ways  of  the  votaries  of  pleasure,  have  been  common 
reading  matter  since  the  days  of  Horace.  The  human 
race  has  not  had  to  wait  for  the  scientific  direction  of 
Wundt  or  of  Ebbinghaus,  to  observe  and  know  these 
things. 

From  such  considerations  one  would  be  led  to  sup- 
pose that  any  further  inquiry  into  the  Psychology  of 
Hedonism  is  unnecessary.  Yet  it  is  not  so.  The 
knowledge  that  we  have  up  to  the  present  is  not  suffi- 
ciently methodical  or  precise.  It  is  not,  for  instance, 
of  a  nature  to  enlighten  us  as  to  the  relations  existing 
between  Hedonism  and  Automatism.  Are  we,  for 
example,  to  admit  that  habits  of  pleasure-seeking  be- 
come quickly  automatic  ?  And  if  so,  how  far  do  they 
become  automatic  ?  Does  responsibility  entirely  dis- 
appear? Are  hedonic  attractions,  under  certain  definite 
circumstances  irresistible  ?  What  are  the  marks  of  such 
states  of  Automatism  in  matters  of  pleasure  seeking? 

Again,  when  pleasure-motives  and  deontological 
motives  conflict,  what  determines  the  result  of  the  con- 
flict? Is  it  determinable  ?  What  are  the  conditions, 
external  and  internal  of  such  conflicts  ? 

(i)  Principles  of  Psychology.  Vol.  II,  p.  55a. 


—  181  — 

Questions  of  this  nature,  can  only  be  solved,  if  they 
can  be  solved  at  all,  by  very  exact  psychological 
researches,  that  is,  researches  under  definitely  deter- 
mined conditions.  Take,  for  instance,  our  affirmation, 
«  that  although,  in  our  researches,  we  took  every  mea- 
sure calculated  to  bring  about  hedonic  motivation,  there 
was  always  a  considerable  percentage  of  non-hedonic 
motives  » . 

Examining  the  results  of  our  preparatory  series  of 
experiments,  in  which  the  Subjects  had  to  choose 
between  substances  of  various  degrees  of  hedonic  value, 
and  which,  at  times,  inspired  extremely  strong  attrac- 
tions and  repulsions  ;  we  find  that,  of  all  the  motives 
recorded  by  S1,  only  70  °/0,  and  of  all  those  recorded 
by  S*,  only  76  %,  were  hedonic  (i).  So  that,  even  in 
conditions  eminently  favourable  to  hedonic  motivation, 
for  one  Subject  3o  °/0  and  for  another  24  %  of  the 
motives  were  non-hedonic. 

Our  object  then,  in  this  chapter,  is  not  to  call  in 
question  the  merit  of  the  psychological  observations  of 
artists  or  litterateurs,  or  indeed  to  add  to  the  number 
of  those  observations,  but  rather  to  indicate  a  method 
of  determining  the  real  significance  of  these  signs  or 
marks  of  Hedonism,  and  of  showing  the  form  they  take 
in  choices  made  under  definitely  determined  conditions. 

Our  method  was,  in  general,  that  indicated  in  our  Method  of 
chapter  on  Motivation-Tracks.     We  considered,  apart,  Investlgatlon» 
whole  series  of  hedonic  choices,  such,  for  instance,  as 
all  the  T — K  choices  of  Ss,  and  watched  from  choice 
to  choice,  the  gradual  evolution  of  hedonic  tendencies, 
noticing  as  far  as  possible  the  effects  of  Hedonism  on 
Motivation. 

Hedonic  motives,  in  our  experiments,  appeared  in 

(i)  Many  of  these  motives  were  far  from  being  purely  hedonic. 


—    182   — 

Hedonism  various  forms,   as  attractions,   impressions  of  value, 

mour     feeimgs>  anci  judgments  of  value.     They  were  often 

''  accompanied    by    interesting    phenomena.     «  T  held 

me  •» ;  «  K  drew  me  to  it  »  ;  «  /  felt  an  instantaneous 

recoil  from  C  » ;   « I  took  Z  in  a  spirit  of  mockery  of 

the  other  alternative  »  Hedonism  appeared  ordinarily; 

1.  In  the  general  character  of  the  Motivation. 

2.  In  the  manner  of  Choosing. 

3.  In  the  way  in  which  the  Choice  was  realised. 

If  the  choice  was  distinctly  hedonic,  the  motivation 
often  consisted  in  rapid  and  eager  movements  towards 
this  or  that  alternative  ;  the  choice  was  made  with 
feelings  of  actual  pleasure  and  certitude ;  and  the  choice 
was  realised  readily  and  willingly.  «  I  took  and  drank 
Z  with  haste  and  pleasure  »,  was  very  frequently  recor- 
ded. Again,  the  beginning  of  a  hedonic  choice  was 
usually  characteristic.  The  recognition  of  bad  sub- 
stances was  accompanied  by  feelings  of  displeasure, 
disappointment,  and  even  of  discouragement.  The 
recognition  of  good  substances  by  feelings  of  pleasure, 
and  often  by  immediate  active  tendencies. 

It  should  be  remarked  that  in  our  experiments  the 
Subjects  were  instructed,  at  least  implicitly,  «  to  take 
the  best  and  drink  it  » — «  the  best  »  meaning  the  most 
agreeable.  There  was  thus  a  deontological  motive  to 
support  the  hedonic  motive  for  the  best.  The  motives 
for  Z,  T,  and  K,  the  agreeable  substances,  would  not 
perhaps,  of  themselves,  have  been  sufficient  to  elicit  the 
act  of  drinking,  were  they  not  strengthened  by  the 
instruction.  The  motives  then  for  these  substances, 
were  in  reality  not  purely  hedonic.  They  were  also, 
in  virtue  of  the  instruction  partly  deontological. 

The  case  of  many  choices  in  ordinary  life  is  more  or  less  the 
same.     The  man  who  studies  the  menu  card  at  lunch,  doubtless  is 


—  i83  — 

usually  seeking  what  will  give  him  most  pleasure  (and  agree  best 
with  his  constitution)  but  he  is  also  under  the  deontological  (i) 
motive  of  «  having  to  eat  something  ». 

From  another  point  of  view  the  motives  in  our  experiments  were 
less  hedonic  than  might  be  expected.  Subjects  did  not  always 
understand  «  the  best  »  as  «  the  most  pleasant ».  For  S3  «  the 
best »  often  meant  «  the  most  definite  » ,  or  « the  one  I  have  always 
chosen  »  (motive  of  consistency).  For  S2  t  the  best  »  meant  at 
times  «  the  most  familiar  »,  or  «  the  one  which  will  get  me  out  of 
this  difficulty  ». 

We  shall  give  some  examples,  first  of  Hedonic  A  ttrac-  Examples 
tions  and  then  of  Hedonic  Repulsions.    Afterwards  we  of  ^e.donic 

Choices. 

shall  analyse  some  points  of  special  interest.  a 


1.  Ss.     Choic  T — B.     Reaction-Time,  907  sigma. 

The  experiment  went  very  rapidly.  I  saw  B  first  and  immedia- 
tely after  T.  It  went  so  quickly,  that  I  seemed  to  pay  attention  to 
the  two  words  at  the  same  time.  I  made  no  comparison  or  judg- 
ment of  value,  but  I  was  drawn  to  T  without  knowing  why.  I 
took  T  quite  naturally.  I  was  drawn  on  seeing  T;  I  find  no 
explanation  of  this  fact.  I  had  no  special  feelings  and  remained 
quite  cool. 

2.  S*.     Choice  T — L.     Reaction-Time,  974  sigma. 

I  saw  L  first.  I  was  distracted  and  waited  a  little  before 
recognising  it.  On  seeing  T,  I  was  drawn  towards  it — even 
strongly  drawn. 

The  manner  in  which  a  hedonic  attraction  may  be  somewhat 
mixed  up  with  other  motives,  is  well  seen  in  the  following  choice. 

3.  S*.     Choice  K — B.     Reaction-Time,  702  sigma. 

/  was  drawn  immediately  by  K  without  any  comparative 
judgment.  In  that  attraction  for  K  there  was  the  memory  that  K 
was  always  good  ;  that  it  played  an  important  role.  I  recalled,  so 
to  say,  all  the  decisions  made  for  K,  so  it  becomes,  as  it  were,  a 
habit  to  choose  K.  It  was  a  choice  for  K  but  very  easy,  because  I 
have  the  habit  of  making  it.  For  K  there  is  a  motive  of  an  agreeable 
quality,  which  is  always  at  the  basis  of  the  preference  which  I  have 
for  it. 

(i)  I  use  tdeontologicali  in  a  wide  sense.  In  the  case  in  question,  the  man  feels 
himself  bound  in  duty  to  his  habits  and  conscience,  «to  eat  something.  »  He 
knows  he  ought  not  rashly  to  injure  his  health,  or  work. 


Hedonic 
Attractions. 


—  184  — 

We  see  from  the  examples  just  given  that  S2  was 
attracted  strongly,  both  by  K  and  by  T.  K.  however 
was  his  greatest  favourite.  We  shall  see  now,  in  the 
choice  T — K  (where  T  and  K  were  opposed),  the  mani- 
festation of  a  peculiar  phenomenon  ,  called  by  S4 
«  moquerie  ».  It  accompanied  the  victory  of  K  over  T, 
and  resembled  the  state  of  feeling ,  which  is  called 
gloating  over  the  defeat  of  an  enemy.  It  marked  too, 
that  the  pleasure  accompanying  the  victory  of  K  overT 
was  all  the  greater,  because  T  was  itself  very  good. 
The  introspection  was  as  follows  : 

4.  Still  something  strange.     I  first  saw  K  very  rapidly  and  then 
T.     I  took  or  seized  K  while  I  was  still  looking  at  T.     This  taking 
of  K  was  accompanied  by  a  feeling  of  pleasure,  mixed  with  a 
feeling  of  n  moquerie  »  for  T.     It  seemed  to  me  that  the  opposi- 
tion here  was  becoming  more  conscious,  because  T  is  also  good* 
In  this  fashion,  the  agreeable  quality  of  K  gives  me  more  pleasure, 
because  I  can  prefer  it  to  T.     Other  preferences  for  K  pass  more 
simply. 

5.  This  phenomenon  of  «  moquerie  »  took  a  somewhat  different 
form,  in  the  next  T — K  choice,  of  S*.     Something  quite  unusual 
occurred.     Having  chosen  K,  and  then,  having  recognised  that  T 
was  also  good,  as  if  to  emphasise  his  choice  of  K,  and  as  if  to 
mock  at  T,  he  drank  K  twice  (i).    The  introspection  was  as 
follows  : 

Not  very  regular  ;  I  saw  K  first.  I  preferred  it  already,  before 
seeing  T.  There  is  a  real  automatic  habit  of  taking  K.  While  I 
was  taking  K,  it  came  into  consciousness  that  T  was  also  good. 
Spontaneously  I  drank  some  of  K  twice. 

We  shall  now  consider  a  few  examples  of  Hedonic 
Repulsions  (2). 

(1)  Such  phenomena  have  an  especial  interest  and  importance  when  they  occur 
in  experiments,  because  their  conditions  can  then  be,  as  here,  accurately  deter- 
mined. In  ordinary  life  the  conditions  could  not  be  determined  with  accuracy. 

(2)  Other  examples  will  be  found  among  the  choices  in  which  Hesitations 
occurred ;  See  chapter  VIII. 


—  i85  — 

1.  To  quote  from  the  J — C  choices,   of  S2.   «  I  saw  C,  and 
jumped  at  once  on  J.     C  repelled  me  to  the  other,  without  discus-   ^ 
sion.     I  preferred  J  by  negative  preference,  without  making  myself 
any  idea  of  its  quality .     I  took  it  very  swiftly  and  eagerly  »  ;  «  I 
saw  G  first  which  repelled  me  at  once  to  J.     I  took  J  eagerly 
without  having  well  understood  it  »  ;    «  I   saw  G,  and  from  C 
rebounded  at  once  on  J,  at  the  moment  of  seeing  J   I  had  reacted. 

C  lets  free  the  reaction  »  ;  «  I  saw  G  and  made  two  simultaneous 
movements,  to  see,  and  to  take  J.     I  was  solely  decided  by  C  ». 

2.  Still  better  examples  are  found  in  the  Z — G  choices  of  the 
same  Subject.     Here,  while  C  was  very  bad,  Z  was  very  good. 

«  I  saw  C  which  repelled  me  to  Z  which  I  preferred  immedia- 
ely  »;  «  I  saw  C  which  drove  me  back  at  once  to  Z,  I  preferred 
Z  and  took  it  eagerly  »  ;  o  I  saw  G,  then  Z,  I  took  Z.  It  is  char- 
acteristic to  fly  from  C — I  saw  it  well  ». 

These  Hedonic  Repulsions  from  G,  afford  us  an  op- 
portunity of  calling  attention  to  a  point  of  interest. 
S2  remarked  that ;  «  C  is  more  familiar  than  L.  Still 
it  drives  me  back  quicker  and  more  spontaneously  * . 
As  a  fact,  C  was  chosen  seven  times  in  preference  to  L, 
and  L  only  twice,  in  preference  to  C.  C  was,  then, 
more  familiar  than  L,  and  as  we  see  preferable  to  it, 
still  C  was  shunned,  and  L  was  usually  regarded 
quietly. 

The  reason  of  this  fact  seems  to  have  been  that  L 
was  somewhat  mysterious  and  enigmatic.  Though 
known  to  be  very  bad,  it  was  never  fully  known.  It 
had  according  to  both  S2  and  S3,  an  enigmatic  cha- 
racter. It  defied  analysis.  S2  explained  the  point,  to 
which  we  have  called  attention,  thus  :  «  L  does  not 
provoke  so  strong  a  contrast  as  C  provokes,  because  L 
is  more  vague  »  (i). 

The  phenomena  accompanying  the  Realisation  of 

(i)  S*  speaks,  on  one  of  these  occasions,  of  «  a  laugh  of  discouragement)) 
which  he  was  quite  unable  to  analyse  or  explain  ;  it  would  remind  one  of  Keat's 
sonnet;  «  Why  did  I  laugh  to-night,  »  etc. 


—  186  — 

Hedonism  the  choice,  no  less  than  those  seen  in  the  motivation, 
pointed  to  the  presence  of  hedonic  influences.  An 

Realisation  ...  .1-1 

of  Choices,  agreeable  substance  was  taken  swiftly  and  with  plea- 
sure. A  disagreeable  substance  was  drunk  in  a  slow 
and  hesitating  manner.  «  I  took  the  glass  slowly  and 
delayed  in  drinking  it  ».  «  I  did  not  drink  L  till  long 
after  I  had  it  in  hand.  I  did'nt  wish  to  drink  it  ». 
Such  unwilling  and  reluctant  methods  of  realising  the 
choice  arrived  at,  were  detected  by  the  time-measure- 
ments of  the  Vernier  Chronoscope.  A  very  noticeable 
difference  occurred  in  such  cases.  The  Subjects,  too, 
were  conscious  of  the  relation  between  the  choice  itself 
and  the  manner  of  realising  it.  Thus  S2,  in  N°  24, 
having  chosen  B  in  preference  to  L,  said ;  «  I  took  B 
slowly  and  hesitatingly.  It  almost  escaped  my  grasp. 
I  believe  that  this  reluctant  manner  of  taking  the  glass 
is  in  relation  with  the  values  indicated  in  the  words.  » 
Sometimes  feelings  of  disgust  or  displeasure  resulted  in 
sudden  changes  of  choice ;  sometimes  the  Subject  felt 
that  he  could  not  bring  himself  to  drink  the  glass ;  it 
appeared  so  very  bad. 

The  Evolution  As  an  example  of  the  Evolution  of  Hedonism,  in  a 
of  Hedonism.  serjes  of  choices,  we  take  the  Z— K  choices  of  S*. 
There  were  six  in  all.  Z  was  chosen  in  each  case. 
The  reaction  times  showed  a  uniformly  descending 
curve,  save  for  a  slight  rise  in  the  case  of  the  first 
experiment  after  the  vacation  (i).  The  Reaction-Times, 
in  chronological  order  were  :  860,  687,  682,  457,  482, 
482  sigma  respectively.  The  introspections  are  given 
in  full  in  the  appendix.  The  following  points  are 
noticeable  in  the  Evolution. 

(i)  The  dates  of  these  six  choices  were,  3rd,  yth,  isth,  igth  Dec.  1910,  and  the 
3rd,  and  gth  February  191 1.  The  experiment  of  Feb.  3rd,  was  the  first  after  the 
vacation. 


-  ,87- 

1 .  The  Subject  was  conscious  of  the  degree  of  hedonic  value,  and 
'had  impressions  of  value.     He  also  made  a  comparison,  «  Z  is  bet- 
ter ».     The  motivation  was  wholly  hedonic. 

2.  The  Subject  was  not  conscious  of  the  degree  of  goodness,  but 
simply  had  consciousness,  «  It's  this  one  ».     The  motivation  was 
hedonic,  and  slightly  deontological. 

3.  The  motivation  was  still  more  deontological.     There  was  an 
implicit  consciousness  of  duty. 

4.  Automatism  appeared  to  be  developed.   «  Saw  Z.     Then, 
at  the  same  moment,  had  a  feeling  of  pleasure,  and  a  conscious- 
ness, '  it's  this' ».     Motivation  was  less  hedonic  and  more  deonto- 
logical. 

5.  Motivation  was  almost  entirely  deontological. 

6.  The  phenomenon,  «  It's  this  without  doubt  »  marked  here,  a 
further  stage  in  the   Evolution.     This    sentiment    of    certitude 
accompanied  choices  where  something  distinctly  good  appeared. 
It  is  the  clear  duty  of  the  Subject  to  take  it,  «  the  best.  »     Hence 
the  motivation  here  is  entirely  deontological. 

In  this  Evolution  we  see  the  motivation,  which  is  at 
first  entirely  hedonic,  becomes  less  and  less  so.  Under 
the  influence  of  the  instruction,  it  becomes  almost 
entirely  deontological.  This  Evolution  was  supported 
by  the  analysis  of  preferences,  given  in  our  chapter  on 
Automatism,  where  it  was  seen  that,  for  the  three 
Subjects,  the  general  tendency  is  towards  a  total  disap- 
pearance of  Hedonic  preferences. 

Among  the  effects  of  Hedonism  on  Motivation  should  me  Effects 
be  noticed  the  fact,  that  the  most  rapid  choices  are, of  Hedonism 
other  circumstances  being  the  same,  those  in  which  Motivation. 
agreeable   substances  are  chosen.      The  slowest  are 
those  in   which   disagreeable  substances   are  chosen. 
Again,  rapidity  in  choosing  facilitates  the  development 
of  Automatism.     Of  course,  when   Automatism   has 
reached  a  high  degree  of  development,  there  are  no 
longer  any  traces  of  Hedonism.     Still  it  is  in  choices, 
2hat  were  originally  hedonic,  that  Automatism  is  found 


—  i88  — 

in  its  most  developed  form.  The  Motivation  in  such 
cases  comes  to  be  quite  abstract  and  algebraical.  To 
quote  SB  ;  «  When  we  discuss  everything  in  an  abstract 
way  the  question  of  pleasure-pain  does  not  occur  » . 
At  times  nevertheless,  for  some  cause  or  other,  there 
is  a  regression  for  a  moment  to  the  hedonic  stage.  As 
a  consequence,  images  and  feelings  are  once  more 
experienced.  To  quote  again  S8 ;  «  Yesterday,  choices 
were  abstract  and  algebraical.  To  day  I  must  appeal 
to  sensations  and  images  which  are  constantly  at  the 
focus  of  conscience  » . 

At  times,  Hedonism  gives  rise  to  a  conflict  of  motives, 
and  in  consequence,  inhibits  the  regular  Evolution  of 
Motivation.  The  following  quotation  from  S*,  gives 
an  example  of  such  a  conflict,  between  a  hedonic  attrac- 
tion and  a  duty  imposed  by  the  instruction.  «  I  expe- 
rienced a  kind  of  struggle  between  the  fact  of  being 
drawn  by  Z,  and  the  habit  of  seeing  the  two  words 
and  of  knowing  both  ».  Conflicts  of  a  similar  kind 
were  seen  in  the  act  of  Realising  the  choice. 

The  presence  of  opposing  hedonic  attractions  lead 
at  times,  to  «  inexplicable  »  choices.  The  Subject 
chooses  without  being  aware  of  the  cause  of  his  choice, 
which  was,  in  all  probability,  a  sub-conscious  hedonic 
tendency.  The  following  example,  a  T — K  choice  of 
S*,  will  show  this  to  be  the  case. 

I  first  understood  K.  Then  I  went  to  the  left,  to  T,  without 
expressing  any  judgment  of  value.  Owing  to  the  instruction  I  pass 
from  one  to  the  other.  /  understood  T  as  good.  I  came  back  to 
K,  and  said,  and  thought,  that  it  was  better  than  T.  In  the 
beginning  I  must  have  judged  it  also,  as  better  than  T.  I  took  T 
all  the  same,  although  I  judged  K  as  better.  It  is  impossible  to 
explain  why.  It  is  just  like  what  happened  before.  Is  it  auto- 
matism ?  or  confusion  ?  or  a  hidden  choice  ?  The  taking  of  the 
glass  is  done  so  unconsciously,  that  f  I  am  very  astonished  after- 


wards.  It  was  late  when  I  saw  my  error  and  I  was  astonished. 
Yet  I  felt  that  this  change  could  be  explained.  I  had  a  favourable 
sentiment  for  T. 

Other  minor  effects  of  Hedonism  on  Motivation  may 
here  be  briefly  noticed. 

1 .  Words  that  represent  something  very  pleasant  are 
often  «  fixed  »,  «  stared  at  »  (physically  and  mentally), 
for  a   considerable   time.     They  hold  or  attract  the 
attention  of  the  Subjects. 

2.  When  both  alternatives  are  agreeable,  there  is  a 
distinct  feeling  of  ease  and  pleasure.     «  I  was  content 
that  both  were  good.     One  is  at  one's  ease  in  such  a 
choice  » . 

3.  When  both  alternatives  are  good,  and  one  (having 
been  decided  on)  is  being  taken,  there  appears  some- 
times a  kind  of  backward  glance  at  the  one  that  is  left. 
It  is  not  a  glance  of  regret  exactly, — it  is  hard  to  ana- 
lyse.    «  During  my  taking  of  T  I  looked  again  at  K. 
1  am  still  asking  myself  why  I  did  so?  » 

4.  The  sudden  force  of  a  new  hedonic  attraction 
suffices  at  times  to  make  us  change  our  choices  quite 
automatically.     Our  hand  seems  to  turn  from  that  to 
which  it  is  tending,  and  to  take  something  else.     To 
quote  from  Ss,  in  a  Z — K  choice ;  (both  Z  and  K  were 
regarded  by  him  as  very  good). 

I  saw  Z  at  the  left  and  undersU  od  it  immediately  as  good,  and 
without  delay,  I  wished  to  take  it.  In  the  meantime  I  was  making 
a  movement  well  directed  towards  Z.  I  had  [ reacted,  but  at  that 
moment  I  saw  K.  My  hand  turned,  as  I  saw  and  understood 
that  K  was  better,  and  I  took  K.  The  direction  of  my  hand  for- 
med a  curve.  At  what  stage  of  the  movement  I  was  when  I  saw 
and  understood  K,  I  don't  know.  I  was  quite  nearZ.  My  hand, 
at  the  last  instant,  took  K.  I  was  content  in  taking  K;  it  was 
much  better  than  Z. 


—  igo  — 

In  this  choice  we  see  that  the  Subject  S8,  yielded  to 
a  sudden  attraction  coming  at  the  very  moment,  at 
which  he  was  choosing.  Ten  days  after,  when  the 
same  choice  reappeared,  the  case  was  reversed,  for  the 
same  choice,  and  the  same  Subject.  On  seeing  K  he 
tended  immediately  towards  it.  Then  he  saw  Z, 
and  judged  it  to  be  also  good.  But  instead  of  changing 
his  movement  and  swerving  towards  Z,  he  sneers 
contemptuously  at  Z  and  continues  his  movement  to 
take  K.  «  Z  seemed  to  protest  against  my  taking  K  so 
quickly.  But  a  contemptuous  «  soit  »  justified  me  in 
taking  K.  » 

Many  little  shades  and  touches,  which  came  to  light 
in  our  choice  experiments,  served  to  render  intelligible 
the  more  complex  hedonic  attitudes  of  people  in  ordi- 
nary life. 


CHAPTER  X. 


THE   RELATIVITY   OF  VALUES. 


We  are  aware,  in  ordinary  life,  of  various  fluctua-  Relativity  i» 
tions  of  value.     What  is  precious  in  our  eyes  to-day,     Choice  *  - 

Processes 

may  be  of  little  worth  to-morrow.  The  shade  of  colour, 
and  the  perfume  of  the  rose  that  we  find  charming  at 
one  moment,  hardly  please  us  at  another.  On  such 
occasions  we  know  that  something  has  changed — that 
there  has  been  some  inconstancy.  It  may  be  that  we 
ourselves  have  changed,  and  perhaps,  we  confess  to  a 
certain  consciousness  of  inconsistency.  Or,  it  may  be 
that  the  tint  or  the  scent  of  the  rose  has  somehow  lost 
its  freshness,  or,  thirdly,  it  may  be  that  some  external 
circumstance  has  caused  the  fluctuation  of  value. 

There  seem,  however,  to  be  other  causes  of  fluctua- 
tions, of  quite  another  kind ;  causes  founded  in  our 
psychical  nature,  and  intimately  connected  with  our 
conative  faculty.  Some  of  these  causes  we  have  striven 
to  analyse  in  the  course  of  our  Researches. 

Our  Subjects  were  frequently  struck  by  sudden,  un- 
accountable variations  in  the  values  of  the  different 
substances  between  which  they  chose.  At  one  moment 
T,  would  appear  most  desireable,  and  at  another  time 
as  of  little  worth,  or  as  quite  indifferent.  What  was 
the  reason  of  such  fluctuations  in  value?  It  was  not 
any  change  in  the  Subjects,  as  owing  to  their  long  pre- 


—  192  — 

paration,  their  attitude  towards  the  various  substances 
was  static  or  almost  so.  Neither  was  it  owing  to  any 
change  in  the  substances  Z,  T,  etc.,  for  they  were  main- 
tained at  the  same  intensity,  freshness  and  quality. 
Nor,  thirdly,  was  it  owing  to  any  external  circum- 
stances. The  external  conditions  were  always  preci- 
sely the  same. 

It  seemed  to  us  that  the  changes  in  values  were 
mainly  to  be  attributed  to  the  fact,  that  whereas  the 
substances,  when  considered  on  their  own  merits,  had 
«  absolute  »,  or  «  independent  »  values,  once  they  ente- 
red into  a  choice,  and  became  alternatives  they  were 
considered  on  their  comparative  merits  and  their  values 
became  relative  (i). 

The  Meaning  That  the  values  of  alternatives  in  a  choice  should 
of  Relativity.  ^e  reiative,  follows  from  the  very  nature  of  choosing. 
In  a  choice,  the  alternatives  become  part  of  a  system. 
They  measure  each  other  mutually,  and  stand  in  con- 
trast to  one  another.  They  are  subject  to  conditions 
calculated  to  lessen  or  increase  the  absolute  values  that 
they  hitherto  possessed.  They  now  form  part  of  a 
whole  ;  they  are  elements  in  a  synthesis.  They  are  no 
longer  quite  what  they  were  before.  A  whole  host  of 
new  relations  has  sprung  up.  Absolute  merits  are  for- 
gotten, only  relative  or  comparative  merits  are  con- 
sidered. 

The  new  values  may  be  higher,  or  lower  than  the 
old.  If  the  opposed  alternatives  are  almost  equally 
good,  if  the  competition  between  them  is  a  close  one, 
and  well  contested,  if  so  to  speak,  there  is  a  close  finish 

(i)  In  the  Recognition  experiments,  which  preceded  the  choice  experiments, 
the  substances  were  judged  on  their  own  merits,  as  good,  or  bad,  or  indifferent. 
Such  values  were  «  absolute  ».  Later  on,  in  the  Choice  experiments,  substances 
were  judged  as  better  than,  or  worse  than  other  substances.  Here  the  values 
were  relative,  and  comparative. 


to  the  race,  then  the  value  of  the  winning  alternative 
mounts  very  high.  The  fact  of  being  preferred  in  a 
choice,  causes  an  increase  of  value  in  the  chosen  alter- 
native. 

La  valorisation  comparative  des  deux  alternatives  opposees  aug- 
mente  la  valeur  de  1'alternative  la  plus  favorisee  (i). 

Then,  again,  while  alternatives  are  opposed  face  to 
face,  and  deliberation  continues,  and  while  the  motiva- 
tion now  rises  and  now  descends  with  a  certain 
rhythmic  motion,  the  values  too,  rise  and  descend.  In 
such  protracted,  deliberations,  now  one,  now  another 
alternative  is  under  the  lime-light,  and  grows  fair  and 
fresh,  or  foul  and  repulsive,  according  to  the  colours 
which  play  on  it. 

The  motives  which  yesterday  seemed  full  of  urgency  and  blood 
and  life,  to-day  feel  strangely  weak  and  pale  and  dead.  But  as  little 
to-day  as  to-morrow  is  the  question  finally  resolved.  Something 
tells  us  that  all  this  is  provisional,  that  the  weakened  reasons  will 
wax  strong  again,  and  the  stronger  weaker.  (2) 

The  alternatives  in  a  choice-process  fall  under  still 
another  influence,  more  deep  and  subtle,  and  less  easy 
to  determine.  They  are  relative  to  one  another,  not 
merely  because  they  are  simultaneously  present  to 
consciousness,  nor  merely  because  they  are  in  a  certain 
logical  relation,  (being  both  in  the  same  category),  but 
because  they  are  constituent  elements  in  a  definite 
conative  process.  If  we  may  take  an  example  from  a 
game  of  chess,  they  are  united  by  a  conative  synthesis, 
just  as  each  individual,  deliberate  move  in  the  game 
of  chess,  is  in  close  relation  to  every  other  move,  and 
to  the  whole  process. 

(1)  Le  choix  volontaire,  p.  298. 

(2)  JAMES,  Principles  of  Psychology,  vol.  II,  p.  629. 

i3 


—  194  — 

There  are  relations,  writes  Mr  Stout,  (i)  arising  out  of  the  unity 
of  a  single  act  of  consciousness  as  it  exists  at  any  moment,  and 
there  are  also  relations  arising  out  of  the  transition  from  one 
state  to  another.  These  relations  involve  immediate  contiguity  in 
time ;  either  in  the  way  of  simultaneous  existence  or  continuous 
succession.  But  there  is  another  kind  of  psychical  connexion 
independent  of  direct  proximity  in  time,  and  arising  out  of  a  more 
special  and  intimate  continuity  than  that  which  is  characteristic  of 
the  flow  of  consciousness  in  general. 

We  are  not  here,  however,  concerned  with  the  general 
Relativity  of  the  parts  in  a  conative  process  but,  to  put 
the  matter  simply,  with  the  strengthening  or  weakening 
of  the  value  of  one  alternative,  resulting  from  the 
influence  of  the  opposing  alternative.  To  take  a  con- 
crete example,  we  propose  to  examine  why  J,  which 
was  regarded  as  something  bad,  and  even  repulsive, 
when  proposed  as  an  alternative  to  Z,  was  regarded  as 
something  good  when  proposed  as  an  alternative  to  C. 

Doubtless  the  general  principle  of  Psychical  Rela- 
tivity (2)  held  good  in  the  choice  processes  of  our 
experiments,  as  it  holds  good  for  every  mental  act, 
nevertheless,  we  are  not  concerned  with  it  specially. 

To  summarise  then  it  would  seem  that  the  alternat- 
ives in  a  Choice-Process  are  trebly  relative. 

I.  In  as  much  as  they  are  present  in,  and  are  actual 
parts  of  a  system  or  synthesis  (3). 

II.  In  as  much  as  they  modify  each  other  directly, 
owing  to  contrasts. 

III.  In  as  much  as  they  are  subject  to  the  effects 
of  the  forward  movement  of  the  conative  process  of 
choosing. 

(1)  Manual  of  Psychology,  p.  80. 

(2)  «  Mental  development  depends  on  modes  of  consciousness  being  deter- 
mined by  their  psychological  relations  and  subject  to  modification  accordingly.  » 
(STOUT,  Manual  of  Psychology,  p.  78.) 

(3)  See  Introduction.  M.  Paulhan  says  of  the  Will  that  it  is  essentially  a 
synthesis. 


In  our  researches  the  choices  were  made  between   Relativity 

in  our 
Researches. 


various    combinations    of   definitely   known   hedonic 


values.  The  choices  were  self-contained ,  in  this  sense, 
that  no  external  circumstances  intervened  to  make  one 
substance  more  desireable  to-day,  and  another  to- 
morrow. All  the  circumstances  as  to  time,  place,  etc., 
remained  the  same.  The  substances  were  maintained 
at  the  same  degree  of  strength,  and  the  Subjects  habi- 
tuated by  the  long  preparation,  did  not  find  their  tastes 
(for  the  different  substances)  to  vary  appreciably. 

Our  choices  were  then  uninfluenced  by  external  con- 
ditions. Z,  for  instance,  was  not  like  a  flask  of  water 
carried  to  the  middle  of  a  desert,  of  great  value  to-day, 
and  to-morrow  of  no  value  at  all.  Z,  T  and  all  the 
eight  substances,  retained  always  the  same  absolute 
values. 

When,  however,  the  various  combinations  were 
taken  apart,  and  a  choice  was  to  be  effected  between 
them,  influences  of  Relativity  were  at  once  apparent. 
In  one  choice,  for  instance,  B  would  have  a  positive 
value,  in  another  a  negative  value.  Such  changes  of 
value,  due  to  the  mutual  influence  of  the  alternatives, 
we  shall  now  consider.  We  shall  see  that,  normally, 
the  winning  substance  was  taken  for  its  relative  value, 
not  for  its  absolute  value. 

We  propose,  then,  to  give  examples,  indicating  from 
different  points  of  view  the  effects  of  Relativity.  Next, 
we  shall  examine  the  question  as  to  whether  or  no  a 
choice  may  be  made  in  virtue  of  the  absolute  value  of 
an  alternative.  Next ,  having  pointed  out  what  we 
regard  as  general  laws  of  Relativity  in  choices,  we 
shall  dwell  on  some  of  its  consequences,  as  revealed 
by  our  experiments. 

The  effects  of  Relativity  were  seen  both  in  the  moti- 


—  196  — 

Examples  of  vation  and  in  the  realisation  of  the  choice.     We  shall 
Relativity.  ^rst  colder   a   few   examples    of  Relativity   in   the 
motivation. 

1 .  When   J  appeared  beside  C  it  was  judged   as 
something  good.     It  had  a  positive  value.     When   J 
appeared  beside  Z  it  was  judged  as  something  bad.     It 
had   a  negative  value.     When,   finally,    it  appeared 
beside   B,    it  was    judged   as   indifferent,   as   having 
nothing  for  or  against  it.     It  was,   for  Ss,  of  equal 
value  with  B — but  that  value  was  neither  positive  or 
negative — it  was  neutral  (i). 

2.  The  substance  T,  though  sweet  and  pleasant  for 
S1   and   S2  was,  for  some  reason  or  other,    rejected 
constantly  by  S3.     It  had  acquired  for  S3  a  false  nega- 
tive value.     In   the  third  series  however,  when   the 
instruction,   «  choose  the  worst  and   drink  it  »   was 
given,  the  values  of  the  substances  had  to  be  revised, 
and  S3  suddenly  found  that  he  had  been  unjust  to  T. 
The  choice  T — B  was  presented  to  him.     Logically  he 
should  now  choose  T  as  the  worst,  for  it  was  the  one 
he  had   always   rejected.     His   introspection  was   as 
follows. 

I  recognised  the  substances  in  the  order  T — B.  I  felt  an  instinc- 
tive tendency  to  choose  B  as  the  worst.  This  was  followed  by 
the  consciousness  that  T  was  not  so  bad  after  all.  I  had  often 
thought  T  bad.  Here  on  account  of  the  contrast  it  did  not  seem 
so  bad. 

This  introspection  shows  the  Relativity  of  the  value, 
that  had  been  attributed,  and  that  was  now  attributed 
to  T.  Shortly  afterwards  S*  in  another  introspection 
admits  a  feeling  «.  of  having  been  unjust  towards  T  ». 

The  effects  of  Relativity  were  clearly  seen  in  the 
Realisation  of  the  choices.  The  manner  of  realising 

(i)  Vide  p.  102. 


the  choice  seemed  to  be  in  relation  with  the  nature  of 
the  choice  made.     To  quote  S2 : 

I  took  B  slowly  and  gingerly.  It  just  escaped  my  grasp.  I 
believe  that  this  indifferent  manner  of  taking  the  glass  is  in  relation 
with  the  value  indicated  in  the  words  (i). 

This  quotation  shows  the  general  relation  between 
the  choice  and  its  Realisation.  There  was,  however, 
another  relation  of  more  interest  for  us  at  this  moment, 
that  between  the  valuation  of  a  substance  in  the  choice, 
and  the  valuation  of  it  at  the  moment  of  drinking.  It 
often  happened,  for  instance,  that  when  the  substance  G 
was  presented  in  a  choice,  the  other  was  at  once  taken, 
even  though  in  itself  bad.  Though  taken  quickly 
however,  it  was  often  drunk  slowly.  In  the  choice  it 
was  taken  for  its  relative  value,  in  drinking  its  absolute 
value  was  alone  thought  of. 

The  subjects  were  conscious  of  the  contrast  between  the  quick 
taking  of  the  substance  and  the  slow  drinking  of  it.  Thus  S2,  in 
a  V — C  choice,  said.  «  On  seeing  C  I  jumped  back  on  V  and  took 
it  very  quickly  »  ;  but  when  he  had  it  in  his  hand  he  saw  its  true 
worth,  «  and  felt  a  repugnance  to  drinking  it  ».  «  When  we  must 
drink  »  he  said,  «  it  becomes  more  serious  and  we  reflect  again 
what  it  means.  »  Again,  S2,  in  a  J — C  choice,  said  ;  «  Saw  C, 
and  took  immediately  the  other  without  recognising  it ;  but  then 
drank  it  slowly.  The  fashion  of  taking  and  drinking  seem  in 
opposition.  » 

Again  we  find  such  introspections  as  the  following  :  «  T  did  not 
merit  to  be  chosen  so  quickly.  »  «  I  took  V  rapidly  and  drank  it, 
as  though  I  had  found  something  excellent.  » 

I  have  said  that  the  choice  was  made  in  view  of  relative  value, 
but  the  glass  was  drunk  with  consciousness  of  its  absolute  value. 
«  C  gives  me  a  preference  for  what  is  beside  it  »  said  S1,  «  but 
never  would  such  a  negative  preference  for  a  glass  make  me  drink 

(i)  N.  B.  Such  introspections  as  :  «  I  chose  K  as  though  its  greatest  concur- 
rent was  beside  it. »  «  Z  does  not  beat  the  others  so  easily  as  K. » 


._  1Q8  — 

it  as  though  it  were  in  itself  good,  if  it  were  not  really  good  n.  S* 
was  of  opinion  that  no  effect  of  Relativity  could  be  so  great,  as  to 
make  him  forget  the  absolute  value  of  the  substance,  in  the  act  of 
drinking  it. 

Subjects  grew  so  much  accustomed  to  the  mutual 
play  of  values,  strengthening  or  weakening  each  other, 
that  when  a  good  substance  was  seen  first  they  expected 
that  the  second  would  be  bad,  and  were  surprised  if  it 
also  proved  good. 

I  saw  J.  I  wished  to  take  it.  I  had  it  in  my  hand,  but  then  I 
took  T,  believing  that  there  was  something  opposed  to  Z  beside  it ; 
(the  duty  here  was  to  take  the  worst}.  That  feeling  comes  to  me 
by  habit.  »  «  When  I  saw  Z,  I  was  already  in  movement  to  take 
K.  Then  I  judged,  «  but  Z  is  also  good  ».  Z  seemed  to  protest 
against  the  taking  of  K.  A  contemptuous  '  soit ',  suppressed  Z's 
reclamations.  The  judgment  was  made,  «  K  is  better  all  the 
same  »  (i). 

An  interesting  aspect  of  the  effects  of  Relativity 
in  realising  choices  came  to  light  in  the  third  Series. 
S2  had  been  frequently  conscious  of  the  contrast  be- 
tween taking  a  glass  quickly  and  drinking  it  slowly. 
So  much  so,  that  he  came  to  find  a  certain  deception 
in  the  experiment.  J,  for  instance,  would  be  chosen 
eagerly  as  the  best,  and  yet  it  would  prove  very  unplea- 
sant. In  the  third  Series  however,  where  the  instruc- 
tion was  «  to  take  the  worst  »,  there  was  no  such 
deception.  If  a  bad  thing  had  to  be  chosen  and  drunk, 
it  was  at  least  what  had  been  bargained  for  !  It  seem- 
ed, for  that  reason,  easier  to  drink.  We  give  in  full 
the  introspection  of  S2,  in  a  Z — L  choice. 

I  saw  L  first,  then  Z.  I  returned  to  L,  took  it  and  drank  it.  I 
had  no  feeling  of  repugnance,  which  surprises  me  more  or  less. 
(L  was  very  bad).  I  drank  it  easily  (in  a  continuous  movement) 

( i )  From  the  introspections  of  S*. 


—  199  — 

owing  to  the  influence  of  the  task.  In  these  experiments  (of  the 
third  series)  all  is  straight-forward.  In  the  other  series  the  chosen 
aJternative  ought  to  have  been  good  and  often  was  not.  Here  all 
is  logical.  You  are  told  to  take  the  worst  and  it  proves  to  be  bad. 

Normally  in  the  choices  the  values  were  distinctly  Absolute  and 
relative.     Sometimes  they  were  openly  comparative,    Relatlve 

,.   .  J  J.  Values. 

sometimes  implicitly  so.  Comparative  judgments 
however  grew  rarer  as  Motivation  evolved,  and  finally 
they  almost  disappeared.  Such  Motivations,  as  the 
following,  became  common.  «  K  was  taken  without 
knowing  what  was  beside  it  »  ;  «  Z  was  taken  for  itself, 
without  any  relation  to  what  was  beside  it.  » 

The  question  now  arose  ;  were  there  cases  in  which 
the  choice  was  made  in  virtue  of  the  absolute  value  of 
an  alternative  ?  Can  an  alternative  be  chosen  without  its 
value  being  in  any  way  influenced  by  its  companion 
alternative  ? 

We  do  not  pretend  that  the  mere  absence  from  con- 
sciousness of  all  trace  of  a  comparison,  is  of  itself 
sufficient  to  show  that  the  value  of  the  chosen  alterna- 
tive was  absolute  and  not  relative.  Still  we  believe, 
basing  our  opinion  on  the  data  of  the  experiments,  that 
at  times  alternatives  were,  de  facto,  chosen  simply  on 
their  absolute  value  and  that  the  questions  posed  above 
may  be  answered  in  the  affirmative.  Let  us  quote  from 
some  introspections. 

«  B  did  not  intervene  at  all  in  the  choice.  It  counted  for  noth- 
ing in  the  choice.  Still  it  was  seen  and  understood  ».  «  I 
understood  L  as  bad,  from  the  beginning.  I  went  to  Z,  which  I 
decided  to  take  because  it  was  good.  There  was  no  comparison 
The  two  facts  were  quite  apart.  L  =  bad.  Z  =  good.  »  This 
choosing  for  the  absolute  value,  seemed  to  occur  if  the  two  sub- 
stances were  too  dissimilar  to  be  compared.  «  No  weighing  or 
comparison.  The  two  tastes  were  too  dissimilar  :  I  chose  K  for 
itself.  » 


—   200   — 

Again,  at  times,  there  seemed  to  be  no  consciousness  of  values, 
at  least  of  anything  like  relative  values.  «  I  had  no  consciousness 
of  values.  The  two  words,  then  immediately  the  judgment,  '  It's 
the  other1 ».  There  were  too,  frequent  cases  of  choice  after  the 
recognition  of  the  first  alternative,  before  the  second  alternative 
was  even  known.  Such  cases  point  however  to  such  implicit 
reasoning  as ;  «  Z  is  the  best  of  all,  therefore  take  it  »  ;  or  «  C  is 
the  worst  of  all,  therefore  reject  it.  »  They  cannot  be  regarded 
as  evidence  for  the  view  we  are  defending . 

It  will  be  remembered  that  in  the  Recognition  Expe- 
riments which  preceded  the  Choice  Experiments  judg- 
ments of  absolute  value,  «  Z  is  very  good  »,  «  C  is  very 
bad  »  were  quite  frequent.  Such  judgments  reappeared 
from  time  to  time  in  the  Choice  Experiments,  and 
sometimes  they  were  the  only  judgments  of  value  to  be 
found  in  the  introspections. 

It  may  be,  then,  that  choices  are  made  at  times  in 
virtue  of  the  absolute  value  of  an  alternative,  and  not 
in  view  of  its  relative  value.  Such  cases,  however, 
must  be  considered  as  exceptional. 

It  may  well  be  objected  that  we  are  not  and  cannot 
be  directly  aware  of  the  relativity  of  a  value,  and  that, 
even  when  Subjects  believe  that  they  are  choosing  in 
virtue  of  an  absolute  value,  they  are  in  reality  choosing 
in  virtue  of  a  relative  value. 

This  objection  finds  support  in  the  fact  that  in  the 
matter,  say  of  colour  or  sound  contrast,  we  are  totally 
unaware  that  we  are  under  the  influence  of  a  contrast, 
and  that  what  we  believe  to  be  a  definite  note,  is  really 
only  what  it  is  in  virtue  of  some  contrast. 

In  answer  to  such  an  objection  it  may  be  pointed 
out,  that  it  is  not  valid  to  argue  from  the  analogy  of 
external  senses,  to  the  mind.  It  is  true  that  the  senses 
are  directly  unaware  of  the  effects  of  contrast.  It  does 
not  follow  that  the  mind  is  unaware  in  cases  of  value 


—    201     — 

contrast.  Our  Subjects,  at  times,  were  conscious 
of  values  sliding  up  or  down  the  scale,  under  the 
influence  of  comparison.  They  were  conscious  of  the 
value  of  a  substance  being  greater  in  one  choice  than  it 
had  been  in  another.  They  confessed  to  feelings  of 
inconsistency  on  such  cases,  or  to  feelings  of  having  been 
deceived  with  regard  to  the  value  of  such  and  such  an 
alternative.  On  some  occasions  they  affirmed  empha- 
tically, that  they  were  under  no  such  influence  as  that  of 
Relativity.  «  I  took  Z  for  its  absolute  value.  Its  value 
was  not  increased  by  the  presence  of  V  » .  Subjects 
seemed  indeed  to  be  aware  if  they  were  under  the 
influence  of  Relativity.  «I  chose  K»,  said  Sl,  «  as 
though  its  greatest  concurrent  was  beside  it.  This 
would  not  have  happened  had  I  seen  B  better  ».  Again, 
*  C  gives  me  a  preference  for  what  is  beside  it  ».  «  I 
took  V,  knowing  that  C  was  the  cause  of  the  choice  » . 
In  fine  it  seems  to  us,  basing  our  opinion  on  the 
results  of  our  experiments,  i .  that  choices  are  made  at 
times,  in  virtue  of  the  absolute  value  of  one  or  other 
alternative,  and  2.  that  Subjects  are  sometimes  aware  of 
the  fact  that  they  are  choosing  for  absolute  values. 

We  propose  to  summarise  under  the  form  of  three   The  Laws 
laws,  the  general  conditions  of  the  rise  or  fall  of  values  Relat[vit. 
in  virtue  of  Relativity,  as  exemplified  in  our  researches. 
It  should  be  remembered  that  we  have  no  evidence 
that  these  conditions  hold,  good  outside  the  special  cir- 
cumstances of  the  choices  in  our  experiments. 

1.  A  neutral  value  becomes   positive   or  negative, 
according  as  it  is  opposed  to  something  very  negative 
or  very  positive. 

2.  A  positive  value  rises  when  opposed  to  something 
very  negative  or  to  something  slightly  less  positive.     It 
falls,  if  opposed  to  something  more  positive  than  itself. 


—    2O2    — 

3.  When  two  neutral  values  are  opposed  they  remain 
neutral ;  two  positives  remain  positive ;  two  negatives 
remain  negative. 

In  addition,  we  were  able  to  determine  that,  though 
a  neutral  value  might  appear  positive,  or  a  positive 
more  positive,  during  the  process  of  the  choice,  the 
moment  the  choice  was  finished,  and  even  before  it 
was  realised,  it  almost  invariably  had  lost  its  surplu- 
sage of  value.  These  laws  are  of  course  nothing  more 
than  the  re-stating,  in  terms  of  science,  facts  of  ordinary 
observation  Nevertheless  it  is  important  to  point  out 
their  significance.  It  is  interesting  too,  to  trace  some  of 
their  practical  consequences. 

An  obvious  conclusion,  for  instance,  to  be  drawn,  is 
that  we  are  rarely  or  never  in  a  position  to  judge  the 
conduct  of  others.  Even  if  we  are  able  to  find  out  the 
motives  of  their  actions,  we  are  never  able  to  tell  the 
force  of  those  motives.  The  alternative  chosen  by  such 
a  man,  may  seem  petty  and  sordid  in  our  eyes,  but, 
perhaps  for  him,  that  alternative  had,  owing  to  Relati- 
vity, immense  value. 

The          We  shall  now  briefly  tabulate  some  of  the  Conse- 
Consequcnces  quences  of  Relativity. 

Relativity.  1-  The  form  of  the  motive  was  often  changed. 
J  would  now  be  positive,  now  negative  according  as 
the  value  of  its  alternative  varied. 

2.  The  content  of  the  motive  varied.     The  sweet- 
ness and  special  flavour  of  Z,  for  instance,  were  called 
to  mind  when  T  or  K  were  opposed  to  it.     Its  strength 
or  intensity  was  called  to  mind  if  V  was  opposed  to  it. 
Special  circumstances  determined  the  special  aspects 
under  which  an  alternative  is  seen. 

3.  Motives  were  more  or  less  concrete  in  form, accor- 
ding as  the  value  was  increased  or  diminished.     For 


—    203   — 

instance,  the  fact  that  the  value  of  J  was  increased,  in 
consequence  of  its  proximity  to  C,  resulted  in  a  change 
of  the  usual  form  of  the  motive  for  J.  Such  strengthen- 
ing of  value  meant  a  regression  in  the  form — it  became 
less  abstract. 

4.  The  Subjects  were  conscious  of  the  values  of  the 
substances  changing  owing  to  Relativity.     The  result 
was  that  they  were,  at  times,  under  the  impression 
that  they  were  acting  inconsistently.     This  feeling  was 
deceptive.  S3,  for  instance,  who  was  in  reality  faithful 
to  the  original  scale  of  values  which  he  had  drawn  up, 
said,  experiment  N°i25  ;  «  I  was  aware  that  my  ideas 
of  T  and  B  had  changed  considerably  since  first  I  saw 
them.  »  On  another  occasion  he  felt  he  had  changed 
his  preference  in  a  certain  choice,  and  yet  he  had  been 
perfectly  consistent. 

5.  We  have  already  dwelt  on  the  feeling  of  evenness 
or  unevenness  experienced  in  choices,  according  as  the 
substances  were  similar  or  dissimilar. 

Thus  S3,  in  a  Z — T  choice,  says.;  «  I  had  a  feeling  of  a  certain 
similitude  between  the  qualities  of  the  things  compared ;  there 
was  a  certain  equality  of  intensity  »  ;  again,  in  a  Z — K  choice,  S3 
says  ;  «  I  had  an  immediate  intellectual  recognition  of  an  evenness 
in  the  choice.  They  were  qualitatively  similar.  » 

Subjects  were  also  immediately  conscious  of  contrasts  between 
the  alternatives.  S3  said  ;  «  I  recognised  the  contrast  between  the 
bitter  and  the  sweet  »  ;  «  the  contrast  between  T  and  V  sprang  into 
my  mind  before  I  was  aware  of  individual  significance  »  ;  «  I  felt 
a  great  unevenness  in  the  elements  of  the  choice.  Things  so  very 
different  seem  to  me  to  be  situated  on  the  two  banks  of  a  ravine  »  ; 
«  I  felt  that  the  choice  lay  between  things  very  dissimilar.  This 
feeling  is  connected  with  a  nerve  process.  I  always  know  when  it 
is  there  ». 

It  remains  for  us,  in  concluding  this  chapter,  to 
recall  the  necessity  of  taking  into  consideration  the 


—  204  — 

various  Consequences  of  Relativity,  when  dealing 
with  questions  of  Motive-Force,  and  of  Motivation- 
Evolution.  Naturally,  little  can  be  determined  with 
regard  to  Relativity  by  means  of  Experiment.  The 
problem  belongs  to  the  domain  of  Metaphysics.  Still, 
it  is  important,  that,  as  far  as  possible,  examples  of 
the  presence  of  Relativity  should  be  classified  and 
analysed. 


CHAPTER    XL 


THE   PSYCHOLOGY   OF    CHARACTER. 


Surely   it  only   needs   that   we 
should  learn  to  handle  men,  as  we 
handle  the  forces  of  Nature,  and 
we  should  become  masters  of  our 
human  destiny  to  a  degree  which 
would  lift  us  to  the  level  of  gods. 
L.  P.  JACKS,  The  Alchemy  of 
Thought,  p.  ao5. 


In   ordinary  life,   if  asked   what  the  character  of  Character,  as 

manifested 
in  Choice. 


someone  is,  we  spontaneously  recount  what  he  likes  mamfested 


and  dislikes  (i).  In  doing  so  we  show  ourselves  to  be 
good  psychologists,  for  as  Ruskin  insisted,  there  is  no 
better  way  of  finding  out  what  a  man  is,  than  by  stu- 
dying what  he  likes. 

It  is  still  more  advantageous  to  be  able  to  study  how 
he  likes,  that  is,  how  he  chooses.  In  the  Choice-pro- 
cess, a  man  reveals  himself  completely.  Choice,  im- 
plies acting  on  motives,  and  nothing  gives  a  deeper 
insight  into  man's  nature,  than  the  knowledge  of  his 
motives,  for  they  show  us,  whether  sense  of  duty,  or 

(i)  This  point  is  well  brought  out  by  a  storyette  from  Punch.  A  rough-looking 
sailor  is  represented  as  standing  before  the  Captain  and  a  Petty-Officer.  The 
Captain  asks,  pointing  to  the  sailor,  «  What  is  his  character  apart  from  his  leave- 
breaking  ?  »  The  Petty-Officer  replies.  «  Well,  Sir,  this  man  'e  goes  ashore  when 
'e  likes,  'e  comes  off  when  'e  likes,  'e  uses  'orrible  language  when  'e's  spoken  to. 
In  fact  from  'ii  general  be'aviour  'e  might  be  'a  'orficer.  » 


—    206   — 

hedonic  attraction  plays  the  chief  part  in  his  life. 
Again,  to  choose  is  to  put  oneself  in  motion,  to  act ; 
not  necessarily  to  act  exteriorly,  but  to  act,  at  least, 
within.  But  action  at  once  betrays  the  strength  or 
weakness,  the  resoluteness  or  indecision  of  him  who 
acts.  Choice  too  implies  motivation,  and  in  motiva- 
tion, our  power  of  reasoning,  (of  insight  into  things), 
of  calm  and  tranquil  thought  is  shown.  In  motivation 
impulsiveness,  caprice,  inconsistency,  and  carelessness, 
or  the  opposite  qualities  are  inevitably  manifested. 

Mr  Mackenzie  writes  :  «  Deliberate  choice  depends  on  thought 
or  reason.  In  order  to  choose  the  right,  in  the  sense  in  which 
such  a  choice  has  any  moral  significance,  we  must  know  the  right. 
If  we  simply  hit  on  the  right  course  by  chance  we  do  not  really 
choose  the  right.  Right  willing  therefore  depends  on  true 
insight  (i). 

In  choice  then,  a  man's  character  stands  fully  reveal- 
ed. Likes  and  dislikes,  consistency  and  inconsistency, 
firmness  and  weakness,  calmness  and  impulsiveness 
are  all  manifested.  In  the  choice  a  man's  soul,  like  a 
city  in  the  glow  of  sun-rise  is  «  open  unto  the  fields  and 
to  the  sky  ».  To  study  him  then,  is  to  study  him  in- 
deed. 

Adopting  this  standpoint,  that  the  Psychology  of 
Choice  or  of  Motivation  is  the  Psychology  of  Charac- 
ter, we  propose  to  summarise  the  results  of  these  re- 
searches and  to  apply  them  to  the  practical  problem  of 
Character- Formation. 

The  question  may  be  raised  at  the  very  outset,  as  to 
the  possibility  of  Psychology  being  able  to  afford  any 
practical  aid  in  the  study  of  Character.  Psychology, 
though  an  empirical  science,  is  after  all  necessarily 
abstract.  It  is  forced  to  deal  with  generalities.  A  man's 

(i)  Manual  of  Ethics,  p.  89. 


—  207  — 

Character,  on  the  other  hand,  is  individual  and  con- 
crete. It  is  complex,  vital,  dynamic,  self-creating,  and 
in  consequence,  defies  definition.  How  then  is  a 
Science  of  Man  possible  ? 

We  must  think  of  man  throughout,  writes  Mr  Jacks  (i),  as  a 
self-conscious  being,  as  a  living  will,  and  ask  whether  the  interests 
of  such  a  being  are  amenable  to  scientific  definition  and  whether 
the  activities  of  his  will  in  the  pursuit  of  those  interests  can  be 
brought  under  formulated  laws.  Nothing  short  of  this  is  entitled 
to  rank  as  the  science  of  man. 

For  Such  reasons  there  is  always  a  chasm  between 
Character,  in  the  reality,  and  its  definition.  There  is 
too,  something  essentially  deficient  in  attempted  defini- 
tions, even  though  they  be  couched  in  striking  terms. 

For  Lacordaire,  to  take  one  example,  character  is,  «  1'energie 
sourde  et  constante  de  la  volonte,  je  ne  sais  quoi  d'ine"branlable 
dans  les  desseins,  de  plus  inebranlable  encore  dans  la  fiddlite  a  soi- 
meme,  a  ses  convictions,  a  ses  amities,  a  ses  vertus,  une  force 
intime  qui  jaillit  de  la  personne  et  qui  inspire  a  tous  cette  certitude 
que  nous  appelons  la  securite.  » 

Lacordaire  gives  us,  it  is  true,  an  eloquent  and  finely- 
worded  description,  but  we  are  as  far  as  ever  from  an 
exact  scientific  definition.  What  is  to  be  understood 
by  «  1'energie  sourde  et  constante  de  la  volonte  »?  or  by 
«  la  force  intime  qui  jaillit  de  la  personne  »  ?  The  trite 
definition  of  Novalis,  «  Character  is  a  finely  fashioned 
WilU,  though  somewhat  more  precise,  is  still  of  as  little 
practical  value  as  that  of  Lacordaire. 

Turning  now  to  Experimental  Psychology,  we  find  Experimental 
that  within  certain  limits,  great  light  is  thrown  on  the  Psycholo«y> 
problem  of  Character.     Much  can  be  determined  with  character, 
precision,  as  to  the  intellectual  and  volitional  nature  of 
the  individual.     It  is  now  in  our  power,  owing  to 

(i)  Alchemy  of  Thought,  p.  ao3. 


—   208    — 

modern  methods  of  research  to  determine  with  compar- 
ative ease  the  mental  type  of  the  individual.  It  is 
possible  to  find  out,  how  far  he  is  a  visual,  or  auditive, 
or  motor  type,  or  how  far  he  is  a  mixture  of  different 
types. 

It  is  possible  too,  in  a  manner  perhaps  somewhat 
less  precise,  to  guage  the  individual's  power  of  memory, 
attention,  and  perception.  Something  too  can  be  done, 
in  the  way  of  determining  the  characteristics  of  his 
volitional  functioning;  how  much,  or  how  violently 
he  hesitates,  how  slowly  or  how  rapidly  his  choices 
become  automatic ;  how  far  he  is  under  the  influence 
of  hedonic  tendencies ;  and  finally  what  percentage  of 
hedonic  attractions  and  repulsions,  and  sudden  changes 
of  mind,  occur  in  his  choices,  as  compared  with  those 
of  others.  An  effort,  as  we  have  seen,  may  even  be 
made  towards  measuring  the  force  of  his  motives,  and 
towards  determining  the  various  ways  in  which  he 
strengthens  his  motives.  Indeed  the  hope  may  justly 
be  entertained  of  discovering  methods,  applicable  even 
outside  of  the  laboratory,  of  acquiring  a  very  exact 
insight  into  the  nature  and  force  of  individual  Wills. 

As  regards  investigating  the  nature,  and  strength  of 
various  habits  much  can  be  achieved.  We  have  shown, 
in  our  chapter  on  Motivation  Tracks,  that  it  is  possible, 
when  conditions  are  fully  determined,  to  discover  the 
«  structural  »  and  « psychical »  phenomena  of  certain 
habits  of  choice.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that,  with  the 
advance  of  the  psychical  method,  much  more  may  be 
discovered. 

That  the  intellectual  temper  of  our  time  encourages  the  belief  in 
the  possibility  of  the  Science  of  Man,  and  the  hope  of  its  realisation 
in  the  future,  admits  of  little  doubt.  A  state  of  the  world  when 
the  system  of  natural  laws  shall  be  throughly  understood,  and 


—    20Q   — 

when  all  human  action  shall  be  in  accordance  with  this  knowledge, 
is  the  far-off  divine  event  to  which  vast  numbers  of  persons  are 
vaguely  looking  forward. 

This  millenium  of  science  has  been  often  described.  Physiology 
and  its  cognates  shall  enable  us  to  control  our  bodies  ;  we  shall  eat 
by  science,  dress,  warm,  and  house  ourselves  by  science.  Psycho- 
logy will  have  given  us  command  of  our  minds  ;  we  shall  know 
how  our  intellects,  our  emotions,  our  wills,  act  under  given  condi- 
tions, and  we  shall  prepare  them  for  acting  accordingly  ;  education 
will  be  throughly  scientific  ;  we  shall  teach  nothing  but  what  the 
laws  of  the  mind  allow  the  young  to  assimilate,  and  to  assimilate 
in  the  most  favourable  manner,  (i) 

Let  us  now  show,  by  an  example,  how  far  we  are  The 
able  from  the  data  of  our  experiments,  to  determine  the  Character 
intellectual  and  volitional  nature  of  our  Subjects.  We 
take  the  case  of  S2.  Naturally,  we  must  base  our  con- 
clusions on  comparisons  with  what  we  know  of  the 
other  two  Subjects.  Doing  so,  we  find  that  S8  is  the 
most  impulsive,  and  the  most  «  thoughtless  »  of  the 
three.  He  changes  his  choices,  and  his  movements 
more  frequently,  has  more  active  tendencies  and  has 
more  sudden,  «  inexplicable  »  choices.  He  hesitates 
and  oscillates  most,  is  more  liable  to  discouragement,  to 
grow  excited,  to  manifest  exteriorly  his  feelings.  He  is 
the  most  hedonic ;  chooses  the  pleasant  tastes  with  child- 
ish eagerness  ;  he  becomes  so  upset  when  an  unplea- 
sant taste  has  to  be  drunk  that  at  times,  he  cannot 
overcome  his  repugnance  to  drinking  it ;  he  fails  in  his 
duty.  S*  is  the  least  consistent,  the  most  liable  to 
distraction  and  inattention,  yet  withal  the  most  obser- 
vant and  the  most  impressionable.  He  noticed  pheno- 
mena that  the  others  did  not  remark,  and  was 
eminently  frank,  and  spontaneous  in  his  introspections. 
Though  having  but  few  images  and  associations,  he  had 

(i)  L.  P.  JACKS,  The  Alchemy  of  Thought,  p.  203-204. 


210   — 

a  quick  sense  of  the  strange  or  the  humourous.  In  fine 
he  is  mercurial,  demonstrative,  sanguine,  frank,— like 
the  «  sanguins  »  of  Mgr  Guibert  (i)  : 

Sa  sensibilite  est  vive,  aigue  meme,  mais  sans  consistance.  Les 
impressions,  chez  lui,  sans  profondeur ;  il  passe,  en  un  instant,  du 
rire  aux  larmes,  de  la  joie  delirante  a  une  tristesse  noire...  Leur 
intelligence  se  ressent  de  leur  vivacite  de  nature.  Elle  est  prompte, 
elle  voit  vite,  elle  s'assimile  aise'ment,  elle  est  servie  par  une 
memoire  heureuse...  comme  une  pointe  aigue,  elle  penetre  sans 
peine  dans  toutes  les  questions...  Etourdi,  irreflechi...  genereux... 
desinteresse.  Ce  qui  lui  manque,  c'est  la  volonte,  c'est-a-dire  la 
consistance  dans  ses  resolutions...  (2) 

Of  course  such  a  character-sketch  might  easily  be 
given  by  any  friend  of  S2,  who  took  the  trouble  to 
write  it.  Still  we  believe,  we  are  able  to  render  it  pre- 
cise and  exact  by  putting  it  in  relation  with  certain 
statistics. 

1 .  We  have  given  a  table  of  the  favourite  choices  of 
S8,  and  of  the  force  of  his  various  motives,  in  our  sec- 
tion on  Motive-Force. 

2.  We  have  given  (3)  a  table  showing  the  gradual 
disappearance  of  Hedonic  Preferences.     From  this  table 
it  will  be  seen  that  S2  had  proportionately  more  hedonic 
motives  than  S*  or  S8. 

3.  In  our  chapter  on  Automatism,  we  have  given  a 
table  of  comparative  figures,    verifying  many  of  the 
points  referred  to  above  (4),  and  in  our  chapter  on 

(1)  Le  Car  act  ere,  p.  178-180. 

(2)  Although  a  typical  « sanguin  »,  S2  was  by  no  means  without  Will.  We 
have  seen,  in  our  chapter  on  Hesitation,  how  S2  had  the  power  of  getting  rid 
of  Hesitations.  S2  also  manifested,  in  his  choices,  an  excellent  trait  of  Character, 
namely,  that  when  he  saw  clearly  what  was  best  to  do,  he  acted  resolutely  and 
at  once.  His  Character  was  many-sided  and  interesting,  as  far  as  revealed  in  our 
Experiments.  Naturally  our  remarks  only  apply  to  the  S*  of  the  Laboratory. 

(3)  P.  .17. 

(4)  P.  147- 


—    211    — 

Hesitation  we  have  carefully  analysed  the  Hesita- 
tions of  S2,  and  the  manner  in  which  he  rid  himself  of 
certain  tendencies  to  Hesitate. 

4.  The  impulsiveness  and  inconsistency  of  S8  are 
shown  by  the  following  figures  (i). 

Impulsive  choices  and  movements  8*24         S1  i5         S8  i5 

Movements  or  choices  changed  S8    7         S1    5         S3     i 

Inconsistencies  in  choices  Sa    8         S1    4         S3    5 

5.  That  S2  is  a  more  hedonic  temperament  than  S* 
or  S3  follows  from  his  more  frequent  manifestations  of 
hedonic  attractions  and  repulsions;  (feelings  of  pleasure, 
displeasure,  regret,  capriciousness,  etc.)     The  following 
numbers  represent  approximately  the  hedonic  manifes- 
tations in  the  three  Subjects. 

S2  5o  S1  25  S3  10 

6.  That  S8  had  less  imagery  than  the  other  Subjects, 
appears  from  the  following  facts. 

Reproductions  of  Taste  S*    2        S1    5        S3    8 

Associations  S*    o         S1    o         S*    7 

Specifications  of  Taste  ;  «  Sweet  »,  >        S2    o         S1  12         S3  3o 

«  Acid  »,  a  Sugar  »,  etc.  ( 

« 

7.  S2  noticed  various,  tendencies,  feelings,  muscular 
sensations,  peculiar  attitudes  of  mind,  and  interesting 
post-reaction  phenomena  which  were  unobserved  by 
S1  and  S3. 

8.  Many   minor   points   also   throw    light    on    the 
Character  of  S2, — such  for  instance — 

Feelings  of  Easy  Task.  S8  7        S1  o        S»  a 

Consciousness  of  Task.  S8  9        S1  5        S*  5 

Strong  hedonic  attractions  S8  5        Sd  —       S3  — 

(i)  They  are  based  on  the  278  experiments  of  the  first  part  of  the  second  series. 


^  —   212   — 

The  Formula      The  possibility  of  expressing  Character  by  means  of 
of  the     a  formula  has  been  often  discussed.     We  believe  that 

Character        . 

Ofs*.  with  the  data  of  our  experiments  it  could  be  done 
more  or  less  adequately.  Nevertheless,  since  there  is  no 
approved  method  of  doing  so  (i),  the  first  to  attempt  the 
task  most  run  the  risk  of  being  accounted  rash. 

Clearly  the  standpoint  should  be  strictly  empirical. 
The  supposition,  by  no  means  an  arbitrary  one,  should 
be  made,  that  all  the  essential  elements  of  character 
are  expressed  in  the  choice-process.  All  these  elements, 
together  with  all  the  phenomena  occurring  in  these 
choices  should  then  be  analysed.  Therein,  all  that  can 
be  known  of  the  Will  or  Character  is  contained. 

Next,  a  standard  character  must  be  determined  on  (2). 
This,  we  should  propose  to  do,  by  (taking  the  case  of 
our  researches)  finding  the  mean  of  the  added  pheno- 
mena of  S3  and  S1 — thus  forming  an  ideal  type.  To 
such  a  proceeding  objection  might  easily  be  taken  from 
many  standpoints.  Still  the  question  is  a  pratical  one, 
and  must  be  solved  by  some  method  of  this  nature. 

Applying  this  method,  as  far  as  we  can,  and  with  all  due  reser- 
vation, to  the  case  of  S*,  that  is,  comparing  him,  with  respect  to 
certain  important  elements  of  character  with  the  standard  type  of 
character,  we  get  the  following  formula  —  (the  abbreviations  are 
explained  below)  (3). 

S«  =  Act.  i-5  +  Res.  i  +  Hed.  3  -f  Hes.  2  +  Incon.  2-5 
+  Aesth.  i  +  Repr.  o-5 

(i)  Schopenhauer  wrote  that  the  normal  man  is  2/3  Will  and  i/3  Intellect, 
while  the  genius  is  2/3  Intellect  and  i/3  Will.  This  calculation  was  not,  of  course, 
based  on  any  very  serious  research.  Vide.  RIBOT,  Psychologic  des  Sentiments, 
p.  392. 

(a)  We  have  passed  over  the  old  classifications  of  men  into  phlegmatic, 
choleric,  etc.,  as  of  little  use  for  our  purpose. 

(3)  Hed.  =  Hedonism.  Hes.  =  Hesitation.  Incon.  =  Inconsistency.  Repr. 
=  Representations,  Images,  etc.  Aesth.  =  Aestheticism.  Act.  =  Active  Tenden- 
cies. Res.  =  Resistance  to  Tendencies. 


—    2l3    — 

We  have,  here,  put  intellectual  and  conative  phenomena  side  by 
side.  We  have  been  at  a  loss  to  determine  what  the  chief  element 
of  character  is.  Our  proceeding  is  simply  and  purely  empirical. 
We  state  that,  de  facto,  under  the  conditions  of  our  experiments, 
the  formula  given  above  approximately  represents  the  intellectual 
and  volitional  nature  of  S*  —  as  compared  with  the  standard  des- 
cribed above.  We  are  aware  that  the  formula  is  incomplete,  and 
open  to  criticism.  We  merely  propose  it,  as  a  tentative  effort. 

Mr  Jacks,  discussing  the  possibility  of  such  a  for- 
mula, reminds  us,  that  no  matter  how  thoroughly  and 
profoundly  we  may  know  the  abstract  law  of  a  man's 
nature,  it  is  vain  to  dream  of  expressing  it  in  a  formula. 
Did  we  do  so,  and  did  the  individual  come  to  know  it, 
he  could  falsify  it,  and  nullify  it  at  will.  Such  a  one 
would  say  : 

I  shall  cause  no  trouble  to  science  so  long  as  you  are  content 
with  the  abstract  statement  that  my  nature  or  my  character  is  law- 
abiding.  But  make  your  statement  concrete,  give  me  the  precise 
formula  of  my  character,  tell  me  the  specific  law  of  my  action,  and 
I  will  at  once  put  science  to  confusion  by  adopting  another  formula, 
and  by  acting  under  another  law  (i). 

Clearly,  the  only  thing  to  be  done  with  a  difficult 
character  of  this  nature,  would  be  to  hide  from  him 
his  formula,  or  to  change  somewhere  a  plus  into  a 
minus,  and  show  it  to  him  thus.  It  is  nevertheless  of 
immense  importance  from  the  point  of  view  of  edu- 
cation that  Psychology  should  tend  in  this  practical 
direction,  and  that  a  method  should  be  found  for 
determining  the  systems  of  values  of  individuals.  In- 
deed no  important  advance  can  be  made  in  moral 
education  until  such  a  method  is  discovered. 

L'analyse  du  systems  individuel  des  valeurs,  1'exprimant  sous 
forme  numerique  aurait  evidemment  une  importance  de  tout  pre- 

(i)  The  Alchemy  of  Thought,  p.  208. 


—  214  — 

mier  ordre  dans  la  pedagogic,  dans  Pethique  et  dans  la  science  des 
religions.  L'education  morale  ou  religieuse  consistant,  en  derniere 
analyse,  en  La  formation  du  systeme  des  valeurs  de  1'individu,  en  la 
modification  d'un  systeme,  la  connaissance  de  ce  systeme  tel  qu'il 
est  donne,  serait  un  des  plus  precieux  auxiliaires  de  ces  sciences  (i). 

Character-  It  remains  for  us,  to  indicate  the  chief  conclusions, 
Formation.  of  a  practical  nature,  which  may  be  drawn  from  the 
present  study  of  Motivation  and  to  show  how  they 
apply  to  Character-Formation. 

The  central  fact  of  the  researches  we  have  been 
describing,  is  that  when  a  choice  has  to  be  made 
between  two  alternatives,  the  choice  is  quick  and  easy 
in  proportion  as  the  values  of  the  alternatives  are 
clearly  and  definitely  known.  So  long  as  the  Subjects 
in  our  experiments  were  quite  sure  of  the  positions  of 
the  alternatives  on  their  scale  of  values,  the  choices 
presented  no  difficulties.  They  were  made  more  and 
more  automatically.  There  was  no  hesitation,  and  no 
irregularity. 

From  the  moment,  however,  that  a  Subject  grew 
doubtful  about  the  position  of  a  substance  on  the  scale 
of  values,  all  regularity  and  certitude  were  at  an  end. 
The  motivation  was  no  longer  swift  and  easy.  Voli- 
tional force,  instead  of  being  economised  was  wasted. 
Hesitations  occurred,  and  the  functioning  of  the  Will 
grew  more  and  more  arduous  and  painful.  In  a  word 
the  motivation  deteriorated,  and  instead  of  following 
its  normal  evolution  towards  automatism,  and  consis- 
tency, it  devolved,  and  inconsistencies  occurred 

What  held  true  in  general,  for  the  choices  and  the 
motivation  of  our  researches,  holds  true,  though  pos- 
sibly in  a  less  degree,  for  the  choices  made  in  ordinary 
life.  We  speak  in  particular  of  the  more  important 

(i)  MICHOTTE  KT  ?RUM,  Le  choix  volotttaire,  p.  290. 


choices,  where  questions  of  honour,  and  of  morality 
arise,  of  choices,  that  is,  in  which  character  is  involved. 
In  these  crises,  in  which  good  and  evil,  the  noble  and 
the  base,  stand  opposed,  in  which  no  compromise  can 
be  made,  and  no  delay  is  possible,  all  depends  on 
something  in  the  man  which  is  called  Character.  A 
choice  is  to  be  made,  must  be  made,  and  in  making  it, 
the  last  word  is  spoken  by  «  Character  ». 

What  then  is  to  be  understood  by  Character?  And 
how  is  it  to  be  formed? 

Let  us  admit,  as  a  working  definition  that  Character 
is  «  a  well-fashioned  Will  »,  that  is  to  say,  in  the  psy- 
chological terms  which  we  have  been  using  throughout 
this  book,  Character  is  the  power  of  quick,  sure,  and 
serious  motivation  in  choice-processes.  In  a  word,  a 
person  who  consistently,  without  hesitation,  or  capri- 
cious movements,  takes  the  best  of  the  two  alternatives, 
with  more  and  more  ease,  and  that  for  intrinsic 
motives,  is  one  who  has  «  a  well-fashioned  Will  », 
a  good  Character. 

We  seem  then  to  reduce  Character  to  the  power  of 
good  motivation,  and  we  do  so  deliberately.  The  act 
of  choosing  is  the  first  and  the  last  act  of  the  ego — it  is 
the  assertion  of  what  the  ego  is— it  is  the  positing  of  his 
character. 

All  our  attention  must  then  be  turned  on  the  problem 
of  choosing  well,  on  the  problem  of  how  to  acquire  the 
power  of  good  motivation. 

We  now  find  ourselves  at  the  point  from  which  we      The 
started.     «  The  central  fact  of  the  researches  we  have  lmP°|;tance 

of  a 

been  describing  is  that,  when  a  choice  has  to  be  made    cieariy- 
between  two  alternatives,  the  choice  is  quick  and  easy 
in  proportion  as  the  values  of  the  alternatives  are  clearly  Q 
and  definitely  known  ». 


—   2l6    — 

In  this  last  phrase  lies,  as  it  seems  to  us  the  practical 
solution  of  the  whole  problem,  of  how  to  acquire  a 
power  of  good  motivation — and  ultimately  of  how  to 
choose  well.  We  must  clearly  and  definitely  determine 
the  values  of  alternatives,  and  that  of  course,  as  far  as 
possible,  long  before  the  choice  begins.  We  must  have 
our  fixed  scale  of  values.  We  must  have  a  scale  of 
values  for  every  sphere  in  which  we  live,  and  for  our 
life  as  a  whole.  There  must  be  a  top-value,  a  ne  plus 
ultra,  with  which  nothing  whatever  is  comparable. 
That  top- value  must  act  as  a  charm ,  it  must  electrify 
us,  hypnotise  us.  It  must  be  a  top-value  in  all  reality. 

Then  again  there  must  be  a  lowest,  a  bottom-value; 
something  which  must  never  be  chosen.  Something 
which  must  be  rejected  on  every  occasion  as  absolutely 
loathsome. 

There  will  be  also  middle-values,  and  perhaps 
neutral  values.  Into  such  details  it  is  not  necessary  to 
enter.  The  main  fact,  the  central  fact,  must  always  be 
kept  in  mind,  that  the  scale  must  be  clearly  and  defini- 
tely known,  in  consequence  it  must  be  fixed  and  rigidly 
partitioned  off,  each  grade  from  that  above  and  from 
that  below. 

To  such  a  solution  of  problem  of  how  to  choose 
well,  the  obvious  objection  is,  that  we  frequently  know 
and  see  clearly  that  one  thing  is  more  valuable  than 
another,  yet  we  take  what  is  worst  :  video  meliora 
proboque,  deteriora  sequor.  Something  then  further 
than  the  mere  clear  and  definite  knowledge  of  a  scale 
of  values  is  required  ?  To  answer  this  objection,  we 
may  point  out,  that  what  we  are  seeking  to  give  is  the 
practical  solution  of  the  problem.  We  do  not  deny 
that  it  may  be  possible,  and  even  that  it  happens  at 


times,  that  one  course  is  clearly  and  definitely  know  to 
be  better  than  another,  and  yet  that  the  other  is  fol- 
lowed. Still  we  believe  that  such  a  case  is  exceptional. 
The  usual  antecedent  of  wrong  conduct  is  a  confused, 
uncertain  state  of  mind.  On  the  other  hand,  just  as 
was  clearly  evident  in  our  1 100  experiments,  when  the 
values  were  clearly  known,  automatically  the  choice 
was  realised.  It  followed  of  itself  (i).  Doubtless  in 
our  experiments  there  was  the  additional  instruction 
and  resolution  to  effect  the  choice,  and  to  take  what 
was^known  to  be  best.  But  such  instructions  and  reso- 
lutions hold,  at  least  normally,  in  ordinary  life.  What 
is  wanted  in  ordinary  life  is  a  fixed  well-known  scale 
of  values,  such  as  those  according  to  which  men,  who 
have  won  universal  admiration  for  their  morality  have 
lived. 

It  may  seem  that  this  view  is  extreme.  That,  while 
it  is  true  that  it  is  most  important  to  have  a  scale  of 
values  such  as  I  described,  it  is  necessary  also  that 
subjective  efforts  should  constantly  be  made.  But  in 
what  do  such  subjective  efforts  consist,  if  not  in 
directing  the  attention  constantly  in  some  direction? 
Is  not  their  efficacy  to  be  fully  utilised  in  keeping 
clearly  and  constantly  before  the  mind  the  Scale  of 
Values?  Prof.  James  seems  to  attribute  such  a  role  to 
volition  when  he  says  (2),  «  we  reach  the  heart  of  our 
enquiry  into  Volition  when  we  ask  by  what  process  it 
is,  that  the  thought  of  any  given  object  comes  to  prevail 
stably  in  the  mind.  » 

There  is  certainly  a  tendency  among  Psychologists 

(i)  As  an  example,  the  Z — C  choice  of  S3;  «  Immediate  recognition  in  the 
order  Z — C.  There  was  no  mental  pleasure  or  displeasure,  but  a  purely  alge- 
braical working  of  the  mind.  Z  was  the  upper,  C  the  lower  limit  of  my  scale. 
By  first  principles,  Z  must  be  chosen.* 

(a)  Principles  of  Pscyhology,  vol.  II.  p.  56 1. 


01 
«  A  w 

to  interpret  iitterally  such  expressions  as  Will-Force, 
and  to  believe  that  some  such  energy  is  stored-up  some- 
where in  the  mind.  Kiilpe  for  instance  tells  us  (i)  that, 
«  the  reserve  of  energy  which  gives  efficacy  to  the  Will 
lies  below  the  conscious  limen  ». 

That  such  a  reserve  exists  somewhere  in  readiness 
for  voluntary  action  we  should  not  deny.  That  such 
a  reserve  could  be  more  practically  employed,  from 
the  point  of  view  of  moral  conduct,  than  in  keeping 
present  to  the  mind  the  ideals  and  axioms  that  represent 
our  highest  values,  we  should  certainly  not  admit.  The 
dictum  of  Socrates,  that  virtue  and  knowledge  are  one, 
bears  out  the  truth  of  our  contention.  He  who  knows 
the  right  acts  aright.  Not  that  we  are  to  understand 
this  dictum  narrowly;  but,  taking  it  in  a  concrete  and 
practical  sense,  it  is  true. 

With  regard  to  Character- Formation,  besides  the  im- 
portant principle  we  have  formulated,  of  having  a 
scale  of  clearly-known  and  definitely  fixed  values,  some 
other  points  suggested  themselves  naturally,  during  the 
course  of  our  experiments. 

1.  With  regard  to  Hesitation,  which  is,  par  excel- 
lence the  malady  of  the  Will,  in  as  much  as  it  destroys 
serious   motivation ,    and   leads  to    irregularities   and 
inconsistencies,  the  great  means  of  avoiding  it  is  to 
acquire  the  habit  of  serious,  decisive,  choosing,  and  to 
avoid  repining  over  past  choices.     Evidently  the  pos- 
session of  a  clearly-known,  definite   scale  of  values 
renders  Hesitation  less  likely. 

2.  With  regard  to  Motivation,  we   have  seen  how 
habits  of  choice  persist,  and  how  Motivation-Tracks 
are  formed.     Not  only  does  the  general  structure  of  the 

(j)  Outlines  of  Psychology,  p.  21 5. 


—  219  — 

choice-process  persist,  but  the  same  motives,  images, 
feelings,  delays  or  hesitations,  tend  to  reappear. 

Once  more  the  advisibility  of  choosing  for  serious 
motives,  and  of  choosing  in  a  resolute  way,  appears. 
If  our  motive  in  the  past  was  a  sense  of  duty,  that 
motive  will  return  again,  and  with  greater  force.  The 
«  Universe  of  Duty  »  will  come  to  prevail  and,  in 
modern  language  «  the  man  of  good  character  is  he  in 
whom  the  Universe  of  Duty  habitually  predominates  ». 
It  is  hardly  necessary  to  dwell  on  the  significance 
of  habit  in  connection  with  Character- Formation.  Aris- 
totle and  all  the  great  moralists  have  done  so.  They 
have  shown  virtue  to  be  a  habit,  «  habitus  operativus 
bonus  ».  Virtue,  indeed,  is  a  habit  of  choice.  «"Ea-nv 
dpa  f)  dpetrj  e£t£  TrpoaiperiKri  »  (i). 

Such  a  habit  of  choice  must  persist  in  the  concrete. 
It  must  be  capable  of  translation  into  psychological 
terms.  This  is  what  we  have  striven  to  do  in  our 
chapter  on  Motivation  Tracks. 

3.  With  regard  to  Motive -Strengthening  we  have 
seen  the  efficacy  of  some  ready  principle.  Not  only  is 
it  useful  in  case  of  Hesitation,  in  turning  the  scale  and 
saving  us  from  indecision,  but  it  is  useful  in  choices 
of  all  kinds.  It  adds  strength  to  the  right  motive,  and 
the  choice  is  rendered  easy  and  automatic.  From  this 
point  of  view  too,  the  question  of  Relativity  is 
important.  Motives  are  strengthened  by  contrast.  The 
good  is  easier  to  perform,  when  placed  well  in  anti- 
thesis to  evil.  The  more  perfect  and  honourable  !of 
two  courses  of  action,  may  be  rendered  easy,  by  putting 
it  in  a  like  contrast  with  the  alternative,  the  less  honour- 
able course.  Indeed  the  theory  of  Motive  Streng- 
thening is  one  of  great  importance  in  moral  education. 

(i)  Ethics,  II.  VI.  i5. 


—    220    — 

We  content  ourselves  with  enumerating  these  three 
or  four  points.  They  may  be  of  use  to  those  interested 
in  the  problem  of  Character-Formation.  Other  points 
will  suggest  themselves  in  the  course  of  reading  our 
chapters  on  Hedonism  and  Motive-Force,  and  espe- 
cially in  studying  the  various  examples  of  introspections , 
which  we  have  furnished  in  great  number  throughout 
this  volume. 


APPENDIX. 


A.  THE  J— V  CHOICES  OF  S2 

B.  THE  J-B  CHOICES  OF  S2 

C.  THE  Z— K  CHOICES  OF  Sl 

A.     THE  J— V  CHOICES  OF  S*. 

NOVEMBER  30th.  R.  T.  1365.  V.  CHOSEN. 

1.  I  saw  V  first.  I  understood  it,  (superficially).  I  went  at  once 
to  J  ;  on  seeing  it  I  hesitated  a  moment.  J  did  not  satisfy  me.  I  had 
a  special  feeling  of  non-satisfaction,  but  not  of  disgust.  I  went  back 
to  V  and  took  it  quite  coolly,  without  pleasure,  and  without  explicit 
comparison  with  J.  I  took  it  deliberately,  being  more  content  to  take 
it.  I  had  no  feelings. 

DEC.  10th.  R.  T.  899.  J.  CHOSEN. 

2  I  saw  V  first.  I  made  no  appreciation  of  value.  I  then  saw  J. 
I  took  J  in  an  irresponsible  way  ;  when  I  had  the  glass  J  in  my  hand  I 
regretted  having  taken  it.  At  that  moment  V  became  conscious  to  me 
as  something  better,  which  I  had  lost.  This  regret  to  have  J,  came 
rather  from  the  fact  that  V  came  back  to  conscience  and  appeared  to 
me  better.  In  reality  J  is  unknown  to  me  from  the  point  of  view  of 
pleasantness  or  disagreeableness  I  don't  think  it  came  '  positively' 
into  that  regret...  V  was  not  conscious  as  being  pleasant,  but  as  being 
more  known,  more  intimate  ! 

DEC.  13'h.  R.  T.  597.  V.  CHOSEN. 

3.  Something  novel  this  time.  I  saw  V  first.  I  understood  it  but 
superficially.  I  then  saw  and  examined  J.  I  wished  to  take  J.  I 
was  so  near  reacting  that  I  saw  a  spark  at  the  contact.  I  '  put  back' 


o  o  o 

-*-  —  -- 

the  button  The  thought  came  to  me,  «  The  other  is  not  so  bad  »  I 
took  V  rapidly,  and  drank  it.  I  reacted  just  as  if  I  had  found 
something  excellent.  V  came  to  me  as  well-known,  not  as  agreeable. 

JAN.  18th.  R.  T.  2215.  J.  CHOSEN. 

4.  A  hesitation  so  strong  that  I  could  not  get  out  of  it.    I  saw  the 
two  words  at  least  four  times  successively.    There  was  no  discussion ; 
one  is  in  too  great  a  hurry  !    If  in  the  beginning  one  were  resolved  to 
weigh  the  values  it  would  go  quicker.    Now  we  fuss  about,  to  see 
which  of  the  two  is  going  to  attract  us.     It  was  «  un  veritable  tatonne- 
ment ».    I  chose  J.    At  the  moment  of  the  choice  I  had  the  idea  that 
J  was  better.    Hardly  had  I  taken  the  glass  into  my  hand  when  I  was 
convinced  that  I  was  deceived.     I  repented  of  having  taken  it — of 
having  been  deceived.    I  don't  know  why  I  should  have  preferred  to 
have  taken  the  other.    I  had  to  drink  J  with  very  great  repugnance — 
a  repugnance  which  was  suggested  by  that  regret  to  have  taken  it. 

JAN.  24th.  R.  T.  2175.  V.  CHOSEN. 

5.  A  hesitation  such  as  I  never  had,  as  far  as  1  remember.    In  the 
L  -C  choice  I  found  a  difference  with  respect  to  familiarity.    Here  I 
found  no  difference  whatever  ;  there  was  absolutely  no  reason  which 
pleaded  for  one  or  the  other.    Then  I  swore,  with  a  gesture  of  discon- 
tent.   I  recalled  the  duty  I  was  under,  of  choosing.    I  took  V— and 
drank  it  slowly.     During  my  hesitation  I  did  not  pass  from  one  to  the 
other,  but  hung  anxiously  between  the  two.    I  had  a  feeling  of  dis- 
content. 

JAN.  30th.  R.  T.  1404.  V.  CHOSEN. 

6.  A  strange  business !     I  saw  the  two  words  about  the  same  time — 
then,  successively,  saw  V  and  J.    I  feel,  to-day,  more  under  the  duty  of 
reacting  rapidly.    I  felt  three  or  four  movements  in  my  arm  to  take  J, 
but  my  finger  rested  still  on  the  button.    I  took  V  without  any  con- 
scious reason  for  taking  it.    I  drank  it  with  caution. 

FEB.  1st.  R.  T.  606.  J.  CHOSEN. 

7.  I  saw  first  V— then  J.    I  took  J.    It  was  not  a  choice.    I  hardly 
had  decided  to  take  it  when  the  movement  went.    I  regretted  to  have 
chosen  « tenement  a  la  legere.  »    I  did'nt  regret  to  |have  taken  J— but 
to  have  reacted  so,  i.  e.,  to  have  chosen  automatically,  without  any 
motive. 


—    223    — 

FEB.  8th.  R.  T.  510.  V.  CHOSEN. 

8.  Saw  J.  then  V.  Had  feeling  of  tendency  to  take  one  or  the 
other.  I  was  not  decided  for  one  or  the  other.  I  began  then  to  fiddle 
about  (un  tatonnement),  and  having  passed  three  times  from  J  to  V, 
got  out  of  this  oscillation,  in  despair.  I  took  V,  without  any  conscious 
reason  for  taking  it.  I  could  just  as  well  have  taken  J  !! 

B.    THE  J-B  CHOICES  OF  82. 

Nov.  29th.  R.  T.  725.  J.  CHOSEN. 

1.  I  first  saw  B.    There  was  no  judgment  of  value.    I  went  imme- 
diately to  J  and  took  it,  though  not  conscious  that  J  was  better  than 
B.    I  thought  I  took  it  by  habit,  (as  yesterday).    There  were  no  judg- 
ments of  value,  or  associations ;  no  feeling  of  pleasure  on  seeing  J-, 
though  it  was  recognised  as  real.    There  was  no  motivation ;  I  recogn- 
ised them,  and  went  automatically  to  the  one  at  the  left. 

DEC.  5th.  R.  T.  1712.  B.  CHOSEN. 

2.  I  was  distracted  on  account  of  irregularity  of  the  signal.    A 
veritable  oscillation  (B,  J,  B,  J),  began.    The  second  time  I  saw  J,  I 
reflected  on  its  value,  and  I  refused  it.    Then  I  took  B,  finding  B  less 
bad.    There  was  no  feeling  of  pleasure  in  taking  it.    All  went  slowly. 
I  took  the  glass  with  a  kind  of  hesitation.     It  was  a  veritable  choice. 
I  truly  refused  J  as  it  was  not  worth  much. 

DEC.  14*h.  R.  T.  1270.  B.  CHOSEN. 

3.  I  saw  B  first,  pretty  superficially.    Then  J,  which  I  examined,  or 
rather  on  which  I  rested.    I  half  released  the  button.    I  pressed  back 
the  button  and  saw  B  again,  which  I  preferred  to  J.     I  took  and  drank 
it.    It  came  immediately  to  conscience  after  the  reaction  that  that  way 
of  reacting  happened  once  before  and  (as  I  think)  for  the  same  words  ! 

There  were  no  feelings  of  pleasure  or  disgust.  At  first  I  was  going 
to  take  J,  my  attention  had  been  especially  carried  to  it.  I  had  nothing 
against  it ;  I  had  no  repugnance  for  J. 

DEC.  15th.  R.  T.  877.  B.  CHOSEN. 

4.  I  saw  B,  at  right,  very  quickly  (superficially);  then  J,  which  I 
chose.    But  when  half  way  on  my  movement,  my  hand  went  towards 
B,  because  J  did  not  seem  to  me  to  be  good.    In  the  beginning  of  the 


—    224    — 

experiments  the  preference  was  mentally  for  J.  That  preference  was 
not  based  on  any  reason.  In  the  act  of  taking  J,  it  seemed  less  good, 
or  not-good.  There  was  no  comparison  with  B. 

JAN.  26th.  R.  T.  1642  B.  CHOSEN. 

5.  I  saw  in  turn,  B,  J,  B,  J,  B,  J,  and  could  not  arrive  at  a  decis- 
ion.   Then  I  preferred  B  without  really  knowing  the  reason.    B  is 
more  familiar.    J  is  more  or  less  unknown.    When  I  drink  B,  I 
believe  that  I  would  prefer  to  drink  J.    All  the  same,  B  would  draw 
me  again  before  J,  as  being  more  familiar. 

JAN.  31st.  R.  T.  1152.  B  CHOSEN. 

6.  I  saw  in  turn  B,  J,  B,  J,  then  I  took  B.    A.  sentiment  of  Duty 
was  conscious.    The  Duty  was  to  take  one  of  the  two.    I  recalled 
having  had  some  difficulty  in  choosing  before.    I  took  B,  as  it  seemed 
the  more  familiar.    When  I  drank  it  I  was  astonished  at  finding  it  an 
acid.    I  was  determined,  in  the  choice,  by  the  word  itself,  without 
seeking  the  value  of  the  taste. 

FEB.  6th.  R.  T.  1006.  J  CHOSEN. 

7.  I  saw  rapidly  each  word  twice.    I  was  distracted.    Then  I  felt 
a  shock  in  my  arm,  tending  towards  it.    I  did  not  free  the  button. 
There  were  two  movements  in  my  arm,  to  react,  and  to  take  the  glass. 
Then  I  took  J  without  knowing  why— automatically.    I  did  not  take 
a  deliberately  reasoned  decision. 

FEB.  10th.  R.  T.  809.  B  CHOSEN. 

8.  «  I  saw  B  first,  superficially,  then  J.    I  recalled  the  difficulty  I 
always  have  of  choosing  between  the  two.    I  took  B  immediately  at 
the  right.    The  word  B  seems  to  me  more  familiar. 

C.  THE  Z— K  CHOICES  OF  S*. 

DEC.  3rd.  R.  T.  860.  Z  CHOSEN. 

1 .  I  saw  K  first,  and  was  conscious  that  it  was  good ;  at  the  same 
time,  of  the  degree  of  goodness.  It  was  of  moderate,  positive  value. 
It  appeared  to  me  as  best.  Then  there  was  a  short  void,  or  rather  a 
very  slight  hesitation,  then  immediately  the  consciousness  that  Z  is 
better^  There  •vnere  no  words,  but  I  was  conscious  in  some  way. 
Immediately,  I  took  Z  and  drank  it,  automatically. 


—   225   — 

DEC.  7th.  R.  T.  687.  Z  CHOSEN. 

2.  I  saw  first  Z  passing,  and  had  immediate  consciousness  « this  », 
with  signification,  «  it's  this  one  ».    There  was  no  other  phenomenon. 
Then  I  looked  at  K.    I  was,  perhaps,  astonished,  and  conscious,  « it's 
a  good  one  too  »,  but  at  the  same  time  I  perceived  it  as  not  so  good  as 
the  first.    That  comparison  was  not  given  in  a  separate  act,  but  was 
given  in  the  perception  of  the  word  itself,  it  appeared  as  not  so  good 
as  the  other.    I  came  back  to  Z  and  had  consciousness  like,  « that's 
right ».    I  took  and  drank  it,  automatically. 

DEC.  12th.  R.  T.  682.  Z  CHOSEN. 

3.  I  saw  Z  first  and  had  a  certain  impression  of  value,  it  appeared 
as  good,  even  as  very  good.    I  had  that  internal  «Yes»,  which  signifies, 
«  It's  possible  ».    Then  there  was  a  slight  inhibition.    I  looked  at  K, 
and  had  consciousness  of  value  too— or  rather  an  impression  of  value. 
It  appeared  as  good,  but  as  having,  at  the  same  time,  a  less  degree  of 
goodness  than  Z.    That  appeared  directly.    A  moment  after  I  knew 
that '  It  was  Z\  meaning '  Z  is  the  thing '.    There  %was  no  consciousness 
of  Duty. 

DEC.  19th.  R.  T.  457.  Z  CHOSEN. 

4.  I  saw  Z  first,  then  at  the  same  moment  had  a  feeling  of  pleasure 
and  the  consciousness,  «  It's  this  ».    Then  I  looked  at  K,  but  I  believe 
I  reached  it  before  K  became  clearly  conscious.    Then  I  experienced  a 
feeling  of  astonishment,  with  the  consciousness  «  Oh !  it's  a  good  one 
too.  » 

FEB.  3'~d.  R.  T.  482.  Z  CHOSEN. 

5.  Prepared  to  take  tho  best  as  quickly  as  possible.    Read  first  Z 
and  immediately  thought;  «  Oh !  yes!    I  may  do  with  this  what  I 
thought  of,  just  now*.    I  was  conscious  that  I  had  a  right  to  do  so. 
I  knew  I  had  no  more  need  to  look  at  the  other.    After  that  I  looked 
at  K,  I  was  slightly  astonished  to  see  K,  which  appeared  as  good. 

FEB.  9tl>.  R.  T.  432.  Z  CHOSEN. 

6.  I  read  Z  first— it  grew  clear  in  consciousness,  and  at  the  same 
time  I  had  an  auditive  representation  of  K.    Immediately  when  Z 
became  clear  it  was  accompanied  by  an  internal  «  yes !  »  which  meant, 
«  It's  this  without  doubt ». 


i5 


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